Elizabeth Boardman v. Cir , 597 F. App'x 413 ( 2015 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 12 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
ELIZABETH BOARDMAN, No. 13-15022 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-00639-MCE-
GGH
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL MEMORANDUM*
REVENUE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 10, 2015**
San Francisco, California
Before: BYBEE, CALLAHAN, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth Boardman appeals the district court’s dismissal
of her complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
The complaint asserts claims under the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., and seeks an
injunction ordering the Internal Revenue Service to “put into operation procedures
for processing disputes, claims, collections and litigation adverse to taxpayers who
refuse to pay taxes because of conscience or religion that are respectful, efficient,
transparent and minimally burdensome and that lead to Tax Court determinations
upon taxpayer request.” We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
The district court correctly determined that the complaint is barred by the
Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). The complaint seeks an injunction that
would enjoin the government from following certain tax collection procedures—in
particular, procedures designed to allow the government to expeditiously resolve
taxpayer claims lacking legal merit—and therefore falls within the scope of the
Anti-Injunction Act. See Hansen v. Dep’t of Treasury, 528 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir.
2007).
Accordingly, the Anti-Injunction Act precludes federal jurisdiction here
unless Appellant can satisfy the judicially created exception to the Act by
demonstrating (1) irreparable injury if her case is not heard, and (2) certainty of
success on the merits. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737 (1974).
Appellant fails to satisfy either requirement. Appellant has a legal remedy in the
2
form of a suit for refund and thus will suffer no irreparable injury. Hansen, 528
F.3d at 601–02. Appellant also has not shown that she is certain to succeed on the
merits of her claim that the government’s listing of war tax resistance as a
“frivolous” legal position for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 6702 connotes
discouragement of religion or otherwise violates her free exercise rights. See
Jenney v. United States, 755 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a
taxpayer’s attempt to claim a war tax deduction is frivolous within the meaning of
26 U.S.C. § 6702 because “[t]here is no provision in the Internal Revenue Code for
a war tax deduction or credit, and taxpayers have no constitutional right to refuse
to pay federal taxes because of their anti-war sentiments”).
Thus, the district court properly granted the Commissioner’s motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).1
AFFIRMED.
1
Because we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), we need not decide whether the complaint was also properly
dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
3