United States v. Singletary , 685 F. App'x 33 ( 2017 )

16-595
United States v. Singletary
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 30th day of March, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN,
7 DENNIS JACOBS,
8 Circuit Judges,
9 LEWIS A. KAPLAN,*
10 District Judge.
11
12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
14 Appellee,
15
16 -v.- 16-595
17
18 LAVERNE SINGLETARY,
19 Defendant-Appellant.
20
21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
22
23
*
Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by
designation.
1
1 FOR APPELLANT: JON P. GETZ, Muldoon, Getz, &
2 Reston, Rochester, New York.
3
4 FOR APPELLEE: JOSEPH J. KARASZEWSKI, for James
5 P. Kennedy, Jr., Acting United
6 States Attorney for the Western
7 District of New York.
8
9 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
10 Court for the Western District of New York (Geraci, Ch.J.).
11 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
12 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
13 AFFIRMED.
14 Laverne Singletary appeals from the judgment of the
15 United States District Court for the Western District of New
16 York (Geraci, C.J.) denying his motion for a new trial after
17 a jury convicted him of being a felon in possession of a
18 firearm and of simple possession of marijuana. We assume
19 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
20 procedural history, and the issues presented for review. We
21 affirm because Singletary received the potentially
22 exculpatory impeachment material with enough time to
23 effectively use it at trial.
24 Amy Pfeffer of the Rochester Police Department and
25 Robert Masucci of the Monroe County Office of Probation
26 stopped Singletary on October 6, 2012. After Singletary
27 bolted, the officers caught up to him and found several bags
2
1 of marijuana in Singletary’s pocket and a handgun he
2 discarded on the sidewalk. Masucci processed the firearm
3 and the marijuana at the police station, but wrote on the
4 evidence labels that Pfeffer collected the items and sealed
5 the bags. Masucci testified that he used Pfeffer’s name as
6 a convenience: because Masucci was an officer in the Monroe
7 County Office of Probation, his name was not in the
8 Rochester Police Department’s system.
9 Singletary moved for a new trial after conviction on
10 the basis of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963): he
11 argued that he did not learn of the mislabeled evidence bags
12 early enough. The district judge denied the motion.
13 Singletary learned that Masucci had filled out the evidence
14 labels when Masucci testified to that effect on the first
15 day of trial. Singletary’s attorney cross-examined Masucci,
16 but did not seek a continuance after his direct.1
17 “The basic rule of Brady is that the Government has a
18 constitutional duty to disclose favorable evidence to the
19 accused where such evidence is ‘material’ either to guilt or
20 to punishment.” United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139
21 (2d Cir. 2001). That rule encompasses evidence that can be
1
Masucci was the key government witness because
Pfeffer did not testify during the trial–-she resigned from
the police department before the trial, and signaled that
she would take the Fifth Amendment if asked to testify.
3
1 used to impeach a government witness. Id. (citing Giglio v.
2 United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)). But the
3 constitution requires only that the government disclose such
4 evidence “in time for its effective use at trial,” id. at
5 142, and effective use can be made even when evidence is
6 disclosed for the first time during trial. See Leka v.
7 Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2001).
8 Masucci’s misstatements about the evidence bags may
9 well have been material for impeachment, and Singletary
10 certainly seemed to treat them as such: the defense
11 aggressively cross-examined Masucci about the incorrectly
12 labeled evidence bags, forced him to admit that the evidence
13 bag labels were “lies,” called a witness from the Rochester
14 Police Department who testified that what Masucci did was
15 “forgery,” and argued about the incorrect labels in his
16 closing statement. Singletary has failed to offer any
17 concrete examples of how he could have used the information
18 more effectively at trial if he had learned of it earlier.
19 He suffered no prejudice from the timing of the disclosure,
20 and there was therefore no Brady violation. Coppa, 267 F.3d
21 at 140-42. His ill-defined claim of prosecutorial
22 misconduct fails for the same reason.
4
1 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
2 Singletary’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment
3 of the district court.
4
5
6 FOR THE COURT:
7 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
8
5