Michael Boronda v. Sara Moye , 599 F. App'x 321 ( 2015 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                             MAR 20 2015
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    MICHAEL A. BORONDA,                              No. 13-35273
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 1:11-cv-03082-CL
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    SARA MOYE and JOSEPHINE
    COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
    State of Oregon,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Owen M. Panner, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 6, 2015**
    Portland, Oregon
    Before: PAEZ and IKUTA, Circuit Judges and SELNA,*** District Judge.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable James V. Selna, District Judge for the U.S. District
    Court for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.
    Michael Boronda appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Josephine County (the County) and Sara Moye. We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
    The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the
    County and Moye on Boronda’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for First Amendment
    retaliation. We agree with Boronda that he was a private citizen at the time he
    made demands on the County and Moye requested that he be barred from
    undertaking construction work in certain County offices. Cf. Clairmont v. Sound
    Mental Health, 
    632 F.3d 1091
    , 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2011). Applying the framework
    for First Amendment retaliation claims by private citizens, we conclude that
    Boronda failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Moye’s
    request was intended to chill Boronda’s speech, rather than to prevent him from
    having access to valuable and confidential County property and documents. See
    Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 
    469 F.3d 1221
    , 1232 (9th Cir. 2006) (requiring the
    plaintiff to prove that the “desire to cause the chilling effect” was a “but-for cause
    of the defendant’s action”).
    The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the
    County and Moye on Boronda’s claim for a violation of the Family Medical Leave
    Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(1). Boronda does not allege that Moye
    2
    retaliated against him because he filed a charge or “instituted or caused to be
    instituted any proceeding” under the FMLA, or otherwise engaged in an act
    protected by the FMLA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(b)(1). Rather, he alleges that Moye
    retaliated against him because he sought to enforce his contract rights under state
    law.
    The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the
    County and Moye on Boronda’s claim for intentional interference with economic
    relations in violation of Oregon law. Boronda failed to raise a genuine dispute of
    material fact as to whether Moye violated Oregon Revised Statute section
    659.805(1) by blacklisting or publishing Boronda’s name “with intent and for the
    purpose of preventing” Boronda from obtaining or retaining employment, see Or.
    Rev. Stat. § 659.805(1), or retaliated against Boronda for exercising his First
    Amendment rights. Therefore, Boronda did not raise a genuine dispute of material
    fact as to whether Moye interfered with Boronda’s relationship with his employer
    using improper means, or for an improper purpose, which is a necessary element of
    the tort. See McGanty v. Staudenraus, 
    901 P.2d 841
    , 844 (Or. 1995) (en banc).
    Finally, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor
    of the County and Moye on Boronda’s state law breach of contract claim. In the
    settlement agreement, the parties agreed to treat the $8,333.75 as back wages.
    3
    Because Oregon law requires the County to remit six percent of gross wages to the
    Public Employee Retirement System (PERS), the County did not violate the
    settlement agreement when it deducted $500.03 from the $8,333.75 settlement
    payment and remitted it to PERS.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-35273

Citation Numbers: 599 F. App'x 321

Filed Date: 3/20/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023