United States v. Kamara Catavious Woodson , 354 F. App'x 411 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 1, 2009
No. 09-11921 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 98-00221-CR-WS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KAMARA CATAVIOUS WOODSON,
a.k.a. Kamara Woodson,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(December 1, 2009)
Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kamara Catavious Woodson appeals the district court’s denial of his second
motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In his second
§ 3582(c)(2) motion, Woodson asserted the district court erred by partially denying
his first § 3582(c)(2) motion. In Woodson’s first § 3582(c)(2) motion, he
requested a lower sentence based on Amendment 706 to the Sentencing
Guidelines, which reduced the base offense level for crack cocaine offenses two
levels. The district court partially granted Woodson’s first motion and reduced his
sentence to the lowest possible under the amended Guidelines range. The district
court denied further relief, however, determining it lacked the authority to revisit
other sentencing issues and could not reduce his sentence any further. Woodson’s
appeal from the first § 3582(c)(2) order was dismissed. Woodson now contends
the district court erred in denying his second § 3582(c)(2) motion by refusing to
correct purported errors in his original resentencing.
Assuming arguendo this second § 3582(c)(2) motion was procedurally
permitted, the district court committed no error in denying it. The district court
previously afforded Woodson the maximum relief permitted under Amendment
706 and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3). Proceedings under § 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10 “do not constitute a full resentencing of the defendant” or a de novo
resentencing. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(3); United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217,
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1220 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court could not revisit other purported
sentencing errors, see United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 782 (11th Cir. 2000)
(stating § 3582(c)(2) does not “grant to the court jurisdiction to consider
extraneous resentencing issues”), and Booker did not give the district court
authority to resentence Woodson, see United States v. Melvin, 556 F.3d 1190, 1192
(11th Cir. 2009) (holding the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), does not provide an independent basis for granting a
sentence reduction in the context of § 3582(c)(2) proceedings because Booker does
not apply to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings). The district court did not err in denying
Woodson’s second § 3582(c)(2) motion. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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