United States v. Miguel Zamora-Alonzo , 693 F. App'x 370 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 16-11760   Document: 00514080289   Page: 1   Date Filed: 07/19/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 16-11760                             FILED
    Summary Calendar                       July 19, 2017
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    MIGUEL ANGEL ZAMORA-ALONSO,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Cons. w/ No. 16-11761
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    MIGUEL ANGEL ZAMORA-ALONSO, also known as Miguel Angel Zamora-
    Alonso,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:16-CR-143-1
    USDC No. 3:16-CR-390-1
    Case: 16-11760      Document: 00514080289         Page: 2    Date Filed: 07/19/2017
    No. 16-11760
    c/w No. 16-11761
    Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Miguel Angel Zamora-Alonso appeals the sentence imposed following his
    guilty plea conviction for illegal reentry. He also appeals the revocation of his
    supervised release and the sentence imposed upon revocation.
    Zamora-Alonso argues that, with regard to the sentence imposed for his
    illegal reentry conviction, the district court committed reversible plain error in
    assessing a 16-level adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2015)
    in light of his Texas conviction for aggravated assault under Texas Penal Code
    § 22.02. He maintains that the offense does not have as an element the use,
    attempted use, or threatened use of force and does not conform to the generic
    definition of aggravated assault. As to the revocation of his supervised release,
    Zamora-Alonso challenges the validity of the transfer of jurisdiction from the
    Western District of Texas to the Northern District of Texas. See 18 U.S.C.
    § 3605.    He contends that the Northern District lacked jurisdiction to
    adjudicate violations of his supervision that were committed before the
    Northern District accepted jurisdiction over his supervised release imposed in
    the Western District.
    The Government has moved for summary affirmance. The Government
    asserts that Zamora-Alonso’s challenge to the 16-level adjustment is foreclosed
    by United States v. Guillen-Alvarez, 
    489 F.3d 197
    , 200-01 (5th Cir. 2007), in
    which we determined that the Texas offense of aggravated assault is a crime
    of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). See also United States v. Shepherd, 
    848 F.3d 425
    , 427-28 (5th Cir. 2017) (reaffirming the validity of Guillen-Alvarez
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    2
    Case: 16-11760    Document: 00514080289     Page: 3   Date Filed: 07/19/2017
    No. 16-11760
    c/w No. 16-11761
    after Mathis v. United States, 
    136 S. Ct. 2243
    (2016)). The Government notes
    that Zamora-Alonso’s claims as to the transfer of jurisdiction for his supervised
    release are foreclosed by United States v. Fernandez, 
    379 F.3d 270
    (5th Cir.
    2004).
    Zamora-Alonso acknowledges that his appellate issues are foreclosed by
    Guillen-Alvarez and Fernandez. He argues that those decisions were wrongly
    decided, and he raises the arguments to preserve them for further review. One
    panel of this court may not overrule the decision of another absent an en banc
    or superseding Supreme Court decision. See United States v. Lipscomb, 
    299 F.3d 303
    , 313 n.34 (5th Cir. 2002).
    Therefore, summary affirmance is proper. See Groendyke Transp., Inc.
    v. Davis, 
    406 F.2d 1158
    , 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). The Government’s motion for
    summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is
    AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for an extension of time to
    file a brief is DENIED.
    3