United States v. Steffey , 352 F. App'x 763 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-4786
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    BENJAMIN RAY STEFFEY,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    No. 08-5214
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    BILLY RAY FRANKLIN,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Durham.    James A. Beaty, Jr.,
    Chief District Judge; William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge.
    (1:07-cr-00428-JAB-6; 1:07-cr-00428-WO-2)
    Submitted:    October 23, 2009              Decided:   November 10, 2009
    Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Ames C. Chamberlin, LAW OFFICES OF AMES CHAMBERLIN, Greensboro,
    North Carolina; John C. Fischer, RANDOLPH & FISCHER, Winston
    Salem, North Carolina, for Appellants.       Anna Mills Wagoner,
    United States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    2
    PER CURIAM:
    Benjamin Ray Steffey pled guilty pursuant to a plea
    agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess pseudoephedrine,
    knowing and having reasonable cause to believe that it would be
    used to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
       (2006).         After    granting       the    Government’s     motion    for    a
    downward      variance      for        substantial       assistance       under       U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 5K1.1, p.s. (2007), the
    district    court     sentenced        Steffey    to    28    months’   imprisonment.
    Co-defendant Billy Ray Franklin pled guilty pursuant to a plea
    agreement to conspiracy to manufacture and distribute 500 grams
    or   more      of     methamphetamine            and     conspiracy      to      possess
    pseudoephedrine, knowing and having reasonable cause to believe
    it would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of
    
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (b)(1)(A),          846     (2006).       The    district        court
    sentenced      Franklin     to     a    within-Guidelines         sentence       of    188
    months’ imprisonment.
    Steffey    and     Franklin      timely    appeal      their   sentences.
    Steffey contends that the district court erred in refusing to
    grant his request for a variance.                      Franklin contends that the
    district      court     erred    in     enhancing       his   base    offense     level,
    pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(10)(C)(ii), for a methamphetamine-
    manufacturing offense that created a substantial risk of harm to
    human life.      We affirm.
    3
    We review the sentence imposed by the district court
    for abuse of discretion.           Gall v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    ,
    591 (2007).      In conducting this review, we must first determine
    that the court committed no significant procedural errors; if
    the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then consider its
    substantive     reasonableness,          applying     an    abuse    of    discretion
    standard.     United States v. Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 328 (4th Cir.
    2009).       “Procedural errors include ‘failing to calculate (or
    improperly     calculating)        the    Guidelines        range,    treating    the
    Guidelines     as     mandatory,    failing      to    consider      the    § 3553(a)
    factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
    or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence--including
    an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’”
    Id. (quoting Gall, 
    128 S. Ct. at 597
    ).
    Steffey requested a downward variance of two offense
    levels, arguing that, had his Guidelines range been calculated
    pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1 instead of USSG § 2D1.11, he would have
    qualified for the two-level offense level reduction associated
    with   the    USSG    § 5C1.2   safety     valve.          Having    considered   the
    parties’ arguments, the district court denied Steffey’s request
    for a variance.         In sentencing Steffey, the court followed the
    necessary procedural steps, including treating the Guidelines as
    advisory, weighing the relevant 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors, and
    calculating     and     considering       the   applicable      Guideline     range.
    4
    Steffey’s base offense level was calculated pursuant to USSG
    § 2D1.11.       Unlike USSG § 2D1.1, this section does not explicitly
    provide for a two-level reduction if the defendant satisfies the
    criteria of USSG § 5C1.2.                     USSG § 2D1.11; see United States v.
    Saffo, 
    227 F.3d 1260
    , 1273 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that, when
    a   defendant’s           base      offense      level     is     calculated       under     USSG
    § 2D1.11,      he    is       not     eligible    for      the    safety     valve    reduction
    under    USSG       § 2D1.1);           cf.   USSG     § 2D1.1(b)(11).             Accordingly,
    Steffey’s      sentence          is     procedurally       reasonable.          Moreover,     we
    cannot    say    it       was     an     abuse   of    discretion      for     the    court    to
    decline to grant the two-level reduction.                             Hence, the sentence
    was not substantively unreasonable.
    Franklin contends that the district court erred in its
    application         of    USSG      §    2D1.1(b)(10)(C)(ii).               Specifically,     he
    asserts       that       the     methamphetamine-manufacturing                activities       in
    which he participated did not present a “substantial” risk to
    human    life.           We     conclude        that    the      district    court     properly
    applied the enhancement.
    The district court’s determination that the risk of
    harm enhancement applies is a mixed question of fact and law
    that     is    reviewed          de      novo    when,      as     here,     the     facts    are
    undisputed.              United       States     v.    Houchins,      
    364 F.3d 182
    ,    187
    (4th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 
    543 U.S. 1104
     (2005).
    Section       2D1.1(b)(10)(C)(ii)(I)                  of   the     Sentencing        Guidelines
    5
    provides       for     a    three-level        increase      in     a     defendant’s       base
    offense        level       if   the    offense      involved        the       manufacture     of
    methamphetamine and created a substantial risk of harm to human
    life.     In determining whether a substantial risk was created, a
    court    should        consider:       (1)    the   quantity       of    any     chemicals   or
    hazardous       or     toxic      substances,       and   the     manner       in   which   such
    items were stored; (2) the manner in which the substances were
    disposed, and the likelihood of release into the environment;
    (3)     the     duration        of    the     offense,      and    the        extent   of    the
    manufacturing operation; and (4) the location of the laboratory.
    USSG § 2D1.1, cmt. n.20(A); see Houchins, 
    364 F.3d at 187-90
    .
    Here,        law       enforcement         officials           recovered     from
    properties used by Franklin a 1000-pound tank containing 700
    gallons of a hazardous chemical, anhydrous ammonia, along with
    other, smaller tanks and other chemicals and implements used in
    the manufacturing of methamphetamine.                       Franklin, members of his
    family,        and     various        other    people       came        and     went   on    the
    properties.          As a result of its improper storage, the highly
    pressurized 1000-pound tank, the second largest ever recovered
    in the United States, was at risk of explosion and the people
    coming and going on the properties were at risk of death or
    injury.        Further, a hazardous materials team was required to
    clean up the properties and spent nine days draining the ammonia
    from     the     1000-pound          tank.       Under      these       circumstances,       we
    6
    conclude that the district court did not err in applying the
    enhancement.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district
    court.     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions   are   adequately   presented    in   the    materials
    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-4786, 08-5214

Citation Numbers: 352 F. App'x 763

Judges: Hamilton, King, Michael, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 11/10/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/7/2023