Susan Harris v. Thomas L. Harris , 235 So. 3d 125 ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2016-CA-00532-COA
SUSAN HARRIS APPELLANT
v.
THOMAS L. HARRIS APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/16/2016
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. H. DAVID CLARK II
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: NEWTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: THOMAS L. TULLOS
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: WILLIAM B. JACOB
JOSEPH A. KIERONSKI JR.
DANIEL P. SELF JR.
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS
TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: HELD THAT SOCIAL SECURITY
BENEFITS AWARDED TO APPELLANT
COULD BE CREDITED TO APPELLEE AS
ALIMONY PAYMENTS
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED – 05/16/2017
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
IRVING, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Thomas L. Harris (“Leon”)—alleging that a material change in circumstances had
occurred since the judgment of divorce from his former spouse, Susan Harris—filed a
complaint against Susan, seeking a reduction or termination of his alimony obligation that
he agreed to in the property-settlement agreement (Agreement) that was approved in the
judgment of divorce. Rather than reducing or terminating Leon’s alimony obligation, the
chancellor held that Susan’s Social Security benefits that were derivative of Leon’s Social
Security earning credits would be credited against Leon’s monthly alimony obligation. Susan
now appeals, and argues that the chancellor erred when he credited the Social Security
payments against Leon’s alimony obligation and modified the Agreement without requiring
Leon to prove that a material change in circumstances had occurred. We find that the
chancellor did not err as to either issue; consequently, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. Susan and Leon were married on July 14, 1979. They sought an irreconcilable-
difference divorce, and entered into an Agreement, wherein Leon agreed to pay $2,755 per
month to Susan as periodic alimony. The Agreement was incorporated into the divorce,
which became final on February 25, 2011. The Agreement did not address any contingency
with respect to the alimony other than that it would end at Susan’s remarriage or death.
¶3. After the divorce, Susan filed for and obtained derivative Social Security retirement
benefits in the amount of $1,035 per month based on Leon’s earnings record with the Social
Security Administration. On January 21, 2015, Susan filed a complaint to review the health
provision of the Agreement. On March 5, 2015, Leon filed his answer, which contained a
motion to dismiss and a counterclaim to reduce or terminate his alimony payments in light
of the fact that Susan had begun drawing Social Security benefits off of his earnings record.
¶4. On March 8, 2016, the chancellor granted Leon’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and held a
hearing on his counterclaim. The parties stipulated that Susan was receiving $1,035 per
month in Social Security benefits that were derivative of Leon’s work history. Leon argued
that he should be given credit for the $1,035 being paid to Susan by the Social Security
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Administration. Leon maintained that he should be required to pay Susan only an additional
$1,720 per month, since she was already drawing $1,035 per month from Social Security as
a result of his earnings record. The chancellor agreed and entered judgment in his favor.
Susan now appeals.
DISCUSSION
¶5. This Court in Russell acknowledged that the standard of review in domestic-relations
matters is “extremely limited”:
We will not disturb a chancellor’s findings unless the findings were manifestly
wrong or clearly erroneous or unless the chancellor applied an erroneous legal
standard. Id. Where the record contains substantial evidence to support the
chancellor’s findings of fact, we will not reverse his decision. Id.
Russell v. Russell, 148 So. 3d 1052, 1053 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Phillips v.
Phillips, 45 So. 3d 684, 692 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)).
¶6. Susan asserts that the chancellor erred in modifying the Agreement before requiring
Leon to show a material change in circumstances. Susan asserts that the Agreement is a
binding contract that is devoid of fraud, unconscionability, or any other factors which would
render it an invalid contract; thus, the chancellor erred by disturbing the Agreement’s terms.
She cites Peebles, in which this Court held that a property-settlement agreement—like any
other contract—is “an agreement made between the parties [and] should ordinarily be
enforced, and the court should take a dim view of efforts to modify or reform the parties’
settlement agreement.” Peebles v. Peebles, 153 So. 3d 728, 732 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)
(quoting McFarland v. McFarland, 105 So. 3d 1111, 1119 (¶23) (Miss. 2013)). Susan also
cites Lestrade, in which this Court held that property-settlement agreements “entered into by
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divorcing parties and incorporated into the divorce decree are not subject to modification,
except in limited situations.” Lestrade v. Lestrade, 49 So. 3d 639, 642 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App.
2010).
¶7. In support of her argument that the chancellor erred when he granted Leon credit for
the Social Security benefits that she was receiving without first requiring Leon to show that
a material change in circumstances had occurred since entering into the Agreement, Susan
cites this Court’s decision in Cockrell, which provides:
A payor spouse’s alimony obligation may be modified or even terminated if
the spouse is able to show a material change of circumstances has occurred
since the original divorce decree. West v. West, 891 So. 2d 203, 212 (¶21)
(Miss. 2004) (citation omitted). However, “the material change must be one
that was not reasonably anticipated at the time of the original decree.” Clower
v. Clower, 988 So. 2d 441, 444 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Holcombe
v. Holcombe, 813 So. 2d 700, 703 (¶11) (Miss. 2002)). A material change in
the income and expenses of both parties should be considered in determining
any modification of periodic alimony. Austin v. Austin, 766 So. 2d 86, 90
(¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Armstrong [v. Armstrong], 618 So. 2d
[1278,] 1280 [(Miss. 1993)]).
Cockrell v. Cockrell, 139 So. 3d 766, 770 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). Susan contends that
Leon cannot show a material change in circumstances, as his health status has not changed,
and he is still working as a bank president like he was at the time of the divorce. Susan
argues that even if her receipt of Social Security benefits constitutes a material change, Leon
should have reasonably anticipated at the time of the divorce that she would begin collecting
Social Security benefits in a few years, since Leon was sixty-one years old and Susan was
sixty years old at that time. She also points out that at the time the two entered into the
Agreement, Leon could have reasonably anticipated the need for a clause addressing Susan’s
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probable receipt of Social Security benefits in a few years.
¶8. In response, Leon submits that neither Peebles nor Lestrade is proper authority for this
issue because both cases address modification of property division, not modification of
alimony. Leon references this Court’s decision in Clower, which provides that “[p]eriodic
alimony can be modified by increasing, decreasing, or terminating the award due to a
material change in circumstances.” Clower, 988 So. 2d at 444 (¶7). Leon asserts that he was
not required to show a material change in circumstances because he was not attempting to
modify his alimony payment; rather, he maintains that he was only seeking clarification from
the court as to how to make his alimony payment, because the Agreement is devoid of
language specifying from which source those payments may be derived.
¶9. Leon cites Spalding v. Spalding, 691 So. 2d 435, 439 (Miss. 1997), in support of his
argument that the chancellor was correct in finding that he should be credited for Susan’s
receipt of the Social Security benefits derived from his work record. The facts of Spalding
are similar to those in the matter at hand. In Spalding, the appellant insisted that “the
decision of the chancellor to credit derivative Social Security benefits against alimony
represented a downward modification of the alimony granted to [the appellant],” and asserted
that “[the appellee] failed to meet his burden of proof regarding a material change in
circumstances.” Id. The chancellor, in considering whether derivative Social Security
benefits could be credited against alimony, relied on the Mississippi Supreme Court’s
decision in Mooneyham v. Mooneyham, 420 So. 2d 1072, 1073-74 (Miss. 1982), wherein the
court held that Social Security payments derivative from the child-support payor should be
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credited against the payor’s child-support obligation. Spalding, 691 So. 2d at 438 (citing
Mooneyham, 420 So. 2d at 1073-74). The Mississippi Supreme Court in Spalding affirmed
the chancellor’s application of Mooneyham, finding that, in light of Mooneyham’s holding
that “Social Security payments derivative from the child[-]support payor should be credited
against the child support,” it could not “fathom any valid reason or reasonable logic” as to
why the rule of law would be any different with respect to periodic alimony rather than child
support. Spalding, 691 So. 2d at 439 (citations omitted).
¶10. We agree with Leon that Spalding is dispositive of the issue presented. Therefore, we
affirm the decision of the chancellor. The Agreement between Leon and Susan did not
specify or qualify the source of income for payment of the alimony obligation. It simply
required that Leon pay the amount to Susan. Crediting Social Security payments derivative
from Leon against his alimony obligation, as set forth in the Agreement, is not a breach of
the terms of that Agreement. As Leon points out, Susan is receiving the same amount of
alimony that she is entitled to under the Agreement, and she would not be receiving the
Social Security payments unhinged from Leon’s Social Security earnings record. Thus, we
find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in failing to require Leon to show a
material change in circumstances because Leon’s obligation to pay alimony in the amount
set forth in the Agreement remains the same.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE NEWTON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS
AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE
APPELLANT.
LEE, C.J., GRIFFIS, P.J., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON,
GREENLEE AND WESTBROOKS, JJ., CONCUR.
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