Holliday v. Calanni Ents., Inc. , 2021 Ohio 2266 ( 2021 )

[Cite as Holliday v. Calanni Ents., Inc., 2021-Ohio-2266.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
YOLANDA HOLLIDAY, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 110001
v. :
CALANNI ENTERPRISES, INC., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 1, 2021
Civil Appeal from the Lakewood Municipal Court
Case No. 2018-CVI-01295
Appearances:
Yolanda Holliday, pro se.
Kenneth D. Myers, for appellant.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
Defendant-appellant, Calanni Enterprises, Inc. (“Calanni”), appeals
the trial court’s decision entering judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Yolanda
Holliday (“Holliday”). Finding merit to the appeal, we reverse and remand with
instructions for the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Calanni.
In July 2018, Holliday filed a small claims complaint against Calanni
for money damages associated with repairs made to her vehicle. Holliday sought a
refund of $1,699.87.
At trial, Holliday and her father, George Holliday (“George”)
(collectively “the Hollidays”), testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the
repair of the vehicle. On November 2, 2017, Holliday’s then-boyfriend, Joe Frame,
contacted Calanni to repair Holliday’s 2004 Mitsubishi Endeavor. The vehicle was
towed to the Calanni lot. According to Holliday, the main concerns about her vehicle
were that the car would not shift into gear and the check-engine light was
illuminated. A repair order dated November 2, 2017 was purportedly signed by
Frame, authorizing Calanni to make the repairs described on the work order. Those
repairs included basic fluid checks and refills, charging the battery, ignition work,
and gearshift repair. The total cost for the repairs was $1,699.87.
Charles Calanni (“Charles”) testified that he completed the repairs
listed on the repair order. Because Holliday needed additional time to pay for the
repairs, he stored her vehicle at an offsite location until the invoice was paid. It is
undisputed that the invoice was paid in full on April 2, 2018, and George drove the
vehicle from the Calanni lot.
George testified that when he got into the vehicle, he noticed that the
gearshift cover was not replaced on the gearshift and was sitting on the passenger
seat. He admitted, however, that the gearshift issue was repaired.
According to George, he had to jump-start the car the next day to take
it back to Calanni for the “ignitions test,” i.e., E-check. He stated that on his way to
Calanni, the car stalled, and he had to call Charles for the car to be towed back to the
shop. According to George, Charles told him that the battery cables were connected
incorrectly. After they were tightened, George left with the vehicle without getting
the ignitions test done. On the way home the vehicle stalled again. George said that
he called Charles, and the vehicle was towed again back to the shop. According to
George, Charles advised him that the alternator was bad and would cost $200 to fix.
George said that Charles subsequently told him that there were some wiring issues,
and despite being told it would only take a few days to fix, weeks passed without
hearing anything regarding the repairs.
George stated that when he finally spoke to Charles, he was told that
the fuel pump was clogged and needed repair. According to George, Charles told
him it would be fixed within a week, but after time passed, Charles told him that the
starter needed repair. Documentary evidence was presented that on June 27, 2018,
George authorized a repair order whereby Calanni agreed to accept $200 to make
all the subsequent repairs to Holliday’s vehicle.
George testified that he did not know what the initial November 2017
repair order involved. He further stated that the subsequent issues involving the
battery, fuel pump, alternator, and starter occurred after the car was initially fixed.
Finally, he stated that he did not know whether these subsequent problems were
related to the initial repairs made by Calanni.
Holliday testified that her ex-boyfriend had her vehicle towed to
Calanni to repair a gearshift issue — the car would run but would not shift into gear
— and to address the illuminated check-engine light. Holliday stated that the vehicle
was in Calanni’s possession from November 2, 2017 until April 2, 2018, which was
when the repair invoice was paid in full. She stated that on that date, her father
drove the car off the lot; she admitted that as of that date, the gearshift issue had
been repaired. She stated that the check-engine light was still illuminated, however.
When asked whether she had any evidence that Calanni did not fix
the items listed on the November 2, 2017 repair order, Holliday responded “[n]ot
yet,” but said she felt that if the car was not running, then nothing was fixed,
especially because the check-engine light was still illuminated. (Tr. 66.) Holliday
later stated that she did not know what Calanni fixed, speculating that nothing was
fixed.
Regarding the “ignitions test” or E-check, Holliday stated that she
gave Charles some paperwork so he could obtain an E-check. She testified that she
did not know that he obtained the E-check, stating that she had not seen Exhibit 14,
the State of Ohio Vehicle Inspection Report depicting that an E-check was
performed on her vehicle on November 2, 2017. George, however, denied that the
E-check was ever obtained because they could not get license plates for the vehicle.
Charles testified that when the vehicle was initially towed to his shop,
it had a running and shifting problem. According to Charles, it was “diagnosed with
bad ignition coils and fuel injection work, and a running problem on the shifter
problem. There were some linkage problems on the shifter.” (Tr. 82.) Charles
stated that he had the vehicle repaired within a few days. (Tr. 84-85.) He testified
that after he repaired the vehicle, it sat in storage until the invoice was paid on
April 2, 2018. Charles stated that he heard from George in late April about getting
the vehicle E-checked, but other than that, he did not hear any complaints about the
repairs made until early May 2018 when the Hollidays contacted him again
regarding getting the vehicle E-checked, and stating that they were experiencing
additional issues with the vehicle, including the battery, alternator, and starter.
According to Charles, he had the vehicle in his shop again in May to address these
issues, but it sat until June 27, 2018, because the Hollidays would not authorize the
repairs.
Charles denied that the work listed in the repair order dated June 27,
2018, was contracted for under the original work order in November 2017. He
testified that he completed all the work listed in the original 2017 work order and
that when the Hollidays picked up the vehicle in April 2018, it was operable.
The trial court concluded that the gearshift issue was repaired, but
that the check-engine light, which was still illuminated, revealed that the repairs
were not made as agreed. The court found that $200 was a “fair and reasonable”
amount for the gearshift repair and that Calanni was entitled to $86 for towing
Holliday’s vehicle. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Holliday
in the amount of $1,413.87.
Calanni now appeals, raising the following two assignments of error.
In its first assignment of error, Calanni contends that the trial court
erred in overruling its motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(2) because
Holliday presented no evidence in support of her claim that Calanni failed to do any
work on her car.
Civ.R. 41(B)(2) provides that
[a]fter the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has
completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant,
without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court as trier
of the facts may then determine them and render judgment against the
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the
evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Civ.R. 52 if
requested to do so by any party.
Under Civ. R. 41(B)(2), a defendant may move for dismissal on the
ground that under the facts and law, the plaintiff has shown no grounds for relief.
In this situation, the trial court’s role is “to weigh the evidence, resolve any conflicts
therein, and render judgment for the defendant if the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.” Bank One, Dayton, N.A. v. Doughman, 59 Ohio App.3d 60, 63, fn.4, 571
N.E.2d 442, (1st Dist.1988). Under Civ.R. 41(B)(2), the trial court does not view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Whitestone Co. v. Stittsworth,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 06AP-371, 2007-Ohio-233, ¶ 13. The trial court’s only
consideration in ruling on a motion for involuntary dismissal is “‘whether [the]
plaintiff has made out [her] case by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Pacher v.
Invisible Fence of Dayton, 154 Ohio App.3d 744, 2003-Ohio-5333, 798 N.E.2d 1121,
¶ 29 (2d Dist.), quoting L.W. Shoemaker, M.D., Inc. v. Connor (1992), 81 Ohio
App.3d 748, 752, 612 N.E.2d 369 (10th Dist.1992).
A reviewing court may set aside a trial court’s decision under Civ.R.
41(B)(2) “only if it is erroneous as a matter of law or against the manifest weight of
the evidence.” Osborne, Inc. v. H&R Purchasing, Inc., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-
051, 2004-Ohio-3503, ¶ 9.
In order to prevail on a breach-of-contract claim, the party seeking to
enforce the contract must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the
elements of the claim. On Line Logistics, Inc. v. Amerisource Corp., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 82056, 2003-Ohio-5381, ¶ 39, citing Cooper & Pachell v. Haslage,
142 Ohio App.3d 704, 707, 756 N.E.2d 1248 (9th Dist.2001). These elements
include “the existence of a contract, performance by the plaintiff, breach by the
defendant, and damage or loss to the plaintiff.” Doner v. Snapp, 98 Ohio App.3d
597, 600, 649 N.E.2d 42 (2d Dist.1994).
In a civil case, in which the burden of persuasion is only by a
preponderance of the evidence, evidence must still exist on each element
(sufficiency) and the evidence on each element must satisfy the burden of
persuasion (weight).” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179,
972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 17. “Preponderance of the evidence simply means ‘evidence which
is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in
opposition to it.’” In re Starks, 2d Dist. Darke No. 1646, 2005-Ohio-1912, ¶ 15,
quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1998) 1182.
In this case, there is no dispute that the parties entered into a contract
whereby Holliday agreed to pay Calanni $1,699.87 in exchange for Calanni fixing
the gearshift and addressing the illumination of the check-engine light on Holliday’s
2004 Mitsubishi Endeavor vehicle. There is also no dispute that Calanni towed the
vehicle to his shop on November 2, 2017, to make the repairs. It is further
undisputed that Holliday made a $600 payment on March 5, 2018, and a $1,099.87
payment on April 2, 2018, when the vehicle was driven from the Calanni lot by
Holliday’s father. It is undisputed that the car was in Calanni’s possession from
November 2, 2017 until April 2, 2018. Accordingly, the existence of a contract,
performance by Holliday, and the alleged damages are not in dispute.
The relevant issue is whether Calanni breached its promise to repair
the gearshift and address the check-engine light. At trial, Holliday admitted that
Calanni repaired the gearshift because her father drove it off the Calanni lot.
Q. So the car was — the gearshift was fixed, correct?
A. Yes. He just didn’t put the gearshift thing on. It was not on like they
got it on this picture. It was off, sitting in the seat.
Q. Okay. So the gearshift cover was off, but the gearshift was running
and the car was operated (indiscernible)?
A. It — yeah, [my father] could — [my father] could drive it, yes.
(Tr. 65.)
The trial court acknowledged that the gearshift was repaired and
found “that the amount of [$200] is fair and reasonable for the work performed to
repair the sticking gearshift.” No testimony or evidence was presented supporting
the trial court’s determination of the “reasonableness” of the repair cost, and the
trial court did not explain how it reached that conclusion.
Although the gearshift was repaired, Holliday and her father testified
that the engine light was illuminated when the vehicle was picked up on April 2,
2018. (Tr. 65-66.) However, no evidence was presented regarding what was causing
the check-engine light to be illuminated or that they brought this issue to Calanni’s
attention prior to paying the invoice in full and driving the car off the lot.
The trial court placed much emphasis on the fact that the check-
engine light was still illuminated when the Hollidays picked up the vehicle, thus
concluding that Calanni did not repair this issue. However, as the trial court noted,
Calanni was able to obtain an e-check of Holliday’s vehicle, and as the trial court
found in its decision, “a vehicle will not pass the E-check emissions test when the
check-engine light is on.” Accordingly, without any testimony or finding that the E-
check was not in fact performed, the evidence supports a conclusion that the check-
engine light was not illuminated at that time that the test was completed.
Calanni contends that the vehicle was repaired as contracted, and that
Holliday failed to withstand her burden of proving that the subsequent issues she
experienced with her vehicle were caused by the repairs it made or that it did not
make the repairs as charged.
In support, Calanni cites to Mitchell v. Brownies Transm., Inc., 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 27563, 2018-Ohio-32. In that case, Mitchell contracted with
Brownies to repair his transmission and torque converter on his vehicle. Despite
Brownies making the agreed-upon repairs, the vehicle would not start when Mitchell
picked up his vehicle. The vehicle was towed to Mitchell’s house, and no further
work was performed on the vehicle. At trial, Mitchell contended that Brownies
breached its contract when it failed to fix the vehicle’s transmission. The trial court
agreed, finding that when Mitchell’s vehicle was returned, it was inoperable. The
Second District reversed the trial court, concluding that Mitchell failed to withstand
his burden of demonstrating that the subsequent problems he experienced with his
vehicle were related to the repairs made by Brownies. Id. at ¶ 37. The court noted
that a number of issues could have rendered the vehicle inoperable, including the
age of the vehicle, other problems Brownies noted on the invoice that needed to be
addressed, or the fact that the vehicle was stored in Brownies lot over the winter
while Mitchell made payments on the invoice. Id. at ¶ 36-37.
We find Mitchell instructive. Much like in Mitchell, Holliday failed to
provide any evidence establishing that Calanni did not perform the agreed-upon
repairs or that the subsequent issues she experienced were related to the repairs.
The evidence was undisputed that Calanni fixed the gearshift issue. However,
because Holliday’s vehicle was stored for a period of time after Calanni made the
agreed-upon repairs, other issues affecting the operability of Holliday’s vehicle may
have developed during that time, including why Holliday’s check-engine light was
illuminated.
We find that Holliday failed to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that Calanni breached the service contract. No evidence was presented
that the work Calanni charged for was not performed or was not necessary to repair
the vehicle as contracted. And no evidence was presented that the problems
Holliday subsequently experienced were related to the work performed and charged.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Calanni’s Civ.R. 41(B)(2)
motion to dismiss. Calanni’s first assignment of error is sustained. Consequently,
Calanni’s second assignment of error, requesting reversal on a manifest weight
challenge, is rendered moot.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR