Yolanda Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank Na , 587 F. App'x 410 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             DEC 10 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    YOLANDA JONES,                                   No. 11-55613
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 5:10-cv-01399-CJC-DTB
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 2, 2014**
    Before: GOULD, BERZON, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
    Yolanda Jones appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her
    action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
    § 1291. We review de novo. Knievel v. ESPN, 
    393 F.3d 1068
    , 1072 (9th Cir.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2005). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Jones’s claims of fraud and
    misrepresentation because Jones did not allege facts sufficient to show that she
    either actually or justifiably relied on the alleged misrepresentations. See Small v.
    Fritz Cos., 
    65 P.3d 1255
    , 1258, 1262 (Cal. 2003) (listing elements of fraud under
    California law). Whether framed as a fraudulent misrepresentation or as a
    fraudulent omission, Jones could not have relied on Wells Fargo’s statements
    because her own pleadings state that it was “clear” after her interaction with Wells
    Fargo and before she agreed to the loan that she “could not afford such high
    monthly payments.”
    Also, the district court properly dismissed Jones’s claim alleging fraudulent
    business acts under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) because Jones
    did not allege facts sufficient to show that she actually relied on the alleged
    misrepresentation of her income and financial assets in accepting her loan. See In
    re Tobacco II Cases, 
    207 P.3d 20
    , 26 (Cal. 2009) (stating that for a private plaintiff
    to have standing to bring a UCL claim alleging a fraudulent business act or
    practice, that individual “must demonstrate actual reliance on the allegedly
    deceptive or misleading statements, in accordance with well-settled principles
    regarding the element of reliance in ordinary fraud actions”).
    2
    Finally, Jones’s contention that the district court should have considered her
    realtor’s declaration attached to Jones’s opposition to the motion to dismiss is
    unpersuasive. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 
    250 F.3d 668
    , 688–89 (9th Cir.
    2001) (stating that a court must generally refrain from considering extrinsic
    evidence in deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and may
    consider documents not physically attached to the complaint only if their
    authenticity is uncontested and the complaint necessarily relies on them, or if they
    are matters of public record subject to judicial notice).
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-55613

Citation Numbers: 587 F. App'x 410

Filed Date: 12/10/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023