United States v. Reyes ( 2022 )


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  •            United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 19-2013
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    CARLOS REYES, JR.,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. George A. O’Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges,
    and Katzmann, Judge.
    Leslie Feldman-Rumpler for appellant.
    Karen L. Eisenstadt, Assistant United States Attorney, with
    whom Nathaniel R. Mendell, Acting United States Attorney, was on
    brief, for appellee.
    January 19, 2022
     Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting
    by designation.
    KATZMANN, Judge.            A jury convicted defendant Carlos
    Reyes, Jr. ("Reyes") of one count of conspiracy to possess with
    intent to distribute and to distribute 500 grams or more of
    cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , and one count of
    possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine,
    in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1).                   Defendant now appeals,
    asserting error by the district court.             Before us are claims that:
    (1) evidence obtained during a traffic stop should have been
    suppressed; (2) the district court erroneously admitted certain
    statements    of    lay   witnesses        that    unfairly       prejudiced    the
    defendant;    (3)   the   proceedings           contravened    the    defendant's
    statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial; and (4) the
    defendant's absence at certain pre-trial proceedings violated his
    statutory and constitutional presence rights.                 We affirm.
    I.        Background
    A.     Facts
    "We state the facts in the light most favorable to the
    verdict."    United States v. Vega-Figueroa, 
    234 F.3d 744
    , 747 (1st
    Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Duclos, 
    214 F.3d 27
    , 32 (1st
    Cir.   2000)).      Because   "[m]any       of     the    facts    pertaining    to
    particular issues will be set forth in our discussion of the
    issues[,] [a]ll we do now is state those facts that will give the
    reader the necessary background information to understand the
    - 2 -
    different issues raised by defendant."            Id. at 748.
    In 2016, the United States Postal Inspector Service and
    the Massachusetts State Police began investigating a potential
    drug distribution conspiracy that law enforcement assessed was
    using the mail to transport controlled substances from Puerto Rico
    to Massachusetts.         Investigators became suspicious after observing
    packages bearing characteristics common to drug conspiracies,
    namely parcels with: fictitious sender information (either a fake
    sender    name      or    undeliverable       return    address,     or    both);
    deliverable, but slightly incorrect addresses for recipients;
    postage paid in cash; and handwritten mailing labels all in the
    same handwriting but listing different senders' names.
    After        additional    investigation,        law    enforcement
    identified       Pablo      Santiago-Cruz      ("Santiago-Cruz")          as   the
    conspiracy's central figure and Reyes as a "runner" who received
    some of the drug shipments from Puerto Rico and then transferred
    their    contents    to    Santiago-Cruz.        Of    the   more   than   thirty
    suspicious parcels identified as part of the conspiracy, seven
    were identified as addressed to Reyes; five of these packages were
    delivered    as      "controlled      deliveries"       executed     under     law
    enforcement surveillance.
    Through these controlled deliveries and corresponding
    surveillance, law enforcement observed that on three occasions,
    shortly after Reyes took delivery of the packages, Santiago-Cruz
    - 3 -
    either came to Reyes's house or Reyes traveled to meet Santiago-
    Cruz; on two of these occasions, law enforcement observed Reyes
    carrying bags consistent with the size and shape of cocaine.
    Additionally, telephone records obtained by investigators revealed
    that on days parcels were shipped from Puerto Rico and delivered
    in Massachusetts, Santiago-Cruz and Reyes had multiple telephone
    contacts.
    On July 18, 2016, the investigative team carried out the
    final controlled delivery that led to Reyes's arrest.            At around
    12:30 p.m., a postal inspector dressed as a mail carrier left the
    controlled parcel addressed to Reyes at 45 Winthrop Street in
    Framingham -- Reyes's correct address was in fact 47 Winthrop
    Street -- on the shared porch of Reyes's duplex at 45-47 Winthrop
    Street.     Approximately ten minutes later, an unidentified person
    came out and carried the parcel into 47 Winthrop.            Reyes returned
    home that night at around 7:00 p.m. and reemerged from his house
    approximately      ten   minutes   later    carrying   the   parcel.    Law
    enforcement saw Reyes walk down his driveway to an out-of-sight
    area behind the house and shortly thereafter observed Reyes pulling
    into the street in his car.
    Once    mobile,    members      of   the   investigative   team
    surreptitiously followed Reyes for approximately thirty minutes,
    driving in a "stack" of eight to ten unmarked vehicles and one
    State Police cruiser.       Trooper Dennis Lynch ("Trooper Lynch"), of
    - 4 -
    the Massachusetts State Police,               --   who had been involved in
    surveillance of some of the prior controlled deliveries to Reyes
    -- drove the police cruiser.             After another trooper in the "stack"
    -- Trooper Keith Pantazelos -- conveyed over the radio that he had
    observed Reyes tailgating, and after Trooper Lynch "clocked" Reyes
    speeding, Trooper Lynch initiated a traffic stop of Reyes.                            As
    Trooper Lynch pulled Reyes over to the side of the road, Trooper
    Pantazelos     and    the    other   officers      in   the    unmarked       vehicles
    continued driving to a nearby parking lot where they could covertly
    monitor the traffic stop from a distance.
    In order to avoid alerting Reyes to the larger drug
    investigation,       Trooper    Lynch      approached    Reyes     as    if   he   were
    conducting an ordinary traffic stop.               Accordingly, Trooper Lynch
    began by asking Reyes routine traffic-related questions through
    the driver's side window, such as where Reyes was going; Reyes
    could not identify his destination beyond                     "Boston".         As the
    conversation proceeded, Reyes acknowledged to Trooper Lynch that
    he    had   previously      served   a     188-month    sentence    in    a    federal
    narcotics case, and Trooper Lynch knew -- from his involvement in
    the    overarching    drug     investigation       --   that     Reyes    had      prior
    convictions     for   firearms       and    assault,    including       assault     and
    battery on a police officer.                 Throughout their conversation,
    Trooper Lynch observed that Reyes was extremely nervous and was
    crumpling something in his left hand, which Trooper Lynch thought
    - 5 -
    at the time was cocaine.    Upon inquiry, Reyes told Trooper Lynch
    that it was a shipping label from a package with his name on it;
    when Trooper Lynch asked for and took possession of the label, he
    identified it as the Priority Mail label from that day's controlled
    delivery.
    Trooper Lynch proceeded to ask Reyes for his consent to
    search the car for drugs and weapons, which Trooper Lynch testified
    -- and the district court found -- that he received.    In order to
    conduct the search, Trooper Lynch asked Reyes to exit his vehicle,
    at which point, Trooper Lynch escorted him to the front of the
    car.   After conducting a brief scan of the immediate driver's
    area, Trooper Lynch called for a canine team to assist.     Trooper
    Lynch testified -- and the district court found -- that as he
    waited for the K-9 unit to arrive, Trooper Lynch reconfirmed
    Reyes's consent to the search.
    Once the canine team -- consisting of Trooper William
    McSweeney and his dog -- arrived, Trooper Lynch handcuffed Reyes
    and placed him in the back-passenger seat of his police cruiser
    for the duration of the dog's search.       Trooper Lynch informed
    Reyes that he was not under arrest and that these measures were
    just for safety.   The dog then commenced its search; at some point
    surrounding the dog's search, a third trooper -- Trooper Daniel
    Mahoney -- arrived on the scene.    After the dog finished searching
    the passenger areas of the car, Trooper McSweeney opened the car's
    - 6 -
    trunk and the dog jumped into it; the dog "alerted on" a box
    containing a Girl Scout Cookie Oven, which the Troopers removed
    from the trunk.
    Prompted by the discovery of the Girl Scout Cookie Oven
    box, Trooper Lynch asked Reyes if he "ha[d] kids," to which Reyes
    replied that he had a nineteen-year-old daughter.     When Trooper
    Lynch expressed skepticism that a nineteen-year-old would want a
    Girl Scout Cookie Oven, Reyes claimed the oven was for his two-
    year-old niece.   When Trooper Lynch expressed further skepticism
    that a Girl Scout Cookie Oven was an appropriate toy for a two-
    year-old, Reyes said that a girl had given him the box and that he
    did not know what was inside of it.
    Trooper Lynch picked up the Girl Scout Cookie Oven box
    and assessed that it felt heavier than a toy oven.    Accordingly,
    Trooper Lynch opened the box and took out the actual oven.   After
    reconfirming his assessment that the Girl Scout Cookie Oven felt
    heavier than a toy, Trooper Lynch peeled open the plastic top of
    the oven and found what he believed to be -- and what was later
    confirmed to be -- a kilogram of cocaine inside it.   Trooper Lynch
    returned to Reyes, informed him of what the dog had found, and
    placed him under arrest.   Trooper Lynch read Reyes his Miranda
    - 7 -
    rights1 at that time.
    On    July   19,   2016,    law    enforcement   executed   search
    warrants of Santiago-Cruz's and Reyes's residences.             Agents found
    drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a quantity of U.S. currency at
    Santiago-Cruz's residence and the discarded parcel box from the
    July 18 controlled delivery with its mailing label removed in
    Reyes's trash.
    B.   Proceedings
    On August 31, 2016, a federal grand jury returned an
    indictment charging Reyes with one count of conspiracy to possess
    with intent to distribute and to distribute 500 grams or more of
    cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , and one count of
    possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine,
    in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1).
    On September 25, 2017, Reyes made a pre-trial motion to
    suppress the physical evidence seized from his vehicle as well as
    the statements he made to Trooper Lynch during the stop on July
    18, 2016.        Reyes argued that the physical evidence should be
    suppressed because there was no valid basis for the stop and search
    -- as he neither committed any traffic violations to justify the
    1  Before   a  suspect   is   subjected   to  "custodial   police
    interrogation," an "accused must be adequately and effectively
    apprised of his [Miranda] rights," which include the right to
    remain silent.   Dickerson v. United States, 
    530 U.S. 428
    , 440
    (2000) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 467 (1966)).
    - 8 -
    initial stop nor did he consent to the search -- and that his
    statements should be suppressed because the stop was a de facto
    arrest that required Miranda warnings.2
    Following an evidentiary hearing on January 10, 2018,
    the district court denied Reyes's motion to suppress on April 9,
    2018.   Of relevance to Reyes's current appeal, the district court
    made    the    following    findings:   (i)   Reyes   committed   traffic
    violations of tailgating and speeding, which justified the initial
    traffic stop; (ii) Reyes twice voluntarily consented to the search
    of his car; (iii) the "justified investigatory stop" did not become
    a de facto arrest -- even after Reyes was handcuffed -- where
    Trooper Lynch was "effectively alone" in attending to the defendant
    throughout the stop; and (iv) the entire stop prior to arrest
    lasted approximately twenty-six minutes, with Reyes in handcuffs
    but not arrested, for nineteen of those minutes.
    Trial began on September 24, 2018.      At trial, Reyes's
    defense focused on the Government's lack of evidence that he was
    aware of the contents of the package seized from his car during
    the July 18 stop.          During the proceedings, Reyes objected to
    certain statements given by Government witnesses, Trooper Lynch
    and United States Postal Inspector Stephen Dowd.         Of relevance to
    2 "[T]he admissibility in evidence of any statement given during
    [a] custodial interrogation of a suspect . . . depend[s] on whether
    the police provided the suspect with [Miranda] warnings."
    Dickerson, 
    530 U.S. at 435
    .
    - 9 -
    Reyes's       current   appeal,    the   trial    court    overruled     Reyes's
    objections to statements by Trooper Lynch that: (i) past narcotics
    investigations in which Trooper Lynch had been involved typically
    resulted in arrests for narcotics violations; (ii) Reyes drove
    like "[h]e knew where he was going" on the day of the July 18,
    2016 traffic stop; and (iii) Reyes "was trying to make up a story
    [about] where he was going" while responding to Trooper Lynch's
    questions during the stop; the trial court also overruled Reyes's
    objections to Inspector Dowd's lay testimony that the labels on
    the parcels addressed to Reyes and others appeared to have common
    authorship based on the similarity in handwriting.
    Upon conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict
    finding Reyes guilty on both counts.          The district court sentenced
    Reyes    to    210   months   of   imprisonment    on     each   count   to   run
    concurrently and forty-eight months of supervised release.
    Reyes timely lodged this appeal.
    II.   DISCUSSION
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291.3
                We review
    the district court's findings of fact for clear error and accept
    all reasonable inferences that it has drawn.                See United States
    3   
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     provides in pertinent part:
    The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court
    of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have
    jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
    district courts of the United States. . . .
    - 10 -
    v. Coombs, 
    857 F.3d 439
    , 445–46 (1st Cir. 2017) (first citing
    United States v. Zapata, 
    18 F.3d 971
    , 975 (1st Cir. 1994); then
    citing United States v. Paneto, 
    661 F.3d 709
    , 711 (1st Cir. 2011)).
    We review the district court's legal conclusions de novo.    United
    States v. Arnott, 
    758 F.3d 40
    , 43 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Ornelas
    v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 691, 699 (1996)).
    A.   Suppression Ruling
    First, Reyes challenges the district court's pre-trial
    ruling denying his motion to suppress evidence.   Specifically, he
    challenges the admission of physical evidence collected as a result
    of the search of his vehicle -- namely, the cocaine recovered from
    the closed Girl Scout Cookie Oven box in the trunk -- and the
    admission of statements made by Reyes while he was stopped prior
    to being advised of his Miranda rights.    On appeal, Reyes argues
    that the district court's denial order was flawed because the
    order: (i) relied on two clearly erroneous findings of fact; and
    (ii) did not reflect the Supreme Court's guidance in Rodriguez v.
    United States, 
    575 U.S. 348
     (2015).    We reject both contentions.
    When reviewing a suppression ruling, we consider the
    "evidence in the light most favorable to the suppression ruling"
    and can affirm "on any basis apparent in the record."   Arnott, 758
    F.3d at 43.   As noted, we review the district court's findings of
    fact for clear error and "the court's legal conclusions, including
    its answers to 'the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and
    - 11 -
    probable cause to make a warrantless search[]' de novo."                      Id.
    (emphasis added) (quoting Ornelas, 
    517 U.S. at 691
    ).                Similarly,
    when reviewing "whether [a] defendant[] w[as] 'in custody' for
    Miranda purposes," we review factual questions for clear error and
    the ultimate legal question de novo.            United States v. Campbell,
    
    741 F.3d 251
    , 265 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Hughes,
    
    640 F.3d 428
    , 435 (1st Cir. 2011)).             "Given the textured nature
    of these inquiries," we will "proceed circumspectly and with regard
    for the district court's superior vantage point."                United States
    v. Espinoza, 
    490 F.3d 41
    , 46 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Zapata, 
    18 F.3d at 975
    ).
    1.     The District Court's Factual Findings
    As    has   been   noted,   the   district   court     declined    to
    suppress the physical evidence obtained during the stop, finding
    that Reyes voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle.                 In
    addition, the district court declined to suppress the statements
    made by Reyes during the execution of the search because the court
    found that the investigatory detention was not transformed into a
    de facto arrest by anything that transpired during the stop --
    including   the    handcuffing     of   Reyes   where    Trooper    Lynch     was
    "effectively alone" in attending to him.                 Reyes contests the
    district court's factual findings that he consented to the search
    of his vehicle and that Trooper Lynch was "effectively alone" in
    dealing with Reyes.
    - 12 -
    a.   The Consent Finding.
    The district court, while noting that "[t]here is a
    difference   between    giving   consent    happily   and   giving   it
    voluntarily," concluded that Reyes twice voluntarily consented to
    the search of his vehicle and that "the actual search [conducted]
    did not exceed the scope of [the] consent that was given."           In
    making these findings, the court relied largely on the testimony
    of Trooper Lynch, who the court deemed to be credible.        Because,
    as the district court explained, "[i]t is well-established that 'a
    warrantless search may be conducted with the voluntary consent of
    a person authorized to give it,'"          (quoting United States    v.
    Stierhoff, 
    549 F.3d 19
    , 23 (1st Cir. 2008)), the court ruled that
    both the warrantless search of Reyes's car and the admission at
    trial of the physical evidence seized therein were permissible.
    On appeal, Reyes objects to the fact that the district
    court's finding of consent was based solely on the "uncorroborated"
    testimony of Trooper Lynch. 4      Reyes argues that the district
    court's assessment that Trooper Lynch was credible was belied by
    the lack of any contemporaneous record of Reyes's consent and
    assessed inconsistencies in Trooper Lynch's affidavit and oral
    4 In this overarching challenge, Reyes contests the finding that
    he consented to the search at all; he has not lodged alternative
    challenges to the district court's subsidiary conclusions that
    such consent: (i) was voluntary and (ii) encompassed a search of
    the car's trunk.
    - 13 -
    testimony.       These arguments are unavailing.
    Typically, consent -- including its voluntariness --
    "turns on questions of fact" that must be assessed based upon "the
    totality of the circumstances."            United States v. Fornia-Castillo,
    
    408 F.3d 52
    , 62 (1st Cir. 2005).              "For that reason, a finding of
    voluntary consent . . . is reviewable only for clear error."5                    
    Id.
    "Where a district court's factual findings" -- such as a consent
    finding -- "are based on credibility determinations[,] . . . error
    is seldom considered 'clear' unless the credibility assessments
    were    based     on    testimony     which     was   inherently     implausible,
    internally inconsistent, or critically impeached."                  United States
    v.    Merlino,    
    592 F.3d 22
    ,   27   (1st   Cir.    2010)    (alteration   in
    original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Awon v.
    United States, 
    308 F.3d 133
    , 141 (1st Cir. 2002)).                  Reyes has not
    made the requisite showing.
    Reyes's initial contention -- that the lack of any
    contemporaneous record of Reyes's consent belies Trooper Lynch's
    credibility -- is unpersuasive.                 The lack of such records is
    consistent with Trooper Lynch's evidentiary hearing testimony that
    troopers generally do not create audio recordings of consent or
    use    consent    forms    at   stops.        Moreover,    we     have   previously
    considered and rejected the argument that a lack of contemporaneous
    5 Unless the finding of consent is based on an erroneous legal
    standard. Fornia-Castillo, 
    408 F.3d at 62
    .
    - 14 -
    records    evidencing      a     defendant's        consent     undermines     the
    credibility of a government agent.              See United States v. Meléndez-
    Santiago, 
    644 F.3d 54
    , 61 (1st Cir. 2011) (where                     the district
    court    "afford[ed]     total   credibility"       to   a   government   agent's
    testimony that defendant Meléndez voluntarily confessed to his
    role in a conspiracy and agreed to cooperate, the Government's
    "fail[ure] to produce a signed waiver, a cooperative agreement, a
    recording of the interviews, or a signed statement from Meléndez
    d[id] not establish inherent implausibility or other basis for a
    finding of clear error" (internal citation omitted)).
    Nor has Reyes succeeded in proving that Trooper Lynch's
    narrative regarding Reyes's consent was inherently implausible on
    its own terms.     We disagree with Reyes's contention that there was
    "no reason" for Trooper Lynch to ask for consent a second time
    after Reyes had already consented to the search a few minutes
    prior;    after   all,   this    was    a   pre-planned      stop.     Given   the
    expectation that the stop would produce evidence, it is logical
    that Trooper Lynch would seek to protect the search by reconfirming
    Reyes's consent.       Although, as Reyes suggests, it might have made
    more sense for Trooper Lynch to request consent a second time once
    other officers -- who could serve as witnesses to the consent --
    had arrived on scene, it is not our role to decide whether Trooper
    Lynch acted optimally in securing Reyes's consent, but rather to
    assess whether his account is credible.                  Because Reyes has not
    - 15 -
    shown      that   Trooper   Lynch's       consent   narrative      is     inherently
    implausible or inconsistent, we will not overturn the district
    court's consent finding on such grounds.
    Reyes's    additional       attacks   on   the    district     court's
    assessment        of    Trooper    Lynch's     credibility       are,      likewise,
    unsuccessful.            Reyes     contends     that     there     were      several
    inconsistencies in Trooper Lynch's written and oral statements on
    matters unrelated to the consent issue that show that Trooper Lynch
    is such an incredible witness overall that his testimony on the
    question of consent should, correspondingly, not be believed.
    Because the Government offers a persuasive rebuttal to each of
    Reyes's contentions, Reyes again fails to satisfy his burden of
    proving that the district court's credibility determination was
    clearly erroneous.
    Reyes first points to the fact that the Government asked
    the district court to disregard in deciding the motion to suppress
    the statement in Trooper Lynch's affidavit that he learned from
    fellow officers that Reyes arrived at his home on the day of the
    traffic stop at approximately 7:00 p.m. and that soon thereafter
    Reyes placed a box taken from the suspicious parcel into the trunk
    of   his    car   and   drove     away.     While   Reyes      suggests    that   the
    Government's request itself reveals that Trooper Lynch is not
    credible, the Government explained in its closing argument on the
    motion to suppress that its request was motivated by the fact that
    - 16 -
    certain predicate observations did not come into evidence at the
    evidentiary hearing.        The Government made clear both that its
    request did not stem from any conceded inaccuracy or dishonesty on
    the part of Trooper Lynch, and that it was not asking the district
    court to ignore Trooper Lynch's testimony at the hearing.                  The
    Government was merely moving to withdraw aspects of the affidavit
    that were not elicited during the evidentiary hearing.
    Second, Reyes argues that Trooper Lynch's              testimony
    about the traffic violations committed by Reyes was "inconsistent
    and   dubious."     Specifically,   Reyes    takes   issue     with    Trooper
    Lynch's claim on direct examination that he personally observed
    Reyes tailgating.     Reyes claims that on cross-examination, Trooper
    Lynch changed his testimony about where in the "stack" of officer
    vehicles he was in relation to Reyes and admitted that it was in
    fact Trooper Pantazelos who observed the tailgating, while Trooper
    Lynch learned of this traffic violation via radio transmission.
    Contrary   to     Reyes's   contention,     there    is   no    ipso    facto
    inconsistency.      As the Government explained in oral argument,
    tailgating is not necessarily an instantaneous phenomenon that
    only one person can observe.        Common sense dictates that if a
    driver is tailgating over a period of time, two people could see
    it.    Thus, it could be simultaneously true that Trooper Lynch
    first learned of Reyes's tailgating via the radio transmission of
    Trooper Pantazelos and also observed the tailgating for himself
    - 17 -
    when he eventually moved into position behind Reyes in the State
    Police cruiser.     As such, Trooper Lynch's testimony on the traffic
    violations is not inherently implausible or inconsistent such that
    the    district    court's       credibility     determination     should    be
    disturbed.      See Merlino, 
    592 F.3d at 27
    .
    Finally, Reyes contends that because Trooper Lynch's
    testimony on "how long . . . Reyes was in handcuffs before being
    questioned was different from that in his affidavit and at odds
    with [Massachusetts State Police] records," he is an incredible
    witness.        Contrary   to     Reyes's     assessment,     Trooper   Lynch's
    statement in his affidavit that Reyes was in handcuffs for ten
    minutes prior to his arrest is consistent with his testimony at
    the evidentiary hearing that it was approximately ten to fifteen
    minutes.     Ignoring the fact that the district court found that
    Reyes was handcuffed for around nineteen minutes before his arrest,
    on    appeal,   Reyes   invokes    Trooper     Lynch's   evidentiary    hearing
    testimony that he stopped Reyes at 7:40 p.m. and an Administrative
    Journal Extract that reads "20.20" to suggest that Reyes was
    actually in handcuffs for approximately 35 minutes.              For his part,
    when asked at the evidentiary hearing, Trooper Lynch testified
    that the entry "20.20" did not mean 8:20 p.m., but rather was "just
    a number" assigned to the extract, unrelated to time.              Thus, Reyes
    has    not   identified    any     inconsistencies       in   Trooper   Lynch's
    testimony on the handcuffing, as Trooper Lynch has been entirely
    - 18 -
    consistent in his estimates and explanations.6
    In     short,     Reyes's     multifaceted       attacks     on   the
    credibility of Trooper Lynch are insufficient to show that the
    district court clearly erred in holding that Reyes consented to
    the search of his vehicle.             We, therefore, affirm the factual
    finding that Reyes twice consented to the search.7
    b.   The "effectively alone" Finding.
    The district court found -- in part -- because Trooper
    Lynch was "effectively alone" in attending to Reyes throughout the
    stop,   that    Trooper    Lynch's   use   of   handcuffs    "was     reasonably
    6 Moreover, Reyes has not succeeded in proving that Trooper Lynch's
    testimony was inherently implausible.     While there may be some
    appeal to Reyes's contention that the label "20.20" on the
    Administrative Journal Extract translated to 8:20 p.m. such that
    a court could find that Reyes was in handcuffs for 35 minutes,
    that argument was presented to and rejected by the district court;
    instead, the trial court apparently chose to credit Trooper Lynch's
    testimony that the entry "20.20" did not represent a time and that
    the other times recorded in the Administrative Journal Extract
    were inaccurate. Because "a district court's choice between two
    plausible competing interpretations of the facts cannot be clearly
    erroneous," United States v. Weidul, 
    325 F.3d 50
    , 53 (1st Cir.
    2003) (citing United States v. Palmer, 
    203 F.3d 55
    , 60 (1st Cir.
    2000)), Reyes has not satisfied his burden and we must respect
    "the district court's superior vantage point" on this matter,
    Espinoza, 
    490 F.3d at
    46 (citing Zapata, 
    18 F.3d at 975
    ).
    7 As previously stated, in light of its finding of consent, the
    district court further ruled that both the warrantless search of
    Reyes's car and the admission at trial of the physical evidence
    seized therein were permissible.    In our forthcoming discussion
    regarding Reyes's argument that the district court's denial order
    did not reflect Supreme Court guidance, as embodied in Rodriguez
    v. United States, 
    575 U.S. 348
     (2015), we reject Reyes's Rodriguez-
    based contention and affirm these additional consent rulings of
    the district court. Infra p. 21–32.
    - 19 -
    necessary" to mitigate legitimate safety concerns presented by the
    specific facts and circumstances of the stop.                     More broadly, the
    district court assessed that nothing that transpired during the
    stop -- including the handcuffing of Reyes -- transformed the
    investigatory detention of Reyes into a de facto arrest in which
    administration of Miranda rights was necessary.                     Accordingly, as
    Mirandization of Reyes was not required, the District Court found
    Reyes's statements made during the execution of the search to be
    admissible.
    On    appeal,   Reyes    argues        that    because    on-the-scene
    officers outnumbered Reyes during the stop and because additional
    officers covertly monitored the stop from a parking lot nearby,
    the district court's "finding that Trooper Lynch was 'effectively
    alone' cannot survive appellate review even under the deferential
    clear       error    standard."        While    Reyes    raises     a    nonfrivolous
    challenge to the district court's "effectively alone" finding,
    ultimately, we must ask what the impact of any such finding of
    clear error would be:          Would it transform the detention of Reyes
    into    a    de     facto   arrest,    such    that     Reyes's    statements     were
    improperly admitted at trial given the lack of Miranda warnings?
    Of particular -- and dispositive -- note, Reyes does not
    articulate such an argument on appeal; the most he says is that
    the district court's order denying his motion to suppress relied
    on     the    erroneous     finding     of     fact    that    Trooper    Lynch   was
    - 20 -
    "effectively alone" during the stop without referencing Miranda,
    let alone explaining the broader admissibility consequences of
    such a factual error.     It cannot be said that these admissibility
    consequences   are     inherent     in    Reyes's      "effectively   alone"
    contention such that explicit argumentation is unnecessary, and
    "[w]e [do] not consider potentially applicable arguments that are
    not squarely presented in a party's appellate brief," Baybank-
    Middlesex v. Ralar Distribs., Inc., 
    69 F.3d 1200
    , 1203–04 n.5 (1st
    Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Zannino, 
    895 F.2d 1
    , 17 (1st
    Cir. 1990)).   A litigant must "'spell out [his] arguments squarely
    and distinctly,' or else forever hold [his] peace."             Zannino, 
    895 F.2d at 17
     (quoting Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 
    843 F.2d 631
    , 635
    (1st Cir. 1988)).
    Because    we   find    that   Reyes   has   waived   the   broader
    admissibility argument, we conclude that, even assuming arguendo
    error in the district court's "effectively alone" finding, that
    error is of no consequence.       At least on the basis argued by Reyes,
    we discern no reason to disturb the district court's decision
    denying the motion to suppress Reyes's statements made during the
    stop.
    2.      Reyes's Rodriguez Argument
    The district court found that the Government met its
    burden of establishing that the stop and warrantless search of
    Reyes were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.                On appeal,
    - 21 -
    Reyes argues that the district court's denial order was flawed
    because the court did not adhere to the Supreme Court precedent,
    Rodriguez v. United States, where the Court was clear that police
    may not prolong a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff unless the
    officer    has   "the        reasonable     suspicion      ordinarily   demanded   to
    justify detaining [the] individual."                  
    575 U.S. 348
    , 353-55 (2015).
    By the defendant's assessment, Rodriguez illuminates that the stop
    of Reyes "became an unreasonable search and seizure in violation
    of the Fourth Amendment when Trooper Lynch detoured from the
    mission of traffic enforcement in pursuit of evidence to further
    an unrelated criminal investigation without reasonable suspicion."
    We are unpersuaded by Reyes's Rodriguez argument.
    a.     Waiver.
    As     a    threshold      matter,       the   Government   argues   that
    because    Reyes       (i)    never   raised     a   Rodriguez-based    suppression
    argument to the district court and (ii) made no attempt on appeal
    to show "good cause" for the delay in raising it, the argument is
    waived.8    While Reyes acknowledges that he did not specifically
    8 Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(C) enumerates "suppression of evidence"
    as a motion that must be made before trial.       Fed. R. Crim. P.
    12(c)(3) further specifies that "[i]f a party does not meet the
    deadline for making a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the motion is
    untimely." However, "a court may consider the defense, objection,
    or request if the party shows good cause."       While there is a
    circuit split as to whether defendants may still receive plain
    error review for Rule 12 arguments not made before the district
    court, see United States v. Lindsey, 
    3 F.4th 32
    , 41 n.6 (1st Cir.
    2021) (collecting cases), we have recently clarified that in the
    - 22 -
    invoke the Rodriguez case by name in the district court, he
    nevertheless contends     this does not mean that he waived the
    argument that the traffic stop morphed into an unconstitutional
    search for drug evidence.       Even assuming Reyes's argument below
    was sufficient to preserve this issue, we nonetheless find that
    the stop accords with the requirements of Rodriguez.
    The essence of Reyes's Rodriguez-centered argument on
    appeal is that accepting the district court's finding that Reyes
    violated the traffic laws -- and the corresponding conclusion that
    the   stop    was   initially   justified   --   the   stop   became   an
    unconstitutional seizure "when Trooper Lynch detoured from the
    mission of traffic enforcement in pursuit of evidence to further
    an unrelated criminal investigation without reasonable suspicion."
    We adopt, arguendo, Reyes's contention that the core of this
    argument was articulated in his initial Memorandum in Support of
    Motion to Suppress, which read in part:      "[L]aw enforcement lacked
    reasonable suspicion -- let alone the more stringent standard of
    probable cause -- to believe that Reyes or [his car] were involved
    in drug-related activity" and "nothing that occurred during the
    traffic stop provided law enforcement probable cause to search the
    First Circuit, unpreserved arguments under Fed. R. Crim. P.
    12(b)(3) and (c)(3) "cannot be raised on appeal absent a showing
    of good cause," 
    id.
     at 40–41, and parties are "not entitled to
    plain error review," 
    id. at 42
    .
    - 23 -
    vehicle."9
    We proceed to consider and reject Reyes's argument on
    the merits.
    b.        Merits.
    The    district   court       found     that    both   the    stop    and
    warrantless search of Reyes were reasonable under the Fourth
    Amendment and, thus, declined to suppress the items seized from
    the vehicle.        While we agree with the district court's ultimate
    conclusion,        our   rationale    is     slightly       different     from    that
    articulated in the suppression decision.                "[W]e are not wed to the
    district court's reasoning but, rather, may affirm its suppression
    rulings on any basis apparent in the record."                   Arnott, 
    758 F.3d 9
       Reyes's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress further read:
    That the [car] was purportedly involved in a traffic
    violation, which Reyes denies (see Reyes Aff., attached
    hereto as Ex. B), was not sufficient to provide law
    enforcement with probable cause to search the vehicle.
    See [California v.] Acevedo, 500 U.S. [565,] 569-570
    [(1991)] ("If the officer goes beyond a brief
    investigatory stop and actually searches or seizes a
    vehicle in the absence of a warrant, the officer must
    have 'probable cause to believe that the vehicle
    contain[s] evidence of crime in the light of an exigency
    arising out of the likely disappearance of the
    vehicle.'") Nor was the fact that Reyes was nervous an
    adequate reason to search the [car]. See United States
    v. McKoy, 
    428 F.3d 38
    , 40 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that
    there was not reasonable suspicion to justify pat frisk
    of defendant solely based upon the dangerousness of the
    neighborhood and the defendant's "nervous demeanor," as
    "[n]ervousness is a common and entirely natural reaction
    to police presence. . . .").
    - 24 -
    at 43.    Accordingly, in affirming here, we supplement the analysis
    in the denial order, which did not consider the Rodriguez argument
    Reyes now presses expressly.
    The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the
    people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
    against    unreasonable   searches   and   seizures."   U.S.   Const.
    amend. IV.     "Temporary detention of individuals during the stop
    of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period
    and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons'
    within the meaning of this provision."       Whren v. United States,
    
    517 U.S. 806
    , 809–10 (1996).     "[W]here the police have probable
    cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred," "the
    decision to stop an automobile is reasonable" under the Fourth
    Amendment, 
    id. at 810
    , and a police investigation of that violation
    is justified, Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354.     While "[a] traffic stop
    is a 'relatively brief encounter' intended to 'address the traffic
    violation that warranted the stop,'" United States v. Cruz-Rivera,
    
    14 F.4th 32
    , 43 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
    354), it is well-established that "where there is reasonable
    suspicion of further criminal wrongdoing," id. (citing United
    States v. Lee, 
    317 F.3d 26
    , 33 (1st Cir. 2003)), an officer may
    use a traffic violation as a pretext to stop a car in order to
    obtain evidence for some more serious crime, United States v.
    McGregor, 
    650 F.3d 813
    , 820 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Whren, 517
    - 25 -
    U.S. at 810).     However, where "a seizure is 'justified only by a
    police-observed traffic violation,' officers may not prolong a
    stop   [to    investigate    another   crime]   'absent   the    reasonable
    suspicion      ordinarily     demanded     to   justify    detaining       an
    individual.'"     Cruz-Rivera, 14 F.4th at 46–47 (quoting Rodriguez,
    575 U.S. at 350, 355).
    In the case at bar, the district court explained that
    because it found "as a factual matter that [Reyes] did commit
    traffic violations," "[t]his gave Trooper Lynch probable cause to
    stop [Reyes] for those traffic violations even if doing so was
    'just an excuse to investigate something else.'"          Accordingly, the
    stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.                 Furthermore,
    because the district court found that Reyes "voluntarily consented
    to the search of his vehicle, including the trunk," it held "the
    search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."             Having found
    that Reyes gave voluntary consent, the district court held there
    was "no need to address whether law enforcement had probable cause
    to conduct the warrantless search."
    Supreme Court case law indicates that an additional link
    is needed.      For example, the Court explained in Illinois v.
    Caballes, that even when a traffic stop is based on probable cause
    -- as the district court found the stop of Reyes to be in light of
    his tailgating and speeding violations -- "a seizure that is lawful
    at   its   inception   can   [ultimately    still]   violate     the   Fourth
    - 26 -
    Amendment."     
    543 U.S. 405
    , 407 (2005).               Specifically, tasks not
    related to the traffic mission, such as "[o]n-scene investigation
    into other crimes," are "unlawful" if they prolong the stop absent
    independent reasonable suspicion.            Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355–57.
    Here, without Rodriguez squarely invoked before it, the district
    court did not -- or at least did not explicitly -- find that
    independent reasonable suspicion existed to justify extending the
    stop of Reyes beyond an investigation of traffic violations into
    an investigation of unrelated drug crimes.
    This     lack     of    an     explicit        independent   reasonable
    suspicion finding complicates the district court's conclusion that
    Reyes's consent validated the search of his vehicle.                   In Florida
    v. Royer, the Supreme Court affirmed that because "the bounds of
    an investigative stop had been exceeded" at the time that the
    defendant Royer gave consent to search his luggage, Royer's consent
    was "tainted by . . . illegality" and therefore "ineffective to
    justify   the    search."         
    460 U.S. 491
    ,     501,   507–08   (1983).
    Importantly,    the   Court      clarified       that   "had   Royer   voluntarily
    consented to the search of his luggage while he was justifiably
    being detained on reasonable suspicion," 
    id. at 502
    , or while he
    was not yet seized, 
    id.
     at 503–05, "the products of the search
    would be admissible against him," 
    id. at 502
    .
    In Reyes's case, there is no question that he was seized
    at the time he gave his consent to the vehicle search.                  Whren, 517
    - 27 -
    U.S. at 809–10 ("Temporary detention of individuals during the
    stop of an automobile by the police . . . constitutes a 'seizure'
    of 'persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].").
    Thus, applying Royer and Rodriguez, in order for Reyes's consent
    to have been effective to justify the search of his vehicle, Reyes
    must have been legally detained at the time such consent was given
    -- either because Trooper Lynch was still in the process of
    completing tasks related to the valid traffic mission10 or because
    independent reasonable suspicion justified extending the stop
    beyond the investigation of traffic violations.     Again, without
    Rodriguez squarely presented, the district court did not consider
    whether independent reasonable suspicion was necessary to extend
    the stop, but instead declared that because Reyes's consent had
    blessed the search, it was unnecessary to address whether law
    enforcement   also   had   probable   cause   for   that   search.
    Consequently, because the district court did not explicitly find
    that Reyes's detention continued to be lawful at the time he gave
    his consent, it is not clear from the denial order that Reyes's
    10We note that the Supreme Court has declared that "a dog sniff
    is not fairly characterized as part of [an] officer's traffic
    mission." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356. Thus -- in the absence of
    independent reasonable suspicion justifying extension of the
    traffic stop into investigation of other crimes -- the traffic
    stop of Reyes would, at a minimum, become unlawful at the
    commencement of the canine search of Reyes's vehicle.          We
    ultimately conclude that law enforcement here had the requisite
    independent reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. Infra p. 30–
    32.
    - 28 -
    consent was valid to justify the search.
    We note that in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court did not
    definitively rule out the possibility that independent reasonable
    suspicion of additional criminal wrongdoing existed to justify
    detaining      Rodriguez   beyond     the     completion    of   the     traffic
    investigation, but rather left that question open for the Eighth
    Circuit's consideration on remand.            575 U.S. at 358.         Here too,
    the district court did not rule on whether independent reasonable
    suspicion existed to justify extending the traffic stop.                       Of
    course, "the general rule is that a 'federal appellate court does
    not consider an issue not passed on below,'" N.H. Motor Transp.
    Ass'n v. Flynn, 
    751 F.2d 43
    , 52 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Singleton
    v. Wulff, 
    428 U.S. 106
    , 120 (1976)), however, the Supreme Court
    has instructed:
    The matter of what questions may be taken up
    and resolved for the first time on appeal is
    one left primarily to the discretion of the
    courts of appeals, to be exercised on the
    facts of individual cases. . . .   Certainly
    there are circumstances in which a federal
    appellate court is justified in resolving an
    issue not passed on below.
    
    Id.
     (alteration in original) (quoting Wulff, 
    428 U.S. at 121
    ).
    Because we review district courts' legal conclusions on reasonable
    suspicion de novo, Arnott, 758 F.3d at 43 (emphasis added), and
    because   we    assess   that   we   would    not   be   materially    aided   by
    additional fact or credibility findings by the district court, we
    - 29 -
    deem remand unnecessary here.         Compare Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 358,
    with United States v. Berryman, 
    717 F.2d 651
    , 663 (1st Cir. 1983)
    (Breyer,   J.,   dissenting)    (making       a   first-instance    finding    of
    reasonable suspicion on appeal), and United States v. Berryman,
    
    717 F.2d 650
    , 650 (1st Cir. 1983) (en banc) (adopting the dissent
    upon rehearing en banc).         We now consider whether independent
    reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop of Reyes.
    "No simple, mechanical formula tells us what reasonable
    suspicion is, though we know that it is less than probable cause
    and more than a naked hunch. . . . [C]ourts must gauge its presence
    in a commonsense, case-by-case way, taking in the whole picture."
    Cruz-Rivera, 14 F.4th at 43 (alteration in original) (quoting
    McGregor, 
    650 F.3d at 821
    ). Considering the "totality of the
    circumstances,"    id.   at    44,    we   find    that   Trooper   Lynch     had
    sufficient independent reasonable suspicion of additional criminal
    wrongdoing to support his continued detention and questioning of
    Reyes.
    We are informed by our recent opinion in Cruz-Rivera, in
    which we affirmed a finding of independent reasonable suspicion on
    the basis of similar factual elements to those presented here.                 14
    F.4th at 44–47.      In Cruz-Rivera, as part of a larger, ongoing
    investigation     into   a     heroin      distribution     conspiracy,       law
    enforcement executed a "walled-off" stop in which the police pulled
    over the defendants for a pretextual -- though valid -- traffic
    - 30 -
    violation with the aim of furthering the drug investigation.                            Id.
    at 40.    We found that the valid traffic violation justified the
    initial stop, id. at 44, and moreover, that the officer executing
    the    stop    had    independent         reasonable   suspicion        to   extend     the
    investigative detention beyond the initial traffic infractions
    into possible drug crimes given: (i) the trooper's pre-existing
    knowledge that the vehicle had likely been involved in a drug
    transaction; and (ii) the defendants' noticeable nervousness and
    inconsistent answers upon police questioning, id. at 44–47.
    Similarly, here, law enforcement identified Reyes as a
    suspected participant in a drug distribution conspiracy via an
    ongoing investigation that began in February 2016.                           On July 18,
    the investigative team carried out a controlled delivery of drugs
    to Reyes and targeted Reyes for a "walled-off" traffic stop at a
    time in which          the    surveillance team believed Reyes would be
    transporting         the    drugs.        Trooper   Lynch    --    a    member   of    the
    investigative team -- executed the "walled-off" stop after Reyes
    committed traffic violations of speeding and tailgating.                                 On
    appeal, Reyes accepts the district court's finding that at least
    one    traffic    violation       occurred,      justifying       the    initial      stop.
    During questioning, Trooper Lynch, who "knew more about Mr. Reyes
    than   [he]     let    on    to   believe,"      observed    that       Reyes   was    both
    extremely nervous -- his hands were shaking -- and was unable to
    provide       basic    details       on    his   professed        destination      beyond
    - 31 -
    "Boston".   Moreover, Trooper Lynch saw that Reyes was crumpling a
    shipping label in his left hand, which Trooper Lynch confiscated
    and identified as the Priority Mail label from the parcel that had
    been delivered earlier that day as part of the controlled delivery.
    Thus, following the model of Cruz-Rivera and taking into account
    the "totality of the circumstances," we conclude that Trooper Lynch
    had the necessary independent reasonable suspicion to justify
    extending Reyes's detention beyond an investigation of traffic
    violations into unrelated drug crimes.
    Having   determined    that    the   requisite    independent
    reasonable suspicion existed to justify extending the stop, we
    correspondingly find that Reyes was not illegally detained at the
    time he consented to the vehicle search, such that his consent was
    effective to justify the search under Royer.        Supra p. 27–28.    We
    can, thus, affirm the district court's finding that because Reyes
    consented to the search of his vehicle, the warrantless search was
    reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the items seized from
    the vehicle were properly admitted at trial.
    B.    Evidentiary Rulings
    Reyes raises    evidentiary    challenges to     the district
    court's admission of certain statements by witnesses Trooper Lynch
    and Postal Inspector Stephen Dowd.         On appeal, Reyes argues the
    contested statements were not proper lay testimony as they did not
    - 32 -
    help the jury to understand any facts, 11 but rather                unfairly
    prejudiced him and tainted the proceedings such that a new trial
    is required.     By contrast, the Government defends the propriety
    of each of the challenged rulings, while also arguing that even if
    the district court erred in admitting some or all of the contested
    evidence, such admissions did not influence the verdict and were,
    therefore, harmless.        We agree that the contested evidence was
    either properly admitted or was harmless.
    "We review a district court's admission of lay opinion
    testimony    under   Fed.    R.   Evid.     701   for   manifest   abuse   of
    discretion."     United States v. Jackman, 
    48 F.3d 1
    , 4 (1st Cir.
    1995).    To be admissible under Rule 701, lay opinion must be: (i)
    "rationally based on the witness's perception," Fed. R. Evid.
    701(a);   (ii)   "helpful    to   clearly    understanding   the   witness's
    testimony or to determining a fact in issue," Fed. R. Evid. 701(b);
    and (iii) "not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
    11We note that the heading of the evidentiary section of Reyes's
    brief appears to contain a typographical error. The brief asserts
    that the district court erred in permitting testimony of Inspector
    Dowd and Trooper Lynch that "failed to meet the second requirement
    of F.R.Evid. [sic] 702 as it did not help the jury understand any
    fact."   The second requirement of Fed. R. Evid. 701 on lay
    testimony -- and not that of Fed. R. Evid. 702 on expert testimony
    -- enumerates a requirement that testimony be helpful to
    determining a fact in issue. In light of the Rules' wording and
    because nothing else indicates that Inspector Dowd or Trooper Lynch
    were, or should have been, qualified as expert witnesses under
    Fed. R. Evid. 702, we assume -- as the Government did in its
    briefing -- that Reyes intended to lodge objections to Inspector
    Dowd's and Trooper Lynch's statements under Fed. R. Evid. 701.
    - 33 -
    knowledge,"   Fed. R. Evid. 701(c).        As these are conjunctive
    requirements, lay witness testimony that fails to satisfy a single
    prong of Rule 701 is not properly admitted.         See Fed. R. Evid.
    701(a)–(c).
    However,   "[n]ot    all    erroneous   evidentiary   rulings
    require reversal."   United States v. Obiora, 
    910 F.3d 555
    , 560–61
    (1st Cir. 2018).     "It is settled that '[a] non-constitutional
    evidentiary error is harmless (and, therefore, does not require a
    new trial) so long as it is highly probable that the error did not
    influence the verdict.'"      United States v. Flemmi, 
    402 F.3d 79
    ,
    95 (1st Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting United States
    v. Piper, 
    298 F.3d 47
    , 56 (1st Cir. 2002)).       Such a determination
    "requires a case-specific examination of . . . 'the centrality of
    the tainted material,' its prejudicial impact, and any other
    indications that 'the error affected the factfinder's resolution
    of a material issue.'"     United States v. Meises, 
    645 F.3d 5
    , 24
    (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Sepulveda, 
    15 F.3d 1161
    ,
    1182 (1st Cir. 1993)).
    In the case at bar, the parties agree that the central
    question -- and indeed the only material issue -- is whether Reyes
    knew that the package he was transporting at the time of the
    traffic stop contained cocaine, and thus, whether Reyes was a
    participant in the conspiracy.       Defense counsel made explicit in
    closing argument at trial that Reyes does not contest: (i) the
    - 34 -
    existence of an overarching drug-distribution conspiracy; (ii)
    that he had been receiving packages for Santiago-Cruz; or (iii)
    that the Girl Scout Cookie Oven found in his car held concealed
    cocaine; Reyes only disputes that he knew that said Girl Scout
    Cookie Oven contained drugs.       Because Reyes's defense focused
    exclusively on his knowing participation, in order for us to hold
    that it was "highly probable" that the district court's evidentiary
    rulings "influence[d] the verdict," Flemmi, 
    402 F.3d at 95
     (quoting
    Piper, 
    298 F.3d at 56
    ), we must determine that such admitted
    testimony concerned the "central question" of Reyes's knowledge,
    see, e.g., Obiora, 910 F.3d at 563 (finding admission of contested
    testimony harmless because it was "irrelevant to the central
    question of whether [the defendant] agreed in the first place to
    distribute heroin"). 12   As such, we will examine each of the
    challenged evidentiary admissions through this lens.
    1. Trooper Lynch's Testimony
    At trial, Reyes objected to Trooper Lynch's statements
    that (i) past narcotics investigations in which Trooper Lynch had
    been   involved   typically   resulted   in   arrests   for   narcotics
    violations; (ii) Reyes drove like "[h]e knew where he was going"
    12Contra Meises, 
    645 F.3d at 25
     (granting a new trial where "the
    tainted evidence was central to the prosecution's case and
    potentially disastrous to the appellants' defense," such that we
    "[could] not say that it [wa]s 'highly probable' that the errors
    did not affect the jury's resolution of the case").
    - 35 -
    on the day of the July 18, 2016 traffic stop; and (iii) Reyes "was
    trying to make up a story [about] where he was going" while
    responding to Trooper Lynch's questions during the stop.                   We
    conclude that each of these statements was either properly admitted
    or its admission was harmless error.
    a.     Narcotics Investigations Typically Result in Arrests.
    At the beginning of direct examination of Trooper Lynch
    at trial, the Government engaged in the following exchange with
    him:
    Q. Okay.   So over the last five plus years
    have you had an opportunity to conduct such
    investigations into narcotics?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. And on approximately how many different
    occasions?
    A. Hundreds of investigations, sir.
    Q. Okay.     And what were the results         or
    findings of those investigations?
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.
    THE COURT: Sustained.
    Q. When you finished those investigations,
    what would typically happen?
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.
    THE COURT: Overruled.       You may answer
    that.
    A. We would arrest individuals for narcotics
    violations.
    Reyes objected below and on appeal now contends that such testimony
    was    "in    the   nature   of   overview   testimony"   that    served   to
    - 36 -
    impermissibly    bolster   Trooper   Lynch's   credibility.    (emphasis
    added).   The Government     counters    that this exchange     was not
    "overview testimony" and did not in any way suggest that Reyes was
    guilty of the crime charged.     While we think that this minimally
    probative exchange toed the line of propriety, we conclude that
    any error in its admission was ultimately harmless.
    Typically,   "[a]n   'overview witness'    is a government
    agent who testifies as one of the prosecution's first witnesses
    and . . . provides an overview or roadmap of the prosecution's
    case to come."    United States v. Etienne, 
    772 F.3d 907
    , 913 (1st
    Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Brown, 
    669 F.3d 10
    , 24 (1st
    Cir. 2012)).     While there is no "blanket ban on all overview
    testimony," id. at 914, such testimony is "[d]isfavored" in the
    drug conspiracy context where a law enforcement agent "based on
    the results of the agency's overall investigation, rather than on
    his own personal knowledge or participation" "testif[ies] about a
    defendant's specific role in [a] charged conspiracy," id. at 913-
    14.
    Here, the contested exchange with Trooper Lynch was not
    "overview testimony"; Trooper Lynch did not "provide[] a[] . . .
    roadmap of the prosecution's case to come."      Id. at 913.   However,
    Reyes's concerns that the testimony made representations about
    matters not before the trial court and served only to enhance the
    jury's confidence in Trooper Lynch -- verging on witness bolstering
    - 37 -
    -- are nonfrivolous.   See United States v. Fields, 
    660 F.3d 95
    ,
    97 n.3 (1st Cir. 2011) (defining "bolstering").13
    But ultimately, we hold that even if the trial court
    erred in admitting this exchange, any such error was harmless.
    This is so because Trooper Lynch's generalized statement did not
    mention Reyes, let alone discuss his "specific role in the charged
    conspiracy," Etienne, 772 F.3d at 914; we, therefore, cannot say
    that this testimony implicated the central question of Reyes's
    knowledge such that it was     "highly probable"    that   the error
    "influence[d] the verdict," Flemmi, 
    402 F.3d at 95
     (quoting Piper,
    
    298 F.3d at 56
    ).   Our conclusion is buttressed both by the weight
    of the evidence suggesting that Reyes was a knowing participant in
    the drug conspiracy, and not just innocently receiving parcels for
    a friend,14 as well as by the fact that Trooper Lynch was subject
    13We note that the contested exchange with Trooper Lynch amounted
    to a recitation of certain language contained in his affidavit
    presented to the district court in support of the Government's
    opposition to Reyes's motion to suppress. While such language is
    commonplace in affidavits presented to a district court judge, lay
    jurors are not in the same position as a trial judge to analyze
    such representations in a circumscribed form.
    14Namely: Reyes received multiple packages for Santiago-Cruz; most
    of these packages were addressed from relatives of Reyes, despite
    being for Santiago-Cruz; the packages had slightly incorrect
    addresses for Reyes and non-deliverable return addresses, a
    reportedly common characteristic of parcels containing drug
    contraband; Reyes and Santiago-Cruz had multiple telephone
    contacts on the days the parcels were shipped and delivered; Reyes
    met with Santiago-Cruz after the deliveries; Reyes removed the
    mailing label from the parcel before discarding the box; during
    the stop, Reyes lied to Trooper Lynch about why he had a Girl Scout
    Cookie Oven in his car; and so on.
    - 38 -
    to substantial cross-examination at trial.                    See, e.g., United
    States v. Torres-Galindo, 
    206 F.3d 136
    , 140-42 (1st Cir. 2000)
    (deeming harmless the erroneous admission of a testifying agent's
    generalized statement that suspects frequently first deny and then
    later   admit    their    involvement     in    a     crime   where   the   agent's
    credibility was fully explored at trial and the weight of the
    evidence against the defendant was "so great" that the "testimony
    did not likely affect the jury's verdict").
    Although    we    ultimately      deem    harmless    any   error   in
    admitting    Trooper     Lynch's     generalized       account    that   narcotics
    investigations typically result in arrests, in closing, we note
    that    by   soliciting       this   minimally      probative     testimony,     the
    prosecution created an unnecessary appellate issue.
    b.      Reyes Drove "like he knew where he was going".
    Reyes next objects to the admission of Trooper Lynch's
    testimony that prior to the stop on July 18, 2016, Reyes was
    driving "like he knew where he was going," elicited in the context
    of the following exchange:
    Q. Now, are you familiar with the most direct route
    between 47 Winthrop Street [Reyes's address] and 185
    Metropolitan Ave. [Santiago-Cruz's address]?
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. And how would that route compare to the route that
    Mr. Reyes took on that day?
    A. In my opinion, it's the most direct route.
    Q. And with respect to the route that he took that day,
    how would you characterize his driving?
    - 39 -
    A. He knew where he was going.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.   Move to strike.
    The Government contends that such lay opinion was admissible, but
    argues as a threshold matter that because Reyes "fail[ed] to
    specify the nature of his complaint" concerning the statement, it
    should be       "deemed waived for lack of development."        (citing
    Zannino, 
    895 F.2d at 17
     ("[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory
    manner . . . are deemed waived.")).        Because Reyes's briefing on
    this objection consisted of one conclusory sentence, we agree with
    the Government that Reyes's objection is waived.15
    c.    Reyes "was trying to make up a story [about] where he was
    going".
    Reyes further objects to the admission of statements by
    Trooper Lynch describing Reyes's behavior during the traffic stop.
    In particular contention is Trooper Lynch's assertion that Reyes
    15But waiver aside, Reyes's objection is unavailing. This is so
    because the Government solicited the contested statement from
    Trooper Lynch in order to establish its theory that Reyes was
    driving to Santiago-Cruz's house at the time of the traffic stop.
    Crucially, Reyes did not dispute that he was going to give the
    parcel containing the Girl Scout Cookie Oven -- and the concealed
    drugs therein -- to Santiago-Cruz. Indeed, the defense's theory
    of the case hinged on the jury simultaneously accepting that Reyes
    intended to give the package to Santiago-Cruz, but that he had no
    knowledge of the package's contents. Thus, whether or not Reyes
    was in fact en route to Santiago-Cruz's house at the precise moment
    of the traffic stop -- the theory to which Trooper Lynch's "he
    knew where he was going" statement lent support -- was extraneous.
    Because Trooper Lynch's contested statement shed minimal, if any,
    light on the central question of Reyes's knowledge of the parcel's
    contents, its admission -- even if erroneous -- was harmless.
    - 40 -
    "was trying to make up a story" in the following exchange:
    A. . . . I said, "Where in Boston [are you
    going]?" But he couldn't say where.
    Q. How did his answers to that question differ
    from his answers to your earlier questions?
    A. His demeanor changed. He was holding the
    steering wheel, and he was looking . . .
    straight ahead, and he was holding onto the
    steering wheel and I could see him crumpling
    something in his left hand.
    Q. Before we get to that, what, if any,
    investigative value did his inability to give
    you specifics about where he was going have?
    A. Like I said to you, sir, I knew more about
    Mr. Reyes than I let on to believe.     So at
    that time I knew he was trying to make up a
    story where he was going.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.    Move to
    strike.
    On appeal, Reyes contends that Trooper Lynch invaded the province
    of the jury by opining on "facts relevant to innocence or guilt,"
    including Reyes's veracity during the stop.      By contrast, the
    Government maintains that Trooper Lynch's testimony did not usurp
    the jury's role, but rather met all of the requirements for lay
    testimony under Rule 701.   The Government's position prevails.
    Trooper Lynch's statement satisfied each of Rule 701's
    requirements for lay testimony: Trooper Lynch's testimony (i) was
    rationally based on his perceptions under 701(a), as it recounted
    Trooper Lynch's own interactions with and assessment of Reyes
    during the stop; (ii) was "helpful" to the jury under 701(b)
    because Trooper Lynch participated in the conversation with Reyes,
    - 41 -
    while the jury did not; and (iii) was not based on scientific,
    technical, or other specialized knowledge under 701(c), because it
    derived in large part from observations of Reyes's body language
    and demeanor against the backdrop of Trooper Lynch's personal
    involvement in the broader investigation.
    Although "one can't actually read another person's mind,
    one is often able to infer, from what the person says or from the
    expression   on    his    face   or    other   body   language,   what   he   is
    thinking."     United States v. Prange, 
    771 F.3d 17
    , 29 (1st Cir.
    2014) (quoting United States v. Curescu, 
    674 F.3d 735
    , 740 (7th
    Cir. 2012)).      Trooper Lynch, as a lay witness, was therefore "free
    to state his rationally-based perception of what [Reyes] was
    thinking during their face-to-face conversation."             
    Id.
    Reyes's argument to the contrary -- that by opining on
    "facts relevant to innocence or guilt," including Reyes's veracity
    during the stop, Trooper Lynch impermissibly usurped the role of
    the jury -- is unavailing.            First, the Federal Rules of Evidence
    themselves dictate that "lay opinion 'is not objectionable just
    because it embraces an ultimate issue.'"              Id. at 30 (quoting Fed.
    R. Evid. 704(a)).        Here, Reyes does not contend that Trooper Lynch
    opined on an ultimate issue, but merely implied that his statement
    concerned "facts relevant to innocence or guilt."             Because Trooper
    Lynch's testimony would not have been ipso facto inadmissible even
    had it "embrace[d] an ultimate issue," Fed. R. Evid. 704(a), we
    - 42 -
    cannot accept Reyes's broader proposition that Trooper Lynch's lay
    opinion   "invade[d]   the   jury's    province"   and   was,   thus,
    inadmissible because it concerned "facts relevant to innocence or
    guilt."   (emphasis added).     Nor has Reyes shown that it is
    categorically impermissible for a lay witness to opine on the
    veracity of another's out-of-court statements, as each of the cases
    he invoked either concerned in-court statements, see, e.g., United
    States v. Thiongo, 
    344 F.3d 55
    , 61 (1st Cir. 2003) ("This Court
    has held it is improper for an attorney to ask a witness whether
    another witness lied on the stand.") (emphasis added),16 or were
    otherwise inapposite, see United States v. Serrano-Osorio, 
    191 F.3d 12
    , 14-15 (1st Cir. 1999) (addressing no admissibility of
    evidence issues).
    In light of the above, we conclude that Trooper Lynch's
    assessment of Reyes during the traffic stop was admissible lay
    testimony under Rule 701.    Our finding of admissibility ends the
    16See also United States v. Sullivan, 
    85 F.3d 743
    , 750 (1st Cir.
    1996) ("The rule . . . makes it improper to induce a witness to
    say another witness lied on the stand.") (emphasis added); United
    States v. Pereira, 
    848 F.3d 17
    , 21 (1st Cir. 2017) ("Over the past
    twenty-five years, this court has consistently held that 'counsel
    should not ask one witness to comment on the veracity of the
    testimony of another witness.'") (emphasis added) (quoting
    Sullivan, 
    85 F.3d at 750
    )); United States v. Akitoye, 
    923 F.2d 221
    , 223-24 (1st Cir. 1991) (finding in part that the trial court
    "justifiably sustained" the defendant's objection to a question on
    whether another witness was "lying to this Jury" because it was
    the kind of "'was-the-witness-lying' question . . . by the
    prosecutor . . . [that] should never have been posed").
    - 43 -
    matter; however, we note that even had the district court erred in
    admitting Trooper Lynch's assessment, such an error would be
    harmless for the same reasons that admission of Trooper Lynch's
    generalized    account     of    his    past     narcotics    investigations    was
    harmless: namely, that Trooper Lynch was subject to extensive
    cross-examination      and      the    other     evidence     against   Reyes   was
    sufficiently substantial.             Supra p. 38-39.        We determine this to
    be true even though, here, the contested statement arguably touched
    upon the case's "central question" of Reyes's knowledge.
    Concerning         the       exploration       of      Trooper    Lynch's
    credibility,    it    is   important      that     at   trial,    defense   counsel
    highlighted specific misperceptions of Trooper Lynch during the
    traffic stop.        For example, in closing, defense counsel noted:
    "Trooper Lynch admitted that when he stopped Mr. Reyes and he saw
    . . . little white crumbles in his hands, he assumed it was
    cocaine. . . . Guess what?              He was wrong.         It wasn't cocaine."
    Thus, shortly before the jurors were excused to deliberate, defense
    counsel   underscored        that       Trooper     Lynch's      perceptions    and
    assumptions were not infallible.            As such, the accuracy of Trooper
    Lynch's assessment of Reyes during the traffic stop was a matter
    "presented to the jury for its evaluation."                   See Torres-Galindo,
    
    206 F.3d at 141
    .
    Moreover, the weight of the evidence continues to be
    sufficiently substantial such that it is "highly probable" that
    - 44 -
    Trooper Lynch's assessment of Reyes's veracity during the stop
    "did not influence the verdict."           Flemmi, 
    402 F.3d at 95
     (quoting
    Piper, 
    298 F.3d at 56
    ).           In addition to the evidentiary proof
    previously enumerated, supra p. 38 n.14, we also note that defense
    counsel conceded at trial that Reyes lied to Trooper Lynch at least
    once during the traffic stop.             For example, in closing, defense
    counsel acknowledged that after the canine unit alerted to the
    presence of contraband in the Girl Scout Cookie Oven, Reyes was
    not honest with Trooper Lynch about how or why he came to have the
    oven in his possession.        Thus, the jury had cause to doubt Reyes's
    veracity during the stop even without Trooper Lynch's assessment.
    This justifiable      doubt coupled with the              weight of the     other
    evidence   persuade     us    that   it   is   "highly     probable"   that   any
    potential error in admitting Trooper Lynch's assessment of Reyes
    during the stop "did not influence" the jury's resolution of the
    case.
    In sum, although we determine that the district court
    did not manifestly abuse its discretion in admitting Trooper
    Lynch's statement that Reyes "was trying to make up a story," any
    error in admission would also have been harmless.
    2.        Inspector Dowd's Testimony
    Finally,     Reyes    objected      to   the   admission    of   Postal
    Inspector Stephen Dowd's lay testimony that the labels on the
    parcels addressed to Reyes and others appeared to have common
    - 45 -
    authorship based on the similarity in handwriting.            The following
    is an example of the Government and Inspector Dowd's exchanges on
    this issue:
    Q. And do you have an opinion with respect to
    the handwriting on both [labels]?
    A. Yes.
    Q. And what is that opinion?
    A. I believe    the   same     person    wrote   these
    labels.
    Q. And, again, what's the basis for that?
    A. By looking at the different letters, and
    they appear to be exactly duplicates on both.
    As Inspector Dowd gave his testimony, the various labels under
    discussion were shown side-by-side on a split-screen for the jury
    to view.      On appeal, Reyes argues that Inspector Dowd's lay
    testimony was not "helpful" to the jury under Rule 701 where "[t]he
    jurors not only could view and compare the handwriting on the
    various labels for themselves, but they did so."            By contrast, the
    Government    maintains   that    Inspector        Dowd's    testimony   was
    "helpful."
    While we tend to agree with the Government that Reyes's
    "argument misapprehends the scope of Fed. R. Evid. 701,"17 in any
    17Our standard for excluding lay opinion testimony as "unhelpful"
    under Rule 701 requires "that the witness [be] no better suited
    than the jury to make" the judgment at issue. United States v.
    Kornegay, 
    410 F.3d 89
    , 95 (1st Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (quoting
    Jackman, 
    48 F.3d at 4-5
    ).      We find it difficult to say that
    Inspector Dowd was no better suited than the jury to assess the
    labels where Inspector Dowd had relevant background from the
    - 46 -
    case, even if the district court did err in admitting Inspector
    Dowd's testimony,         such error would         again be harmless                as the
    testimony    did    not    concern      the     central       question       of    Reyes's
    knowledge.       The   Government       used     Inspector       Dowd's      handwriting
    testimony to help establish that a drug conspiracy existed; but
    Reyes did not dispute the existence of a conspiracy.                          Reyes only
    disputed that he was a knowing participant in said conspiracy.
    For its part, the Government never attempted to argue that the
    similar handwriting on the parcel labels was "probative of Reyes's
    knowledge"   or     even   that       Reyes    would    have     "noticed         that   the
    handwriting was the same."            Indeed, defense counsel itself argued
    in opening statement that Inspector Dowd "w[ould not] be able to
    [explain] why a normal, non-law enforcement person would consider
    [the   parcels]     suspicious."          Thus,        because      Inspector       Dowd's
    testimony    addressed      an    uncontested          issue,       and     because      the
    Government never invoked Inspector Dowd's testimony to prove the
    central question of Reyes's knowledge, its admission, erroneous or
    otherwise, was harmless.
    3.     Conclusion
    In     sum,    having      examined        each    of     the     challenged
    evidentiary rulings, we conclude that the district court did not
    investigation that the jurors did not and his assessment "was not
    limited to three days in a sterile courtroom setting," Jackman, 
    48 F.3d at 5
    .
    - 47 -
    manifestly   abuse   its   discretion    in   admitting   the   contested
    statements or in the event of any error, such error was harmless.
    "While we [may] have uncovered a . . . benign bevue[], e.g.,"
    admission of the minimally probative account of Trooper Lynch's
    past narcotics investigations, this "error[] w[as] not portentous"
    where "the government's case was very strong," Sepulveda, 
    15 F.3d at 1196
    ; supra p. 38 n.14.        As Reyes has not "achiev[ed] the
    critical mass necessary to cast a shadow upon the integrity of the
    verdict," see 
    15 F.3d at 1196
    , we deny his request for a new trial.
    C.    Speedy Trial Claims
    Reyes also lodges pro se claims, alleging -- for the
    first time on appeal -- violations of his right to a speedy trial
    under the Speedy Trial Act, 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3161
    –3174,              and the
    Constitution; accordingly, Reyes asks us to vacate his conviction
    and sentence and to order a new trial.        The Government argues that
    Reyes's claims under the Speedy Trial Act are waived and that his
    constitutional claim is meritless.       We agree with the Government.
    1.    Speedy Trial Act Claims
    Reyes raises two issues under the Speedy Trial Act: He
    claims that his statutory rights were violated first, because he
    was indicted more than 30 days after his arrest, and second,
    because his trial commenced twenty-six months after his arrest.
    The Government correctly contends that because Reyes did not raise
    - 48 -
    any statutory speedy trial claims in the district court, such
    claims are waived.
    "The Speedy Trial Act . . . is generally concerned with
    two    periods    of   delay:   delay    in     bringing    an   information   or
    indictment     after   arrest   and     delay    in   commencing    trial   after
    information, indictment, or the defendant's first appearance."
    United States v. Spagnuolo, 
    469 F.3d 39
    , 40 (1st Cir. 2006).                   The
    deadlines for these periods are laid out in § 3161(b)-(c)(1):
    namely, thirty days to indictment and an additional seventy days
    to    trial. 18    Sanctions    for     governmental       non-compliance    with
    § 3161's statutory deadlines include dismissal of charges for
    overdue indictments and case dismissal for delayed trials.                     See
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3162.19
          In order to exercise one's remedy for a delayed
    18   The Speedy Trial Act, at § 3161, provides in pertinent part:
    . . .
    (b) Any information or indictment charging an individual
    with the commission of an offense shall be filed within
    thirty days from the date on which such individual was
    arrested or served with a summons in connection with
    such charges. . . .
    (c)(1) In any case in which a plea of not guilty is
    entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an
    information or indictment with the commission of an
    offense shall commence within seventy days from the
    filing date (and making public) of the information or
    indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared
    before a judicial officer of the court in which such
    charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. . . .
    19   Section 3162 of the Speedy Trial Act provides in pertinent part:
    (a)(1) If, in the case of any individual against whom a
    - 49 -
    trial, § 3162(a)(2) explicitly requires a defendant to file a
    motion for dismissal; we have clarified that a defendant must also
    file a motion to remedy a delayed indictment under § 3162(a)(1),
    Spagnuolo, 
    469 F.3d at 44-46
     (concluding "the motion and waiver
    provision of § 3162(a)(2) also applies to § 3162(a)(1) speedy
    indictment claims").   Thus, a defendant's failure to timely file
    a motion to remedy speedy indictment and/or speedy trial violations
    under the Speedy Trial Act will result in a waiver of such rights
    for which "not even plain error review is available."   Id. at 41.
    Here, the Government maintains that Reyes failed to move
    for dismissal under either § 3162(a)(1) or (2) prior to trial.
    Because Reyes has not identified anything in the record that
    preserves his statutory speedy trial claims, we find such claims
    are waived.
    complaint is filed charging such individual with an
    offense, no indictment or information is filed within
    the time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended
    by section 3161(h) of this chapter, such charge against
    that individual contained in such complaint shall be
    dismissed or otherwise dropped. . . .
    (2) If a defendant is not brought to trial within the
    time limit required by section 3161(c) as extended by
    section 3161(h), the information or indictment shall be
    dismissed on motion of the defendant. . . . Failure of
    the defendant to move for dismissal prior to trial or
    entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall
    constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this
    section.
    (emphasis added).
    - 50 -
    2.     Constitutional Claim
    Reyes further argues that the twenty-six-month delay
    between his arrest and trial violated his constitutional right to
    a   speedy    trial.         The   Government    counters       that   Reyes's
    constitutional claim -- though not waived as a result of Reyes's
    failure to raise it below -- is nevertheless meritless, and we
    agree.
    The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that
    "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
    to a speedy and public trial."          U.S. Const. amend. VI.         "[T]he
    seminal Supreme Court case interpreting this directive," Barker v.
    Wingo,   supplies   a   "quadripartite       balancing   test    for   use   in
    evaluating potential speedy trial violations" under which courts
    must consider the: (i) length of delay; (ii) reason for the delay;
    (iii) defendant's assertion of his right; and (iv) prejudice to
    the defendant.      RaShad v. Walsh, 
    300 F.3d 27
    , 33-34 (1st Cir.
    2002) (discussing Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 530-33 (1972)).
    No single factor is dispositive, Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 533
    , but
    rather courts must weigh the factors "on a case-by-case basis
    'together with such other circumstances as may be relevant,'"
    United States v. Mala, 
    7 F.3d 1058
    , 1061 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting
    Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 533
    ).
    While a defendant "does have some responsibility to
    assert his speedy trial claim," United States v. Perez-Cubertier,
    - 51 -
    
    958 F.3d 81
    , 91 (1st Cir. 2020), (citing Look v. Amaral, 
    725 F.2d 4
    , 6-7 (1st Cir. 1984)), cert. denied, 
    141 S. Ct. 349
     (2020), "a
    defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial" under the Sixth
    Amendment does not "forever waive[] his right," Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 528
    .    Instead, a "defendant's assertion of or failure to assert
    his right to a speedy trial is one of the factors to be considered"
    under the quadripartite inquiry, 
    id.,
     with a "failure to assert
    the right [making] it difficult for a defendant to prove that he
    was denied a speedy trial," 
    id. at 532
    .
    Applying the quadripartite balancing test, we find no
    violation of Reyes's constitutional right to a speedy trial.
    a.    Length of Delay.
    The first factor concerning the length of the delay
    between arrest or indictment, on the one hand, and the date of
    trial, on the other hand, weighs slightly in Reyes's favor.              This
    factor serves as a "triggering mechanism," meaning that "[u]ntil
    there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is
    no necessity for inquiry into the other factors."              Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 530
    .    "While '[t]here is no bright-line time limit dividing
    the lengths that trigger further Barker inquiry from those that do
    not,' a '[d]elay of around one year is considered presumptively
    prejudicial.'"    United States v. Handa, 
    892 F.3d 95
    , 102 (1st Cir.
    2018)     (alterations   in   original)    (quoting   United    States    v.
    Irizarry-Colón, 
    848 F.3d 61
    , 68 (1st Cir. 2017)).          Thus, we find
    - 52 -
    that the twenty-six-month delay between Reyes's arrest and trial
    is sufficient to trigger further Sixth Amendment review.              See
    United States v. Lara, 
    970 F.3d 68
    , 82-83 (1st Cir. 2020) (finding
    no speedy trial right violation despite delay of eighteen months
    after weighing the factors in toto), cert. denied sub. nom Williams
    v. United States, 
    141 S. Ct. 2821
     (2021); see also United States
    v. Muñoz-Franco, 
    487 F.3d 25
    , 60-62 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding no
    speedy trial right violation despite delay of five years between
    indictment and trial after weighing the factors in toto).
    b.    Reason for the delay.
    The second factor -- our "focal inquiry" concerning the
    explanation for the delay, Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d at 60 (quoting
    United States v. Santiago-Becerril, 
    130 F.3d 11
    , 22 (1st Cir.
    1997)) -- weighs against Reyes.        The Supreme Court has instructed
    that "different weights should be assigned to different reasons"
    offered to explain the delay between arrest or indictment and
    trial.   Barker,   
    407 U.S. at 531
    .   For   example,   "deliberate
    attempt[s] to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should
    be weighted heavily against the government," id.; whereas, "to the
    extent that valid reasons cause delay," or the "delay . . . is
    caused by the defendant," it "does not count against the state at
    all," RaShad, 300 F.3d at 34.         The defendant bears the burden of
    proving bad faith or inefficiency on the part of the government in
    causing the delay.   See, e.g., Lara, 970 F.3d at 82 (finding the
    - 53 -
    "second factor point[ed] against . . . a speedy trial violation"
    where the defendant "d[id] not identify any evidence that the delay
    was a product of bad faith or inefficiency on the government's
    part").
    Here, because Reyes has produced no evidence of bad faith
    on the part of the government -- and in fact has only highlighted
    valid actions that justified an appropriate delay -- the second
    factor weighs against him.          In his pro se appeal brief, Reyes
    raises    the   fact   that   the    district   court   granted   fifteen
    continuances of his trial over the span of twenty-six months.
    However, the Government counters -- and a review of the case
    filings cited by Reyes confirms -- that "Reyes caused or expressly
    assented to nearly all, if not literally all, of the delay."          For
    example, in the time between Reyes's arrest and trial, Reyes asked
    for more time both for discovery and to file his pre-trial motions,
    as well as filed a pre-trial motion to suppress that took over six
    months to resolve.     Because the Supreme Court has declined to find
    speedy trial violations where the defense failed to object to
    continuances, see, e.g., Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 536
    , and we have
    declined where the defense significantly contributed to the delay
    through filing its own requests for continuances or pretrial
    motions, see, e.g., Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d at 60-61, here too, we
    do not find government action suggestive of a violation.              The
    second factor, thus, weighs against Reyes.
    - 54 -
    c.     Defendant's Assertion of His Right.
    As previously discussed, "[a]lthough a defendant does
    not waive his constitutional right to a speedy trial by failing to
    assert it" prior to trial, "his failure to do so means that he
    must make a much stronger showing on the other factors in order to
    succeed in his claim."    RaShad, 300 F.3d at 34 (citing Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 532
    ).     Here, Reyes did not raise a constitutional speedy
    trial claim below, which "significantly undermines [his] claim."
    Perez-Cubertier, 958 F.3d at 91.
    d.   Prejudice to the Defendant.
    Reyes also fails to prove that he has suffered cognizable
    prejudice as a result of the delay.        The prejudice prong seeks to
    protect   three   interests:   "(i)   to   prevent   oppressive   pretrial
    incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused;
    and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be
    impaired."   Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 532
    .       "Of these, the most serious
    is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to
    prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system."             
    Id.
    "[T]he defendant bears the burden of alleging and proving specific
    ways in which the delay attributable to the [government] unfairly
    compromised his ability to defend himself."          RaShad, 300 F.3d at
    34 (citing United States v. Aguirre, 
    994 F.2d 1454
    , 1455 (9th Cir.
    1993)).
    - 55 -
    Reyes has not carried this burden.      Reyes alleges only
    the third kind of    prejudice pertaining to impairment of the
    defense; specifically, Reyes contends that the prosecution "gained
    a tactical advantage" via the twenty-six-month delay between his
    arrest and trial because the Government ostensibly used that time
    to "coach" Trooper Lynch on a narrative that would make the traffic
    stop of Reyes appear to be constitutional.         By contrast, the
    Government   maintains   that   Reyes's   claim   of   prejudice   is
    unsupported and illogical given that Reyes and his counsel caused
    much of the delay.   We agree with the Government.
    Although Reyes claims that differences exist in Trooper
    Lynch's original statement on the traffic stop as compared to his
    second statement taken seventeen months later, he provides no
    explanation as to why Trooper Lynch's original statement would not
    support the constitutionality of the traffic stop, while his second
    statement would; put simply, Reyes has not explained how any
    differences in Trooper Lynch's statements conferred a tactical
    advantage to the Government.    Moreover, Reyes's assessment of the
    Government's motive is entirely speculative.        Because we have
    declined to credit speculation in the past, see, e.g., United
    States v. Souza, 
    749 F.3d 74
    , 83 (1st Cir. 2014) ("Though Souza
    speculates about prejudice, he points to nothing in the eighteen-
    month period between his arrest and trial that impaired his ability
    to mount a defense."), here too, Reyes has not carried his burden
    - 56 -
    in proving prejudice attributable to delay.           The fourth factor,
    thus, weighs against Reyes.
    Having weighed all four of the Barker factors, we find
    no violation of Reyes's right to a speedy trial under the Sixth
    Amendment.      We, therefore, decline Reyes's request to vacate his
    conviction and sentence and to order a new trial.
    D.    Presence Claims
    Finally, Reyes argues pro se that his absence at pre-
    trial proceedings on October 11, 2016, April 4, 2017, and August 7,
    2017, violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a), the Fifth Amendment's Due
    Process Clause, and the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
    such that his conviction and sentence should be reversed and a new
    trial ordered.     The Government maintains that Reyes's claims have
    "no legal basis."       Because Reyes did not object to his absence
    below, we review each of these claims for plain error; that is,
    Reyes "must show, among other things, both that any error was clear
    or obvious and that it affected his substantial rights."            United
    States v. Karmue, 
    841 F.3d 24
    , 27 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing United
    States v. Savarese, 
    686 F.3d 1
    , 12 (1st Cir. 2012)) (applying plain
    error review to claims under Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a) and the Fifth
    Amendment's Due Process Clause raised for the first time on
    appeal); United States v. Acevedo-Maldonado, 
    696 F.3d 150
    , 155-56
    (1st   Cir.    2012)   (same   for    unpreserved   Confrontation   Clause
    objections).     We find no plain error.
    - 57 -
    1.     Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(1) Claim
    Reyes's statutory claim has no legal basis and fails.
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 provides that a "defendant must be present at:
    (1) the initial appearance, the initial arraignment, and the plea;
    (2) every trial stage, including jury impanelment and the return
    of the verdict; and (3) sentencing," Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)); the
    rule further states "a defendant need not be present when '[t]he
    proceeding involves only a conference or hearing on a question of
    law,'" United States v. Veloz, 
    948 F.3d 418
    , 434 n.4 (1st Cir.
    2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(3));
    see also Karmue, 841 F.3d at 28 (holding no clear or obvious
    violation of Rule 43 where defendant was not present at pretrial
    Daubert hearing).       In Reyes's case, a review of the relevant case
    filings reveals that the contested pre-trial proceedings from
    which Reyes was absent were status conferences to discuss discovery
    and scheduling.        We, thus, find that Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 did not
    require Reyes to be present, and Reyes has not established that
    proceeding   at    these       pre-trial   hearings   without   him   present
    constituted a clear or obvious error.
    2.      Fifth Amendment Claim
    We, likewise, reject Reyes's presence claim lodged under
    the Fifth Amendment.          The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
    "requires that a defendant be allowed to be present 'to the extent
    that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence,'"
    - 58 -
    Veloz, 948 F.3d at 435 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 
    482 U.S. 730
    ,
    745 (1987)); "whenever [a defendant's] presence has a relation,
    reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend
    against the charge," he has a due process right to be present at
    the proceedings, United States v. Gagnon, 
    470 U.S. 522
    , 526 (1985)
    (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 
    291 U.S. 97
    , 105-106 (1934))
    (rejecting   claim   of   due   process   violation   where    in   camera
    discussion at trial did not include respondent).        Here, "[i]t is
    not clear or obvious . . . what the benefit of [Reyes]'s presence"
    at the contested pre-trial status conferences would have been.
    Karmue, 841 F.3d at 27.     Because Reyes has not demonstrated that
    his "absence 'affected [his] substantial rights, which in the
    ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court
    proceedings,'" id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States
    v. Fernández–Hernández, 
    652 F.3d 56
    , 64 (1st Cir. 2011)), Reyes
    has not shown any error -- obvious or otherwise -- and his Fifth
    Amendment claim also fails.
    3.    Sixth Amendment Claim
    Finally, Reyes's Sixth Amendment claim is inapposite.
    The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that "[i]n all
    criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
    be confronted with the witnesses against him."                U.S. Const.
    amend. VI.   The Confrontation Clause "has historically applied to
    testimony elicited at, and evidence produced for, trial," United
    - 59 -
    States v. Mitchell-Hunter, 
    663 F.3d 45
    , 51 (1st Cir. 2011), and we
    -- and the Supreme Court -- have thus far declined to extend the
    reach of the Confrontation Clause beyond trial, see, e.g., 
    id. at 50-53
     (noting that defendant "d[id] not point to a single case
    extending the right to confrontation beyond the context of trial");
    see    also   Crawford    v.    Washington,    
    541 U.S. 36
    ,   53–56   (2004)
    (extending      right    to    confrontation    only   to    declarants    whose
    statements are offered at trial).          Reyes's presence claims concern
    only    his   absence    at    pre-trial   proceedings      and   he   offers   no
    arguments as to why we should extend the reach of the Confrontation
    Clause beyond trial in this case.              Moreover, even if we were to
    extend the right to confrontation here, such a right would be
    inapplicable as Reyes points to no evidence that was offered
    against him at these proceedings; indeed, such pre-trial status
    conferences would not present an opportunity to do so.                 Here too,
    Reyes has failed to show plain error.
    Accordingly, we decline to reverse Reyes's conviction
    and sentence and to order a new trial because he was not present
    at three of the pre-trial court dates.
    III. Conclusion
    For the reasons stated above, the judgment of conviction
    is affirmed.
    - 60 -