Dorothy Sands, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Cecilia Stanford, and Julie Stanford v. AutoZone, Inc. ( 2022 )


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  •                         NUMBER 13-22-00097-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    DOROTHY SANDS, INDIVIDUALLY
    AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
    ESTATE OF CECILIA STANFORD,
    DECEASED, AND JULIE STANFORD,                                         Appellants,
    v.
    AUTOZONE, INC.,                                                          Appellee.
    On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
    of Nueces County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Benavides and Tijerina
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina
    This cause is before the Court on its own motion. On March 14, 2022, appellants
    Dorothy Sands, individually and as representative of the estate of Cecilia Stanford,
    deceased, and Julie Stanford filed a notice of appeal regarding a December 15, 2021
    summary judgment disposing of their causes of action against AutoZone Parts, Inc.,
    “erroneously sued as AutoZone, Inc.” (AutoZone). On April 21, 2022, this Court notified
    appellants that it appeared that there was no final, appealable judgment, directed
    appellants to correct this defect, if possible, and advised appellants that the appeal would
    be dismissed for want of jurisdiction if the defect was not corrected. See TEX. R. APP. P.
    42.3. Appellants did not respond to the Court’s directive or otherwise correct the defect.
    See id.
    In the instant case, appellants filed suit against AutoZone and Dacota Deryl Lee
    Deaver. AutoZone filed two separate motions for summary judgment on appellants’
    claims, and the record indicates that the trial court granted those motions for summary
    judgment on February 8, 2021, and December 15, 2021. The record also reflects that
    AutoZone filed a motion requesting the trial court to sever appellants’ claims against it
    from appellants’ pending claims against Deaver. However, the record before the Court
    fails to contain an order granting AutoZone’s motion to sever, or otherwise severing
    appellants’ claims against Deaver.
    “Usually, only final judgments are subject to appeal.” Alexander Dubose Jefferson
    & Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 
    540 S.W.3d 577
    , 581 (Tex. 2018) (per
    curiam). Absent a timely filed notice of appeal from a final judgment or appealable
    interlocutory order, we do not have jurisdiction over an appeal. See Lehmann v. Har-Con
    Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001). A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it
    disposes of all parties and claims in the record. See id. at 195; see also Sherer v. Sherer,
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    393 S.W.3d 480
    , 486 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (stating that a judgment
    “cannot be final as to some issues but not other issues”). “Because the law does not
    require that a final judgment be in any particular form, whether a judicial decree is a final
    judgment must be determined from its language and the record in the case.” Lehmann,
    39 S.W.3d at 195; see also Jack M. Sanders Family Ltd. P’ship v. Roger T. Fridholm
    Revocable Living Tr., 
    434 S.W.3d 236
    , 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)
    (stating that the question of whether appellate jurisdiction exists cannot be waived or
    settled by agreement of parties). If the record before the Court does not affirmatively
    demonstrate our jurisdiction, we have no option but to dismiss the appeal. See IFS Sec.
    Grp., Inc. v. Am. Equity Ins., 
    175 S.W.3d 560
    , 562 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.);
    Parks v. DeWitt Cnty. Elec. Coop., Inc., 
    112 S.W.3d 157
    , 160 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
    Edinburg 2003, no pet.); see Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 199–200.
    In this case, the trial court’s December 15, 2021 summary judgment was not a final
    judgment because it disposed of appellants’ claims against AutoZone, but not appellants’
    claims against Deaver. We conclude that the record does not contain a judgment that is
    final for purposes of appeal, and there is no statute providing for consideration of this
    interlocutory order. See Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. Because the record does not
    affirmatively demonstrate our jurisdiction, we have no option but to dismiss the appeal.
    See id. at 199–200; IFS Sec. Grp., Inc., 
    175 S.W.3d at 562
    ; Parks, 
    112 S.W.3d at 160
    .
    The Court, having considered the record, the applicable law, and appellants’ failure
    to correct the defect in this matter, is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed
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    for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c). Accordingly, we dismiss the
    appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See 
    id.
    JAIME TIJERINA
    Justice
    Delivered and filed on the
    12th day of May, 2022.
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