People v. Williams ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • Filed 9/8/17
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION EIGHT
    THE PEOPLE,                          B275226
    Plaintiff and Respondent,   (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. MA064988)
    v.
    KEVIN R. WILLIAMS et al.,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
    Angeles County. Eric P. Harmon, Judge. Affirmed.
    Allison H. Ting, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
    for defendant and appellant Kevin R. Williams.
    James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of
    Appeal, for defendant and appellant Pauline R. Winbush.
    Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General,
    Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E.
    Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Tannaz
    Kouhpainezhad, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
    Respondent.
    **********
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendants and appellants
    Kevin R. Williams and Pauline R. Winbush were each convicted
    of one felony count of dog fighting, and one felony count of animal
    cruelty. The sole issue on appeal is defendants’ contention the
    court erred in denying their joint motion to suppress evidence
    and to quash and traverse the warrant pursuant to Penal Code
    section 1538.5.
    We affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On February 17, 2015, defendants Williams and Winbush
    were charged by information with 29 separate counts, including
    four felony counts of possession of fighting dogs (Pen. Code,
    § 597.5, subd. (a)(1); counts 1-4), and 17 counts of animal cruelty
    (Pen. Code, § 595, subd. (b); counts 5-21).
    Defendants jointly filed a motion to suppress evidence
    seized during the search of their residential property on
    November 26, 2014, and to quash and traverse the warrant
    pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. The People filed
    opposition. The motion was heard on October 7 and 26, 2015,
    and concluded on November 18, 2015. We summarize the
    material facts as reflected in the testimony received at the
    hearing.
    Just before 3:00 p.m. on October 29, 2014, Ed Callaway, a
    field officer with the Los Angeles County Department of Animal
    Control (Animal Control), responded to a report of a loose horse
    near the 7000 block of West Avenue A-14 in an unincorporated
    rural area of Los Angeles county, near Lancaster. When he
    arrived on the scene and saw the wandering horse, he saw a car
    swerve to avoid hitting it, and several other cars in the vicinity.
    Officer Callaway approached the horse, trying not to
    frighten it out into traffic, but the horse headed back down
    2
    Avenue A-14. He followed the horse slowly in his vehicle until
    the horse stopped at the property located at 7038 West Avenue A-
    14 (property later determined to be defendants’ residence). The
    horse attempted to reenter the property through a side fence near
    where there was some sort of corral. Officer Callaway noticed
    there were several broken or loose boards in the fence, and
    presumed the horse had gotten loose from there. The horse was
    unable to get back into the yard.
    As the horse continued to try to push through the fence,
    Officer Callaway heard several dogs begin to bark. He walked
    along the outside of the fence toward the horse to try to
    determine if the dogs were loose and could frighten or injure the
    horse, or chase it back out onto the street where it would be a
    serious hazard. Officer Callaway saw that the dogs were
    confined in “makeshift” kennels of chain link fencing and plywood
    inside the yard.
    The dogs continued barking, and the horse walked back
    toward the front of the property. The horse stopped near the
    driveway that led up to the garage attached to the home. There
    was an open gate in a chain link fence that abutted the side of
    the garage. The fence was about three feet high. The horse went
    through the gate but appeared to have difficulty getting into the
    back yard due to debris and weeds. It retreated back out to the
    front yard and began to eat some weeds or spilled hay on the
    ground near the garage. Officer Callaway moved his vehicle and
    parked it in a location near the driveway, hoping to block the
    horse from leaving that portion of the front yard. Officer
    Callaway then walked through the open gate into the back yard
    to see if there was a suitable corral, that did not have broken
    fencing, in which to safely secure the horse. He could not see any
    suitable corral and returned to the front yard.
    3
    Officer Callaway called Sergeant Rachel Montez-Kemp,
    also of Animal Control, and told her he needed a trailer to
    impound a loose horse. While he waited for her to arrive, he
    yelled into the yard announcing his presence in case the property
    owner was out back. He also honked the horn of his vehicle. He
    got no response. Sergeant Montez-Kemp arrived about
    20 minutes later with a horse trailer.
    Once Sergeant Montez-Kemp arrived, they haltered the
    horse and placed it inside the horse trailer. The horse looked
    “thin.” Sergeant Montez-Kemp had brought a bucket of feed, so
    they left the horse eating inside the trailer while they attempted
    to determine if the owner was at home. Sergeant Montez-Kemp
    has worked for Animal Control for 16 years and the department’s
    normal procedure is to attempt to make contact with an owner of
    livestock before impounding an animal. Officer Callaway, who
    had seven years of experience, confirmed that was the
    department’s practice.
    Sergeant Montez-Kemp knocked on the front door of the
    home. No one answered, but she heard the distinctive sound of
    puppies barking from inside the home. She also knocked on the
    front window of the home and the garage door but got no
    response. Sergeant Montez-Kemp told Officer Callaway to call
    dispatch to attempt to call the property owners. Dispatch left a
    message on an answering machine after no one picked up the
    phone.
    They heard several dogs barking in the back yard, as well
    as a dog barking and “whining” from inside the garage. There
    was a strong smell of “excessive” fecal matter. Officer Callaway
    looked through a broken window in the upper corner of the
    garage door. There was a dog inside, in conditions that appeared
    “unhealthful.” Officer Callaway also saw a treadmill and a “slat
    4
    mill” partially covered by a tarp. A slat mill is a device used in
    the training of fighting dogs. Officer Callaway said he was six
    feet one inch tall, but was a couple of inches taller in his work
    boots, and was able to look into the window of the garage door.1
    Sergeant Montez-Kemp thought if the owner was out in the
    back yard, the noise from the barking dogs could make it difficult
    to hear them knocking and yelling out front. Both she and
    Officer Callaway walked through the open gate near the garage
    into the back yard.2 Officer Callaway looked into the window at
    the back of the garage, as did Sergeant Montez-Kemp.
    While in the back yard, Sergeant Montez-Kemp confirmed
    the corral with the broken boards was not suitable for the horse
    as it could plainly escape again and get injured or be a danger to
    motorists. They walked a little further into the back yard toward
    the kennels. She noticed that all of the dogs on the property in
    makeshift kennels were pit bulls, the breed most often used in
    dog fighting. One of the dogs had a missing lip, and another
    smaller female pit bull had multiple scars on her body. Another
    kennel contained a dog with a litter of puppies. They saw no one
    in the back yard.
    1     During cross-examination, Officer Callaway conceded he
    wrote his report about the incident several weeks later. Because
    Animal Control is understaffed, he often has to delay writing
    incident reports in order to handle more urgent matters. He
    conceded he did not include anything in his written report about
    entering the back yard of the property or hearing the whining
    dogs, because the focus of his report was documenting the
    impounding of the loose horse.
    2      Sergeant Montez-Kemp confirmed, on cross-examination,
    that she and Officer Callaway walked into the back yard together
    after the horse was secured on the trailer.
    5
    Sergeant Montez-Kemp was familiar with defendants’
    property as she had been called out to the property on prior
    occasions, including in February 2008 on a report of excessive
    dogs on the property and “possible dog fighting.” At that time,
    she found approximately 30 pit bulls on the property but
    defendants claimed to have the requisite permits or were in the
    process of obtaining them. No further action was taken. She was
    also aware that another Animal Control officer had been called to
    the property in 2010 due to a report regarding horses that were
    “thin” or in poor condition. The officer who responded to the
    property in 2010 reported numerous pit bulls were kept in
    kennels filled with excrement and water bowls containing mold
    and algae. Sergeant Montez-Kemp testified she was experienced
    in “blood sports” and had investigated dozens of animal fighting
    cases in her career.
    Sergeant Montez-Kemp instructed Officer Callaway to take
    several photographs at the property, including the interior of the
    garage through the back window, and also from the window in
    the front garage door because he was taller than she was.
    Sergeant Montez-Kemp said Officer Callaway was able to see
    into, and take a photograph of, the interior of the garage from the
    broken front window without standing on anything. Sergeant
    Montez-Kemp also took some photographs of the kennels in the
    back yard.
    Sometime around 5:00 p.m., defendant Williams arrived
    home. He told Officer Callaway the horse got loose all the time
    and he was unable to keep it locked up. Officer Callaway issued
    defendant a misdemeanor citation and impounded the horse.
    The next day, Sergeant Montez-Kemp sent Deputy Robert
    Ferrell of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department an email
    about the events of October 29. She provided him copies of the
    6
    photographs she and Officer Callaway had taken on October 29,
    2014. Sergeant Montez-Kemp told Deputy Ferrell she suspected
    defendants were operating a “dog fighting operation” at their
    property.
    On November 10, 2014, Deputy Ferrell and Sergeant
    Montez-Kemp went to defendants’ property and drove around the
    perimeter from outside the fence. Deputy Ferrell noted two
    different sets of individual dog kennels. On at least two sides of
    the property, the fencing was “low” so the kennels were visible
    from the road, but he could not see the dogs inside. Deputy
    Ferrell confirmed he and Sergeant Montez-Kemp never entered
    defendants’ property on November 10, but only observed, and
    took photographs of, the property and kennels from the public
    roads outside of the fencing.
    Deputy Ferrell testified he prepared his affidavit in support
    of the search warrant based on the written and oral reports
    received from Sergeant Montez-Kemp, as well as his personal
    observations on November 10, 2014. Deputy Ferrell explained he
    had 26 years of experience as a deputy sheriff and is a certified
    court expert in the field of “bloodsports” and illegal animal
    fighting. Because he knew Sergeant Montez-Kemp to be
    experienced in blood sport investigations, her report and
    statements of her observations were credible to him. He
    understood from Sergeant Montez-Kemp that the horse had been
    secured in the trailer, when she and Officer Callaway proceeded
    into the back yard and eventually took the photographs. He
    agreed her photographs of the kennels appeared to be taken “up
    close” as compared to his photographs taken from outside the
    fence.
    Deputy Ferrell’s affidavit identified his experience, as well
    as Sergeant Montez-Kemp’s experience, with blood sport
    7
    investigations. It summarized the observations made at the
    property by Sergeant Montez-Kemp and Officer Callaway on
    October 29, as well as the prior calls to the property. It further
    set forth the information concerning Deputy Ferrell’s trip to
    defendants’ property on November 10, with Sergeant Montez-
    Kemp, in which he confirmed the presence of the kennels. The
    affidavit stated, in part, that based on the breed of dog being kept
    on the property, “the training devices observed, and the condition
    in which the dogs are housed (fighting dogs used in bloodsports
    are kept either on individual chains or in kennels spaced closely
    enough to see and get near each other, but always just out of each
    other [sic] reach) coupled with my observations of the location
    and my training and experience in bloodsports,” it was his belief
    that evidence of an illegal dog fighting operation would be found
    on the property.
    The search warrant issued November 24, 2014 and was
    served and executed on November 26, 2014. The officers
    recovered 19 pit bulls (11 adults and 8 puppies), many of which
    were emaciated or had sores or scars. They also recovered
    numerous other dead animals, as well as the slat mill device and
    three boxes of documents related to dog fighting, among other
    items.
    After the testimony of Deputy Ferrell, Sergeant Montez-
    Kemp and Officer Callaway was completed, defendants called
    Pasquale DiFabrizio to testify. Mr. DiFabrizio is a private
    investigator hired by defendants. He attested to the information
    in his report documenting the conditions on the property. He
    said he attempted to duplicate the photographs taken by Officer
    Callaway on October 29, and could only obtain similar
    photographs of the kennels if he was inside the back yard right
    next to the kennels, as they are approximately 80 feet into the
    8
    middle portion of the back yard from the chain link fence near
    the garage. He stated the back yard of defendants’ property is
    fully fenced with a mixture of chain link and wood boards.
    Mr. DiFabrizio confirmed there are windows on the front garage
    door, one of which is broken. The bottom edge of that window is
    approximately 5 feet 11 inches from the ground. Mr. DiFabrizio
    said he is six feet tall but could not take a photograph of the
    interior of the garage from that window without holding the
    camera over his head.
    After entertaining extensive argument, the court denied
    defendants’ motion.
    Thereafter, defendants each pled no contest to one count of
    possession of fighting dogs (Pen. Code, § 597.5, subd. (a)(1)), and
    one count of animal cruelty (§ 597, subd. (b)).
    The court sentenced each defendant to county jail for a
    term of three years eight months. The court suspended execution
    of sentence and placed both defendants on five years of formal
    probation on the condition that defendant Williams serve
    365 days in county jail, and defendant Winbush serve 270 days in
    county jail. Defendants were ordered to take animal cruelty
    classes and were prohibited for owning or residing with any
    animals during the probationary period. The remaining counts
    were dismissed in accordance with the plea agreement.
    This appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying their
    motion to suppress and to quash and traverse the warrant. They
    argue the Animal Control officers’ entry onto their property was
    unlawful because they did not have a warrant and there were no
    exigent circumstances. Defendants argue that to the extent the
    loose horse created an emergency, it ended as soon as the horse
    9
    was secured in the trailer and there was no reasonable basis for
    the officers to continue their search into the back yard.
    Defendants contend the subsequent search and seizure of
    evidence pursuant to a warrant was the tainted fruit of the initial
    unconstitutional entry, and neither the independent source rule
    nor the good faith exception apply. When the tainted material is
    excised from the warrant, defendants contend it does not support
    a finding of probable cause. We disagree.
    In reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress
    pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5, we “uphold those factual
    findings of the trial court that are supported by substantial
    evidence.” (People v. Camacho (2000) 
    23 Cal.4th 824
    , 830
    (Camacho).) We independently review the question whether the
    challenged search conformed to constitutional standards of
    reasonableness. (Ibid.) Our review is governed by federal
    constitutional standards. (People v. Rogers (2009) 
    46 Cal.4th 1136
    , 1156, fn. 8 (Rogers); People v. Chung (2010) 
    195 Cal.App.4th 721
    , 727 (Chung).)
    It is fundamental that the Fourth Amendment only
    protects from unreasonable searches “those areas in which a
    person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” (People v.
    Chavez (2008) 
    161 Cal.App.4th 1493
    , 1499 (Chavez).) Plainly, a
    private home is a place in which an individual has a reasonable
    expectation of privacy. (Camacho, 
    supra,
     23 Cal.4th at p. 831.)
    Land or structures immediately adjacent to and intimately
    associated with one’s home, referred to as “curtilage,” are
    ordinarily considered part of the home itself for Fourth
    Amendment purposes. (Oliver v. United States (1984) 
    466 U.S. 170
    , 180.) The Supreme Court identified four factors relevant to
    deciding whether a given area constitutes curtilage: “the
    proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,
    10
    whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the
    home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the
    steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation
    by people passing by.” (United States v. Dunn (1987) 
    480 U.S. 294
    , 301.)
    However, not every warrantless entry to the curtilage of a
    home offends the Fourth Amendment. The protection afforded
    one’s home by the Fourth Amendment “ ‘has never been extended
    to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when
    passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor does the mere
    fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views
    of his activities preclude an officer’s observations from a public
    vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the
    activities clearly visible. [Citation.] “What a person knowingly
    exposes to the public, even in his own home . . . , is not a subject
    of Fourth Amendment protection.” ’ ” (Camacho, supra,
    23 Cal.4th at p. 831.)
    “ ‘ “It is clear that police with legitimate business may enter
    areas of the curtilage which are impliedly open, such as access
    routes to the house.” ’ ” (Chavez, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 1500, italics added.) “ ‘A sidewalk, pathway, common entrance
    or similar passageway offers an implied permission to the public
    to enter which necessarily negates any reasonable expectancy of
    privacy in regard to observations made there. The officer who
    walks upon such property so used by the public does not wear a
    blindfold; the property owner must reasonably expect him to
    observe all that is visible. In substance the owner has invited the
    public and the officer to look and to see.’ ” (Chavez, supra, 161
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1500.)
    It is undisputed that on October 29, 2014, Officer Callaway
    entered the unfenced front yard of defendants’ property for a
    11
    legitimate purpose. Officer Callaway responded to a report of a
    loose horse on the road, a horse which it is undisputed belonged
    to defendants.3 Defendants’ front yard and driveway were not
    fenced off and were publicly accessible. Officer Callaway’s
    actions, including briefly walking through the open gate to see if
    there was a safe corral, were reasonable attempts to secure the
    loose horse and determine if there was a suitable corral on the
    property. His conduct did not constitute a search under the
    Fourth Amendment.
    Once Sergeant Montez-Kemp arrived with the horse trailer
    and secured the horse inside, she and Officer Callaway made
    further efforts to make contact with defendants before hauling
    the horse away. It was reasonable for the officers to make a
    genuine effort to contact the property owner before formally
    impounding the horse. Knocking on the front door, a front
    window to the home, and the front garage door while calling out
    to see if anyone was home were reasonable tactics in that regard
    and did not offend the Fourth Amendment.4
    Defendants primarily take issue with the conduct of the
    officers that occurred thereafter on October 29, 2014, namely
    looking into the windows of the attached garage and walking into
    and inspecting the fenced back yard. Defendants contend there
    3      Los Angeles County Code section 10.32.040 makes it a
    misdemeanor to allow one’s livestock to be loose on public land or
    roads. The citation issued to defendant Williams was for a
    violation of this ordinance.
    4     As defendants apparently concede, no Fourth Amendment
    issue was raised by any of the actions on November 10, 2014,
    when Deputy Ferrell returned with Sergeant Montez-Kemp and
    made observations of the property solely from public vantage
    points outside the fence.
    12
    was no longer any emergency as the horse was in the trailer and
    no longer presented a hazard, and their activities were motivated
    solely by the fact Sergeant Montez-Kemp was on “a mission of
    ferreting out” evidence of a crime.
    Respondent contends the conduct of the officers was
    justified by exigent circumstances. We agree.
    “[T]he exigent circumstances doctrine constitutes an
    exception to the warrant requirement when an emergency
    situation requires swift action to prevent imminent danger to
    life.” (Rogers, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1156.) The exigent
    circumstances exception is properly invoked when “an officer
    reasonably believes an animal on the property is in immediate
    need of aid due to injury or mistreatment.” (Chung, supra,
    195 Cal.App.4th at p. 732; accord, Broden v. Marin Humane
    Society (1999) 
    70 Cal.App.4th 1212
    , 1222.)
    There is no “ ‘ “ ‘litmus test’ ” ’ ” for determining whether
    exigent circumstances exist. (Rogers, 
    supra,
     46 Cal.4th at
    p. 1157.) “ ‘ “ ‘[I]n each case the claim of an extraordinary
    situation must be measured by the facts known to the officers.’ ” ’
    [Citation.] Generally, a court will find a warrantless entry
    justified if the facts available to the officer at the moment of the
    entry would cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that
    the action taken was appropriate.” (Ibid.)
    In Chavez, an officer took a report from a woman that her
    boyfriend, who had previously been violent with her, had forcibly
    taken her car. (Chavez, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497.) She
    told the officer she was scared of her boyfriend, was not certain
    where their seven-year-old son was, and she had seen a gun at
    their home about six months earlier. (Ibid.) The officer went to
    the family home, felt the front grill of the car parked in the
    driveway and noticed it was warm. He therefore assumed the
    13
    boyfriend was inside. He knocked several times on the front
    door, rang the doorbell, and called out his presence, but got no
    response. (Ibid.) He then walked a few steps down a cement
    walkway to a six-foot wooden gate, and looked over. The officer
    noticed a gun lying on the ground near a sliding door that led into
    the home. Fearing for the safety of the boy in case he was inside
    the home, the officer jumped over the fence to retrieve the gun,
    and then jumped back over the fence. (Ibid.)
    In reversing the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s
    motion to suppress, the Chavez court explained, “the officer’s
    observation of the revolver was not a search because the revolver
    was viewed in plain sight. . . . Defendant’s fence, at
    approximately six feet tall, prevented only physical intrusion and
    not observations by persons approximately six feet or taller. . . .
    Such a fence does not prevent viewing . . . in many other
    circumstances such as from an adjacent deck, back yard
    improvement, play set, children’s tree house, or neighbor’s
    second-story window.” (Chavez, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at
    p. 1501, citations omitted.)
    Chavez further held that exigent circumstances justified
    the officer briefly jumping over the fence to secure the revolver.
    “By jumping the fence into defendant’s side yard to secure the
    revolver, [the officer] acted reasonably under the circumstances
    to protect both himself and the child he had reason to believe was
    in the residence. . . . He did not conduct any further search while
    in the yard and instead did no more than was necessary to
    eliminate the risk posed by the gun.” (Chavez, supra, 161
    Cal.App.4th at p. 1503.)
    Here, a horse that was thin and being housed in an unsafe
    corral had escaped from defendants’ property. Officer Callaway
    and Sergeant Montez-Kemp knew there had been prior calls to
    14
    the property in response to reported concerns about the
    conditions of horses and pit bulls on the property. Sergeant
    Montez-Kemp heard puppies barking inside the home when she
    knocked on the door trying to contact defendants, and Officer
    Callaway heard a dog whining from inside the garage. There
    were strong odors of excessive fecal matter reasonably associated
    with unhealthful housing conditions.
    Under those circumstances, it was reasonable for Officer
    Callaway and Sergeant Montez-Kemp to be concerned there was
    a dog in distress inside the garage and possibly in need of
    immediate aid. There was nothing unreasonable about Officer
    Callaway standing on the front driveway and simply looking
    through the broken window in the garage door to determine
    whether the dog he heard making a whining bark was in genuine
    distress. Such facts “would cause a person of reasonable caution
    to believe that the action taken was appropriate.” (Rogers, supra,
    46 Cal.4th at p. 1157.)
    Moreover, Officer Callaway’s conduct, like the officer in
    Chavez, was “ ‘strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which
    justif[ied] its initiation.’ ” (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 
    437 U.S. 385
    ,
    393.) He did not thereafter enter the garage or intrude further
    inside. He only looked inside to determine if the dog needed to be
    assisted. From that vantage point, the treadmill and partially
    covered slat mill device were plainly visible inside the garage.
    Defendants argue that Officer Callaway and Sergeant
    Montez-Kemp did not find any animals in immediate threat of
    injury or death, either inside the garage or in the back yard, and
    in fact ultimately waited several weeks to return with law
    enforcement, and a warrant, to impound the dogs on the
    property. Defendants suggest this is proof there was no
    emergency justifying their conduct. We are not persuaded.
    15
    The exigent circumstances doctrine protects reasonable law
    enforcement conduct. Officer Callaway acted reasonably in
    looking inside the garage window to attempt to determine the
    conditions of the dog he heard inside. Simply because the dog,
    while living in unhealthful conditions, did not appear to be in
    immediate risk of death, does not mean exigent circumstances
    did not justify Officer Callaway’s decision to look inside. (People
    v. Troyer (2011) 
    51 Cal.4th 599
    , 606 [the possibility that injury or
    death may be prevented by immediate action “outweighs the
    affront to privacy” when an officer makes a warrantless entry
    “under the reasonable but mistaken belief that an emergency
    exists”].)
    Defendants argue there were no circumstances that
    justified the officers proceeding into the back yard after having
    looked in the garage. Given the facts known to the officers, it was
    not unreasonable for them to be concerned about the condition of
    the dogs they could hear barking incessantly from the back yard.
    They could have reasonably believed they were justified to walk
    into the back yard and briefly check on the dogs in the kennels
    that were visible from outside the fence.
    Even assuming that Officer Callaway and Sergeant
    Montez-Kemp’s decision to walk into the back yard and inspect
    the kennels was not justified by exigent circumstances, the
    warrant was nonetheless valid. Deputy Ferrell’s affidavit
    contained substantial information supporting a finding of
    probable cause, even without the information obtained by Officer
    Callaway and Sergeant Montez-Kemp’s search of the back yard
    on October 29, 2014.
    We begin with the well-established principle that an
    affidavit of probable cause in support of a search warrant is
    presumed valid. (People v. Scott (2011) 
    52 Cal.4th 452
    , 484.)
    16
    Moreover, “[t]he showing required in order to establish probable
    cause is less than a preponderance of the evidence or even a
    prima facie case.” (People v. Carrington (2009) 
    47 Cal.4th 145
    ,
    163.)
    After excising the information provided to Deputy Ferrell
    by Sergeant Montez-Kemp that was obtained from her
    observations of the kennels while in the back yard (specifically
    the injuries and scarring to the dogs in the kennels), Deputy
    Ferrell’s affidavit contained the following information:
    (1) Deputy Ferrell was a certified expert in blood sport
    investigations; (2) Deputy Ferrell personally observed, from the
    public roadway, the individual dog kennels located on defendants’
    property that were of a type used to house fighting dogs;
    (3) Sergeant Montez-Kemp was an experienced Animal Control
    officer with expertise in illegal dog fighting operations;
    (4) defendants’ property had been the source of numerous calls
    over the previous four years regarding pit bulls on the property
    and an illegal dog fighting operation had been suspected but not
    confirmed; (5) on October 29, 2014, Sergeant Montez-Kemp and
    Officer Callaway had to secure and impound a horse that escaped
    from unsafe housing from defendants’ property; and (6) on
    October 29, 2014, after securing the horse, a slat mill device used
    in the training of fighting dogs was observed on the property.
    This information, without more, was sufficient for the
    search warrant to issue. “[L]aw enforcement officers may draw
    upon their expertise to interpret the facts in a search warrant
    application, and such expertise may be considered by the
    magistrate as a factor supporting probable cause.” (People v.
    Nicholls (2008) 
    159 Cal.App.4th 703
    , 711.) Deputy Ferrell’s
    experience allowed him to explain the significance of the dog
    breed (pit bulls) and the type of kennels on defendants’ property
    17
    as related to a possible dog-fighting operation. Combined with
    the balance of information provided, including the prior calls to
    defendants’ property, there was ample information, given Deputy
    Ferrell’s expertise in bloodsports, demonstrating probable cause,
    even without the information about the injuries and scarring on
    the dogs in the back yard.
    We reject defendants’ contention the information from
    Sergeant Montez-Kemp about prior calls made to defendants’
    property were stale and not properly considered in determining
    probable cause. “No bright-line rule defines the point at which
    information is considered stale. [Citation.] Rather, ‘the question
    of staleness depends on the facts of each case.’ [Citation.] ‘If
    circumstances would justify a person of ordinary prudence to
    conclude that an activity had continued to the present time, then
    the passage of time will not render the information stale.’
    [Citation.]” (People v. Carrington, 
    supra,
     47 Cal.4th at pp. 163-
    164.) The calls at issue spanned approximately a four-year
    period of time during which defendants were known to be
    keeping, and apparently breeding, numerous pit bulls on their
    property. It was not unreasonable for that information to be
    considered relevant to the possible existence of an ongoing dog-
    fighting operation on defendants’ property.
    Defendants have failed to show the affidavit contained any
    material omissions that were deliberately made to create a false
    impression or with reckless disregard for the truth. (People v.
    Scott, 
    supra,
     52 Cal.4th at p. 484.)
    18
    DISPOSITION
    The order denying defendants and appellants’ motion to
    suppress evidence and to quash and traverse the warrant is
    affirmed.
    Defendant and appellant Kevin R. Williams’ judgment of
    conviction is affirmed.
    Defendant and appellant Pauline R. Winbush’s judgment of
    conviction is affirmed.
    GRIMES, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    RUBIN, Acting P. J.
    FLIER, J.
    19