Ray A. Lasser Jr. v. Clifford L. McNeal ( 2016 )


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  •                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-0535
    Filed February 24, 2016
    RAY A. LASSER JR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    vs.
    CLIFFORD L. MCNEAL,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Annette J.
    Scieszinski, Judge.
    A plaintiff appeals the district court’s directed verdict on punitive damages
    and its decision to reduce the past medical expenses awarded by the jury.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
    Steven Gardner of Denefe, Gardner & Zingg, P.C., Ottumwa, for
    appellant.
    Bryan J. Goldsmith of Gaumer, Emanuel, Carpenter & Goldsmith, P.C.,
    Ottumwa, for appellee.
    Considered by Tabor, P.J., Bower, J., and Scott, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
    2
    SCOTT, Senior Judge.
    Ray Lasser appeals following a jury verdict in his lawsuit against Clifford
    McNeal for battery. He asserts the court erred in refusing to submit his claim for
    punitive damages to the jury. He also asserts the court should not have reduced
    the jury’s verdict pertaining to his past medical expenses.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    On September 13, 2009, Lasser and McNeal were involved in a physical
    altercation at Lasser’s home. Both men give entirely different accounts of the
    altercation, both claiming the other was the aggressor. Lasser filed suit against
    McNeal for battery and trespass on August 11, 2011, seeking damages for pain
    and suffering, medical and dental bills, and mental anguish and seeking an
    award of punitive damages.      McNeal answered and asserted a counterclaim
    against Lasser for his injuries and the damages to his car. McNeal likewise
    sought an award of punitive damages.
    The case was tried to a jury, but before the matter was submitted, the
    court granted McNeal’s motion for a directed verdict excluding both parties’
    claims for punitive damages from the jury’s consideration. The jury returned a
    verdict in favor of Lasser, finding McNeal committed battery upon Lasser, and
    awarding Lasser $50,721.61 in past medical expenses, $30,000.00 for past
    physical and mental pain and suffering, and $5103.00 for past loss of sick-leave
    benefits for a total damage award of $85,824.61. The jury also concluded Lasser
    did not commit a battery upon McNeal, awarding McNeal no damages on his
    counterclaim.
    3
    McNeal filed a motion for remitter or, in the alternative, a motion for a new
    trial, asserting the award of past medical expenses was too high in light of the
    fact that the amount awarded was the total amount billed by the care provider
    and was not what the health insurance company paid for those services.
    Evidence was admitted at trial that the health insurance company’s subrogation
    interest was $22,918.44 for the medical expenses paid on Lasser’s behalf.1
    McNeal asserted the jury awarded the higher “billed” amount to punish McNeal
    due to Lasser’s repeated attacks on McNeal’s untruthful and violent character
    during trial.   Lasser resisted this posttrial motion, but the court granted the
    remitter concluding Lasser’s doctor testified as to the reasonableness of only her
    charges—$1331.00—but did not state the other billed charges were fair and
    reasonable. Therefore, the court entered judgment for the medical expenses for
    $23,186.36, which included the $22,726.222 paid by the health insurer, the
    $393.80 the insurer wrote off of Lasser’s doctor’s billed amounts, and $66.34
    paid directly by Lasser. The total judgment the court entered in favor of Lasser
    was $58,289.36.
    Lasser appeals.
    II. Scope and Standard of Review.
    Our review of a district court’s ruling on a motion for a directed verdict is
    for the correction of error at law. Gibson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., 
    621 N.W.2d 1
      In reaching this figure, McNeal’s attorney used the total the health insurance company
    had paid on behalf of Lasser for both medical expenses and prescription drug coverage;
    however, based on the amount awarded, the jury did not add to the medical expense
    award the amount paid for prescription drugs.
    2
    In calculating the total medical expenses, the court, like the jury, did not consider the
    amount paid by Lasser or the health insurance company for prescription drugs. Neither
    party appeals this issue, and we will therefore not address it further.
    4
    388, 391 (Iowa 2001). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    party opposing the motion to determine if reasonable minds could differ on an
    issue of fact. 
    Id. If reasonable
    minds could differ, the issue should be submitted
    to the jury. 
    Id. The party
    opposing the motion must have presented substantial
    evidence on each element of the claim; otherwise, a directed verdict is
    appropriate. 
    Id. “Evidence is
    substantial if a jury could reasonably infer a fact
    from the evidence.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    It is more prudent for the court to
    submit the case to a jury even if the case is weak so that judicial and party
    resources are not wasted in conducting a second trial should we find error in
    granting a directed verdict motion. Hill v. Damm, 
    804 N.W.2d 95
    , 98 (Iowa Ct.
    App. 2011).
    We review the district court’s decision to grant a remittitur for an abuse of
    discretion. Triplett v. McCourt Mfg. Corp., 
    742 N.W.2d 600
    , 602 (Iowa Ct. App.
    2007). “An abuse-of-discretion standard is appropriate because the trial court
    has had the advantage of seeing and hearing the evidence . . . .” 
    Id. We will
    find
    an abuse of discretion only when the trial court’s decision is clearly untenable or
    to an extent clearly unreasonable. 
    Id. III. Punitive
    Damages.
    In his first claim on appeal, Lasser asserts the district court erred in
    granting McNeal’s directed verdict on punitive damages, refusing to submit the
    issue to the jury. Lasser claims because there was sufficient proof of assault and
    battery—an intentional tort—to submit to the jury, then a punitive damage claim
    should also be properly submitted.       He asserts intentional tort cases always
    permit the recovery of punitive damages. While we do not necessarily agree all
    5
    intentional torts automatically permit the recovery of punitive damages, we do
    conclude the court erred in not submitting the issue to the jury in this case.
    For a punitive damage claim to be submitted to the jury, there must be
    proof by “a preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence” the
    defendant acted willfully and wantonly in disregard for the rights and safety of
    another. Iowa Code § 668A.1(1)(a) (2011); Miranda v. Said, 
    836 N.W.2d 8
    , 34
    (Iowa 2013).
    [C]onduct is willful and wanton when “[t]he actor has intentionally
    done an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or
    obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that
    harm would follow, and which thus is usually accompanied by a
    conscious indifference to the consequences.”
    
    Miranda, 836 N.W.2d at 34
    (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
    Lasser had to show McNeal’s conduct constituted actual or legal malice. See
    
    Gibson, 621 N.W.2d at 396
    . “‘Actual malice is characterized by such factors as
    personal spite, hatred, or ill will.’ ‘Legal malice is shown by wrongful conduct
    committed or continued with a willful or reckless disregard for another’s rights.’”
    
    Id. (citations omitted).
    The evidence presented at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to
    Lasser, showed the following.3 Lasser testified he was working on a car in his
    garage when McNeal arrived. The two men had a verbal exchange regarding the
    work that had been done on a car in Lasser’s garage, and McNeal stated, “You
    3
    We note McNeal’s description of the altercation was vastly different from Lasser’s
    version. McNeal claimed Lasser was the aggressor in the fight, tackling him to the
    ground as he attempted to leave and striking him in the abdomen with a sledgehammer
    handle. However, when reviewing a court’s directed verdict motion, we must view the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
    Gibson, 621 N.W.2d at 391
    .
    6
    want to fight; I’m going to kill you.” McNeal then attacked Lasser in front of
    Lasser’s garage.       Lasser described McNeal hit him in the face many times,
    knocked off his glasses, and kicked him. In an attempt to defend himself, Lasser
    grabbed ahold of McNeal, and the two rolled to the ground. McNeal’s father
    broke the two apart. Lasser then walked back toward his garage when McNeal
    jumped on his back and knocked him to the ground. McNeal kept swinging and
    hitting him in the face, head, and stomach, continuing to tell Lasser he was going
    to kill him. McNeal’s father again broke up the fight. Lasser then grabbed a
    broken sledgehammer handle and struck McNeal’s car, breaking a window. Both
    McNeal and his father then rushed Lasser, knocking him to the ground and
    rendering him unconscious. When Lasser woke up, McNeal was on top of him
    with his hand round Lasser’s throat, choking him and telling him he was going to
    kill him. McNeal’s father then said he heard sirens and that McNeal needed to
    leave quickly. McNeal left, and Lasser heard the two say that they would get
    back at Lasser in their own way. Lasser estimated he was struck in the face
    seven or eight times at least, maybe more.
    The police arrived shortly thereafter, and Lasser told the officer it was just
    a family disagreement4 and that everything was fine. After trying to get McNeal’s
    belongings out of Lasser’s garage with the help of McNeal’s father, Lasser went
    inside his house to tell his wife what had happened. He collapsed to his knees
    as he entered the kitchen. Lasser’s wife, Kathy, described seeing bruises on
    Lasser’s eye, around his throat, and on his stomach, and saw a big scrape on his
    left arm. Lasser was initially seen in the emergency room the day after the
    4
    Lasser and McNeal have the same mother, and McNeal’s father is Lasser’s step-father.
    7
    assault and then discharged home. However, when he did not improve over the
    next several days and went on to develop a high fever, Lasser returned to the
    hospital where he was eventually admitted into the intensive care unit for a staph
    infection. After he was discharged from the hospital, Lasser had to receive daily
    doses of intravenous antibiotics to continue to treat his infection. Kathy testified it
    took Lasser four to six months to recover from the physical injuries sustained in
    the assault and Lasser still struggled with the emotional injuries. Lasser admitted
    photographs of his injuries and also offered testimony from various witnesses to
    establish McNeal had a reputation as both an untruthful and a violent man.
    From this evidence, we find a reasonable jury could conclude McNeal
    acted with willful and wanton disregard for the rights and safety of Lasser, such
    that the issue of punitive damages should have been submitted to the fact-finder
    for a determination.     See Iowa Code § 668A.1(1)(a).            Based on Lasser’s
    testimony, McNeal attacked him, punching, kicking, and strangling him, all while
    telling Lasser that he was going to kill him. This was evidence a reasonable jury
    could have found amounted to actual malice—“personal spite, hatred, or ill will.”
    See 
    Gibson, 621 N.W.2d at 396
    (citation omitted). The evidence was such that
    the jury could conclude McNeal intentionally did an unreasonable act
    disregarding a known or obvious risk that a physical assault on Lasser would
    cause harm. 
    Miranda, 836 N.W.2d at 34
    . We thus conclude Lasser’s claim of
    punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury.5
    5
    McNeal did not appeal the district court’s decision to enter a directed verdict on his
    claim for punitive damages against Lasser. We therefore do not address that issue.
    8
    IV. Medical Bills.
    Lasser also claims the court abused its discretion in reducing the jury’s
    award of medical expenses.      Because evidence was submitted to the jury
    showing both the billed amount and the insurance payment amount, Lasser
    claims it was in the providence of the jury to determine the fair value of his
    medical expenses.
    Our supreme court has stated:
    An injured plaintiff may recover only the reasonable and
    necessary costs of medical care. Therefore, the plaintiff has the
    burden to prove the reasonable value of the services rendered.
    The reasonable value of medical services can be shown by
    evidence of the amount paid for such services or through the
    testimony of a qualified expert witness. The amount charged,
    standing alone, is not evidence of the reasonable and fair value of
    the services rendered. The billed amount is relevant only if that
    figure was paid or an expert witness has testified to the
    reasonableness of the charges. We have consistently held that
    evidence of the amount charged will not, in the absence of proof of
    the reasonableness of the billed sum, support recovery of medical
    expenses.
    Pexa v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 
    686 N.W.2d 150
    , 156 (Iowa 2004) (emphasis
    added) (citations omitted).
    During discovery, Lasser sent McNeal’s counsel requests for admission,
    which attached his medical records and billing statements and requested McNeal
    admit that the documents were true and accurate copies and were “admissible
    into evidence at trial without objection.” The admission request did not address
    whether the amount billed was reasonable. McNeal failed to admit or deny the
    requests within thirty days, and the billing records were thereby admitted into
    evidence at trial without any foundational objection. However, simply because
    the evidence of the amount billed came before the jury during trial does not mean
    9
    it was sufficient for the jury to base its verdict on that evidence alone. There
    needed to be evidence that the amount billed was actually paid or expert
    testimony to support the conclusion that the amount billed was reasonable. 
    Id. at 157
    (“[T]he relevant fact in the assessment of damages is the reasonable and
    necessary cost of medical care, which may or may not be the same as the
    medical bills. . . . [O]nly when the charged amounts have been paid or an expert
    testifies they are fair and reasonable do the medical bills take on any probative
    value.”).
    At trial, Lasser’s doctor testified, via deposition, the charges she submitted
    were “fair and reasonable for the services [she] provided.” She was asked to
    assume the charges from the hospital were reasonable and then affirmed the
    care given to Lasser was needed. The doctor went on to state that the hospital
    charges “are appropriate.” As the district court correctly found, this testimony
    “fell short of proving that all other billed health care charges of $49,456.95 were
    reasonable.” We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to
    reduce the medical-expense damages awarded by the jury in light of the lack of
    evidence to support the reasonableness of the amounts billed.
    V. Conclusion.
    Because we conclude the district court erred in directing verdict on the
    punitive damages claim, the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial
    on that issue only. See 
    Miranda, 836 N.W.2d at 35
    . However, we affirm the
    district court’s decision to reduce the medical expense damages awarded by the
    jury.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-0535

Filed Date: 2/24/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/24/2016