David Brett Middleton v. State of Mississippi ( 2019 )


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  •         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
    NO. 2016-KA-01295-COA
    DAVID BRETT MIDDLETON A/K/A DAVID B.                                        APPELLANT
    MIDDLETON A/K/A DAVID MIDDLETON
    v.
    STATE OF MISSISSIPPI                                                          APPELLEE
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                          08/26/2016
    TRIAL JUDGE:                               HON. LINDA F. COLEMAN
    COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                 COAHOMA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                    MARK KEVIN HORAN
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:                     OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
    BY: KATY TAYLOR GERBER
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY:                         BRENDA FAY MITCHELL
    NATURE OF THE CASE:                        CRIMINAL - FELONY
    DISPOSITION:                               AFFIRMED - 01/22/2019
    MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
    MANDATE ISSUED:
    BEFORE GRIFFIS, C.J., BARNES AND CARLTON, P.JJ.
    BARNES, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
    ¶1.    David Brett Middleton was convicted of aggravated assault by a Coahoma County
    jury and sentenced to ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections,
    with five years suspended and five years of post-release supervision. On appeal, Middleton
    claims the trial court erred in allowing a law-enforcement officer’s “duty tape” to be played
    to the jury because the tape contained a racial slur. Additionally, he argues his motion for
    a directed verdict should have been granted because there was no evidence presented that
    the action of driving a motor vehicle in a parking lot constituted a means likely to produce
    serious bodily injury. We find both issues without merit and affirm.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    ¶2.    On the afternoon of February 11, 2015, Larry Brown, a fifty-six-year-old homeless
    African-American male, was struck by a GMC Sierra pickup truck driven by Middleton, a
    white male. The incident occurred in an empty parking lot in Clarksdale, Mississippi. The
    parking lot was in front of a vacant building that was previously a grocery store. Middleton,
    a local businessman and realtor, leased commercial space in the Executive Plaza, which was
    across the street. Dave Houston, who could view the parking lot from his barbershop across
    the street, testified that Brown had been living outside the entrance to the vacant building
    for at least a year. On the day of the incident, Houston was called outside while cutting hair.
    Cedric Betts, another barber, was outside with a customer and noticed Middleton’s truck
    following Brown. Betts testified the truck followed Brown from the Executive Plaza into
    the empty parking lot. Middleton, who was driving the truck, and Brown were having an
    argument. Betts stated Middleton was screaming at Brown, at one point saying “I’m gone
    kill you, n*****.” Brown, meanwhile, was cursing back at Middleton, walking away from
    the truck. Betts testified that Middleton then revved his truck’s engine and hit Brown with
    his truck. Brown lay on the ground, but then got up and walked away.
    ¶3.    Houston also testified he observed Middleton and Brown having a “verbal
    disagreement.” Houston then saw Brown on the ground but did not see what caused him to
    hit the ground. Houston ran to check on him, and Middleton came by in his truck and asked
    Houston if Brown was “okay.” Houston then called the police to obtain medical attention
    2
    for Brown, but he had left the scene.
    ¶4.    During the incident, firefighters were training outside of the Clarksdale Fire
    Department, which is across the street from the parking lot. Captain Marvin McCray
    testified that he heard the truck’s engine revving and a “loud boom” or “thump.” He then
    saw Brown lying face down in front of Middleton’s truck in the nearby parking lot. Richard
    Trotter, another firefighter, testified he saw a man walking down the sidewalk and heard an
    engine revving in the empty parking lot. He saw Middleton’s truck and then heard a “loud
    bump” that sounded like a car accident. When Trotter looked back again, Brown was lying
    face down on the ground. Several people ran to help Brown, but he ignored them and
    walked down the street, talking incoherently.
    ¶5.    Officer Eddie Earl of the Clarksdale Police Department was first on the scene. He
    activated his “duty tape”1 and recorded his conversation with Middleton. At the time,
    Middleton was not under arrest and was very cooperative, wanting to tell Officer Earl his
    version of the events. The tape was played for the jury over the defense’s objection. In it,
    Middleton explained that he managed the Executive Plaza for his father, who owned the
    property. They had had prior problems with Brown, who was homeless, being on the
    property and scaring tenants. Middleton had a park bench removed from outside the plaza
    because Brown would loiter there and harass tenants. Brown had also been arrested for this
    1
    At trial, Officer Earl explained that a “duty tape” is a tape recording of the
    individuals he speaks with and the statements they make.
    3
    conduct in the past.
    ¶6.    On the tape, Middleton explained to Officer Earl that earlier in the day, Middleton
    had told Brown to leave the property, but Brown cursed at him. Middleton became angry.
    The men cursed back and forth at each other. Middleton apologetically admitted he called
    Brown a “n*****” because he was “mad as hell at that son-of-a-b****.” He told Officer
    Earl “this has been an ongoing thing for several weeks.” Middleton claimed he only
    intended to scare Brown with his truck, but instead he accidentally “clipped him with the
    [side] mirror.” Brown fell down. When Middleton circled back around, Brown was gone.
    Because Brown got up quickly after being hit, Middleton felt Brown was not injured too
    badly. He added that if he really wanted to hurt Brown, he “could’ve run him slap over.”
    ¶7.    Even though Officer Earl informed Middleton his oral statement was recorded,
    Middleton insisted on writing a statement as well, which read:
    The guy has been over here before and police called on him. I just recently
    took a bench from my property to try and get him to stop hanging out over
    here. Today he was in [the] lot by [the] garbage can. I told him [to] leave
    [and] he started cussing me etc. I cussed him back – said words I shouldn’t
    have. He was standing in [the] lot [and I] took out to leave past him [and]
    hoped to scare him. My side view mirror hit him. He fell but got back up and
    left.
    The statement was admitted into evidence over the defense’s objection.
    ¶8.    At trial, Middleton testified in his own defense. On February 11, he saw Brown
    rummaging through the garbage dumpster of the Executive Plaza parking lot. Middleton’s
    father requested him to ask Brown to leave because of the problems in the past. Middleton
    4
    walked outside, asked Brown to leave, and warned Brown he would call the police.
    Middleton then returned to his office. Later, as he was leaving his office to attend an
    appraisal, Middleton saw Brown beside the building on the sidewalk. Middleton rolled
    down the window to his truck and yelled at Brown to leave. In response, Brown started
    cussing and threatening Middleton. Unsure what to do, Middleton decided to follow Brown
    in his truck, trying to “push him away.” Brown crossed the street and walked to the old
    grocery-store parking lot. Middleton parked his vehicle to “calm down.” He claimed to hit
    the gas before realizing the truck was in park, accidentally revving the engine. Putting the
    truck in drive, Middleton saw Brown was in front of him and went to the right of him.
    Middleton claims he accidentally hit Brown with his truck’s side mirror. From what he
    could tell, the side-view mirror was the only part of the truck that touched Brown. As soon
    as it happened, Middleton turned around to check on Brown, but he was gone.
    ¶9.    Brown briefly testified, affirming that he was homeless and sleeping in front of the
    former grocery store. He stated he was “run over by a white man in a white pickup truck”
    for no reason. The next day, he said the sheriff took him to the hospital. Officer Earl
    testified that after the accident, he had observed minor cuts and bruises on Brown’s face and
    some blood.
    ANALYSIS
    I.     Admission of the Duty Tape
    ¶10.   Middleton argues he was prejudiced by the admission of Officer Earl’s duty tape,
    5
    which was played to the jury. He claims his verbal statement was cumulative to his written
    statement and had no probative value. Instead, he argues the racially charged remarks in the
    tape inflamed the jurors, causing an unfair trial. This Court reviews the trial court’s
    admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. Stone v. State, 
    94 So. 3d 1078
    ,
    1081 (¶9) (Miss. 2012).
    ¶11.   During Officer Earl’s direct examination, defense counsel objected when the
    prosecutor asked what Middleton told him.          Counsel argued this information was
    inadmissible because at that point Middleton had not been given a Miranda2 warning
    informing him that any statements he made could be used against him. Outside the jury’s
    presence, defense counsel moved to suppress Middleton’s statements to the officer on the
    scene, all of which were recorded on the duty tape. The prosecutor sought to show the trial
    court that the statements were voluntary by questioning Officer Earl. The trial court
    determined that the statements were not made during a custodial interrogation; so Middleton
    was not entitled to a Miranda warning. The motion to suppress was denied. Over a
    renewed objection from the defense, the duty tape was admitted into evidence and played
    for the jury.
    ¶12.   Now, Middleton argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the highly
    prejudicial duty tape into evidence because the trial court failed to perform the requisite
    balancing test under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403, which is “an ultimate filter through
    2
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
    6
    which all otherwise admissible evidence must pass.” Welde v. State, 
    3 So. 3d 113
    , 117 (¶15)
    (Miss. 2009) (quoting Crawford v. State, 
    754 So. 2d 1211
    , 1220 (¶23) (Miss. 2000)). The
    test is whether “the probative value of the evidence . . . outweigh[s] the prejudicial effect.”
    
    Id.
     However, defense counsel’s objection at trial was different: that the duty tape should
    have been excluded because Middleton had not been advised of his Miranda rights prior to
    giving any statements.
    ¶13.   It is well established that “[o]ne may not raise an issue on appeal which was not
    raised in the trial court.” Osborne v. State, 
    942 So. 2d 193
    , 200 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).
    Here, this issue is waived because it was not raised before the trial court.3 Regardless of the
    waiver, the issue is without merit. The tape had probative value as to Middleton’s motive
    and intent. On the tape, while initially apologetic about using a racial slur against Brown,
    as he recounted the incident to Officer Earl, Middleton became more agitated and angry.
    The jury could have deduced from Middleton’s tone of voice that he was angry and
    frustrated enough to hit or clip Brown with his vehicle intentionally. The tape was more
    probative of Middleton’s state of mind at the time of the accident than the less detailed
    written statement. For example, the written statement excludes references to wanting to
    “kill” Brown.
    ¶14.   Further, Middleton never requested a Rule 403 balancing test, and it is his duty to do
    3
    Middleton did raise this argument in his post-trial motion for a judgment
    notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or in the alternative, a new trial, but not at the time of
    his motion to suppress during the trial.
    7
    so. “[T]he onus [is] on the parties” to request the trial court perform the test “with regard
    to relevant evidence which may otherwise be excluded . . . .” McLaurin v. State, 
    31 So. 3d 1263
    , 1270 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
    II.    Sufficiency of the Evidence
    ¶15.   Next, Middleton argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
    verdict because the State presented no evidence that Middleton’s pickup truck was a deadly
    weapon, or was used as a means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm, or that
    Middleton intended to cause any injury.
    ¶16.   “The sufficiency of the evidence is challenged with a motion for a directed verdict,
    a request for a peremptory instruction, or a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
    (JNOV).” Pace v. State, 
    242 So. 3d 107
    , 117 (¶24) (Miss. 2018). “On review of the
    sufficiency of the evidence, th[e reviewing court] considers the trial court’s ruling at the last
    time the sufficiency of the evidence was challenged.” Warren v. State, 
    187 So. 3d 616
    , 627
    (¶29) (Miss. 2016). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.
     at (¶30). The reviewing
    court “must accept as true all evidence consistent with . . . guilt.” Robinson v. State, 
    940 So. 2d 235
    , 240 (¶13) (Miss. 2006).
    ¶17.   At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, defense counsel moved for a directed
    verdict on the charge of aggravated assault. Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-
    8
    3-7(2)(a)(ii) (Rev. 2014), a person is guilty of aggravated assault when he or she “attempts
    to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon
    or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.” Middleton argues that “on
    its face,” a motor vehicle is not a dangerous weapon or means to produce serious bodily
    harm, but merely a mode for transportation. He claims the State did not show the pickup
    truck was used with the intent to harm Middleton. Moreover, in his brief Middleton
    inaccurately states that the only actual witnesses who saw the collision were himself and
    Brown.
    ¶18.   Middleton’s argument is without merit. After its case-in chief, the State provided
    sufficient evidence for the trial court to deny Middleton’s directed verdict. Under the
    sufficiency of evidence standard, all favorable inferences supporting guilt must be accepted
    as true. Robinson, 940 So. 2d at 240 (¶13). While “on its face” a vehicle may not be a
    deadly weapon, this Court has held that “[t]here can be no doubt that a motor vehicle used
    for the purpose of intentionally running over another person is a deadly weapon within the
    contemplation of this State’s aggravated assault statute.” Genry v. State, 
    767 So. 2d 302
    ,
    312 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). The State elicited sufficient evidence that Middleton used
    his truck with the purpose and intent of harming Brown. Middleton admitted, and witness
    testimony corroborated, his anger and frustration toward Brown for loitering in the parking
    lot and scaring tenants, at one point calling Brown a “son-of-a-b****” on the duty tape.
    From the barber shop, Houston saw the two men having a verbal disagreement before
    9
    Brown was hit. Barber Betts also heard Middleton and Brown screaming and cursing at one
    another, with Middleton at one point telling Brown, “I’m gone kill you, n*****.” Contrary
    to Middleton’s assertion that there were no eyewitnesses to the collision, Betts then saw
    Middleton rev his white truck’s engine and hit Brown. An “advanced rate of speed,” as
    Middleton contends, was not necessary to convert a multiple-ton pickup truck into a deadly
    weapon or instrument of harm.
    ¶19.   Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier
    of fact could find the State presented the essential elements of aggravated assault beyond a
    reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm Middleton’s conviction and sentence.
    ¶20.   AFFIRMED.
    GRIFFIS, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., WILSON, GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS
    AND TINDELL, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.,
    NOT PARTICIPATING.
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2016-KA-01295-COA

Filed Date: 1/22/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/22/2019