Jerry Walker v. State of Mississippi ( 1994 )


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  •                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 94-CA-00705-SCT
    JERRY WALKER
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                               06/01/94
    TRIAL JUDGE:                                    HON. MELVIN KEITH STARRETT
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                      LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                         PRO SE
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:                         OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: WAYNE SNUGGS
    BY: PAT S. FLYNN
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                              DUNN LAMPTON
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                             CIVIL - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
    DISPOSITION:                                    AFFIRMED - 11/20/97
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:                     05/01/96
    MANDATE ISSUED:                                 12/1/97
    EN BANC.
    PITTMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
    INTRODUCTION
    ¶1. Motion for Rehearing granted. The original opinions in this case are withdrawn and this opinion
    affirming the trial court is substituted therefor.
    ¶2. Jerry Walker appeals the denial without evidentiary hearing of his motion for post-conviction
    relief in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County. Walker's motion alleged (among other things) that his
    guilty plea to a charge of armed robbery had been entered involuntarily. Prior to filing his motion for
    post-conviction relief, Walker made two requests for the transcript of his plea hearing, which were
    denied by the trial court. Although Walker did not raise this issue on appeal to this Court, we briefly
    address this issue to express this Court's opinion that the trial court was correct in its denial of
    Walker's request for a free copy of his plea transcript. Pursuant to our holding in Fleming v. State,
    
    553 So. 2d 505
     (Miss. 1989) (holding that petitioner did not show a specific need nor that the
    documents sought were necessary to decide a specific issue; and therefore, he was not entitled to the
    documents free of charge), we find that Walker did not demonstrate sufficient need to entitle him to a
    free copy of his plea transcript.
    ¶3. On appeal, Walker raises the sole issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding that Walker
    failed to offer any evidence to substantiate his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we hold that
    the trial court was correct in denying his motion for post-conviction relief. We affirm the holding of
    the trial court.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶4. On January 13, 1992, Jerry Walker was indicted in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County on one
    count of armed robbery and one count of aggravated assault. Walker pled guilty to the charge of
    armed robbery (the charge of aggravated assault was dismissed on January 22, 1992, pursuant to an
    order of nolle prosequi), and was sentenced on January 30, 1992, to eight years in prison without
    parole. In February 5, 1994, Walker filed a Motion for Plea Transcript and affidavit of poverty. On
    February 9, 1994, the court denied Walker's motion, stating that "the plea transcript has not been
    transcribed and is not part of the file and that no showing of need for same has been shown." On May
    7, 1994, Walker filed another request for his plea transcript and other documents. The record
    contains no ruling on the second transcript request. But Walker never received his transcript leading
    one to assume it was denied.
    ¶5. On May 21, 1994, Walker filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the circuit court, asserting
    that (1) his plea was involuntary, and entered without understanding of the charge and consequences
    of a plea; and (2) he was not advised of the minimum and maximum sentences for the charges against
    him. Walker asserted that he would not have pled guilty had he known of the three-year mandatory
    minimum sentence for armed robbery. He requested an evidentiary hearing and that the court grant
    him parole or early release. The trial court found that Walker was not entitled to any relief, and
    denied the motion without hearing by order dated June 18, 1994. It is from the denial of this motion
    that Walker appeals to this Court raising the following issue:
    WHETHER PETITIONER WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
    AS GUARANTEED BY THE 6TH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
    CONSTITUTION.
    ¶6. Finding the issues raised by Walker in his motion for post-conviction relief to be without merit
    coupled with the fact that the issues raised in the trial court are not before this Court on appeal, we
    therefore lack jurisdiction to address these issues. The only issue now before this Court as discussed
    supra, is one of ineffective assistance of counsel.
    ANALYSIS
    ¶7. Walker argues ineffective assistance of counsel. He alleges that his attorney only visited him once
    prior to entry of his guilty plea thus denying him effective assistance of counsel. Walker further states
    that his attorney's failure to do any investigative work prejudiced him, and caused him to plead guilty.
    Walker says that his attorney's advising him that he faced a thirty-year sentence if convicted was
    encouraging him to "cop out," and he perceived same as a threat. He alleges that his attorney's advice
    resulted in his "being intimidated to the point that he would take any plea offer that involved a more
    merciful sentence." Finally, Walker asserts that his attorney's actions forced a denial of his
    constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him.
    ¶8. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show (1) deficiency of
    counsel's performance (2) sufficient to constitute prejudice to the defense. Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984); Moody v. State, 
    644 So. 2d 451
    , 456 (Miss. 1994). The
    burden of proving that both prongs of Strickland have been met is on the defendant who faces a
    "rebuttable presumption that counsel's performance falls within the broad spectrum of reasonable
    professional assistance." Moody, 644 So. 2d at 456; McQuarter v. State, 
    574 So. 2d 685
    , 687 (Miss.
    1990). The Strickland test "'applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of
    counsel.'" Brooks v. State, 
    573 So. 2d 1350
    , 1353 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Leatherwood v. State, 
    539 So. 2d 1378
    , 1381 (Miss. 1989)).
    ¶9. Walker offers no substantiation of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He simply asserts
    that his attorney devoted an inadequate amount of time to his case, and that his attorney "threatened"
    him with a harsh sentence if he did not plead guilty. This Court notes, however, that the fact that his
    attorney conferred with him only once does not, in and of itself, establish ineffective assistance of
    counsel. See Harveston v. State, 
    597 So. 2d 641
    , 642 (Miss. 1992)(Court rejects ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims where attorney conferred with defendant for only one hour and fifteen
    minutes prior to guilty plea; "Harveston's complaints of ineffective assistance of counsel, because his
    attorney failed to make pretrial investigation and to spend more time with him, are insufficient as a
    matter of law"). Moreover, this Court notes that Walker ultimately received an 8-year sentence when
    facing a possible 30-year sentence. We do not regard this result as indicative of a valid claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel.
    ¶10. In the affidavit filed with his motion for post-conviction relief, Walker states, "[t]he identified
    person or persons, admitted to committing the crime, also stated, I the third party was not involved."
    Presumably, this is an assertion that someone else admitted to committing the crime, and also stated
    that Walker was not a participant in the crime. However, Walker makes no assertion that he advised
    his attorney of this information, nor does his attempt to substantiate the above statement with the
    affidavit of the speaker or anyone else who might confirm the statement. In sum, Walker offers no
    evidence whatsoever that his attorney's performance was deficient. To merit an evidentiary hearing
    on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant's allegations of counsel's performance
    must raise "sufficient questions of fact on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel." Washington
    v. State, 
    620 So. 2d 966
    , 970 (Miss. 1993); see also Alexander v. State, 
    605 So. 2d 1170
    , 1173
    (Miss. 1992). Furthermore, this Court has stated that an argument for ineffective assistance of
    counsel is strengthened by not informing the defendant of the maximum sentence he faces. Vittitoe v.
    State, 
    556 So. 2d 1062
    , 1065 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court
    Practice, Rule 3. 03). Any failure to inform the defendant of the maximum possible sentence is not
    relevant in the case sub judice.
    ¶11. Therefore, we hold that Walker has failed to raise sufficient questions of fact on the issue of
    ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, he is not entitled to relief on this issue.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12. Walker fails to offer any evidence to substantiate his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel;
    therefore, this assignment of error is without merit. Consistent with this Court's previous decisions
    regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the ruling of the Circuit Court of Lincoln County is
    affirmed.
    ¶13. LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AFFIRMED.
    LEE, C.J., PRATHER AND SULLIVAN, P.JJ., BANKS, ROBERTS, SMITH AND MILLS,
    JJ., CONCUR. McRAE, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.