Dewey Mitchell Lindsay v. Adoption by Shepherd Care, Inc. , 551 F. App'x 528 ( 2014 )


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  •            Case: 12-12565   Date Filed: 01/07/2014   Page: 1 of 3
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-12565
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 6:10-cv-01401-CEH-GJK
    DEWEY MITCHELL LINDSAY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ADOPTION BY SHEPHERD CARE, INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 7, 2014)
    Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 12-12565      Date Filed: 01/07/2014      Page: 2 of 3
    Dewey Mitchell Lindsay, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment in favor of Adoption by Shepherd Care, Inc., in his
    action alleging constitutional violations arising from a state court parental rights
    termination proceeding. We construe his arguments on appeal as a challenge to the
    district court’s determination that Lindsay’s claim he was denied a right to counsel
    in the state court proceeding, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due
    process rights, was barred by the Rooker-Feldman 2 doctrine.
    We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Johnson v. Governor of
    Fla., 
    405 F.3d 1214
    , 1217 (11th Cir. 2005). Whether a plaintiff’s complaint is
    barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a legal question that we review de novo.
    Doe v. Fla. Bar, 
    630 F.3d 1336
    , 1340 (11th Cir. 2011).
    The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional rule that precludes lower
    federal courts from reviewing state court judgments. Nicholson v. Shafe, 
    558 F.3d 1266
    , 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). The doctrine “precludes a United States district court
    from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be
    empowered to adjudicate.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 291 (2005). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of
    the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court
    1
    Pro se pleadings are construed liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 
    148 F.3d 1262
    ,
    1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
    2
    The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
    (1923), and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
    (1983).
    2
    Case: 12-12565      Date Filed: 01/07/2014    Page: 3 of 3
    losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
    district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
    rejection of those judgments.” 
    Id. at 284.
    The district court did not err in determining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
    operated to bar Lindsay’s federal action. Lindsay’s continued insistence that his
    federal case is actually an “appeal” of the state court parental rights termination
    proceeding makes clear this is the type of case precluded by the Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine. As to his remaining claims, Lindsay offers no specific argument with
    respect to the district court’s order dismissing, for failure to state a claim, his Fifth
    and Sixth Amendment claims and challenge to the constitutionality of Chapter 63,
    Florida Statutes, and accordingly has waived those challenges. See Greenbriar,
    Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 
    881 F.2d 1570
    , 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (explaining
    issues not raised on appeal are deemed waived). Thus, we affirm the judgment of
    the district court.
    AFFIRMED.
    3