State of Missouri v. T'Oddre D. Hudson ( 2021 )

IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
WESTERN DISTRICT
STATE OF MISSOURI, )
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) WD83370
)
T’ODDRE D. HUDSON, ) Opinion filed: April 27, 2021
)
Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI
THE HONORABLE S. MARGENE BURNETT
Division Three: Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge,
Gary D. Witt, Judge and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge
T’Oddre D. Hudson (“Hudson”) appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court
of Jackson County convicting him of one count of first-degree sodomy, one count of
attempted first-degree robbery, and two associated counts of armed criminal action.
In his sole point on appeal, Hudson claims that the motion court clearly erred in
overruling his pre-sentence Rule 29.07(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the
ground that his plea was entered involuntary and without understanding. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
In August 2014, two men approached a parked vehicle and, at gunpoint,
demanded the occupants, a male and female, get out of the vehicle. The two men
then ransacked the vehicle and attempted to drive away. However, because the men
could not operate a manual transmission, they were unable to take the vehicle. The
armed men then made the female victim get back into the vehicle, where one of the
men forced her, at gunpoint, to perform oral sex upon him to completion. While this
act of sodomy occurred, the male victim was held at gunpoint on the pavement some
distance from the vehicle. After hearing sirens, the two men fled. Afterwards, the
female victim was immediately transported to the hospital where her mouth was
swabbed for evidence. The test results indicated the presence of semen which a DNA
analyst later determined belonged to Hudson.
On October 2, 2015, Hudson was indicted on one count of sodomy in the first
degree, one count of robbery in the first degree, and two counts of armed criminal
action. On October 22, 2015, Hudson’s counsel entered his appearance. A jury trial
was scheduled to begin on April 24, 2017, but six days before trial was set to begin,
Hudson’s plea counsel filed a motion for a mental examination. The trial court
sustained the motion and ordered a mental examination, canceled the April 24 trial
date, and rescheduled Hudson’s jury trial for September 25, 2017. However, the
doctor who was to perform Hudson’s mental examination reported to the court that
Hudson had “refused transportation to the examination site or to participate in the
evaluation” and that Hudson’s plea counsel had not responded to the doctor’s request
2
about whether Hudson was willing to be examined. Hudson’s September 25, 2017,
trial date was later continued to May 21, 2018.
On May 18, 2018, at the pretrial conference, Hudson entered an Alford plea.
In exchange for his plea, the parties agreed that the court would sentence Hudson to
at least 16 years in prison, but to no more than 22 years in prison, and the State
would dismiss an unrelated drug case. During the plea colloquy, Hudson testified to
the plea court that he understood he was entering an Alford plea to the charges, that
he had read the reports related to the evidence, and that he had an opportunity to
talk with his attorney. Hudson acknowledged the rights which he was waiving by
pleading guilty and the adverse consequences that would stem from his guilty plea.
Hudson acknowledged that he was not threatened or coerced into entering his plea,
that he had enough time to talk to plea counsel, and that counsel had done what he
had asked him to do. Upon the State’s recitation of the factual basis, Hudson’s plea
counsel confirmed to the court that the evidence described was the information he
had received in discovery and shared with Hudson. Hudson reiterated the accuracy
of the evidence and further agreed that based on the evidence, “there [was] a
substantial likelihood a jury would find [him] guilty.” The court accepted Hudson’s
guilty plea, finding it was made freely, voluntarily, and with understanding, and
ordered a sentencing assessment report.
About two weeks before the sentencing hearing, Hudson’s plea counsel
withdrew from the case and new counsel entered a limited appearance on Hudson’s
behalf for the purpose of filing a motion to withdraw Hudson’s plea. On September
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27, 2018, Hudson filed a motion to withdraw his plea under Rule 29.07(d)1, claiming
his plea was involuntary. In doing so, Hudson alleged that he “did not fully
understand the consequences of his plea and did not have adequate time with his
attorney to fully discuss his discovery, trial preparation, or trial strategy.” Hudson
furthered alleged that he “felt he had no other options” but to plead guilty because
“[i]t was readily apparent to [Hudson] that counsel was unprepared for trial,” and
that this “induced” him into entering into the plea agreement. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the court denied Hudson’s motion.
On November 29, 2018, the court sentenced Hudson to twelve years
imprisonment for the offense of sodomy, to run concurrently with consecutive
sentences of five and three years for robbery and armed criminal action, respectively.
After sentencing, Hudson appeals the trial court’s denial of his Rule 29.07(d)
motion.2 Further factual details will be outlined as relevant in the analysis below.
Standard of Review
A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
prior to sentencing. Johnson v. State, 529 S.W.3d 36, 41 n.5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017).
In reviewing the trial court’s decision:
We are governed . . . by certain well recognized principles: (1) on appeal
from a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea our review is limited
to a determination of whether the ruling of the trial court was clearly
erroneous, Young v. State, 438 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Mo. 1969), State v.
1
All Rule references are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2018), unless otherwise indicated.
2 Hudson currently has two pending cases before this Court, this case and WD83748, in which
Hudson has appealed the trial court’s denial of his Rule 24.035 motion. This unique situation has
occurred because Hudson was granted leave to file a late appeal by this Court in the instant case as
the result of counsel’s failure to file Hudson’s notice of appeal. By that time, his 24.035 hearing had
occurred in the plea court and had been appealed in due course.
4
Davis, 438 S.W.2d 232, 234 (Mo. 1969), or there was an abuse of
discretion; (2) the burden is on the movant to prove by a preponderance
of evidence that the court erred in overruling the motion to withdraw
the plea of guilty, cf. Beach v. State, 488 S.W.2d 652, 656 (Mo. 1972); (3)
a movant does not have an absolute right to withdraw his plea of guilty
whether before or after sentence, State v. Jackson, 514 S.W.2d 638, 641
(Mo. App. 1974), and may do so only in extraordinary circumstances,
Mooney v. State, 433 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Mo. 1968); and (4) if there is
evidence that the defendant was misled or induced to plead guilty
because of fraud, mistake, misapprehension, fear, persuasion or holding
out of hopes which prove to be false or ill-founded, he should be
permitted to withdraw his plea since the law favors a trial on the merits,
State v. Rose, 440 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo. 1969).
State v. Knox, 553 S.W.3d 386, 393-94 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting State v.
Nielsen, 547 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Mo. App. 1977)) (internal footnote omitted).
Analysis
Preliminarily, we address the State’s arguments that this Court lacks
authority to consider this appeal. First, the State asserts we have “no authority to
consider the merits of Defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in overruling his
pre-sentence Rule 29.07(d)3 motion to withdraw his guilty plea, because . . . a direct
appeal of a conviction following a guilty plea is limited only to challenges involving
the circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the sufficiency of the charging
document, or possibly excessive sentencing and Defendant’s claim on appeal, which
involves a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel before the plea, does not fall into
any of these categories . . . .” In making this assertion, the State relies upon State v.
3
Rule 29.07(d) provides: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before
sentence is imposed or when imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw
his plea.”
5
Rohra, 545 S.W.3d 344, 347 (Mo. banc 2018) and State v. Russell, 598 S.W.3d 133,
139 (Mo. banc 2020). However, the State fails to consider the differences in
procedural posture of Rohra and Russell, as compared to the case at hand. Rohra
challenged a motion to dismiss filed post-plea, not a 29.07 motion at all. State v.
Rohra, 545 S.W.3d at 346. Russell addressed a 29.07 motion filed after sentencing (a
post-sentence 29.07) whereas the case at hand involves a 29.07 motion filed before
sentencing (a pre-sentence 29.07). State v. Russell, 598 S.W.3d at 136. Although
Rule 29.07 has a very limited role following the imposition of sentence (a post-
sentence 29.07), as suggested by the State’s argument, it may permit broader relief
at earlier stages of a criminal proceeding. See State v. Onate, 398 S.W.3d 102, 106
(Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citing Brown v. State, 66 S.W.3d 721, 730-31 n.5 (Mo. banc
2002) (overruled on other grounds in State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510 (Mo.
2010)). Because the cases relied upon by the State are not in same procedural posture
as the case at bar, further analysis has no merit. See State v. Knox, 553 S.W.3d at
393. The Missouri Supreme Court has expressly held that a defendant who pleads
guilty may appeal from a final judgment convicting and sentencing him to challenge
the circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s pre-sentence Rule 29.07(d) motion.
Stevens v. State, 208 S.W.3d 893, 894-95 (Mo. banc 2006); accord, State v. Knox, 553
S.W.3d at 392-93 (holding that the Court had appellate jurisdiction to consider a
direct appeal from a final criminal judgment entered after a guilty plea to review
whether the circuit court properly denied the defendant’s pre-sentence Rule 29.07(d)
motion); State v. McAfee, 462 S.W.3d 818, 822 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (same).
6
Second, the State asserts we have no authority to consider the merits of
Defendant’s claim because “the ‘exclusive procedure’ for asserting a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel affecting the voluntariness of the guilty plea is
through a Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief.” In making this assertion,
they rely upon Brown, which is inapposite to their first argument, supra. Indeed,
even the State admits “that Rule 29.07(d) could still be used to raise claims before the
defendant is sentenced . . . .” See Brown v. State, 66 S.W.3d at 728-29. The State,
however, then seeks to draw a line in the sand, suggesting that Rule 29.07(d) claims
cannot address a claim within the “exclusive province of Rule 24.035.” In doing so, it
again seems the State is confused about the importance of Hudson’s procedural
posture as a pre-sentence 29.07(d) motion, and not a post-sentence, post-conviction
motion. The State also fails to cite any precedent or support for this assertion. “When
an appellant cites no authority and offers no explanation why precedent is
unavailable, appellate courts consider the point waived or abandoned.” State v.
Conaway, 912 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995) (citing Freeman v. State, 765
S.W.2d 334, 335 (Mo. App. S.D. 1989)).
In Brown, our Supreme Court reaffirmed that Rule 29.07(d) “cannot be used to
circumvent the time limitations set out in Rule 24.035(b) . . . .” Brown v. State, 66
S.W.3d at 723. Yet, the Brown court, at note 5, emphasized the continued importance
of Rule 29.07(d) when brought in the manner in which Hudson has utilized it,4 stating
4 Further, although Hudson’s point on appeal centers on the plea court’s denial of his motion
to withdraw his plea, a final judgment and sentence supports Hudson’s appeal. See Stevens v. State,
208 S.W.3d at 894-95 (“Unless a defendant is sentenced, there is no final judgment to support an
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[d]espite this holding, Rule 29.07(d) still plays an important role in this
State's jurisprudence . . . . Rule 24.035 by its terms applies only to
motions brought after conviction and sentencing and remand to the
DOC. Therefore, claims that are brought prior to conviction, sentencing
and remand to the DOC do not come within the claims enumerated
in Rule 24.035 and so need not be raised in a Rule 24.035 motion . . . .
For this reason, a motion under the first clause of Rule 29.07(d) to
withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is imposed or when imposition
of a sentence is suspended would still be proper . . . .
Id. at 730, n.5; see also State v. Onate, 398 S.W.3d at 106 (citing Stevens v. State, 208
S.W.3d at 894-95); see also State v. Fensom, 69 S.W.3d 550, 551 (Mo. App. W.D.
2002)). Thus, Hudson’s appeal of the pre-sentence denial of his Rule 29.07 motion to
withdraw his plea is proper, as the appeal followed his conviction and sentencing. We
proceed to the substantive issues presented by Hudson, rejecting the State's
argument in this regard.
In his sole point on appeal, Hudson argues that the motion court clearly erred
in denying his motion to withdraw his plea pursuant to Rule 29.07(d) because “his
plea was not voluntarily and understandingly made due to the deficient performance
of his . . . plea counsel, in violation of [his] due process rights . . ., in that [he] felt
coerced to plead guilty because he did not understand the charges against him and
because he believed his attorney was not prepared to defend him at trial . . . .”
Correctly, he points us to Rule 24.02(e), which states that the guilty plea must not be
entered by the court unless the court is satisfied there is a factual basis for the guilty
plea. Indeed, “[a] factual basis for a guilty plea is necessary to ensure that the guilty
appeal of a denial of a Rule 29.07(d) motion.”). Hence, Hudson “appeals from the judgment of the
conviction, a matter over which this court has appellate jurisdiction.” Id.
8
plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered, thereby satisfying due process
requirements.” State v. Henry, 88 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (citing
Parker v. State, 608 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Mo. App. W.D. 1980)). “A factual basis exists if
the defendant understands the facts recited by the court and expresses an awareness
of the nature and elements of the charge.” Generaux v. State, 448 S.W.3d 355, 358
(Mo. App. W.D. 2014). “The purpose of this rule is to ensure that ‘a defendant
understand[s] the specific charges against him, that he understand[s] the maximum
penalty confronting him, and that he recognize[s] that he has waived specific legal
rights by pleading guilty.’” Benson v. State, 511 S.W.3d 488, 490 (Mo. App. W.D.
2017) (quoting Cafferty v. State, 453 S.W.3d 791, 795 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014)).
Essentially, Hudson alleges two separate reasons for why his plea was entered
involuntarily and without understanding: (1) he did not understand the charges
against him and (2) he believed his plea counsel was unprepared to go to trial. In
analyzing whether Hudson’s plea was entered involuntarily and without
understanding, we first address Hudson’s contention that he did not understand the
charges against him.
During the plea colloquy, the court walked through the essential elements of
the crimes and Hudson confirmed the factual basis for the crimes charged. The trial
court asked Hudson if he “had enough time to talk to [counsel] about [the] plea,” to
which Hudson responded “yes.” The court then assured Hudson “[i]f you need more
time, we can take that.” Hudson again confirmed to the court that he had had enough
time to speak with plea counsel concerning his case and his plea. Hudson never
9
indicated that he did not agree that all the essential elements of the crimes were met
or that he disagreed with the facts as presented. After confirming the essential
elements of the crimes, Hudson acknowledged that “there is a significant likelihood
that at the end of the day, after all of the evidence was presented, there is a
substantial likelihood a jury would find [him] guilty.” Further, Hudson recognized
“it’s in [his] best interest to take this plea and avoid the exposure to greater sentence.”
Accordingly, the court correctly found that a factual basis had been provided, and
that Hudson “does understand the charges and the consequences of this plea
hearing.”
In now arguing that he did not understand the charges against him, Hudson
primarily relies on his own testimony at the 29.07(d) hearing that he neither reviewed
discovery nor had “in-depth conversations at the jail” with plea counsel until just
before the plea hearing. Yet, Hudson’s self-serving testimony is directly refuted by
his own prior testimony at the plea hearing as well as plea counsel’s testimony during
the 29.07(d) hearing. Importantly, the motion court was not required to believe
Hudson’s testimony during the 29.07(d) hearing over Hudson’s testimony at the plea
hearing. See State v. Geist, 583 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019) (“The trial court
[considering a Rule 29.07(d) motion to withdraw a guilty plea] was free to credit
Defendant’s statements under oath when he entered his guilty pleas . . . and
disbelieve Defendant’s subsequent, self-serving statements . . . .”).
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Hudson’s plea counsel testified that he believed he had sufficient time to
discuss both the case and the plea offer with Hudson and that Hudson understood
what was happening:
Q: Do you feel you had sufficient time to discuss the [plea] offer with
your client?
A: I do.
Q: Do you feel he understood the ramifications of that offer?
A: I do. He had – in fact, he was very much on board with the
strategy . . . one of the reasons drugs are illegal for anyone, including
him, was my impression that the reason he had not a specific recollection
of the offense from that night was his own use of drugs. It set up, I
thought, a compelling argument for some leniency or, at least, an
appropriate sentence with drug treatment for him. And that’s where we
were. He was on board with that approach. So that’s where we were
when we did the plea, and then until he chose to seek to withdraw the
plea.
Hudson’s plea counsel testified that he and Hudson had discussions at-length
regarding discovery, the strengths and weaknesses of the case, and their general
strategy moving forward. Plea counsel testified that he believed he had sufficient
time to discuss the case with Hudson, including a discussion prior to Hudson entering
his plea. Plea counsel testified that he not only visited Hudson at the jail, but he
stayed in communication with Hudson and Hudson’s family in other ways.
Additionally, in asserting that he did not understandingly enter his plea,
Hudson relies on his own out-of-context testimony at the plea hearing that he “kind
of, sort of” understood the charges and evidence that had been filed in his case. A full
11
reading of Hudson’s testimony, rather than the mere snippet which he emphasizes,
demonstrates Hudson’s understanding of his case and his plea, to-wit:
Q: Have you read the charges that were filed in this case against
you?
A: Yes.
Q: Through the three years of this case, have you read the reports
containing the evidence in this case?
A: Yes.
Q: And you’ve had an opportunity to talk to your attorney about that;
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you feel you fully understand the charges and the evidence
that has been filed in this case?
A: Yes. Well, kind of, sort of.
Q: What do you mean kind of, sort of?
A: I just didn’t get a chance to research on my own. I mean, I just
know what I’m being told.
[HUDSON’S PLEA COUNSEL]: He’s referring to his limited
access to a law library that was discussed earlier today when the Court
denied the request for continuance.
BY THE COURT:
Okay but you’ve talked with your attorney about the charges and
you have reviewed the evidence that was in this case?
A: Yes.
12
Q: I’m asking you this, even though you haven’t had the access to the
law library that you have wanted, even though you’ve had three years
to have that access, knowing that are you wanting to plead guilty today?
A: Yes. It’s just that if I had the access myself and I could do it
myself I would. The facility is the reason why I didn’t get a chance to.
If I could just go in the law library and like do it on my own I could and
I would, but every request I put in they didn’t honor.
*******
Q: But we are still ready to proceed with the guilty plea today;
correct?
A: Yes.
Hudson demonstrated at the plea hearing that he understood the charges
against him and the plea agreement into which he was entering. In stating that he
“kind of, sort of” understood the charges against him, it is clear that such statement
was not reflective of Hudson’s understanding of the charges. Rather, it is the venting
of frustration that, although he had three years in which to research his charges in
the jail’s library, the day he chose to do so, just prior to the plea hearing, he could not
gain library access.5 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or clearly
err in finding that Hudson entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily because he
understood the evidence and charges against him.
5 The judge may have considered Hudson’s failure to previously schedule time in the jail library
nothing more than a tactic by Hudson to delay the proceedings. And, a trial judge may consider other
delaying tactics of a defendant in denying a pre-sentence 29.07(d) motion. Here, for instance, Hudson
obtained a trial continuance upon the granting of his request for a mental examination, yet refused to
follow through with attending the examination and even refused transport from the jail for such
purpose. Unreasonable efforts to delay the proceedings may be considered by the judge in determining
the merits of the Rule 29.07(d) motion, itself.
13
Second, we address Hudson’s contention that his plea was entered
involuntarily and without understanding because he believed plea counsel was
unprepared to go to trial. In so arguing, Hudson asserts that plea counsel met with
him in-person only three times; that plea counsel never had in-depth conversations
with him regarding the discovery until just before the plea hearing; and that,
although he deposed the female victim, plea counsel failed to depose the male victim.
Hudson again ignores that his contentions are contradicted by plea counsel’s
testimony as well as his own plea testimony. Despite plea counsel’s limited in-person
visits with Hudson, plea counsel testified that he stayed in communication with both
Hudson and his family in other ways. Plea counsel testified that Hudson’s family
was an “involved, engaged family,” and “[w]henever [Hudson’s family] chose or
desired a meeting, we would accommodate them.” In addition, Hudson’s plea counsel
testified that he had discussed with Hudson the discovery the State had produced,
possible defenses, and Hudson’s constitutional rights, including his right to testify.
To that extent, Hudson’s plea counsel repeated his belief that he had sufficient time
to discuss the case with Hudson:
Q: And during your meetings with Mr. Hudson, did you describe –
did you go through all of the discovery that the state had produced?
A: That is normally what we would discuss. My questions like, well,
do you understand that’s what – you know, we’ve got DNA to deal with
here. The victim is – she’s willing to cooperate. She’s going to appear
for her deposition. Things like that.
Q: So you would discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the case?
A: Yes.
14
******
Q: When you are discussing the case with your client, did you feel
you had sufficient time to go over all of the possible defenses, as well as
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s case?
A: I do. I mean, it was pretty straightforward, actual case, I thought.
You know, it really comes down to, as it often does, how strong is this
witness. To me, the most compelling element of the case was the
credibility of the alleged victim after I met her, deposed her. She was
appropriately upset and, yet, she was very adamant. And she would
have been a devastating state’s witness for my client. I don’t think they
would believe him over her.
Likewise, by testifying that “the most compelling element of the case was the
credibility of the alleged [female] victim,” plea counsel acknowledged the grave
impact that the female victim’s testimony had on Hudson’s case. Although plea
counsel did not depose the male victim, the female victim’s deposition not only
prepared trial counsel for trial, but also provided trial counsel substantial evidence
with which to recommend a plea. Furthermore, according to the State’s factual basis
given at the plea hearing, the male victim knew “that [female victim] was taken back
to the car, but he indicates he was far enough away that he didn’t hear exactly what
was happening in the vehicle” and did not realize what had happened until after the
two men fled. Thus, in the event that plea counsel had deposed the male victim, the
testimony elicited would have likely provided little value to Hudson’s defense.
Further, the unwavering credibility of the victim must be compared to
Hudson’s own credibility, as well as the need to depose the other victim. As his
counsel stated, “one of the reasons drugs are illegal for anyone, including [Hudson],
15
was my impression that the reason he had not [sic] a specific recollection of the offense
from that night was his own use of drugs.” In other words, Hudson had little, if any,
recollection of the crimes.
Moreover, trial counsel’s focus on the victim who was deposed, rather than the
other victim, is appropriate. The argument that Hudson was afraid trial counsel was
not prepared for trial because he should have deposed the other victim, that is, the
victim who was being held at gunpoint face down on the sidewalk some distance away,
while the deposed victim was being sodomized, is not persuasive.
Hudson’s overall claim that his plea was not voluntary because his counsel was
not prepared for trial is also not unpersuasive. He has failed to satisfy his burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his plea was entered unintelligently
and involuntarily. Accordingly, the motion court did not clearly err or abuse its
discretion in overruling Hudson’s Rule 29.07(d) motion to withdraw his plea.
Conclusion
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
__________________________________________
W. DOUGLAS THOMSON, JUDGE
All concur.
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