Com. v. Ramos, M. ( 2018 )

J-S03020-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
MARCOS RAMOS : No. 3405 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011359-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED JULY 09, 2018
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order dismissing
narcotics charges against Marcos Ramos. The court dismissed the charges
after finding that Ramos’s right to a speedy trial had been violated. We reverse
and remand.
Rule 600 of our Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the Commonwealth
to bring a defendant to trial within 365 days of the filing of the criminal
complaint. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a).1 Our scope and standard of review
on this issue are as follows.
Our standard of review relating to the application of Rule 600 is
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Our scope of review
____________________________________________
 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1The parties in this case analyzed the speedy trial rule under this section, so
we will do the same.
J-S03020-18
is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary
hearing and the findings of the trial court. We must view the facts
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Commonwealth v. Robbins, 900 A.2d 413, 415 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted).
Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this Court is
not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule [600]. Rule
[600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection
of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the protection of
society. In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy
trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society’s
right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain
those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it.
However, the administrative mandate of Rule [600] was not
designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith
prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc)
(citation omitted; brackets in original).
“[T]o obtain relief, a defendant must have a valid Rule 600 claim at the
time he files his motion to dismiss the charges.” Commonwealth v. Hyland,
875 A.2d 1175, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). The first step in
conducting a Rule 600 analysis is to calculate the “mechanical run date.”
Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Pa. Super. 2003). “The
mechanical run date is the date by which the trial must commence under Rule
600. It is calculated by adding 365 days … to the date on which the criminal
complaint is filed.” Id. (citation omitted). If a defendant is not brought to trial
until after the mechanical run date, and files a Rule 600 motion to dismiss,
“the court must assess whether there is excludable time and/or excusable
-2-
J-S03020-18
delay.” Hunt, 858 A.2d at 1241 (citations omitted). The court must exclude
from the time for commencement of trial any periods during which the
defendant was unavailable, including any continuances requested by the
defendant. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C); Rule 600 Comment. The amount of
excludable time is added to the mechanical run date to arrive at an adjusted
run date. See Commonwealth v. Ramos, 936 A.2d 1097, 1103 (Pa. 2007).
Here, the Commonwealth filed its complaint against Ramos on
September 10, 2015. Thus, Friday, September 9, 2016, was the mechanical
run date for Rule 600 purposes. Ramos filed his Rule 600 motion on October
3, 2016 – 24 days after the mechanical run date. The trial court found that
none of the 389 days between the complaint and the filing of the Rule 600
motion were excludable.
The Commonwealth argues, among other brief arguments, that 97 days
were excludable due to Ramos’s demand for a jury trial. See Appellant’s Brief,
at 15. We decline to reach this issue, as the Commonwealth entirely failed to
address the recent,2 relevant precedent in Commonwealth v. Mills, 162
A.3d 323 (Pa. 2017). And we need not reach this precise issue to grant the
relief sought by the Commonwealth.
____________________________________________
2 Mills was decided on June 20, 2017. The appeals unit of the District Attorney
of Philadelphia is listed as counsel for appellee in that case. That very unit
filed the Appellant’s Brief in this case on September 8, 2017. We direct counsel
to review Pa.R.P.C. 3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal.
-3-
J-S03020-18
On June 7, 2016, Ramos filed a motion seeking the identity of the
confidential informant used by the Commonwealth. That motion was denied
on August 9, 2016. The Commonwealth exercised due diligence in opposing
the motion. Thus, those 63 days spent addressing the motion are clearly
attributable to Ramos. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 736 A.2d 578, 587 (Pa.
1999).The adjusted run date would therefore be at least 63 days beyond the
mechanical run date.
Ramos filed his Rule 600 motion only 24 days after the mechanical run
date, well before the adjusted run date.3 The trial court abused its discretion
in dismissing the charges against Ramos.4 We therefore reverse and remand
for further proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/9/18
____________________________________________
3 Because it is clear that Ramos filed his Rule 600 motion before the adjusted
run date, we need not analyze the entire record to determine whether the final
run date is some later date. See Hyland, 875 A.2d at 1191.
4 In its opinion on appeal, the trial court recognizes its error and requests
reversal.
-4-
J-S03020-18
-5-