In re R.J. , 2018 Ohio 1658 ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as In re R.J., 2018-Ohio-1658.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    HURON COUNTY
    In re R.J.                                      Court of Appeals No. H-17-012
    Trial Court Nos. SO 2008 00001
    SO 2008 00002
    DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Decided: April 27, 2018
    *****
    Kevin J. Baxter, Erie County Special Prosecuting Attorney,
    and Martha S. Schultes, Assistant Special Prosecuting Attorney,
    for appellee.
    Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Timothy B. Hackett,
    Assistant State Public Defender, for appellant.
    *****
    OSOWIK, J.
    {¶ 1} This is an appeal from an August 21, 2017 judgment of the Huron County
    Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, denying appellant’s February 2, 2017 motion
    to vacate a September 21, 2010 sexual offender classification. For the reasons set forth
    below, this court reverses the judgment of the trial court and remands the matter to the
    trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
    {¶ 2} Appellant, R.J., a minor at the time of the underlying events, sets forth the
    following two assignments of error:
    I. The juvenile court erred when it denied R.J.’s motion to vacate
    his classification as void, because the court was not authorized to classify
    him under R.C. 2151.82.
    II. The juvenile court erred when it denied R.J.’s motion to vacate
    his classification, because R.C. 2152.86 was inapplicable and facially
    unconstitutional.
    {¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On April 10,
    2008, appellant was adjudicated to be a delinquent minor on one count of felonious
    assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11, a felony of the first degree, one count of attempted
    rape, in violation of R.C. 2923.02, a felony of the second degree, and one count of
    abduction, in violation of R.C. 2905.02, a felony of the third degree. Appellant was 15
    years of age at the time of the offenses.
    {¶ 4} Following these crimes, appellant was committed to a term of incarceration
    in the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“DYS”) of a minimum of two and one-half
    years to a maximum of appellant’s 21st birthday. On September 21, 2010, appellant was
    released from DYS.
    2.
    {¶ 5} On September 21, 2010, simultaneous to the release, a hearing was
    conducted pursuant to which appellant was designated to be a Tier III sexual offender for
    registration purposes. As specifically relevant to this appeal, the trial court erroneously
    classified appellant for registration purposes as a Tier III offender pursuant to R.C.
    2152.82 and 2152.86.
    {¶ 6} R.C. 2152.82 is Ohio’s more stringent repeat juvenile offender classification
    statute. Appellant was not a repeat offender. R.C. 2152.86 imposed more stringent
    registration requirements upon offenders whom the trial court imposed a serious youthful
    offender (“SYO”) sentence at disposition. Appellant was not sentenced as a serious
    youthful offender.
    {¶ 7} Appellant received a traditional juvenile sentence, not an SYO sentence. In
    addition, R.C. 2152.86 was subsequently stricken as unconstitutional by the Ohio
    Supreme Court in 2012. In re C.P., 
    131 Ohio St. 3d 513
    , 2012-Ohio-1446, 
    967 N.E.2d 729
    .
    {¶ 8} On February 2, 2017, approximately seven years following the subject
    classification hearing, appellant filed a motion to vacate his 2010 sexual offender
    classification. In support, appellant argued that it was improper for the trial court to
    impose the more stringent classification and requirements pursuant to R.C. 2152.82 and
    2152.86 as they facially did not apply to appellant’s case.
    {¶ 9} On April 7, 2017, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s
    pending motion. Notably, on August 21, 2017, the trial court acknowledged the plain,
    3.
    statutory errors in the 2010 classification decision. Despite this acknowledgement,
    appellant’s motion to vacate was nevertheless denied. This appeal ensued.
    {¶ 10} In the first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in
    denying the motion to vacate the 2010 sexual offender classification as R.C. 2152.82 was
    erroneously applied. Given that the record clearly shows that appellant was not a R.C.
    2151.82 repeat offender, yet was more stringently and erroneously classified as though he
    were a repeat offender, we concur.
    {¶ 11} In the related second assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial
    court erred in denying appellant’s motion to vacate the 2010 classification decision as
    R.C. 2152.86 was erroneously applied.
    {¶ 12} Specifically, the record clearly shows that the underlying 2008 trial court
    sentence against appellant was not done as an SYO sentence, but was done as a
    traditional sentence. Given that appellant was more stringently and erroneously classified
    pursuant to R.C. 2151.86, which only applies to serious youthful offenders, we concur.
    {¶ 13} It is well-established that if it is demonstrated that a trial court committed
    plain error, the subject judgment is properly reversed if it is shown that the outcome
    clearly would have been different but for the error resulting such that a manifest
    miscarriage of justice resulted. State v. Wright, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-16-1053, 2017-
    Ohio-1225, ¶ 26.
    {¶ 14} As applied to the instant case, the record clearly shows that the result
    would have been substantively different had appellant’s classification been properly
    4.
    made without erroneously applying the more stringent requirements of R.C. 2152.82 and
    2152.86, which were inapplicable to appellant, but were nevertheless applied against him
    for classification purposes. Accordingly, the record shows that a manifest miscarriage of
    justice resulted from these plain errors.
    {¶ 15} On consideration whereof, we find appellant’s assignments of error to be
    well-taken. Wherefore, the judgment of the Huron County Court of Common Pleas,
    Juvenile Division, is hereby reversed and remanded to the trial court for further
    proceedings consistent with this decision. Appellee is hereby ordered to pay the costs of
    this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment reversed.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           _______________________________
    JUDGE
    James D. Jensen, J.
    _______________________________
    Christine E. Mayle, P.J.                                   JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    5.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: H-17-012

Citation Numbers: 2018 Ohio 1658

Judges: Osowik

Filed Date: 4/27/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/27/2018