Joshua Williams v. State of Mississippi ( 2017 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2016-CP-00382-COA
    JOSHUA WILLIAMS A/K/A JOSHUA DEVON                                          APPELLANT
    WILLIAMS A/K/A JOSHUA D. WILLIAMS
    A/K/A JOSH WILLIAMS
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI                                                          APPELLEE
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                          07/08/2015
    TRIAL JUDGE:                               HON. ANTHONY ALAN MOZINGO
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                 JEFFERSON DAVIS COUNTY CIRCUIT
    COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                    JOSHUA WILLIAMS (PRO SE)
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                     OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                        CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
    TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:                   DENIED APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR
    POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
    DISPOSITION:                               AFFIRMED - 02/28/2017
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    EN BANC.
    CARLTON, J., FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.    Joshua Williams appeals the Jefferson Davis County Circuit Court’s denial of his
    petition for postconviction relief (PCR). On appeal, Williams asserts the following issues:
    (1) whether he was competent to enter valid guilty pleas; (2) whether he was denied effective
    assistance of counsel; and (3) whether he was unlawfully convicted of manslaughter.
    Finding no error, we affirm.
    FACTS
    ¶2.    On March 14, 2012, a Jefferson Davis County grand jury indicted Williams and his
    two co-indictees for one count of capital murder. See 
    Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19
    (2)(e) (Rev.
    2006). At the plea hearing on July 23, 2013, the State moved to reduce Williams’s capital-
    murder charge to manslaughter and armed robbery. See 
    Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-35
     (Rev.
    2006); 
    Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-79
     (Rev. 2006). Following a plea colloquy at the July 23,
    2013 hearing, the circuit court accepted Williams’s guilty pleas to the armed-robbery and
    manslaughter charges. The circuit court subsequently sentenced Williams to twenty years
    for the manslaughter conviction and a consecutive ten-year term for the armed-robbery
    conviction, with both sentences to be served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of
    Corrections.
    ¶3.    Williams filed an unsuccessful motion to reconsider his sentences. He then filed a
    PCR petition and an amendment of his PCR claims, in which he asserted several additional
    assignments of error. After reviewing Williams’s PCR petition, as well as “all files, records,
    transcripts, and correspondence pertaining to the judgment under attack[,]” the circuit court
    filed an order on July 14, 2015, denying Williams’s PCR petition and finding no merit to
    each of his asserted claims. Aggrieved by the circuit court’s judgment, Williams appeals.1
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶4.    “When reviewing a circuit court’s denial or dismissal of a PCR motion, we will
    reverse the judgment of the circuit court only if its factual findings are clearly erroneous;
    1
    After finding that Williams failed to timely receive a copy of the order denying his
    PCR petition, the circuit court granted Williams’s motion for permission to file an out-of-
    time appeal.
    2
    however, we review the circuit court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard of
    review.” Boyd v. State, 
    65 So. 3d 358
    , 360 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Whether Williams was competent to enter valid guilty pleas.
    ¶5.    Williams asserts that the circuit court erred by not conducting a hearing to determine
    whether he was competent at the time he entered his guilty pleas. He further claims that, due
    to a history of mental-health issues, his guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily, knowingly,
    and intelligently.
    A.      Competency
    ¶6.    Under certain circumstances, a trial court should order a competency hearing:
    If before or during trial the court, of its own motion or upon motion of an
    attorney, has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent
    to stand trial, the court shall order the defendant to submit to a mental
    examination by some competent psychiatrist selected by the court . . . .
    After the examination[,] the court shall conduct a hearing to determine if the
    defendant is competent to stand trial. After hearing all the evidence, the court
    shall weigh the evidence and make a determination of whether the defendant
    is competent to stand trial. If the court finds that the defendant is competent
    to stand trial, then the court shall make the finding a matter of record[,] and the
    case will then proceed to trial.
    URCCC 9.06.
    ¶7.    This Court has previously explained:
    Though geared toward[] competency to stand trial, Rule 9.06 may be applied
    to a defendant’s entry of a guilty plea. The standard of competency necessary
    to enter a plea of guilty is the same as that for determining competency to stand
    trial. The key phrase in assessing a trial court’s responsibility to order a
    competency hearing is that a reasonable ground exist.
    3
    The determination of what is reasonable rests largely within the
    discretion of the trial judge because the judge sees the evidence
    first hand and observes the demeanor and behavior of the
    defendant. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals suggested the
    following test for reviewing a decision to forego a competency
    hearing: did the trial judge receive information which,
    objectively considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt
    about the defendant’s competence and alerted him to the
    possibility that the defendant could neither understand the
    proceedings, appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his
    attorney in his defense?
    Smith v. State, 
    831 So. 2d 590
    , 593 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (internal citations and
    quotation marks omitted). We uphold the factual findings a trial court makes at the time a
    defendant enters his guilty plea unless the court’s findings are clearly erroneous. 
    Id. at 594
    (¶13).
    ¶8.      During his plea hearing, Williams offered no evidence to show he was incompetent
    to enter his guilty pleas. Instead, when the circuit court asked whether he was under the
    influence of drugs or alcohol, or whether he had any emotional or physical problems that
    would prevent him from participating in the hearing, Williams answered negatively while
    under oath. In addition, the record reflects that the circuit court repeatedly asked questions
    to determine whether Williams understood the consequences of pleading guilty to the crimes
    charged and whether Williams was doing so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The
    record also reflects that, by signing his plea petition, Williams acknowledged under oath that
    his physical health and mental health were “presently satisfactory” and that he was “not
    under the influence of any drugs or intoxicants.” Furthermore, along with Williams’s plea
    petition, Williams’s attorney submitted a signed certificate stating that, after fully discussing
    4
    the case with Williams, she was satisfied that Williams was competent and had no condition
    that affected his ability to understand the guilty-plea proceedings.
    ¶9.    As an exhibit to his PCR petition, Williams attached a copy of medical records from
    2004, which indicated that Williams had received treatment when he was fifteen years old
    for mental-health problems.2 However, nothing in the attached medical records from 2004
    indicated that Williams lacked the competency at the time of his plea hearing years later on
    July 23, 2013, to enter valid guilty pleas.3 Furthermore, as previously discussed, the record
    as a whole fails to show that Williams ever raised the issue of his competency with the circuit
    court or presented any evidence to the circuit court to demonstrate incompetence. As the
    movant, Williams bore the burden of proof to show that he lacked the competency to enter
    his guilty pleas. See Vanwey v. State, 
    55 So. 3d 1133
    , 1136 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).
    Because Williams failed to meet his burden of proof, we find no support for Williams’s claim
    that the circuit court erred by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing. See id.;
    2
    According to the medical records, information at the time of Williams’s hospital
    admission revealed that he had experienced auditory hallucinations and paranoia, suicidal
    thoughts, social withdrawal, sadness, irritability, a decrease in self-esteem, and a past history
    of trying to harm himself and others. At the time of discharge, the psychiatrist evaluating
    Williams diagnosed him with schizoaffective disorder (depressed type) and conduct disorder
    and determined that Williams had severe psychological stressors in his life. The psychiatrist
    recommended that Williams receive follow-up care, including psychiatric management, case
    management, and individual and group therapy. The psychiatrist also noted that, at the time
    of his discharge, Williams was “without plans of harming himself or others or features of
    psychosis.” With continued outpatient care and therapy, the psychiatrist determined
    Williams’s prognosis to be fair.
    3
    See Smith, 831 So. 2d at 594 (¶¶13-14) (finding that, although the defendant had a
    history of mental-health problems and took antipsychotic medication, he failed to offer
    sufficient evidence to demonstrate he lacked competency at the time of the plea hearing).
    
    5 Smith, 831
     So. 2d at 594 (¶¶13-14). Accordingly, this argument lacks merit.
    B.     Voluntariness of the Pleas
    ¶10.   We likewise find no merit to Williams’s assertion that his pleas were not voluntary,
    knowing, and intelligent. Our caselaw clearly establishes that Williams bore “the burden of
    proving by a preponderance of [the] evidence that [his] guilty plea[s] [were] involuntary.”
    Timmons v. State, 
    176 So. 3d 168
    , 171-72 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (citations omitted). “A
    plea is considered voluntary when the defendant knows what the elements are of the charge
    against him[,] including an understanding of the charge and its relation to him, what effect
    the plea will have, and what the possible sentence might be because of his plea.” Montalto
    v. State, 
    119 So. 3d 1087
    , 1095 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted).
    ¶11.   Williams claims on appeal that his prior mental-health issues rendered his guilty pleas
    involuntary. However, the plea-hearing transcript reflects Williams’s statements under oath
    in open court that he voluntarily wished to change his pleas to guilty; he understood the
    consequences of waiving his constitutional rights and pleading guilty; he was not presently
    under the influence of drugs or alcohol; and he had no emotional or physical problems that
    would prevent him from participating in the hearing. See 
    id. at 1096
     (¶18) (recognizing that
    statements made under oath in open court carry a strong presumption of truthfulness). In
    addition, Williams acknowledged during the plea hearing that he had not been coerced,
    threatened, or promised anything to induce him to change his pleas; he had fully discussed
    with his attorney the charges he faced; and he understood the minimum and maximum
    sentences associated with the charges against him.
    6
    ¶12.   Moreover, the medical records that Williams provides from 2004 fail to present
    evidence to impact Williams’s competency at his plea hearing in 2013 or his ability in 2013
    to enter voluntary, knowing, and intelligent guilty pleas. As already discussed, the movant
    bears the burden of proof to demonstrate the defendant’s lack of competency. Vanwey, 
    55 So. 3d at 1136
     (¶6). In the present case, Williams failed to meet his burden.
    ¶13.   Thus, based on our review of the record and applicable caselaw, we find no support
    for Williams’s assertion that his guilty pleas were not entered voluntarily, knowingly, and
    intelligently. We therefore find that this assignment of error lacks merit.
    II.    Whether Williams was denied effective assistance of counsel.
    ¶14.   Williams contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his
    attorney failed to (1) investigate his competency to enter his guilty pleas and (2) interview
    crucial witnesses in the case.
    ¶15.   To prove his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Williams must show that (1) his
    attorney’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficiency prejudiced his defense.
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984). The defendant bears the burden to
    prove both prongs of Strickland, and a strong presumption exists that an attorney’s conduct
    falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Smith v. State, 
    129 So. 3d 243
    , 246 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).
    ¶16.   This Court has previously explained:
    When applying the [Strickland] test to a guilty plea, [the defendant] must show
    that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would
    not have pleaded guilty, would have insisted on going to trial, and the outcome
    would have been different. Additionally, a defendant must plead claims of
    7
    ineffective assistance of counsel with specificity, and the claim must be
    supported by affidavits other than his own. When a movant fails to attach any
    supporting affidavits and relies solely on his own sworn motion, his
    ineffective-assistance claim must fail.
    Avery v. State, 
    179 So. 3d 1182
    , 1188-89 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (internal citations and
    quotation marks omitted).
    ¶17.   As support for his ineffective-assistance claim, Williams argues that his attorney knew
    about his history of mental-health issues but failed to investigate his competency and inform
    the circuit court that he was incompetent to enter a valid guilty plea. In addition, Williams
    claims that his attorney failed to interview crucial witnesses in his case. According to
    Williams, had his attorney properly investigated the case and interviewed these crucial
    witnesses, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Williams insists that
    he never would have withdrawn his “not guilty” plea but would have proceeded to trial.
    ¶18.   Upon review, we find that Williams’s allegations lack support. As previously
    discussed, Williams fails to provide any evidence to demonstrate that he lacked competency
    during the time period in which he committed the charged offenses, was indicted, and then
    entered his guilty pleas. Instead, Williams provides only his own bare assertions to support
    his claims. See 
    id. at 1189
     (¶13).
    ¶19.   In addition, as stated, the record reflects that Williams entered his guilty pleas under
    oath in open court. See Montalto, 
    119 So. 3d at 1096
     (¶18). In doing so, Williams
    acknowledged that his attorney had reviewed his guilty-plea petition with him, as well as the
    charges he faced and what the State had to prove for him to be found guilty of the crimes
    charged. Williams stated that he had no questions about his petition and that he understood
    8
    the charges against him and the rights he waived by pleading guilty. Moreover, the record
    reflects that, by signing his plea petition, Williams agreed that his attorney “had done all that
    anyone could do to counsel and assist” him and that he was “satisfied with the advice and
    help” that his attorney had provided.
    ¶20.      Williams bore the burden below to demonstrate that he lacked the competency to enter
    a valid guilty plea. See Vanwey, 
    55 So. 3d at 1136
     (¶6). On appeal, he also bears the burden
    to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief. See Smith, 
    129 So. 3d at 245
     (¶5). After reviewing the record and relevant caselaw, however, we find that
    Williams fails to meet his burden of proof on his ineffective-assistance claim. See
    Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 687
    . Williams has not sufficiently shown that his attorney’s
    “performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Avery, 179 So. 3d at 1190
    (¶16). Furthermore, “even assuming errors on his attorney’s part, [Williams fails to show
    that] the outcome would have been different had he proceeded to trial.” Id. We therefore
    find that this assignment of error lacks merit.
    III.   Whether Williams was unlawfully convicted of manslaughter.
    ¶21.      In addition to his other claims, Williams asserts that he “is actually and factually
    innocent” of the manslaughter charge. In discussing this issue, this Court has previously
    stated:
    Rule 8.04(A)(3) of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules
    provides that[,] before the trial court may accept a plea of guilty, the court
    must determine that the plea is voluntarily and intelligently made and that there
    is a factual basis for the plea. A sufficient factual basis requires an evidentiary
    foundation in the record [that] is sufficiently specific to allow the court to
    determine that the defendant’s conduct was within the ambit of that defined as
    9
    criminal. We review the entire record to discern whether a sufficient factual
    basis exists.
    Porter v. State, 
    126 So. 3d 68
    , 72 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (internal citations and
    quotation marks omitted).
    ¶22.   As already stated, we find that Williams voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
    entered his guilty pleas to the crimes charged. See 
    id.
     Furthermore, despite Williams’s claim
    of innocence, the record clearly reflects his statements under oath as to the following: he
    committed the crimes charged; the facts and allegations contained in the charges were true;
    and he was pleading guilty to the charges of his own free will. Because the record reflects
    that the circuit court possessed a sufficient factual basis to accept Williams’s guilty pleas, we
    find that this argument lacks merit. See id.
    ¶23. THE JUDGMENT OF THE JEFFERSON DAVIS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    DENYING THE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED.
    ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO JEFFERSON DAVIS
    COUNTY.
    LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, FAIR, WILSON,
    GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: NO. 2016-CP-00382-COA

Judges: Carlton, Lee, Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee, Fair, Wilson, Greenlee, Westbrooks

Filed Date: 2/28/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/2/2024