Maral Annayeva v. SAB of the TSD of the City of St. Louis, and Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund ( 2020 )

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc
MARAL ANNAYEVA, ) Opinion issued March 17, 2020
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. SC98122
) Consolidated with
SAB OF THE TSD OF THE CITY ) No. SC98124
OF ST. LOUIS, )
)
and )
)
TREASURER OF MISSOURI AS )
CUSTODIAN OF THE SECOND )
INJURY FUND, )
)
Respondents. )
APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
Maral Annayeva appeals a decision from the Labor and Industrial Relations
Commission ("Commission") denying her claim for workers' compensation benefits for
injuries sustained when she fell while entering her place of work. Annayeva failed to prove
her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment; therefore, the Commission's
denial of workers' compensation benefits is affirmed.
Factual Background and Procedural History
Maral Annayeva worked as an English as a second language teacher at Roosevelt
High School in St. Louis. On January 8, 2013, Annayeva drove to Roosevelt, parked in
the school parking lot, and walked into the school carrying a bag containing various folders,
student papers, and lesson plans. Annayeva entered the school through a set of double
doors, passed a security guard station, and headed toward the room where she clocked-in.
At some time during the walk, Annayeva slipped on Roosevelt's linoleum floor, causing
her to fall forward and land on her hands and knees. Annayeva was taken for treatment to
the school nurse's office, where she filled out an accident report noting she could not
determine what had caused her to slip and fall.
Annayeva then went to the emergency room at St. Mary's Hospital complaining of
back and knee pain. She returned to the emergency room the next day due to the pain she
was experiencing. After missing a few days of work due to the accident, Annayeva
returned to work for several days but stopped after having difficulties teaching. She did
not work again until August 2013, when the new school year began. She worked for two
days but again stopped after experiencing too much pain. Annayeva testified she
experienced pain in her legs, back, head, right thigh, right hip, neck, arms, right shoulder
and fingers. Additionally, Annayeva complained of breathing problems, stomach
problems, liver problems, anxiety, depression, dizziness, nausea, face drooping, and cysts
on her fingers. For her ailments, Annayeva sought and received an extensive list of medical
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treatments 1 including: injections, x-rays, physical therapy, spinal adjustments, an MRI, and
water therapy, as well as several other doctor's visits, medical tests, and medications.
In addition to her testimony, Annayeva presented evidence of her medical records,
transcripts of doctors' depositions, and medical bills. The Special Administrative Board of
the Transitional School District of the City of St. Louis ("SAB") presented deposition
testimony of three other doctors who evaluated Annayeva and one other doctor's medical
records. The ALJ denied Annayeva any workers' compensation benefits, noting:
[Annayeva] has failed to provide credible testimony to this Court. It is clear
[Annayeva's] description of her injuries and their subsequent effects verge
on the point of malingering. As all, if not most, of [Annayeva's] medical
expert testimony relies . . . on [Annayeva's] own subjective description of her
maladies[.] There is little or no objective medical finding to support any of
[Annayeva's] anomalies. [Annayeva] has not met her burden of showing the
incident of January 8, 2013 was the prevailing factor causing the
physiological and/or psychological complaints.
Annayeva appealed the ALJ's denial of benefits to the Commission, which affirmed
the ALJ's decision with a supplemental opinion. 2 In its supplemental opinion, the
Commission held Annayeva failed to establish that her injury arose out of her employment.
The Commission determined any evidence, including Annayeva's testimony, 3 regarding
the soiled condition of the floor on the day of her accident was not credible and held,
1
SAB referred Annayeva to Concentra for medical treatment. After evaluation, Concentra
provided her with a knee brace and ordered physical therapy, which Annayeva attended twice.
The remainingmedical treatments were sought by Annayeva individually.
2
When the Commission adopts the findings of the ALJ, appellate courts review those findings as
if originally made by the Commission. § 287.495.1, RSMo 2000.
3
Annayeva testified the condition of the linoleum floor on the day of the accident was "normal"
but, after being repeatedly questioned by her attorney, she recanted this answer and testified the
floor was covered by particles of dirt, ice, dust, and moisture.
3
"[w]ithout additional support in the record for the alleged hazardous condition of the
hallway floor, we find that the only risk source in this matter was that of walking, one to
which [Annayeva] would have been equally exposed in normal non-employment life."
After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V,
§ 10.
Standard of Review
This Court reviews all final decisions, findings, rules, and orders of the Commission
to determine "whether the same are supported by competent and substantial evidence upon
the whole record." Mo. Const. art. V, § 18. The Commission's decision will be affirmed
unless: "(1) the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the award was
procured by fraud; (3) the facts found by the Commission do not support the award; or
(4) there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the
award." White v. ConAgra Packaged Foods, LLC, 535 S.W.3d 336, 338 (Mo. banc 2017);
§ 287.495.1, RSMo 2000. 4 "Upon appeal no additional evidence shall be heard and, in the
absence of fraud, the findings of fact made by the [C]ommission within its powers shall be
conclusive and binding." § 287.495.1, RSMo 2000. In addition to findings of fact, this
Court also defers to the Commission's determinations as to credibility of witnesses and the
weight given to conflicting evidence. Greer v. SYSCO Food Servs., 475 S.W.3d 655, 664
(Mo. banc 2015).
4
All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2008, unless otherwise provided.
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Analysis
Missouri's Workers' Compensation Law ("Act") was amended in 2005 "to provide
that its provisions are to be construed strictly and to require the evidence to be weighed
impartially without giving any party the benefit of the doubt." Miller v. Mo. Highway and
Transp. Comm'n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 673 (Mo. banc 2009) 5; § 287.800. Under the Act, an
injury is compensable only when the claimant demonstrates the injury has arisen out of and
in the course of employment. § 287.020.3(1); Johme v. St. John's Mercy Healthcare, 366
S.W.3d 504, 509 (Mo. banc 2012) ("[T]he workers' compensation claimant[] bears the
burden of proof to show that her injury was compensable in workers' compensation.").
An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment
only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that
the accident is the prevailing factor 6 in causing the injury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to
which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to
the employment in normal nonemployment life.
§ 287.020.3(2)(a)-(b). "For an injury to be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the
employment under section 287.020.3(2)(b), the claimant employee must show a causal
connection between the injury at issue and the employee's work activity." Johme, 366
S.W.3d at 510.
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"Prior to the 2005 amendments, the [A]ct's provisions were required to be construed liberally in
favor of compensation." Id. at 673.
6
"'The prevailing factor' is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing
both the resulting medical condition and disability." § 287.020.3(1) (emphasis omitted).
5
This Court recognized in Miller and Johme that failure to prove the hazard or risk
causing the employee injury was related to employment to which the employee would not
have been equally exposed outside of work is fatal to an employee's workers' compensation
claim.
In Miller, a road crew worker was repairing a section of road on Route N in Pike
County. Miller, 287 S.W.3d at 672. While walking on the flat road back to a truck
containing repair material, Miller felt his knee pop. Id. Miller required surgery to repair
an impinging medial shelf plica. Id. Miller sought workers' compensation benefits, which
the Commission denied. Id. This Court affirmed the Commission's decision, holding
Miller failed to prove his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment because
nothing about his work transformed his walk to the truck into a hazard or risk he was not
equally exposed to in normal, nonemployment life. Id. at 674. Said differently, an injury
occurring at work does not automatically make such an injury compensable; some
condition of employment must create a hazard or risk the employee would not be equally
exposed to in normal, nonemployment life. Id. 7
In Johme, a billing representative at a hospital tripped and fell after making a pot of
coffee in the workplace kitchen. 366 S.W.3d at 505-06. Johme sought workers'
compensation benefits, which the Commission awarded. Id. at 507. This Court reversed,
holding Johme failed to prove her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment
because no evidence demonstrated her injury was caused by a risk related to her
7
"An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor."
§ 287.020.2.
6
employment activity as opposed to a risk she was equally exposed to in normal life. Id. at
512.
Annayeva attempts to distinguish her situation from those cases by arguing the
condition of Roosevelt's linoleum floor on the day of the accident was a hazard or risk she
was not exposed to in her normal, nonemployment life. The Commission found the only
evidence presented regarding the floor's condition was Annayeva's testimony that the floor
was covered with particles of dirt, ice, dust, and moisture. The Commission, however,
determined this testimony was not credible. 8 Because this Court is bound by the
8
Annayeva contends the Commission's determination that her testimony was not credible was not
supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. This contention
misunderstands the nature of that requirement. Only factual findings that are necessary to make
an award for the employee must be supported by competent and substantial evidence on the whole
record. See Mo. Const. art. V, § 18; § 287.495.1, RSMo 2000; White, 535 S.W.3d at 338.
Credibility determinations, on the other hand, do not and – once expressed by the Commission –
are binding on this Court. Greer, 475 S.W.3d at 664. Annayeva's overall burden of proof is made
up of two separate burdens, the burden of persuasion and the burden of production. Krispy Kreme
Doughnut Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 488 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Mo. banc 2016). "The burden of
[production] is a party's duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided
by the fact fact-finder[.]" Kinzenbaw v. Dir. of Revenue, 62 S.W.3d 49, 53 n.6 (Mo. banc 2001)
(internal quotations omitted). In a workers' compensation case, an employee meets this burden
when she introduces competent and substantial evidence on the whole record sufficient to support
a finding on each of the facts necessary to that award. The burden of persuasion, on the other
hand, requires the employee actually "to convince the fact-finder to view the facts in a way that
favors [her]." Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp., 488 S.W.3d at 67. Assuming arguendo that
Annayeva carried her burden of production as to the condition of the linoleum floor through her
testimony, it is clear Annayeva failed to meet her burden of persuasion. In its findings, the
Commission analyzed why it was not persuaded by Annayeva's description of the floor. First,
Annayeva originally testified the floor was "normal" and only changed her answer upon repeated
questioning by her attorney. Second, the Commission reviewed the accident report Annayeva
filled out in the nurse's office immediately after her fall; it explicitly provided she did not know
what the cause of her accident was. Third, the Commission reviewed Annayeva's medical records,
none of which mentioned the condition of the linoleum floor at the time of the accident. Because
it did not believe Annayeva's testimony, the Commission concluded she had failed to carry her
burden of convincing the Commission that her injury arose out of or in the course of her
employment.
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Commission's credibility determinations when they are expressed in the award or denial of
benefits and the weight the Commission gives to conflicting evidence, it must treat
Annayeva's testimony regarding the condition of the floor as not persuasive. Greer, 475
S.W.3d at 664. Because Annayeva has failed to produce any credible evidence regarding
the soiled condition of the floor, her walk into school was no different from any other walk
taken in her normal, nonemployment life. Under § 287.020.3(b), Annayeva's workers'
compensation claim is not compensable.
Conclusion
Just like the claimants in Miller and Johme, Annayeva failed to prove her injury
arose out of and in the course of her employment because the hazard or risk involved was
one Annayeva was equally exposed to in her normal, nonemployment life. Therefore, she
has failed to carry her burden of proof, and the Commission's denial of benefits is affirmed.
________________________
Zel M. Fischer, Judge
All concur.
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