United States v. Tyrell Plair , 356 F. App'x 270 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                    FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-13425                  ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    DECEMBER 10, 2009
    Non-Argument Calendar
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 99-00077-CR-3-LAC
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    TYRELL PLAIR,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (December 10, 2009)
    Before CARNES, HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Tyrell Plair, a federal prisoner convicted of a crack cocaine offense, appeals
    the district court’s denial of his pro se 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a
    sentence reduction. After review, we affirm.1
    Under § 3582(c)(2), may modify a defendant’s term of imprisonment if the
    defendant’s sentence was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
    lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) . . . .” 18
    U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2). However, “[w]here a
    retroactively applicable guideline amendment reduces a defendant’s base offense
    level, but does not alter the sentencing range upon which his or her sentence was
    based, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a reduction in sentence.” 
    Moore, 541 F.3d at 1330
    ; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). A reduction is not authorized if the
    amendment does not lower a defendant’s applicable guidelines range “because of
    the operation of another guideline or statutory provision (e.g., a statutory
    mandatory minimum term of imprisonment).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1(A).
    Here, Plair’s § 3582(c)(2) motion is based on Amendment 706 to the
    Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced the base offense levels in U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1(c) applicable to most crack cocaine offenses. However, at his original
    sentencing, Plair was subject to a statutory mandatory minimum term of twenty
    1
    “In a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, we review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions
    regarding the scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Moore,
    
    541 F.3d 1323
    , 1326 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 965
    (2009).
    2
    years’ imprisonment, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), in light of his prior
    felony drug conviction. Thus, Plair’s sentencing range was not based on the
    amount of crack cocaine attributed to him under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), but on the
    statutory mandatory minimum. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). As such, Amendment
    706 had no effect on Plair’s sentencing range of twenty years’ imprisonment.
    Plair argues that the district court erred at his original sentencing when it
    imposed the twenty-year statutory mandatory minimum because his prior
    conviction was not final when he commenced this federal drug offense. This
    argument cannot be raised in a § 3582(c)(2) motion because the issue relates to an
    original sentencing determination and not to a guideline amendment that has
    subsequently lowered Plair’s sentencing range. See United States v. Moreno, 
    421 F.3d 1217
    , 1220 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding all
    original sentencing determinations remain the same except the guideline range that
    has since been amended).
    Plair’s argument that his sentence is unreasonable based on Kimbrough v.
    United States, 
    552 U.S. 85
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 558
    (2007), is foreclosed by our precedent.
    See United States v. Melvin, 
    556 F.3d 1190
    , 1192 (11th Cir. 2009) (concluding
    that Kimbrough does not “prohibit the limitations on a judge’s discretion in
    reducing a sentence imposed by § 3582(c)(2) and the applicable policy statement
    3
    by the Sentencing Commission”), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 2382
    (2009); United
    States v. Jones, 
    548 F.3d 1366
    , 1369 (11th Cir. 2008) (concluding that United
    States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    (2005) does not provide a basis on
    which to grant a § 3582(c)(2) motion), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 1657
    (2009).
    Thus, the district court did not have the authority to reduce Plair’s sentence
    and properly denied Plair’s § 3582(c)(2) motion.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-13425

Citation Numbers: 356 F. App'x 270

Judges: Carnes, Hull, Marcus, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 12/10/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023