United States v. Leshawn Lawson ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 2 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-10063
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 4:15-cr-00119-PJH-1
v. MEMORANDUM*
LESHAWN LAWSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, Chief Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 10, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: WARDLAW and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,** Judge.
LeShawn Lawson was indicted for one count of possession with intent to
distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(A). The district court denied Lawson’s motions to suppress evidence
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
collected pursuant to three GPS tracking warrants and a UPS package search
warrant, the traffic stop of his Bentley, and the subsequent consensual vehicle
search. After a bench trial, Lawson was found guilty and sentenced to 214 months’
imprisonment, to be followed by five years’ supervised release. Lawson now
appeals, challenging the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
This Court reviews the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo,
and its factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d
954, 960 (9th Cir. 2015).
1. Lawson argues that the traffic stop of his Bentley and the subsequent search
were the fruits of four prior surveillance warrants. Lawson is incorrect. Based upon
his observations of Lawson’s speeding and missing license plates, the arresting
officer, Matthew Williams, had valid grounds to perform the traffic stop. The district
court did not clearly err in finding that Williams reasonably perceived Lawson’s
traffic infractions, and Lawson does not challenge the district court’s finding that he
voluntarily consented to the search which yielded the cocaine. See United States v.
Arreguin, 735 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that trial court’s credibility
determinations are due special deference). Reasonable suspicion that a traffic
violation occurred is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, “even if the stop
serves some other purpose” and “the ultimate charge was not related to the traffic
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stop.” United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808–10, 813 (1996)).
2. Lawson also argues that even if the traffic stop and consensual search
were not the fruit of invalid warrants, they nevertheless violated the Fourth
Amendment because they were unreasonably prolonged. This argument fails.
Rodriguez v. United States provides that a traffic stop “seizure remains lawful only
‘so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’”
135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (alteration in Rodriguez) (quoting Arizona v. Johnson,
555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)). “An officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks
during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he may not do so in a way that
prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify
detaining an individual.” Id.Here, Williams’ traffic stop of Lawson’s Bentley was not unreasonably
prolonged. The district court found that Lawson consented to a search of the vehicle
within five minutes into the stop, and that the subsequent background check on
Lawson “came back clean” approximately seven minutes into the stop. The
remainder of the stop consisted of Williams awaiting cover and conducting the
consensual search. Altogether the stop lasted about twenty minutes. This timeframe
is undisputed.
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Beyond Lawson’s explicit consent, Williams’ grounds for the search were
buttressed by facts providing independent reasonable suspicion that Lawson was
involved in criminal activity. See United States v. Turvin, 517 F.3d 1097, 1099–
1100 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007).
As the district court found, Williams detailed three factors supporting reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to investigate further: (1) the absence of luggage
despite Lawson’s statement that he had spent three weeks in Los Angeles; (2)
Lawson’s stated employment as an entertainer and iron worker, which would not
pay enough for Lawson to afford the Bentley he was driving; and (3) Williams’
knowledge that Interstate 580 was a well-known drug trafficking route from Los
Angeles to San Francisco. Further, Rodriguez does not foreclose any and all
questions not wholly related to perceived traffic infractions. See 135 S. Ct. at 1611.
Williams’ questioning of Lawson and observations regarding the inconsistency in
his answers were reasonable. See United States v. Rojas-Millan, 234 F.3d 464, 469–
70 (9th Cir. 2000).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s ruling.1
AFFIRMED.
1
In light of our analysis, we need not review the constitutionality of the prior four
warrants.
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