Joyce L. Parks v. Commissioner of Social Security , 353 F. App'x 194 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Nov. 16, 2009
No. 09-12367 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00504-CV-OC-GRJ
JOYCE L. PARKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 16, 2009)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joyce L. Parks appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner
of Social Security’s denial of her application for disability benefits, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Parks contends the ALJ committed reversible error by (1) giving
reduced weight to the opinion of Dr. Reheem, one of Parks’ treating physicians,
and (2) discounting Parks’ subjective reports of pain. We address each issue in
turn, and affirm.1
I.
Parks contends the ALJ erred by discounting the medical opinion of one of
her treating physicians, Dr. Reheem, because good cause did not exist to reject the
opinion and the ALJ failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the opinion.
The ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary
finding. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985). Absent the
existence of “good cause” to the contrary, however, the ALJ must give the treating
physician’s testimony substantial weight. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,
1240 (11th Cir. 2004). “‘[G]ood cause’ exists when the: (1) treating physician’s
opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary
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When “the ALJ denies benefits and the [Appeals Council] denies review, we review
the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274,
1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We review the Commissioner’s factual findings with deference, and the
“factual findings are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence, consisting of such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.(quotation omitted). However, we review the Commissioner’s legal conclusions de novo.
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
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finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the
doctor’s own medical records.” Id. at 1240-41.
If the ALJ disregards the opinion of a treating physician, the ALJ must
clearly articulate his reasons. Id. at 1241. We have found no reversible error
“[w]here our limited review precludes re-weighing the evidence anew, and [where]
the ALJ articulated specific reasons for failing to give [the treating physician’s]
opinion controlling weight” and these findings are supported by substantial
evidence. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005). When the
ALJ does not give the treating physician’s opinion controlling weight, the ALJ
applies other factors such as the length of treatment, the frequency of examination,
the nature and extent of the relationship, the supportability of the opinion, its
consistency with other evidence, and the specialization of the physician. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)(2)-(6).
The ALJ expressly addressed the weight given to Dr. Reheem’s opinion.
Specifically, the ALJ found Dr. Reheem’s opinion was not supported by his own
records or the opinions of Drs. Inga and Kaplan who also treated Parks. In
particular, Dr. Reheem repeatedly noted that pain medication controlled Parks’
pain to a tolerable level. In August 2006, Dr. Reheem did not note a change in
Parks’ condition. Nonetheless, in September 2006, he opined that Parks was
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disabled. Moreover, Dr. Inga, another of Parks’ treating physicians, opined in
February 2006 that Parks could work in a sedentary type of job where she lifted
nothing heavier than 20 pounds and avoided certain repetitive motions.
Substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s decision not to give Dr.
Reheem’s testimony great weight.
II.
Parks asserts the ALJ erred by rejecting her credibility about her pain
without any basis in the record. “[A] claimant’s subjective complaints of pain
cannot in and of themselves serve as conclusive evidence of disability. The record
must document by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic
techniques the existence of a medical impairment which could reasonably be
expected to produce the disabling pain.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 132
(11th Cir. 1986). A three-part “pain standard” applies when a claimant attempts to
establish disability through his own testimony of pain or other subjective
symptoms. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). The pain
standard requires: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition, and either
(2) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain arising
from that condition, or (3) the objectively determined medical condition is of such
a severity it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Id.4
When a claimant testifies to subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must
clearly articulate adequate reasons for discrediting the claimant’s allegations of
disabling symptoms. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). In
articulating his reasons, the ALJ need not specifically refer to every piece of
evidence, so long as the decision “is not a broad rejection which is not enough to
enable the district court or this Court to conclude that the ALJ considered [the]
medical condition as a whole.” Id. at 1210-11 (quotation omitted). A clearly
articulated credibility determination supported by substantial evidence will not be
disturbed. Feet v. Cater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995).
Parks’ claim the ALJ erred by discrediting her pain testimony and doing so
without adequate explanation is without merit. The ALJ expressly based the
credibility determination on Parks’ ability to take care of her personal needs,
including errands, driving, and attending church, and the fact that her medication
was controlling her pain. The record supports the ALJ’s conclusion because it
shows Parks was able to cook, clean, run errands, drive, and attend church weekly.
Additionally, medical evidence shows Parks’ medication reasonably controlled her
pain. Thus, the ALJ’s rejection of Parks’ subjective pain testimony was based on
adequate reasons as the effectiveness of Parks’ medication and her ability to
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perform chores, drive, and attend church are inconsistent with her testimony of
debilitating pain.
AFFIRMED.
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