William F. Crawford v. W. Va. Dept. of Corrections - Work Release , 239 W. Va. 374 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  •         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
    January 2017 Term
    FILED
    June 8, 2017
    No. 16-0043                        released at 3:00 p.m.
    RORY L. PERRY, II CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    WILLIAM F. CRAWFORD,
    Claimant Below, Petitioner
    V.
    WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS - WORK RELEASE,
    Respondent Below, Respondent
    Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review
    Claim No. 2014016722
    Appeal No. 2050637
    AFFIRMED
    Submitted: May 16, 2017
    Filed: June 8, 2017
    John Skaggs                                Jonathan J. Jacks
    The Calwell Practice, LC                   Lisa Warner Hunter
    Charleston, West Virginia                  Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan,
    Attorney for the Petitioner                Brown & Poe, PLLC
    Charleston, West Virginia
    Steven K. Wellman                          Attorneys for the Respondent
    Jenkins Fenstermaker, PLLC
    Huntington, West Virginia
    Attorney for Amicus Curiae,
    Defense Trial Counsel of West Virginia
    JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
    1.      W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) (2011) (Supp. 2016) prohibits a person
    confined in a state correctional facility or jail who is participating in a work-release program
    from receiving workers’ compensation benefits for any injury sustained while engaged in
    such work during the person’s period of confinement.
    i
    Davis, Justice:
    In this appeal from an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review
    (“the Board”), Mr. William F. Crawford (“Mr. Crawford”), petitioner herein and claimant
    below, challenges the Board’s finding that he is not eligible to receive workers’
    compensation benefits for an injury he sustained while he was an inmate participating in a
    work-release program.1 Having considered the briefs,2 the record submitted on appeal, the
    relevant law, and the oral argument presented by the parties, we affirm.
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    This case involves a former inmate, Mr. Crawford, who seeks workers’
    compensation benefits for an injury he sustained during his period of confinement at the
    Charleston Work Release Center.3 In order to be placed at the Charleston Work Release
    Center, Mr. Crawford was required to sign a “Contract for Placement at a Work Release
    1
    The case was before the Board on appeal from a ruling of the Worker’s
    Compensation Office of Judges (“OOJ”). The Board’s order affirmed the ruling of the OOJ
    that, in turn, had affirmed the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Claims Administrator.
    2
    We recognize the participation of Amicus Curiae, the Defense Trial Counsel
    of West Virginia, who filed a brief in support of the respondent, the Department of
    Corrections. We value the contribution of the amicus and will consider its brief in
    conjunction with the parties’ arguments.
    3
    The Charleston Work Release Center has been replaced by the Charleston
    Correctional Center, which was opened on May 1, 2015.
    1
    Center.” The contract set out certain conditions for participation in a work-release program,
    and provided that Mr. Crawford could be returned to his parent institution at any time. After
    completing a thirty-day probationary period, Mr. Crawford was assigned to a road crew
    working for the West Virginia Division of Highways (“DOH”). Inmates at the Charleston
    Work Release Center, including Mr. Crawford, were able to provide work to DOH by virtue
    of a “Statewide Convict Workforce Agreement” made between DOH and the West Virginia
    Division of Corrections (“Corrections”),4 the respondent herein and below. Under the
    particular agreement in effect at the time relevant to this appeal, which was dated April 26,
    2012, Corrections would make available to DOH “a number of crews, which will vary both
    according to availability of inmates and the seasonal needs of [DOH].” In return, DOH
    agreed to “reimburse Corrections for inmate pay.” In addition, pursuant to the express terms
    of the agreement,
    [DOH] and Corrections agree that the inmates performing
    services under this agreement will not be employees of the State
    entitling them to any benefits such employees might have
    including, but not limited to, insurance, worker [sic]
    compensation, benefits, pensions, sick, and annual leave.
    4
    The respondent to this appeal has been incorrectly identified in the style of the
    case as “Department of Corrections.” We note that the Legislature reorganized the executive
    branch of state government in 1989. That reorganization, in relevant part, incorporated the
    Department of Corrections into the Department of Public Safety and designated it as the
    Division of Corrections. See W. Va. Code §§ 5F-2-1(e)(8) & (j) (1989) (Repl. Vol. 1990).
    Thereafter, the Department of Public Safety was redesignated as the Department of Military
    Affairs and Public Safety. See W. Va. Code §§ 5F-2-1(e)(7) & (j) (1992) (Repl. Vol. 1993).
    The relevant provisions are now found at W. Va. Code §§ 5F-2-1(i)(8) & (o) (2011) (Repl.
    Vol. 2015).
    2
    (Emphasis added). In order to be on a road crew, Mr. Crawford also was required to sign a
    Corrections document titled “Contract for Placement on Road Crew or Community Crew.”
    This document established various restrictions for inmate participation on a road crew. For
    example, pursuant to the contract, “[DOH] staff members have no authority to excuse an
    inmate Road Crew member from work.” Moreover, “[a]ll inmate Road Crew members must
    remain on their designated crew unless given written permission to leave that assigned
    employment placement. An inmate Road Crew member will not be permitted to leave the
    assigned crew until replaced by another person, except in cases of parole or discharge.”
    Likewise, under the contract, a Corrections “Employment Officer may terminate an inmate’s
    work assignment at any time or may reassign an inmate to a different work crew at his/her
    discretion.”
    While working on a road crew serving DOH, Mr. Crawford’s hand was
    severely injured on March 28, 2013, when it was caught in a wood chipper. His injuries
    resulted in surgery and hospitalization, with medical bills in excess of $90,000 that were paid
    by Corrections. Mr. Crawford was paroled soon after his release from the hospital.
    Mr. Crawford initiated a claim for workers’ compensation and, on November
    15, 2013, the Claims Administrator rejected Mr. Crawford’s application for benefits based
    upon its determination that he did not suffer an injury in the course of and resulting from his
    3
    employment. The claims administrator found that Mr. Crawford was an inmate and not an
    employee as defined under West Virginia Code § 23-4-1(a) (2008) (Repl. Vol. 2010). The
    Office of Judges (“OOJ”) affirmed the decision of the claims administrator. The OOJ found
    that Mr. Crawford was still incarcerated and an inmate while housed at the Charleston Work
    Release Center. Moreover, the work agreement between Corrections and DOH made clear
    that the workers from work release centers were considered inmates and not employees. The
    OOJ concluded that, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23-4-1e(b) (2011) (2016 Supp.), Mr.
    Crawford was ineligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits for an injury he received
    while in a work-release center performing work for DOH. The Board affirmed the Order of
    the OOJ. This appeal followed. By order entered on February 16, 2017, this Court directed
    the parties to file supplemental briefs. The case subsequently was submitted on briefs and
    oral argument.
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Because the Board decision under review affirmed prior rulings by the claims
    administrator and the OOJ, the standards for this Court’s review of the Board’s rulings are
    set out in W. Va. Code §§ 23-5-15(b & c) (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010):
    (b) In reviewing a decision of the board of review, the
    supreme court of appeals shall consider the record provided by
    the board and give deference to the board’s findings, reasoning
    and conclusions, in accordance with subsections (c) and (d) of
    4
    this section.
    (c) If the decision of the board represents an affirmation
    of a prior ruling by both the commission and the office of judges
    that was entered on the same issue in the same claim, the
    decision of the board may be reversed or modified by the
    supreme court of appeals only if the decision is in clear violation
    of constitutional or statutory provision, is clearly the result of
    erroneous conclusions of law, or is based upon the board’s
    material misstatement or mischaracterization of particular
    components of the evidentiary record. The court may not
    conduct a de novo re-weighing of the evidentiary record. If the
    court reverses or modifies a decision of the board pursuant to
    this subsection, it shall state with specificity the basis for the
    reversal or modification and the manner in which the decision
    of the board clearly violated constitutional or statutory
    provisions, resulted from erroneous conclusions of law, or was
    based upon the board’s material misstatement or
    mischaracterization of particular components of the evidentiary
    record.
    (Emphasis added). We have previously recognized, however, that this Court “review[s] de
    novo legal conclusions of the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review. Johnson v. W. Va.
    Office of Ins. Comm’r, 
    226 W. Va. 650
    , 654, 
    704 S.E.2d 650
    , 654 (2010).” Sheena H. ex rel.
    Russell H. ex rel. L.H. v. Amfire, LLC, 
    235 W. Va. 132
    , 135, 
    772 S.E.2d 317
    , 320 (2015).
    Finally, to the extent that our resolution of the case sub judice requires that we engage in
    statutory construction, our review likewise is de novo. See Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v.
    Charlie A.L., 
    194 W. Va. 138
    , 
    459 S.E.2d 415
    (1995) (“Where the issue on an appeal from
    the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we
    apply a de novo standard of review.”). With regard for the forgoing standards, we address
    the dispositive issues herein raised.
    5
    III.
    DISCUSSION
    To resolve the instant matter, we must address two issues raised in this appeal:
    (1) Whether an inmate who is participating in a work-release program and is assigned to
    work for a state agency is prohibited from receiving workers’ compensation benefits by
    W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) (2011) (Supp. 2016); and (2) Whether denying workers’
    compensation benefits to an inmate who is participating in a work-release program violates
    equal protection.5 We address these issues in turn.
    A. W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b)
    Mr. Crawford contends that W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b), which he characterizes
    as excluding workers’ compensation coverage for work “imposed by the administration of
    the state correctional facility or jail,” is unambiguous and does not exclude workers’
    compensation coverage for work-release employment because such employment is voluntary
    5
    Mr. Crawford additionally attempts to argue that denying him workers’
    compensation benefits amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. We reject this issue as
    inadequately briefed. See State v. White, 
    228 W. Va. 530
    , 541 n.9, 
    722 S.E.2d 566
    , 577 n.9
    (2011) (“Typically, this Court will not address issues that have not been properly briefed.”);
    State v. LaRock, 
    196 W. Va. 294
    , 302, 
    470 S.E.2d 613
    , 621 (1996) (“Although we liberally
    construe briefs in determining issues presented for review, issues which are . . . mentioned
    only in passing but are not supported with pertinent authority, are not considered on
    appeal.”); State, Dep’t of Health & Human Res., Child Advocate Office v. Robert Morris N.,
    
    195 W. Va. 759
    , 765, 
    466 S.E.2d 827
    , 833 (1995) (“[A] skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing
    more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim[.]” (internal quotations and citations
    omitted)). Accord W. Va. R. App. P. Rule 10(c)(7).
    6
    as opposed to being imposed by the administration of the state correctional facility or jail.
    In support of his argument, he relies on Syllabus point 5 of State ex rel. Gillespie v. Kendrick,
    
    164 W. Va. 599
    , 
    265 S.E.2d 537
    (1980), which refers to court-granted work release pursuant
    to W. Va. Code § 62-11A-1 and describes that program as a privilege.
    Agreeing that W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) is unambiguous, Corrections argues
    that its plain language precludes work release inmates from receiving workers’ compensation
    benefits. Corrections disagrees with Mr. Crawford’s characterization of his work for DOH
    as voluntary. Rather, Corrections contends that, while inmates may voluntarily request the
    privilege of participating in the work-release program, once an inmate is accepted into the
    program the requirement of work is imposed on inmates as a condition of their continued
    participation in the work-release program.6 If for any reason an inmate fails or refuses to
    work, the inmate is returned to the correctional facility from whence he or she came to
    resume serving his or her term of incarceration at that facility. See, e.g., Syl., Craigo v.
    Legursky, 
    183 W. Va. 678
    , 
    398 S.E.2d 160
    (1990) (“A convict confined in the penitentiary
    or medium security prison who is transferred to a work release and/or study center
    established pursuant to W. Va. Code § 25-1-3 (1977) remains in the custody of officers of
    6
    Corrections explains that, during his first month housed at the Charleston
    Work Release Center, Mr. Crawford, like other work-release inmates, was required to work
    within the facility. Thereafter, he was given the option of finding work in the private sector
    that might extend beyond his incarceration or performing work for DOH.
    7
    the Department of Corrections. Consequently if such convict absconds from a work release
    and/or study center, he shall be deemed guilty of felony escape pursuant to W. Va. Code
    § 62-8-1 (1959).”). Corrections reasons that, because Mr. Crawford would be returned to his
    original facility if he violated his work agreement, the work is imposed and not voluntary.
    In our endeavor to settle the meaning of W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) in the
    context of the facts herein presented, we observe the well-established principle that “[t]he
    primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
    Legislature.” Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 
    159 W. Va. 108
    , 
    219 S.E.2d 361
    (1975). Therefore, “[a] statutory provision [that] is clear and unambiguous and
    plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given
    full force and effect.” Syl. pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 
    135 W. Va. 877
    , 
    65 S.E.2d 488
    (1951).
    In other words, “[w]e look first to the statute’s language. If the text, given its plain meaning,
    answers the interpretive question, the language must prevail and further inquiry is
    foreclosed.” Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t of West Virginia, 
    195 W. Va. 573
    ,
    587, 
    466 S.E.2d 424
    , 438 (1995). See also Foster Found. v. Gainer, 
    228 W. Va. 99
    , 110, 
    717 S.E.2d 883
    , 894 (2011) (“Statutes whose language is plain must be applied as written.”). On
    the other hand, “[a] statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied.”
    Syl. pt. 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 
    186 W. Va. 693
    , 
    414 S.E.2d 454
    (1992). See also Foster
    Found. v. 
    Gainer, 228 W. Va. at 110
    , 717 S.E.2d at 894 (“Statutes . . . whose language is
    8
    ambiguous must be construed before they can be applied.”).
    Pursuant to the relevant portion of W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e,
    (b) Notwithstanding any provision of this code to the
    contrary, no person confined in a state correctional facility or
    jail who suffers injury or a disease in the course of and resulting
    from his or her work during the period of confinement which
    work is imposed by the administration of the state correctional
    facility or jail and is not suffered during the person’s usual
    employment with his or her usual employer when not confined
    shall receive benefits under the provisions of this chapter for the
    injury or disease[.]
    (Emphasis added).7 While we agree that the foregoing language is plain, we disagree with
    7
    The full text of this code section provides:
    (b) Notwithstanding any provision of this code to the
    contrary, no person confined in a state correctional facility or
    jail who suffers injury or a disease in the course of and resulting
    from his or her work during the period of confinement which
    work is imposed by the administration of the state correctional
    facility or jail and is not suffered during the person’s usual
    employment with his or her usual employer when not confined
    shall receive benefits under the provisions of this chapter for the
    injury or disease: Provided, That individuals otherwise confined
    in a state correctional facility or jail, or at a juvenile services
    facility, and working in a program authorized by sections
    fourteen [W. Va. Code § 25-7-14] or sixteen [W. Va. Code § 25­
    7-16] of article seven, chapter twenty-five of this code, shall be
    eligible to receive benefits under the provisions of this chapter
    while working in an authorized program. The coverage for
    benefits may be obtained either by the private entity or by
    agreement with the state agency as specified in subsection (5),
    subsection (a) of sections fourteen [W. Va. Code § 25-7-14] and
    (continued...)
    9
    the interpretation of that language proposed by the parties to this appeal. Disagreement as
    to the meaning of the statue does not, however, render the statute vague. See T. Weston, Inc.
    v. Mineral Cty., 
    219 W. Va. 564
    , 568, 
    638 S.E.2d 167
    , 171 (2006) (“The fact that parties
    disagree about the meaning of a statute does not itself create ambiguity or obscure
    meaning.”); In re Resseger’s Estate, 
    152 W. Va. 216
    , 220, 
    161 S.E.2d 257
    , 260 (1968)
    (“That the parties disagree as to the meaning or the applicability of each [statutory] provision
    does not of itself render either provision ambiguous or of doubtful, uncertain or obscure
    meaning.”).
    The plain language of the foregoing statutory provision identifies two types of
    work: (1) work performed during the period of confinement which work is imposed by the
    administration of the state correctional facility or jail; and (2) the person’s usual employment
    with his or her usual employer when not confined. Under the statute, workers’ compensation
    7
    (...continued)
    sixteen [W. Va. Code § 25-7-16] of article seven, chapter
    twenty-five of this code.
    W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) (2011) (Supp. 2016). The parties agree that the exceptions
    contained in W. Va. Code § 25-7-14 & § 25-7-16, which pertain to the Prisoners’ Industries
    Enhancement (“PIE”) program that apparently has never been implemented, do not apply to
    Mr. Crawford. Corrections asserts that the different treatment afforded the PIE program,
    which was crafted to comply with federal law, was to ensure that participating private
    industries received no unfair advantage from using inmate workers. The purpose was not to
    protect inmate workers. See McMaster v. State of Minn., 
    30 F.3d 976
    , 981 (8th Cir. 1994)
    (“We conclude that Congress’ purpose in enacting the Ashurst-Sumners Act was to protect
    private business, not to protect the inmate worker.”).
    10
    benefits are not provided to a person confined in a state correctional facility or jail for an
    injury sustained while the person is engaged in the first type of work, i.e., work performed
    during the inmate’s period of confinement, which, as the statute plainly recognizes,
    necessarily “is imposed by the administration of the state correctional facility or jail.”
    Workers’ compensation benefits are, however, available to a person confined in a state
    correctional facility or jail for an injury sustained while he or she is engaged in the second
    type of work, that is, the person’s usual employment with his or her usual employer when not
    confined.
    Accordingly, we now expressly hold that W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b) (2011)
    (Supp. 2016) prohibits a person confined in a state correctional facility or jail who is
    participating in a work-release program from receiving workers’ compensation benefits for
    any injury sustained while engaged in such work during the person’s period of confinement.8
    Applying the foregoing holding to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that
    Mr. Crawford is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits for the injury he sustained.
    Mr. Crawford was injured during his period of confinement while participating in a work-
    release program through the Charleston Work Release Center, which is a state correctional
    8
    We reach this holding based upon Mr. Crawford’s employment by a state
    agency, and we render no decision regarding an incarcerated inmate’s employment by a
    private employer, as those are not the facts presently before us.
    11
    facility.   See W. Va. Code § 25-1-3(d) (2013) (Repl. Vol. 2013) (providing “[t]he
    Commissioner of Corrections may establish work and study release units as extensions and
    subsidiaries of those state institutions under his or her control and authority” (emphasis
    added)); Syl., in part, Craigo v. Legursky, 
    183 W. Va. 678
    , 
    398 S.E.2d 160
    (“A convict
    confined in the penitentiary or medium security prison who is transferred to a work release
    and/or study center established pursuant to W. Va. Code § 25-1-3 [(2013) (Repl. Vol. 2013)]
    remains in the custody of officers of the Department of Corrections.”). Therefore, we find
    no error in the Board’s ruling that Mr. Crawford was not entitled to workers’ compensation
    benefits pursuant to W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b).9
    B. Equal Protection
    Mr. Crawford additionally argues that his equal protection rights have been
    violated insofar as he is a member of a class in which all persons are not treated equally. He
    9
    Also raised in this appeal is the question of whether Mr. Crawford qualified
    as an “employee” pursuant to W. Va. Code § 23-2-1a (1999) (Repl. Vol. 2010). However,
    this question is rendered moot by our determination that Mr. Crawford is barred from
    receiving workers’ compensation benefits by operation of W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b), which,
    by its own terms, prevails over other provisions of the Code. See W. Va. Code § 23-4-1e(b)
    (beginning with “[n]otwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary . . . .”). See
    also State ex rel. Canterbury v. Paul, 
    205 W. Va. 665
    , 669 n.2, 
    520 S.E.2d 662
    , 666 n.2
    (1999) (“‘Moot questions or abstract propositions, the decision of which would avail nothing
    in the determination of controverted rights of persons or property, are not properly cognizable
    by a court.’” (quoting Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Lilly v. Carter, 
    63 W. Va. 684
    , 
    60 S.E. 873
    (1908))). Accord Syl. pt. 4, Cline v. Mirandy, 
    234 W. Va. 427
    , 
    765 S.E.2d 583
    (2014);
    Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Durkin v. Neely, 
    166 W. Va. 553
    , 
    276 S.E.2d 311
    (1981).
    12
    contends that some incarcerated prisoners who work while serving their period of
    confinement, i.e., those who work for private employers, are mandated to receive workers’
    compensation, while those, such as himself, who work for a state agency, are not. Mr.
    Crawford avers that, had he been doing the same work for a private employer, he would have
    received workers’ compensation benefits.            He argues that the denial of workers’
    compensation benefits to work-release inmates serving a state agency advances no reasonable
    government interest, nor is there a rational basis for such a denial.10
    Corrections contends that Mr. Crawford’s argument fails because he cannot
    establish that he was discriminated against as compared to other incarcerated individuals.
    In this regard, Corrections avers that Mr. Crawford had the opportunity to seek private
    employment. Corrections further asserts that it has not been established in the record that
    work-release inmates working in the private sector actually receive workers’ compensation
    benefits.11 Nevertheless, Corrections contends that, even if discrimination is found, any such
    10
    Mr. Crawford additionally asserts that he was released from custody upon his
    release from the hospital. He claims that his lack of treatment has put him at a significant
    disadvantage in re-entering society. Mr. Crawford fails to identify any specific treatment that
    was denied to him. Instead, according to the appellate record, Mr. Crawford received
    treatment for his injury at a cost in excess of $90,000, which amount was paid by
    Corrections.
    11
    The only evidence in the record pertaining to whether work release inmates
    working in the private sector receive workers’ compensation was the following deposition
    testimony by Mr. Jeff Stinnett, Administrator of the Charleston Work Release Center:
    (continued...)
    13
    discrimination bears a rational basis to a proper governmental purpose in that there is a
    substantial governmental interest in maintaining fair business practices and a fiscally sound
    state budget. Corrections explains that, if the private sector was permitted to employ inmates
    without providing the benefits afforded to other employees, the businesses would receive an
    unfair advantage in competition versus other private businesses not utilizing inmates.
    Corrections finally argues that imposing a duty on state agencies to provide workers’
    compensation for inmate workers would have a substantial negative impact on the State’s
    budget.
    The right to equal protection is expressly provided by the Fourteenth
    Amendment to the United States Constitution, which declares in relevant part that “[n]o state
    shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
    Likewise, this Court has recognized that “West Virginia’s constitutional equal protection
    principle is a part of the Due Process Clause found in Article III, Section 10 of the West
    Virginia Constitution.” Syl. pt. 4, Israel by Israel v. West Virginia Secondary Sch. Activities
    11
    (...continued)
    Q.     And would those wages [earned by inmates
    working for private employers] be reported[,] if you know, by
    the employers as towards their Workers’ Compensation
    premiums?
    ....
    A.      As far as I know, yes.
    14
    Comm’n, 
    182 W. Va. 454
    , 
    388 S.E.2d 480
    (1989). In practice, “[e]qual protection of the law
    is implicated when a classification treats similarly situated persons in a disadvantageous
    manner. The claimed discrimination must be a product of state action as distinguished from
    a purely private activity.” Syl. pt. 2, 
    id. Accord Syl.
    pt. 4, Kanawha Cty. Pub. Library Bd.
    v. Board of Educ. of Cty. of Kanawha, 
    231 W. Va. 386
    , 
    745 S.E.2d 424
    (2013).
    Under the facts herein presented, we need not address the existence of a
    rational basis or whether the denial of workers’ compensation benefits to inmates bears a
    reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose,12 because we find there has been
    12
    This Court has held that,
    “‘“‘“[w]here economic rights are concerned, we look to
    see whether the classification is a rational one based on social,
    economic, historic or geographic factors, whether it bears a
    reasonable relationship to a proper governmental purpose, and
    whether all persons within the class are treated equally. Where
    such classification is rational and bears the requisite reasonable
    relationship, the statute does not violate Section 10 of Article III
    of the West Virginia Constitution, which is our equal protection
    clause.” Syllabus Point 7, [as modified,] Atchinson v. Erwin,
    [172] W. Va. [8], 
    302 S.E.2d 78
    (1983).’ Syllabus Point 4, as
    modified, Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale
    Grocery Co., [174] W. Va. [538], 
    328 S.E.2d 144
    (1984).” Syl.
    pt. 4, Gibson v. West Virginia Department of Highways, 
    185 W. Va. 214
    , 
    406 S.E.2d 440
    (1991).’ Syllabus Point 2,
    Robinson v. Charleston Area Medical Center, 
    186 W. Va. 720
    ,
    
    414 S.E.2d 877
    (1991).” Syllabus point 2, E.H. v. Matin, 
    189 W. Va. 102
    , 
    428 S.E.2d 523
    (1993).
    (continued...)
    15
    no violation of Mr. Crawford’s equal protection rights. Assuming, arguendo, that inmates
    who work for private businesses through the work-release program do, in fact, receive
    workers’ compensation benefits, the receipt of such benefits does not demonstrate
    disadvantageous treatment of inmates who instead work for a state agency. Clearly both
    classes of inmates receive treatment for work-related injuries. With respect to privately
    employed inmates who presumptively receive workers’ compensation benefits, we note that
    the Legislature has declared its intention that the Workers’ Compensation Code operate, in
    part, “to assure the quick and efficient delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured
    workers.” W. Va. Code § 23-1-1 (2007) (Repl. Vol. 2010). Likewise, inmates working for
    a state agency, such as DOH, receive treatment for their injuries provided by Corrections:
    “[t]here is no question that a governmental unit, such as [a] Correctional Center, has an
    ‘obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.’ Estelle
    v. 
    Gamble, 429 U.S. at 103
    , 97 S. Ct. at 
    290, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 259
    (1976).” Nobles v. Duncil,
    
    202 W. Va. 523
    , 533, 
    505 S.E.2d 442
    , 452 (1998). It is clear, therefore, that all inmates
    participating in a work-release program receive treatment for their injuries sustained in the
    course of and resulting from their work.13 In the case of inmates assigned to a state agency,
    12
    (...continued)
    Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Boan v. Richardson, 
    198 W. Va. 545
    , 
    482 S.E.2d 162
    (1996), modified
    on other grounds as recognized by Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 
    219 W. Va. 774
    , 783, 
    639 S.E.2d 866
    , 875 (2006).
    13
    We recognize that there are disability benefits provided under workers’
    compensation in addition to medical treatment benefits; however, the parties have not raised
    (continued...)
    16
    treatment is paid for by Corrections. Indeed, Mr. Crawford has admitted that Corrections
    paid more than $90,000 for the treatment of his injury. In the case of inmates working for
    private employers who subscribe to workers’ compensation, treatment is paid for by the
    employer through such coverage.14 Under these circumstances, we find no equal protection
    violation.
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing discussion, we affirm the December 21, 2015,
    decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board of Review finding that Mr. Crawford is not
    13
    (...continued)
    those specific benefits in their equal protection arguments. Instead, the parties have referred
    to workers’ compensation in a general sense. Because the parties have not briefed specific
    workers’ compensation disability benefits, we will not address the same.
    14
    Mr. Crawford relies on State ex rel. Boan v. Richardson, 
    198 W. Va. 545
    , 
    482 S.E.2d 162
    (1996), in support of his equal protection argument. We find this case is
    distinguishable and not supportive of Mr. Crawford’s position. In Boan, this Court found
    that W. Va. Code § 23-4-23 (1994) violated equal protection insofar as it reduced permanent
    total disability benefits to individuals receiving old age social security benefits. The
    conclusion reached by this Court was based upon the fact that old age social security benefits
    served a different purpose than permanent total disability benefits. In the instant matter, all
    inmates receive treatment for work-related injuries, it is merely the source of payment for
    those injuries that differs.
    17
    eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits for an injury he sustained while he was
    an inmate participating in a work-release program.
    Affirmed.
    18