Akers v. Weinshienk , 350 F. App'x 292 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 23, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
MONTGOMERY CARL AKERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 09-1115
(D.C. No. 1:09-CV-00480-ZLW)
ZITA L. WEINSHIENK; RON (D. Colo.)
WILEY; ROBERT BAUER; JERRY
JONES; MR. LORINCZ; MARK
COLLINS; GEORGE KNOX,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, ANDERSON, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Montgomery Carl Akers, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, challenges
the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his Bivens 1 action on the grounds that
the presiding judge, Zita L. Weinshienk, was required to recuse from the case
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i) because she is a party defendant. Exercising our
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we vacate the district court’s dismissal order
and remand this case for reassignment to another judge.
I. Background
In 1995, after finding Mr. Akers to be an abusive litigant, the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado entered an order enjoining him from
initiating any lawsuit in that court without representation by counsel unless he
first obtains leave from the court to proceed pro se. We upheld the
filing-restrictions order in Akers v. Sandoval, No. 95-1306, 1996 WL 635309,
at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 1996) (unpublished). Complying with that order, in
February 2009, Mr. Akers requested permission to file the instant pro se action,
which alleges a conditions-of-confinement claim arising out of his incarceration
at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado. For reasons unclear from
the face of his complaint, in addition to naming various employees of USP
Florence, Mr. Akers also named as a defendant U.S. District Judge Weinshienk, to
whom this case was ultimately assigned.
Judge Weinshienk, acting sua sponte, denied Mr. Akers’s request to
proceed pro se and dismissed the action. Her reasoning was twofold. First, she
found that Mr. Akers had failed to comply with the in forma pauperis statute
because he had not provided a copy of his prisoner trust fund account statement.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Second, she found Mr. Akers had violated the
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court’s local rules by failing to include a complete list of his prior lawsuits in the
court-promulgated “prisoner complaint form.” Mr. Akers then filed a motion to
recuse Judge Weinshienk based on her status as a party defendant. Judge
Weinshienk denied that motion, however, concluding that under United States v.
Grismore, 564 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1977), she was not required to recuse despite
the seemingly mandatory language of § 455(b)(5)(i). Mr. Akers’s appeal focuses
exclusively on Judge Weinshienk’s refusal to recuse.
II. Discussion
We review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Mendoza, 468 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 2006). “[U]nder that standard
we will uphold a district court’s decision unless it is an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” Higganbotham v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Okla. Transp. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The statutory provision at issue provides that a judge “shall” disqualify
herself in circumstances where she is a party to the proceeding. 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(5)(i). In two recent unpublished orders, we explicitly informed Judge
Weinshienk that this provision requires her recusal when she is a named
defendant in the action before her. See Young v. United States, Nos. 07-1314 &
07-1333, 2009 WL 624076, at *7 (10th Cir. Mar. 12, 2009) (applying harmless
error analysis to “Judge Weinshienk’s violation of § 455(b)(5)(i)”); Akers v.
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Weinshienk, No. 08-1471, 2009 WL 1789074, at *1 (10th Cir. June 24, 2009)
(reversing and remanding for reassignment). We recognize that the second order
was issued after Judge Weinshienk issued her decision in this case, but
nevertheless, the statute plainly provides for mandatory recusal in the
circumstances presented here.
Grismore did not announce a contrary holding. In that case, a criminal
defendant sought to disqualify his presiding judge on the grounds that he was
considering suing the judge in an unrelated civil matter. We concluded there
were no grounds for disqualification under § 455, stating that “[a] judge is not
disqualified merely because a litigant sues or threatens to sue him.” Grismore,
564 F.2d at 933. Judge Weinshienk contends this language insulates her decision
to preside over this case notwithstanding her status as a defendant and our express
urging in Young that she “follow the plain command in § 455(b)(5)(i) and recuse
herself from any future cases in which is she is named as a party,” 2009 WL
624076 at *7. The obvious difference between this case and Grismore, however,
is that the judge in that case was not a defendant, or even at risk of becoming a
defendant, in the case in which the recusal was sought. By contrast, in this case,
as in Young and Akers v. Weinshienk, Judge Weinshienk issued a ruling
dismissing an action in which she was a current defendant. Absent being required
to sit by the rule of necessity, see United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-14
(1980), we are aware of no exception that would have justified her refusal to
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recuse under these circumstances. 2 Judge Weinshienk’s decision violated the
clear mandate of § 455(b)(5)(i) and was an abuse of discretion.
In certain limited circumstances we have found it appropriate to review an
improper refusal to recuse for harmless error. See Young, 2009 WL 624076 at *7;
Higganbotham, 328 F.3d at 645. But we conclude such review is not appropriate
in this case. The dismissal of this action was not mandated by a straightforward
application of the law to the merits of Mr. Akers’s claims. Cf. Higganbotham,
328 F.3d at 646 (reviewing for harmless error where case presented
“straightforward questions of law”). Rather, in a discretionary ruling, Judge
Weinshienk dismissed Mr. Akers’s claims because she found his compliance with
the local civil rules to be less than perfect. Under these circumstances, we cannot
say with confidence that the outcome was a foregone conclusion because another
judge may have ruled differently. Cf. Young, 2009 WL 624076 at *7 (noting with
confidence “that a remand would simply result in another judge reaching the same
result as Judge Weinsheink”). We recognize that on remand another judge may
very well reach the same conclusion as Judge Weinshienk, but given the
2
In the order denying Mr. Akers’s recusal motion, Judge Weinshienk cites a
number of decisions from other federal district courts and one unpublished First
Circuit opinion, in which those courts questioned the compulsory aspect of
§ 455(b)(5)(i). We are not bound by those decisions or persuaded by their
reasoning. We agree with the panel’s approach in Mr. Akers’s earlier case
(No. 08-1471) and hold that § 455(b)(5)(i) imposes an absolute rule requiring
recusal unless “the case cannot be heard otherwise.” Will, 449 U.S. at 213(internal quotation marks omitted).
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inherently discretionary nature of the decision under review, that possibility is not
dispositive.
III. Conclusion
Because Judge Weinshienk failed to recuse in this case as required under
28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i), the judgment of the district court is VACATED and this
action is REMANDED for reassignment to another judge.
Mr. Akers’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED and he is
reminded of his continuing obligation to make partial payments until the entire
filing fee has been paid.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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