Quincy Fox v. State of Mississippi , 151 So. 3d 226 ( 2014 )


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  •        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2013-KA-01384-COA
    QUINCY FOX A/K/A QUINCY MONTRAY FOX                                     APPELLANT
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI                                                      APPELLEE
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                       08/08/2013
    TRIAL JUDGE:                            HON. LESTER F. WILLIAMSON JR.
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:              LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                 OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
    BY: BENJAMIN ALLEN SUBER
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                  OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                      BILBO MITCHELL
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                     CRIMINAL - FELONY
    TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION:                CONVICTED OF ONE COUNT OF ARMED
    CARJACKING, TWO COUNTS OF
    KIDNAPPING, AND ONE COUNT OF
    ARMED ROBBERY, AND SENTENCED, AS
    A HABITUAL OFFENDER, TO LIFE
    IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF
    THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS, ON EACH COUNT, WITH
    ALL LIFE SENTENCES TO RUN
    CONCURRENTLY TO ONE ANOTHER,
    BUT CONSECUTIVELY TO ANY
    PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED SENTENCES
    DISPOSITION:                            AFFIRMED - 11/04/2014
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE LEE, C.J., ROBERTS AND CARLTON, JJ.
    ROBERTS, J., FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.   Following his trial in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court, a jury convicted Quincy
    Fox of two counts of kidnapping, one count of armed carjacking, and one count of armed
    robbery. Fox was sentenced, as an habitual offender, to life imprisonment in the custody of
    the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) for each count, with his sentences to run
    concurrently to one another. Fox initially filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit
    court denied. Fox then filed a notice of appeal. However, over two weeks after filing a
    notice of appeal, Fox filed a second motion for a new trial with the circuit court. In it, he
    alleged that there was newly discovered evidence that Jessie Jones, a witness for the State
    and accomplice to the crimes, received a more lenient sentence than what he testified to at
    trial. The circuit court denied Fox’s second motion for a new trial, and Fox filed the present
    appeal. He asks this Court to determine whether the circuit court erred in denying his second
    motion for a new trial and whether the circuit court erred in allowing the State to introduce
    evidence of Fox’s other crimes. Finding no error, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2.      On August 2, 2012, Fox and his codefendant, Jones, were indicted jointly for the
    armed carjacking of Robin Rosenbaum, the kidnapping of Rosenbaum and Amanda Davis,
    and the armed robbery of Davis. Fox and Jones were also individually indicted, in counts
    five and six, for felon in possession of a firearm.1 Fox was also indicted as a habitual
    offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2007), which made
    him eligible for a life sentence if he was convicted of any of the charges in his indictment.2
    1
    While Fox and Jones were co-indictees, only Fox’s trial and present appeal are at
    issue.
    2
    Fox had previous convictions in Lauderdale County Circuit Court for armed robbery
    and simple robbery occurring at different times and involving different victims. He had
    2
    Fox elected to go to trial, and his trial was held in the circuit court on May 28-30, 2013. At
    the beginning of the first day of his trial, the State moved for a nolle prosequi on the count
    of felon in possession of a firearm, and the circuit court entered an order granting the motion.
    Also on the same day, the circuit court entered an agreed order granting Fox’s motion in
    limine to exclude any reference, in the jury’s presence, to Fox’s prior convictions or pending
    felony charges.
    ¶3.    The State called Davis to testify first.       According to her testimony, she and
    Rosenbaum were nurses who were teaching a class for the Rush Hospital Education
    Department on the night of January 10, 2012. As they were leaving the facility after 11 p.m.,
    they stood near Rosenbaum’s vehicle talking. Davis testified “[t]he next thing that happened
    was somebody came behind me, and there was a gun in . . . [Rosenbaum’s] face.” Davis
    explained that there were two men, one taller than the other, wearing blue jeans and hoodies,
    with the taller one holding the gun. Davis never saw any of the men’s facial features besides
    their eyes, because the hoodies covered their faces. Davis and Rosenbaum gave the men
    their purses and keys, because they wanted to avoid getting in the car with the men. Davis
    and Rosenbaum did not have any money in their purses, so Davis told the men she would get
    money from the ATM if they would let them leave.              Davis and Rosenbaum got in
    Rosenbaum’s car with the men after the gun was again pointed in their faces. Davis said that
    she was afraid the men would shoot them if they did not get in the vehicle. The men, with
    the shorter man driving Rosenbaum’s car, drove to a bank where Davis handed the taller
    served over five years in custody for each. On January 10, 2012, Fox was on a suspended
    sentence and probation for these prior violent felonies.
    3
    man, who was sitting with her in the back seat, her debit card and her PIN number. The taller
    man then handed the other man the gun, while he got out of the car to use the ATM. He was
    unsuccessful in withdrawing money, so he went back to get Davis out of the car too. Davis
    was able to withdraw $500, which was the maximum she could withdraw from the ATM per
    day. The bank’s surveillance video captured images as the withdrawal occurred. Davis
    further testified that “[t]he guy in the back seat with me was the one running the show.”
    After Davis withdrew the money, the two men took the money, and they stood outside of the
    car talking to one another while Davis and Rosenbaum were in the car. Davis said, “I looked
    down. [Rosenbaum] said something to me, and when I looked back, they were gone.” In
    addition to the $500, the men also took Davis’s cell phone and keys. Davis and Rosenbaum
    walked to a nearby gas station, where they were able to use another person’s cell phone to
    call the police.
    ¶4.    Rosenbaum also testified and corroborated much of Davis’s testimony. She added
    that when the women refused to get into the car with the men, the taller man with the gun,
    “racked that gun and put it in my face and told me B----, get in the car or I’ll shoot you.”
    And it was only at that point that the women agreed to get into the car. Additionally, both
    Rosenbaum and Davis identified a gun as one that looked like the one the taller man was
    holding at the time of crimes. Neither could definitively say it was the same. Rosenbaum
    also testified that after Davis gave them $500 from the ATM, the men talked and then told
    the women they could leave, which they did because the men still had the keys to the car.
    According to her testimony, both men were wearing ski masks with the hoodies pulled tight
    around their faces, and she was unable to see their faces. The taller man with the gun was
    4
    wearing a dark-colored ski mask, and the other man was wearing a tan-colored ski mask.
    ¶5.    Jones testified next for the State. According to his testimony, he and Fox were in the
    Family Dollar store parking lot a week later, on the evening of January 17, 2012, when
    Officer Patrick Gale of the Meridian Police Department, who testified to these events later
    at trial, pulled in the parking lot to talk with them. Officer Gale testified that when he pulled
    in to the parking lot, one of the men, later identified as Fox, dropped something to the
    ground. Officer Gale frisked Jones and Fox, and he discovered a gun in Fox’s coat pocket.
    At that point, both Jones and Fox ran from Officer Gale. Jones was apprehended, but Fox
    managed to escape. Fox was later apprehended by officers at an address given to them by
    Jones. Fox was the current boyfriend of Jones’s girlfriend’s daughter, whom Jones often
    referred to as his stepdaughter. Officers also questioned Jones about the incident that
    occurred on January 10, 2012, and Jones admitted that he and Fox were the ones responsible
    for the crimes. His testimony regarding the events that night were that he and Fox were
    walking when Fox saw Davis and Rosenbaum. Fox told Jones, “there [are] two ladies over
    there, I got to get them.” They put on the ski masks and approached the women. Jones
    testified that Fox had the gun and immediately told the women to get into the car, calling one
    of them a “B----.” Jones corroborated Davis’s and Rosenbaum’s testimony that they were
    taken to an ATM where Fox got out of the vehicle to get money from the ATM, but was
    unable to do so without Davis’s assistance. Jones testified that once Davis got the money
    from the ATM, Fox took the money and Davis’s cell phone. Jones also positively identified
    the gun Officer Gale recovered from Fox as the gun that was used on the night of January 10,
    2012, for the armed robbery, armed carjacking, and kidnappings.
    5
    ¶6.    Jones also informed the jury that his testimony was the truth and was consistent with
    the version of events he told police officers, but he was offered a deal from the State if he
    testified against Fox. He explained that he was offered, as part of a plea deal, forty years in
    the custody of the MDOC, with twenty years suspended. He believed he would serve twenty
    years with the first ten being served day-for-day, and then he believed he would be eligible
    for earned-time release on the other half. Additionally, he would be placed on five years of
    probation. On cross-examination, Jones acknowledged that he was a previously convicted
    felon and would receive life sentences if he went to trial and was convicted of any of the
    charges stemming from the crimes of January 10, 2012. He further acknowledged that part
    of his plea deal required that he testify truthfully and consistently with his previous
    statements or he would lose his plea deal. However, he denied that this was the reason he
    testified the way he did. Jones was also cross-examined on letters purportedly written by him
    while he was in jail; however, he denied ever writing the letters.
    ¶7.    On redirect examination by the State, Jones was asked why Fox was the first name
    that came to his head when he was being interrogated by the police. Jones responded:
    “Because when we got arrested, Detective Manning [(sic)] had brung [(sic)] his name up.
    Detective Manning said he [(Fox)] was on papers for two armed robbery charges.” Fox
    immediately requested a bench conference, following which the jury was excused to the jury
    room. Fox moved for a mistrial based upon Jones’s statement that Fox was “on papers for
    two armed robbery charges,” as it violated the judge’s order on the motion in limine not to
    make any reference to Fox’s prior or pending felony charges. The circuit court admonished
    Jones to refrain from any reference to Fox’s prior bad acts. The circuit court further noted
    6
    that it did not believe the testimony was intentional on the part of the State or Jones, and that
    Jones “felt like [he] was being responsive. . . . I don’t think the jury thought anything about
    it, given the tone of voice that was spoken.” Additionally, in overruling the motion for a
    mistrial, the circuit court said: “I don’t think it was prejudicial to the point where a mistrial
    is required. However, . . . I will admonish the jury to disregard any reference to any
    revocation or any other . . . papers . . . for two armed robberies.” He also gave Fox the option
    to decline giving the jury the instruction to disregard if he felt that it would emphasize it
    further, which Fox refused. The circuit court directed the jury to “totally disregard any
    reference to ‘papers’ as it refers to [Fox].” The jury was polled and unanimously affirmed
    that they could disregard the statement.
    ¶8.    As noted above, Officer Gale also testified for the State. He testified that he received
    a call from police dispatch to investigate two suspicious males in the parking lot of the
    Family Dollar store on Highway 45. According to him, when he approached the men in the
    parking lot on January 17, 2012, he saw Fox drop something. This item was later recovered
    by Officer Gale, and it was a ski mask and a “doo-rag.” The 9mm Smith and Wesson gun
    Officer Gale recovered from Fox’s coat pocket was introduced and entered into evidence
    during his testimony. Following Officer Gale’s testimony, the State rested its case-in-chief,
    and Fox moved for a directed verdict, specifically as to the armed-carjacking charge. The
    circuit court overruled Fox’s motion for a directed verdict.
    ¶9.    Fox called his first witness: August Fox, his sister. August testified that on January
    10, 2012, she drove Fox to Meridian for him to meet his girlfriend; she was with him the
    entire day at their mother’s house; and she also drove him home that same night. When
    7
    pressed by the State on cross-examination as to why she would be able to remember that day
    so clearly as opposed to other days, August stated she remembered that she was off work that
    day, spending time with her children, and “whatever me and my children do, I remember
    those days.” The State then asked when her next day off after January 10, 2012, was.
    August responded it was probably January 15, 2012, but it was just a guess.
    ¶10.   Fox called several other witnesses, all fellow inmates. Elton Fairley testified that he
    was in an adjoining zone to Jones and overheard Jones talking to Kenneth Jordan through a
    steel door separating the zones. Fairley testified he overheard Jones tell Jordan that he
    committed the crimes with someone named Wayne. Fairley also testified that he saw a letter
    Jones passed to Jordan through the side of the door that Jones was going to send an attorney.
    However, Fairley further explained that he could not see through the door to know it was
    Jones that passed the letter, but he could recognize his voice. Jacoby Pickett testified next.
    He stated he did not know Fox, even though they were in the same zone in the jail, but he
    knew Jones from outside of jail, and they would talk through the door separating the zones.
    According to Pickett, Jones told him he committed a crime that he also blamed on Fox, and
    Jones was planning on writing a letter to the State informing it that Fox was not involved.
    Next, Fox called Demarkeio Pritchett. Pritchett testified that he knew Fox and Jones, and
    that he was in the same zone as Fox. Pritchett said that Jones told him Fox was not with him
    at the time of the crimes and was not involved. Pritchett also testified that Jones showed him
    a letter he had written to recant his statement that Fox was involved. Pritchett never
    personally read any letter Jones sent through the door. On cross-examination, Pritchett
    testified that Jones told him he committed the crimes by himself. Lavon Tucker also
    8
    testified; however, his testimony was that he and Jones talked about his charges, but Jones
    never mentioned Fox. Fox voluntarily chose not to testify.
    ¶11.   The State called Jones on rebuttal. Jones testified that he did not know Fairley,
    Pickett, Pritchett, or Tucker. And he said he never had a conversation with any of them and
    denied sliding any letter through a door.
    ¶12.   After hearing all the testimony and evidence presented, the jury deliberated and
    returned a verdict finding Fox guilty on all counts. Prior to his sentencing, Fox filed a
    motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied on June 11, 2013. Fox was sentenced
    on August 8, 2013, as a habitual offender pursuant to section 99-19-83, to life in the custody
    of the MDOC on each of the four counts. Fox’s life sentences were ordered to run
    concurrently to one another, but consecutively to previously imposed sentences. The
    sentencing orders were filed on August 9, 2013. Fox filed his notice of appeal on August 13,
    2013, and the record was designated. Then, on August 29, 2013, Fox filed a second motion
    for a new trial. In it, he claimed that Jones’s testimony was instrumental in Fox’s conviction.
    Jones testified at trial that his sentence would be forty years, with twenty suspended, ten
    years to serve day-for-day, and eligibility for earned-release supervision after that, and Fox
    claims the sentence Jones actually received would subject Jones to no more than fifteen years
    of initial incarceration.3 Further, Fox claimed he was “never notified that [Jones’s] offer
    would change based on how well he testified for the State.” According to the motion, Fox
    3
    Attached to Fox’s second motion was a copy of Jones’s sworn guilty-plea petition
    filed on August 15, 2013. In it, Jones offered to plead guilty to armed robbery in an open
    or blind plea, with the State recommending a maximum, or “cap,” of fifteen years to initially
    serve, but the ultimate sentence would be decided by the circuit court.
    9
    was not provided a meaningful opportunity to confront Jones; the State committed discovery
    violations by failing to inform Fox of Jones’s sentencing change; and Fox was denied his
    right to a fair trial. The circuit court summarily denied Fox’s second motion for a new trial
    on August 29, 2013.
    ¶13.   On appeal, Fox raises two issues:
    I.     The [circuit] court erred in [denying Fox’s motion for a mistrial after]
    allowing the [State] to elicit evidence of crimes other than the crimes
    charged in the indictment.
    II.    The [circuit] court erred in denying Fox’s motion for a new trial based
    on the newly[]discovered reduced sentence of his alleged accomplice.
    ANALYSIS
    I.     ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS
    ¶14.   Fox first argues that the circuit court erred in failing to grant a mistrial when, in
    response to the State’s question as to why Fox’s name came up during interrogation, Jones
    testified that the police brought up Fox’s name because he was “on papers” for two other
    crimes. “Whether to grant a motion for a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial
    court. The standard of review for denial of a motion for [a] mistrial is abuse of discretion.”
    Gunn v. State, 
    56 So. 3d 568
    , 571 (¶14) (Miss. 2011) (quoting Caston v. State, 
    823 So. 2d 473
    , 492 (¶54) (Miss. 2002)).
    ¶15.   Prior to trial, the circuit court entered an agreed order granting Fox’s motion in limine
    to exclude references to any of Fox’s prior convictions or pending felony charges. The
    following dialogue took place during the State’s redirect of Jones:
    STATE:         Now, in response to one of Ms. McNair’s questions[,] she said
    did you implicate or say that Quincy Fox was with you, and that
    10
    was the first name that came to your head, and you agreed with
    her?
    JONES:         Yes, ma’am.
    STATE:         Why was that the first name that came to your head?
    JONES:         Because when we got arrested[,] Detective Manning [(sic)] had
    brung [(sic)] his name up. Detective Manning said he [(Fox)]
    was on papers for two armed robbery charges.
    Immediately, Fox requested a bench conference, the jury was excused, and Fox moved for
    a mistrial for the violation of the motion in limine ruling. In denying the motion for a
    mistrial, the circuit court stated:
    [W]hat we are dealing with here is somebody [(Jones)] that you have proven
    quite clear has been totally immersed in the criminal justice system since 1990,
    and here we are in 2013. . . . I don’t believe what I heard was an intentional
    thing. I think it was something that he felt like was being responsive. . . . I
    don’t think the jury thought anything about it given the tone of voice that was
    spoken.
    I understand the motion; however, I don’t think it was prejudicial to the point
    where a mistrial is required.
    The circuit court instructed the lay witness, Jones, to avoid any other mention of Fox’s prior
    convictions or pending felony charges. The circuit court also admonished the jury “to totally
    disregard any reference to ‘papers’ as it refers to [Fox].” The jury was polled, and each juror
    affirmed he or she could disregard the statement.
    ¶16.   As we found in Hancock v. State, 
    964 So. 2d 1167
    , 1179 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)
    (quoting Hobson v. State, 
    730 So. 2d 20
    , 24 (¶10) (Miss. 1998), “[w]here the witness refers
    briefly to another crime, and the testimony was not purposely elicited by the district attorney
    to prove the defendant's character, no reversible error occurs.” A “trial judge should declare
    11
    a mistrial when a procedural error results in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the
    accused.” Pittman v. State, 
    928 So. 2d 244
    , 249 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Gardner
    v. State, 
    792 So. 2d 1000
    , 1003 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)). “When serious damage does not
    result, the judge should admonish the jury to disregard the impropriety.” 
    Id.
     at (¶12) (citing
    Hoops v. State, 
    681 So. 2d 521
    , 528 (Miss. 1996)). And “[i]t is presumed that the jury
    followed the instruction of the trial judge to disregard the remark.” 
    Id.
     (citing Dennis v.
    State, 
    555 So. 2d 679
    , 682-83 (Miss. 1989)).
    ¶17.   Jones’s singular and brief reference to Fox’s criminal record was not the result of the
    State’s attempt to elicit evidence excluded by the motion in limine. The circuit court then
    instructed the jury to disregard the statement, which the jury agreed it could and would do.
    We do not see that Fox was seriously damaged by the statement, or that some substantial or
    irreparable prejudice occurred. Our analysis of the record before us provides no evidence
    that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Fox’s motion for a mistrial.
    ¶18.   This issue is without merit.
    II.    DENIAL OF FOX’S SECOND MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
    ¶19.   Fox next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his second motion for a new
    trial based on the alleged change in Jones’s sentence from what he testified to at trial. Fox
    filed his first motion for a new trial on June 10, 2013. The circuit court denied this motion
    on June 11, 2013. Fox was then sentenced on August 8, 2013, and he filed his notice of
    appeal on August 13, 2013. Fox did not filed his second motion for a new trial until August
    29, 2013, which was after the date he filed his notice of appeal. It is well settled that “the
    filing of the notice of appeal perfected the appeal and divested the lower court of
    12
    jurisdiction.” Estes v. State, 
    782 So. 2d 1244
    , 1248 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Martin
    v. State, 
    732 So. 2d 847
    , 851 (Miss. 1998)). Because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to
    consider Fox’s second motion for a new trial, we also lack jurisdiction to consider the
    motion.
    ¶20. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY
    OF CONVICTION OF ONE COUNT OF ARMED CARJACKING, TWO COUNTS
    OF KIDNAPPING, AND ONE COUNT OF ARMED ROBBERY AND SENTENCE
    AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT ON EACH COUNT,
    WITH ALL SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY TO ONE ANOTHER AND
    CONSECUTIVELY TO PREVIOUSLY IMPOSED SENTENCES, IS AFFIRMED.
    ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LAUDERDALE COUNTY.
    LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON,
    MAXWELL, FAIR AND JAMES, JJ., CONCUR.
    13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2013-KA-01384-COA

Citation Numbers: 151 So. 3d 226

Filed Date: 11/4/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023