McIntosh v. Wells Fargo Bank , 226 So. 3d 377 ( 2017 )


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  •          IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FIFTH DISTRICT
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    ELNA F. MCINTOSH AND
    CHRISTOPHER HALLMAN,
    Appellants,
    v.                                               Case No. 5D16-2189
    WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.
    AND BELLALAGO AND ISLES
    OF BELLALAGO COMMUNITY
    ASSOCIATION, INC.,
    Appellees.
    ________________________________/
    Opinion filed September 18, 2017
    Appeal from the Circuit Court
    for Osceola County,
    Scott Polodna, Judge.
    Andrew B. Greenlee, of Andrew B
    Greenlee, P.A., Sanford, and Anthony N.
    Legendre, II, of Law Offices of Legendre &
    Legendre, PLLC, Maitland, for Appellants.
    Kimberly S. Mello and Laura J. Bassini, of
    Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Tampa, and
    Michele L. Stocker, of Greenberg Traurig,
    P.A., Ft. Lauderdale, for Appellee, Wells
    Fargo Bank, N.A.
    No Appearance for Appellee, Isles of
    Bellalago Community Association, Inc.
    ORFINGER, J.
    Elna F. McIntosh and Christopher Hallman (collectively “Borrowers”) appeal a final
    judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., following a non-jury
    trial. On appeal, Borrowers contend that the trial court erred by concluding that United
    States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations were not
    conditions precedent to bringing the foreclosure action, denying Borrowers’ motions for
    involuntary dismissal, and entering a final judgment of foreclosure.       We agree and
    reverse.
    In April 2010, Borrowers executed a note to FBC Mortgage, LLC, and secured its
    payment with a mortgage. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured the loan.
    Eventually, Wells Fargo became the holder of the note and mortgage. In its operative
    complaint, Wells Fargo generally alleged that it had complied with all conditions precedent
    to filing the lawsuit. In their answer, Borrowers denied that Wells Fargo had satisfied all
    conditions precedent and asserted several affirmative defenses, including that Wells
    Fargo failed to comply with the HUD requirement to send proper delinquency notices
    under 
    24 C.F.R. § 203.602
     (2016). Ultimately, the case proceeded to trial. After Wells
    Fargo rested its case, Borrowers moved for an involuntary dismissal, asserting several
    grounds, only one of which has merit—Wells Fargo’s failure to demonstrate compliance
    with applicable HUD regulations prior to filing suit.
    The mortgage in this case specifically incorporates HUD regulations as limitations
    on acceleration and foreclosure. Paragraph 9 of the mortgage states, in pertinent part:
    9.     Grounds for Acceleration of Debt.
    (a) Default. Lender may, except as limited by
    regulations issued by the Secretary [of Housing and
    Urban Development], in the case of payment defaults,
    require immediate payment in full of all sums secured
    by this Security Instrument . . .
    2
    ...
    (d) Regulations of HUD Secretary. In many
    circumstances regulations issued by the Secretary will
    limit Lender’s rights, in the case of payment defaults,
    to require immediate payment in full and foreclose if not
    paid. This Security Instrument does not authorize
    acceleration or foreclosure if not permitted by
    regulations of the Secretary.
    Paragraph 6(B) of the note similarly provides:
    (B) Default
    If Borrower defaults by failing to pay in full any monthly
    payment, then Lender may, except as limited by regulations
    of the Secretary in the case of payment defaults, require
    immediate payment in full of the principal balance remaining
    due and all accrued interest. Lender may choose not to
    exercise this option without waiving its rights in the event of
    any subsequent default. In many circumstances regulations
    issued by the Secretary will limit Lender’s rights to require
    immediate payment in full in the case of payment defaults.
    This Note does not authorize acceleration when not permitted
    by HUD regulations. As used in this Note, “Secretary” means
    the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or his or
    her designee.
    Wells Fargo concedes that pursuant to Palma v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
    208 So. 3d 771
     (Fla. 5th DCA 2016), compliance with certain HUD regulations is a condition
    precedent to bringing a foreclosure action when, as here, the regulations are incorporated
    into the terms of the loan.1     In Palma, we held that a promissory note specifically
    incorporated HUD regulations by stating that “[i]f Borrower defaults . . . then Lender may,
    except as limited by regulations of the Secretary in the case of payment defaults, require
    immediate payment in full . . . . This Note does not authorize acceleration when not
    1 This Court decided Palma after the trial and after Wells Fargo filed its initial brief
    in this case.
    3
    permitted by HUD regulations.” 
    208 So. 3d at 773
    . Palma also held that the burden rests
    with the plaintiff to prove compliance with conditions precedent if asserted in the complaint
    and denied in the answer, but with the defendant if raised instead as an affirmative
    defense in the answer. 
    Id. at 774
    . Here, Borrowers raised noncompliance with § 203.602
    and the terms of the note and mortgage as both a specific denial and an affirmative
    defense. Thus, the burden remained on Wells Fargo to demonstrate compliance with the
    applicable HUD regulations.2     See id. at 775 (holding that specific denial that bank
    complied with all conditions precedent shifted burden back to bank to prove at trial that it
    complied).
    Compliance with HUD regulations was a condition precedent to bringing a
    foreclosure action in this case. Wells Fargo’s argument that it substantially complied with
    the HUD regulations is unavailing. Accordingly, we reverse and direct the trial court to
    enter an order of involuntary dismissal.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    WALLIS and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
    2 Compliance with HUD regulations 
    24 C.F.R. §§ 203.604
     and 203.605 is also
    required.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 5D16-2189

Citation Numbers: 226 So. 3d 377

Filed Date: 9/18/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023