SER Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General v. Copper Beech Townhome Communities , 239 W. Va. 741 ( 2017 )


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  •          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
    September 2017 Term                         FILED
    _______________                        October 12, 2017
    released at 3:00 p.m.
    No. 17-0228                            RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    _______________                             OF WEST VIRGINIA
    STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex rel.,
    PATRICK MORRISEY,
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    v.
    COPPER BEECH TOWNHOME COMMUNITIES
    TWENTY-SIX, LLC, et al.,
    Petitioner
    ____________________________________________________________
    Certified Question from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
    The Honorable Jennifer F. Bailey, Judge
    Civil Action No. 15-C-1699
    CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED
    ____________________________________________________________
    Submitted: October 3, 2017
    Filed: October 12, 2017
    M. David Griffith, Jr., Esq.                Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
    Joseph K. Merical, Esq.                     Attorney General
    Thomas Combs & Spann, PLLC                  Thomas M. Johnson, Jr., Esq.
    Charleston, West Virginia                   Deputy Solicitor General
    Counsel for the Petitioner                  Erica N. Peterson, Esq.
    Assistant Attorney General
    Charleston, West Virginia
    Counsel for the Respondent
    W. Bradley Sorrells, Esq.              Marc E. Williams, Esq.
    Robinson & McElwee, PLLC               Randy L. Saunders, Esq.
    Charleston, West Virginia              Alexander L. Turner, Esq.
    Counsel for Amicus Curiae              Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP
    The West Virginia Association          Huntington, West Virginia
    of Realtors, Inc.                      Counsel for Amicus Curiae
    The Defense Trial Counsel of West Virginia
    Samuel H. Simon, Esq.                  Matthew A. Jividen, Esq.
    Matthew J. Lautman, Esq.               Paul R. Sheridan, Esq.
    Houston Harbaugh, P.C.                 Legal Aid of West Virginia
    Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania               Martinsburg, West Virginia
    Counsel for Amicus Curiae              Counsel for Amicus Curiae
    North Central West Virginia            Legal Aid of West Virginia
    Landlords Association, Inc. d/b/a
    North Central West Virginia
    Business Owners Association
    John R. Teare, Jr., Esq.               Mark A. Kepple, Esq.
    Spilman Thomas & Battle, PLLC          Bailey & Wyant, PLLC
    Charleston, West Virginia              Wheeling, West Virginia
    Counsel for Amicus Curiae              Counsel for Amicus Curiae
    The West Virginia Housing              Metro Property Management
    Institute, Inc.
    Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, Esq.
    WVU Litigation & Advocacy Clinic
    Carrie Ann Showalter, Esq.
    WVU Student Legal Services
    Morgantown, West Virginia
    Counsel for Amici Curiae
    WVU Litigation & Advocacy Clinic and
    WVU Student Legal Services
    JUSTICE KETCHUM delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
    1.   “It is not for this Court arbitrarily to read into a statute that which it
    does not say. Just as courts are not to eliminate through judicial interpretation words that
    were purposely included, we are obliged not to add to statutes something the Legislature
    purposely omitted.” Syllabus Point 11, Brooke B. v. Ray, 230 W.Va. 355, 
    738 S.E.2d 21
    (2013).
    2.   The debt collection provisions, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a
    [1996], and deceptive practices provisions, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 to -106 [2015],
    both contained in the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, do not apply to
    and regulate the fees a landlord may charge to a tenant pursuant to a lease of residential
    real property.
    Justice Ketchum:
    In this matter we address whether our consumer credit protection statute
    applies to and regulates the relationship between a landlord and tenant under a lease for
    residential real property. The Circuit Court of Kanawha County certified a question to
    this Court to resolve this issue.
    After thorough review, we find that our consumer credit protection statute
    does not regulate the residential rental fees a landlord may charge pursuant to a
    residential lease. We therefore answer the certified question in the negative.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The relevant facts of this matter are brief and undisputed. In September
    2015, the Attorney General of West Virginia (“Attorney General”), acting on behalf of
    the State,1 filed a civil action in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County against a landlord,
    Copper Beech Townhome Communities Twenty-Six, LLC (“Defendant Landlord”).2
    1
    The Legislature has granted to the Attorney General the authority to bring civil
    actions to enforce our Consumer Credit and Protection Act. See W.Va. Code § 46A-7­
    108 [1974] (“The attorney general may bring a civil action to restrain a person from
    violating this chapter and for other appropriate relief”).
    2
    The Attorney General’s complaint names Copper Beech Townhome
    Communities Twenty-Six, LLC and Copper Beech Townhome Communities Twenty-Six
    SPE, LLC as defendants. As noted in Copper Beech’s brief, these two defendants “are
    separate legal entities, [however] this separate identity is not material for purposes of this
    (Continued . . .)
    1
    Defendant Landlord is one of the largest residential lessors in the state. It maintains a
    number of rental units in Morgantown, West Virginia.
    The Attorney General’s complaint alleged that Defendant Landlord’s
    residential leases included various fees and charges that violated the West Virginia
    Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-1-101 et seq. [1974]
    (“CCPA”).     According to the Attorney General, the fees contained in Defendant
    Landlord’s leases that violate the CCPA include: 1) a non-refundable redecorating fee, 2)
    debt collection fees, 3) attorney’s fees, 4) dishonored check fees, 5) multiple check fees
    when co-tenants pay rent with more than one check, 6) a fee for written receipts, and 7) a
    fee for late payment of monthly rent. The Attorney General’s complaint alleged that
    these fees violated two main provisions of the CCPA: 1) the debt collection provisions as
    set forth in W.Va. Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a, and 2) the unfair and deceptive acts and
    practices provisions contained in W.Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 to -106. The Attorney
    General’s complaint sought an “injunction, consumer restitution, disgorgement, civil
    penalties, and other appropriate relief.”
    Defendant Landlord filed a motion to dismiss the Attorney General’s
    complaint, arguing that the CCPA does not apply to residential leases. After the circuit
    court denied this motion, Defendant Landlord moved the circuit court to certify a
    certified question.” For ease of the reader, we refer to these two named defendants
    collectively as “Defendant Landlord.”
    2
    question to this Court regarding the application of the CCPA to residential leases of real
    property. On March 8, 2017, the circuit court certified the following question to this
    Court: “Does the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (including W.Va.
    Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a and §§ 46A-6-101 to -106) apply to the relationship
    between a landlord and tenant under a lease for residential rental property?”3 Thereafter,
    this Court accepted the certified question.4
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    As this Court recognized in Syllabus Point 1 of Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart
    Stores, Inc., 197 W.Va. 172, 
    475 S.E.2d 172
    (1996), “[t]he appellate standard of review
    of questions of law answered and certified by a circuit court is de novo.” Applying this
    plenary standard of review, we proceed to address the certified question.
    III. ANALYSIS
    Before addressing the specific certified question, we begin with a brief
    background discussion of the CCPA. It was “enacted in 1974 and is a hybrid of the
    Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act and some sections from
    then-existing West Virginia law.” White v. Wyeth, 227 W.Va. 131, 136, 
    705 S.E.2d 828
    ,
    3
    The circuit court answered this question “Yes.”
    4
    We acknowledge the contribution of the numerous amici curiae briefs filed with
    this Court. We value their contributions to this case and have considered their briefs in
    conjunction with the parties’ arguments.
    3
    833 (2010) (internal citation omitted).     This Court has observed that the purpose
    underlying the CCPA is as follows: “We have recognized the dual legislative purposes of
    protecting consumers and promoting sound and fair business practices.” 
    Id., 227 W.Va.
    at
    
    139, 705 S.E.2d at 836
    . Further, this Court has stated that the CCPA “is a comprehensive
    attempt on the part of the West Virginia legislature to extend protection to consumers and
    persons who obtain credit in state.” Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 227 W.Va. 142, 151,
    
    706 S.E.2d 63
    , 72 (2010).
    Additionally, the purpose of the CCPA was described in an excellent law
    review article by WVU Law School Professor Vincent Cardi5 wherein he stated:
    The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection
    Act is intended to: (1) increase the availability of consumer
    credit by raising allowable finance charges (interest rates) and
    move toward equalization of rates available to consumers
    whether they borrow the money from a lender or buy the
    goods on credit from a seller; (2) regulate the rate of finance
    charges allowed for consumer credit transactions by
    prescribing rates and rules for computation; (3) regulate those
    businesses which make small consumer loans and which were
    formerly regulated by the small loan act; (4) protect
    consumers who purchase goods or services on credit or
    through consumer loans from deceptive selling techniques,
    unconscionable contract terms, and undesirable debt recovery
    and collection practices; and (5) protect consumers who
    purchase goods or services for cash or credit from, and to
    5
    This Court has noted that Professor Cardi is the “foremost expert in this area of
    the law[.]” State ex rel. McGraw v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 217 W.Va. 573, 577, 
    618 S.E.2d 582
    , 586 (2005).
    4
    give them remedies for, defective or shoddy goods and
    services and unfair and deceptive selling practices.
    V. Cardi, The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, 77 W.Va. L. Rev. 401,
    402 (1974-75).
    In researching the background and purpose underlying the CCPA, we have
    found no reported West Virginia cases, law review articles, or secondary sources stating
    that the purpose, or even a purpose, of the Act is to regulate fees that a landlord may
    charge to a tenant pursuant to a residential lease. In fact, in the forty-three years since the
    CCPA was enacted, this case is the first occasion in which any party has asserted before
    this Court that the Act applies to and regulates the landlord-tenant relationship.
    With this background in mind, we turn to the specific certified question
    before us: “Does the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (including
    W.Va. Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a and §§ 46A-6-101 to -106) apply to the relationship
    between a landlord and tenant under a lease for residential rental property?”               As
    highlighted by the circuit court in its formulation of the certified question, our resolution
    of this matter requires us to examine two statutory sections contained in the CCPA: the
    debt collection provisions contained in W.Va. Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a, and the
    unfair or deceptive acts or practices provisions contained in W.Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 to
    -106.
    The Attorney General asserts that we should answer the certified question
    in the affirmative and conclude that the CCPA applies to a residential lease entered into
    by a landlord and tenant. According to the Attorney General, the CCPA was written to
    5
    “broadly [and] unambiguously apply to many different categories of people . . . including
    landlords.”    Further, regarding the specific statutory sections at issue, the Attorney
    General asserts:
    Under the plain meaning of the debt collection
    provisions, a tenant is a consumer, a landlord is a debt
    collector, and the tenant’s obligation to pay charges and fees
    to the landlord constitutes a debt. Accordingly, a landlord is
    prohibited from using unfair and unconscionable means in
    order to collect any debt owed. Under the unfair or deceptive
    acts or practices provisions, a landlord engages in a trade or
    commerce and is prohibited from using unfair or deceptive
    acts or practices.
    By contrast, Defendant Landlord argues that neither the debt collection
    provisions, nor the deceptive practices provisions of the Act apply to residential leases.
    Defendant Landlord asserts that the CCPA is “designed to prohibit creditors from taking
    advantage of consumers in various transactions.”6          A landlord’s business of renting
    residential property to a tenant is not the type of conduct regulated by the CCPA
    according to Defendant Landlord. Instead, “residential leases are already subject to
    extensive statutory and regulatory oversight . . . and the specific fees [the Attorney
    General] takes issue with are already addressed by other statutes.”7           Stated simply,
    Defendant Landlord asserts that the CCPA was not written or designed to apply to the
    6
    For ease of the reader, the arguments contained in the numerous amici briefs
    arguing against the Attorney General’s position are attributed to “Defendant Landlord.”
    7
    We discuss these statutes later in our analysis. See infra III. A.
    6
    landlord-tenant relationship. Defendant Landlord notes that “in the forty-two years since
    it was adopted, the [CCPA] has not been treated as applying to residential-landlord-tenant
    relationships.” Finally, Defendant Landlord argues that the Attorney General’s position,
    if adopted, “would inject uncertainty and instability into the West Virginia residential
    rental market.”
    We begin our analysis of the CCPA with a review of our rules of statutory
    construction. This Court has held that in deciding the meaning of a statutory provision,
    “[w]e look first to the statute’s language. If the text, given its plain meaning, answers the
    interpretive question, the language must prevail and further inquiry is foreclosed.”
    Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep’t of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 573, 587, 
    466 S.E.2d 424
    , 438 (1995); see also Syllabus Point 2, Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W.Va. 714,
    
    172 S.E.2d 384
    (1970) (“Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain
    meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.”); and Syllabus
    Point 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 
    65 S.E.2d 488
    (1951) (“A statutory provision
    which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be
    interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.”).
    Additionally, this Court has held that “[a] statute is open to construction
    only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders
    it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that
    reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.” Sizemore v. State
    Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 202 W.Va. 591, 596, 
    505 S.E.2d 654
    , 659 (1998) (internal
    7
    quotations and citation omitted). With these rules of statutory construction in mind, we
    first turn to the debt collection provisions contained in the CCPA.
    A. Debt Collection Provisions
    The debt collection provisions are set forth in article 2 of the CCPA, W.Va.
    Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a.        The debt collection provisions state that “[n]o debt
    collector shall use any fraudulent, deceptive or misleading representation or means to
    collect . . . claims[.]” W.Va. Code § 46A-2-127. Additionally, W.Va. Code § 46A-2-128
    provides that “[n]o debt collector may use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or
    attempt to collect any claim.”
    While the CCPA contains a “general definitions” section in article 1, the
    debt collection provisions in article 2 contain additional definitions specifically for the
    purposes of debt collection. These specific definitions are set forth in W. Va. Code §
    46A-2-122:
    (a) “Consumer” means any natural person obligated or
    allegedly obligated to pay any debt.
    (b) “Claim” means any obligation or alleged obligation of a
    consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which
    the money, property, insurance or service which is the subject
    of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or
    household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been
    reduced to judgment.
    (c) “Debt collection” means any action, conduct or practice of
    soliciting claims for collection or in the collection of claims
    owed or due or alleged to be owed or due by a consumer.
    8
    (d) “Debt collector” means any person or organization
    engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection. The term
    includes any person or organization who sells or offers to sell
    forms which are, or are represented to be, a collection system,
    device or scheme, and are intended or calculated to be used to
    collect claims. The term excludes attorneys representing
    creditors provided the attorneys are licensed in West Virginia
    or otherwise authorized to practice law in the State of West
    Virginia and handling claims and collections in their own
    name as an employee, partner, member, shareholder or owner
    of a law firm and not operating a collection agency under the
    management of a person who is not a licensed attorney.
    The issue we must resolve is whether a residential rental fee charged by a
    landlord, such as a fee for late payment of rent, may be properly characterized as a
    “claim” under W.Va. Code § 46A-2-122(b).
    The Attorney General argues that the broad language used in the foregoing
    definitions signals the legislature’s intent that these debt collection provisions apply to
    anyone, including a landlord, who attempts to collect a “claim” from a consumer.
    Further, the Attorney General asserts that “the charges and fees a tenant owes to a
    landlord constitute claims” under the foregoing definition because a claim is “any
    obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction.”
    The Attorney General asserts that a tenant is a consumer and that the broad meaning of
    the word “transaction” extends to residential leases.
    Conversely, Defendant Landlord argues that the debt collection provisions
    do not apply to landlord-tenant relationships.      Defendant Landlord emphasizes that
    residential lease agreements are not specifically addressed in the debt collection
    9
    provisions. If, as the Attorney General claims, the legislature intended these provisions
    to apply to residential leases of real property, it would have done so explicitly.
    Upon our review, we find that the debt collection provisions in W.Va. Code
    §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a are reasonably susceptible to differing constructions and that
    “reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its intended meaning.” Sizemore,
    202 W.Va. at 
    596, 505 S.E.2d at 659
    . As the Attorney General points out, the definition
    of “claims” is written in a broad manner and includes “any obligation or alleged
    obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money,
    property, insurance or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for
    personal, family or household purposes.” W.Va. Code § 46A-2-122(b). On the other
    hand, the debt collection provisions make no mention of residential leases, landlords,
    tenants, or include any language signaling that these provisions, though broadly drafted,
    were intended to cover residential rental fees a landlord may charge. Therefore, we
    conclude that these provisions are ambiguous.
    When faced with an ambiguous statute, this Court has observed “[a] statute
    that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied.” Syllabus Point 1, Farley v.
    Buckalew, 186 W.Va. 693, 
    414 S.E.2d 454
    (1992). “The primary object in construing a
    statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syllabus Point 1,
    Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W.Va. 108, 
    219 S.E.2d 361
    (1975). “A
    statute is ambiguous when the statute’s language connotes doubtfulness, doubleness of
    meaning or indistinctness or uncertainty of an expression[.]” United Services Auto Ass’n
    10
    v. Lucas, 233 W.Va. 68, 73, 
    754 S.E.2d 754
    , 759 (2014) (internal citation and quotation
    omitted). Similarly, this Court has held that “the initial step in such interpretative inquiry
    [of a statute] is to ascertain legislative intent.” Syllabus Point 1, in part, Ohio County
    Comm’n v. Manchin, 171 W.Va. 552, 
    301 S.E.2d 183
    (1983). Also, “[w]hen a statute’s
    language is ambiguous, a court often must venture into extratextual territory in order to
    distill an appropriate construction.       Absent explicatory legislative history for an
    ambiguous statute . . . this Court is obligated to consider the . . . overarching design of the
    statute.” State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac–Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 777,
    
    461 S.E.2d 516
    , 523 (1995).
    In attempting to ascertain the legislative intent behind the debt collection
    provisions, we note that the CCPA is made up of eight distinct articles.8 We place
    particular reliance on article 1 of the CCPA which includes a statement setting forth the
    Act’s general “application” and a series of general definitions.           Thus, in order to
    understand the legislative intent of the debt collection provisions contained in the CCPA,
    we begin by examining article 1. West Virginia Code § 46A-1-104 [1996], entitled
    “Application,” provides as follows:
    8
    “Statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied
    together so that the Legislature’s intention can be gathered from the whole of the
    enactments.” Syllabus Point 3, Smith v. State Workmen’s Compensation Com’r, 159
    W.Va. 108, 
    219 S.E.2d 361
    (1975).
    11
    (1) This chapter applies if a consumer, who is a
    resident of this state, is induced to enter into a consumer
    credit sale made pursuant to a revolving charge account, to
    enter into a revolving charge account, to enter into a
    consumer loan made pursuant to a revolving loan account, or
    to enter into a consumer lease, by personal or mail
    solicitation, and the goods, services or proceeds are delivered
    to the consumer in this state, and payment on such account is
    to be made from this state.
    (2) With respect to consumer credit sales or consumer
    loans consummated in another state, a creditor may not
    collect in an action brought in this state a sales finance charge
    or loan finance charge in excess of that permitted by this
    chapter.
    Under this general statement of applicability, three elements need to be
    satisfied for the CCPA to apply: 1) a creditor 2) induces a consumer 3) to enter into a
    consumer credit sale, a consumer loan, or a consumer lease. Under article 1’s general
    definitions, a consumer is defined as “a natural person who incurs debt pursuant to a
    consumer credit sale or a consumer loan, or debt or other obligations pursuant to a
    consumer lease.” W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(12). A general lease of residential real
    property could not properly be characterized as either a “consumer credit sale”9 or as a
    9
    We note that the definition of a “consumer credit sale” includes a “sale of . . . an
    interest in land.” “Consumer credit sale” is defined in W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(13), in
    relevant part, as follows: “‘[C]onsumer credit sale’ is a sale of goods, services or an
    interest in land in which: . . . (iii) The goods, services or interest in land are purchased
    primarily for a personal, family, household or agricultural purpose[.]” While the
    definition of “consumer credit sale” includes a sale of an interest in land, it does not
    apply to a general residential lease agreement. According to W.Va. Code § 46A-1­
    102(42), a “sale of an interest in land” is defined as applying to “a lease in which the
    (Continued . . .)
    12
    “consumer loan.” (Emphasis added). The only potential category a residential lease of
    real property could fit into is a “consumer lease.” However, W.Va. Code § 46A-1­
    102(14)(a) provides that a “consumer lease means a lease of goods[.]” (Emphasis added.)
    Clearly, a residential lease of real property made between a landlord and a tenant is not “a
    lease of goods.”10
    We emphasize that neither the CCPA’s general “application” and
    definitions contained in article 1, nor the debt collection provisions at issue in article 2,
    include any indication that the CCPA applies to a residential lease of real property. By
    contrast, our legislature has enacted extensive, detailed statutory law regulating the
    landlord-tenant relationship. West Virginia Code §§ 37-6-1 to -30 [1923] provides
    explicit statutory direction on our landlord-tenant law.       The title of this section is
    “Landlord and Tenant.” The “Landlord and Tenant” section is contained in the “Real
    Property” chapter of the West Virginia Code. See W.Va. Code §§ 37-1-1 et seq. [2008].
    Additionally, W.Va. Code §§ 37-6A-1 to -6 [2011], entitled “Residential Rental Security
    Deposits,” which is also included in the “Real Property” chapter of the West Virginia
    lessee has an option to purchase the interest and all or a substantial part of the rental or
    other payments previously made by him are applied to the purchase price.” The issue in
    the present case does not involve leases in which the lessee had an option to purchase the
    “interest.”
    10
    “‘Goods’ includes goods not in existence at the time the transaction is entered
    into and gift and merchandise certificates, but excludes money, chattel paper, documents
    of title and instruments.” W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(21).
    13
    Code, provides the following explicit direction: “The provisions of this article shall apply
    to all residential rental premises or units used for dwelling purposes.” W.Va. Code § 37­
    6A-6. Other statutory sections that explicitly apply to and regulate the landlord-tenant
    relationship include W.Va. Code §§ 55-3-1 et seq. [1923] (unlawful entry); W.Va. Code
    §§ 55-4-1 et seq. [1923] (concerning the procedure for ejectment of a tenant); W.Va.
    Code §§ 55-3A-1 et seq. [1983] (concerning remedies for wrongful occupation of
    residential property); and W.Va. Code §§ 37-15-1 et seq. [1993] (concerning “factory­
    built homes . . . which are held as personal property situated on real property owned by
    another in conjunction with a landlord/tenant relationship.”).
    Because the landlord-tenant relationship is so pervasively regulated in these
    numerous statutory sections outside of the CCPA, we are compelled to conclude that the
    legislature did not intend to further regulate the landlord-tenant relationship in an
    ambiguous provision of our CCPA. Instead, based on the foregoing statutory sections, it
    is clear that when the legislature intends to address the relationship between a landlord
    and tenant in a particular statute, it does so explicitly.
    Further illustrating this point is the fact that the CCPA includes one explicit
    reference to “the rental of space to be occupied for residential purposes.” West Virginia
    Code § 46A-6-109 [1981]11 provides that a written agreement a consumer enters into
    11
    West Virginia Code § 46A-6-109(a) is as follows:
    (Continued . . .)
    14
    must be written in plain language. This section explicitly includes written agreements
    concerning “the rental of space to be occupied for residential purposes.” This inclusion of
    “rental space to be occupied for residential purposes” in one subsection of the CCPA
    demonstrates that when the legislature intends residential leases to be included into a
    particular section of the CCPA, it does so explicitly. Critically, the debt collection
    provisions at issue, as well as the CCPA’s statement of general applicability contained in
    article 1, do not include any similar language covering “the rental of space to be occupied
    for residential purposes.”
    If the legislature intends for the CCPA to generally regulate fees a landlord
    may charge pursuant to a lease of residential property, it is free to do so by means of the
    full legislative process. However, this Court may not read into the CCPA that which it
    does not say.12 “It is not for this Court arbitrarily to read into a statute that which it does
    (a) Every written agreement entered into by a consumer after
    the first day of April, one thousand nine hundred eighty-two,
    for the purchase or lease of goods or services in consumer
    transactions, whether for the rental of space to be occupied
    for residential purposes or for the sale of goods or services for
    personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, must:
    (1) Be written in a clear and coherent manner, using words
    with common and everyday meanings; (2) use type of an
    easily readable size and ink which adequately contrasts with
    the paper; and (3) be appropriately organized and captioned
    by its various sections to be easily understood.
    12
    We agree with the Attorney General that the CCPA “is a remedial statute
    intended to protect consumers from unfair, illegal and deceptive business practices, and
    (Continued . . .)
    15
    not say. Just as courts are not to eliminate through judicial interpretation words that were
    purposely included, we are obliged not to add to statutes something the Legislature
    purposely omitted.” Syllabus Point 11, Brooke B. v. Ray, 230 W.Va. 355, 
    738 S.E.2d 21
    (2013).
    Moreover, a number of states outside of our jurisdiction have determined
    that their consumer credit protection statutes are not applicable to residential leases,
    concluding that such residential leases are within the purview of their specific landlord-
    tenant acts which explicitly regulate and apply to landlord-tenant relationships.13 For
    instance, in finding that its consumer credit protection act did not regulate and apply to
    must be liberally construed to accomplish that purpose.” Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc.,
    227 W.Va. 142, 151, 
    706 S.E.2d 63
    , 72 (2010). However, we may not read into the
    statute that which it does not say—that the CCPA generally applies to and regulates
    residential leases of real property entered into by a landlord and tenant. Similarly, we
    find the Attorney General’s reliance on Fleet v. Webber Springs Owners Ass’n, Inc., 235
    W.Va. 184, 
    772 S.E.2d 369
    (2015), to be misplaced. In Fleet this Court determined that
    “[h]omeowners association assessments that are to be used for improving and/or
    maintaining common areas of a planned community. . . are an obligation primarily for
    personal, family, or household purposes, and, therefore, such assessments are ‘claims’
    pursuant to W.Va. Code § 46A-2-122(b) (1996).” Syllabus Point 2, in part. The Court in
    Fleet only addressed homeowners association assessment fees, it did not address whether
    the debt collection provisions of the CCPA apply to landlord-tenant relationships.
    Further, unlike our landlord-tenant law, homeowners association assessment fees are not
    pervasively regulated in numerous statutory sections outside of the CCPA.
    13
    See Roberson v. Southwood Manor Associates, LLC, 
    249 P.3d 1059
    (Alaska
    2011); Childs v. Purll, 
    882 A.2d 227
    , 237-39 (D.C. 2005); Webb v. Theriot, 
    704 So. 2d 1211
    (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1997); Carlie v. Morgan, 
    922 P.2d 1
    (Utah 1996); Heritage
    Hills, Ltd. v. Deacon, 
    551 N.E.2d 125
    (Ohio 1990); Chelsea Plaza Homes, Inc. v. Moore,
    
    601 P.2d 1100
    (Kan. 1979).
    16
    residential leases of real property, the Supreme Court of Washington noted the harm that
    could occur if the court, rather than the legislature, were to extend the act to cover the
    landlord-tenant relationship:
    There is a marked difference between the judicial and
    legislative processes of inclusion and exclusion of activities
    under the Consumer Protection Act. In the legislative process,
    the people engaged in the activity sought to be specifically
    included within the act have the full opportunity to be heard
    and to have their particular problems considered at legislative
    hearings. Furthermore, the merits of any such proposed
    inclusion are subject to debate and amendment in legislative
    committees and on the floor of the respective houses of the
    Legislature.
    The judicial process, on the other hand, does not
    always provide equivalent opportunities. In the present case,
    for example, the State Attorney General’s Office represents
    the interests of the public (and indirectly the rights of the
    individual tenants), whereas the landlord appearing pro se
    represents himself in a case which potentially affects every
    person in the state who rents out or ever will rent out one or
    more dwelling units.
    State v. Schwab, 
    103 Wash. 2d 542
    , 547-48, 
    693 P.2d 108
    . 111 (1985).
    We agree with this reasoning and analysis. In fact, in Syllabus Point 2 of
    Huffman v. Goals Coal Co., 223 W.Va. 724, 
    679 S.E.2d 323
    (2009), this Court held:
    This Court does not sit as a superlegislature,
    commissioned to pass upon the political, social, economic or
    scientific merits of statutes pertaining to proper subjects of
    legislation. It is the duty of the Legislature to consider facts,
    establish policy, and embody that policy in legislation. It is
    the duty of this Court to enforce legislation unless it runs
    afoul of the State or Federal Constitutions.
    17
    Therefore, we find that if our CCPA is extended to apply to the landlord-
    tenant relationship, it should be accomplished through the legislative process, which
    entails that all interested parties, including all landlords and tenants who wish to be
    heard, be given the right to have their concerns addressed and considered.
    Finally, in construing the debt collection provisions, we are mindful that the
    overall purpose of the CCPA, as articulated by Professor Cardi, supports the conclusion
    that the Act was not intended to apply to residential leases of real property. As noted, the
    CCPA has been in effect since 1974 and this Court has not considered a single case
    during the intervening forty-three years in which a party has claimed that fees charged
    pursuant to a lease of residential real property violated the CCPA.
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the debt collection provisions
    contained in article 2 of the CCPA, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a, do not apply to
    and regulate the fees a landlord may charge a tenant pursuant to a lease of residential real
    property.
    B. Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices Provisions
    We now address the unfair or deceptive acts or practices provisions
    (“deceptive practices provisions”) contained in article 6 of the CCPA, W.Va. Code §§
    46A-6-101 to -106. Relevant to our inquiry, W.Va. Code § 46A-6-104 provides: “Unfair
    methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
    trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” As with the debt collection provisions
    contained in article 2, article 6 contains a set of definitions specifically applicable to the
    18
    deceptive practices provisions.    West Virginia Code § 46A-6-102(6) sets forth the
    following definition: “‘Trade’ or ‘commerce’ means the advertising, offering for sale,
    sale or distribution of any goods or services and shall include any trade or commerce,
    directly or indirectly, affecting the people of this state.” (Emphasis added). The key
    inquiry is whether a residential lease of real property made between a landlord and tenant
    can be characterized as a “good or service” under the definition contained in W.Va. Code
    § 46A-6-102(6).
    While article 6 does not contain specific definitions of “goods” or
    “services,” those terms are defined in article 1 in the CCPA’s general definitions section.
    “‘Goods’ includes goods not in existence at the time the transaction is entered into and
    gift and merchandise certificates, but excludes money, chattel paper, documents of title
    and instruments.” W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(21). “‘Services’ includes: (a) Work, labor
    and other personal services; (b) privileges with respect to transportation, use of vehicles,
    hotel and restaurant accommodations, education, entertainment, recreation, physical
    culture, hospital accommodations, funerals, cemetery accommodations, and the like; and
    (c) insurance.” W.Va. Code § 46A-1-102(47).
    The Attorney General argues that a residential lease of real property is a
    package of “goods or services” and that it therefore is included in the deceptive practices
    provisions of the CCPA. In support of this argument, the Attorney General cites this
    Court’s ruling in Teller v. McCoy, 162 W.Va. 367, 
    253 S.E.2d 114
    (1978), arguing that
    the Court concluded that a residential lease is a contract for a bundle of goods and
    19
    services. By contrast, Defendant Landlord asserts that the legislature chose to define
    “trade” and “commerce” narrowly and that it limited application of the deceptive
    practices provisions to transactions involving goods and services. Defendant Landlord
    further argues that had the legislature intended to include residential leases in the
    deceptive practices provisions of the CCPA, it would have done so explicitly.
    This Court has previously construed the deceptive practices provisions
    contained in the CCPA. In State ex rel. McGraw v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 217 W.Va.
    573, 576-77, 
    618 S.E.2d 582
    , 585-86 (2005), this Court noted:
    We are guided herein by our previous recognition that
    W.Va. Code § 46A-6-104 is among the most ambiguous
    provisions of the consumer protection act. See McFoy v.
    Amerigas, Inc., 170 W.Va. 526, 529, 
    295 S.E.2d 16
    , 19
    (1982) (stating that “Code, 46A-6-104 [1974] is among the
    most broadly drawn provisions contained in the Consumer
    Credit and Protection Act and it is also among the most
    ambiguous”).
    Having previously determined that W.Va. Code § 46A-6-104 is ambiguous,
    we again recognize that “[a] statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be
    applied.” Farley, Syllabus Point 1. As with our analysis of the debt collection provisions
    of the CCPA, we find that an examination of the Act as a whole reveals that the deceptive
    practices provisions do not apply to and regulate residential leases of real property
    entered into by a landlord and tenant.
    In concluding that the deceptive practices provisions do not apply to and
    regulate residential leases of real property, we are guided by five main points, many of
    which are similar to our debt collection analysis in the previous section. While we need
    20
    not repeat that analysis at length, the reasons underlying our conclusion are as follows.
    First, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 to -106 does not include any explicit direction stating
    that the deceptive practices provisions apply to the landlord-tenant relationship. Second,
    it is clear that when the legislature intends for a particular statute to apply to the landlord-
    tenant relationship, it does so explicitly. See W.Va. Code §§ 37-6-1 to -30; W.Va. Code
    §§ 37-6A-1 to -6, W.Va. Code §§ 55-3-1 et seq.; W.Va. Code §§ 55-4-1 et seq.; W.Va.
    Code §§ 55-3A-1 et seq.; and W.Va. Code §§ 37-15-1 et seq. Third, the origin, history,
    and purposes of the CCPA, previously discussed, indicate that it was not intended to
    generally apply to and regulate residential leases of real property entered into by a
    landlord and tenant. Indeed, in the forty-three years since the CCPA was enacted, there
    have been no cases before this Court in which a party has asserted that the deceptive
    practices provisions regulate and apply to residential leases of real property. Next, we
    find that the legislature may amend the deceptive practices provisions and decide to
    explicitly include residential leases in this section. However, it is not for this Court to
    arbitrarily read into the deceptive practices provisions that which it does not say.
    Finally, we find that the Attorney General’s reliance on our ruling in Teller
    is misplaced. In Teller, the Court found that a residential lease is a contract and that, as a
    matter of contract law, there is an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases.
    To that end, the Court held in Syllabus Point 1 of Teller that “[t]here is, in a written or
    oral lease of residential premises, an implied warranty that the landlord shall at the
    commencement of a tenancy deliver the dwelling unit and surrounding premises in a fit
    21
    and habitable condition and shall thereafter maintain the leased property in such
    condition.” The implied warranty of habitability is set forth by statute in the “Landlord
    and Tenant” section of our law concerning “Real Property.” See W.Va. Code § 37-6-30.
    The Court in Teller made clear that a residential lease is “both a conveyance and a
    contract.” 162 W.Va. at 
    383, 253 S.E.2d at 124
    . The Court did not hold that a residential
    lease was a “good” or a “service.” In fact, the Court noted that in implying a warranty of
    habitability into a residential lease, “[w]e intend in no way to change statutory, common
    law, or case law definitions of ‘real property,’ nor are we today altering the law on
    recordation, descent, conveyancing, creditors’ rights, etc.” 162 W.Va. at 384 
    n.13, 253 S.E.2d at 125
    n.13.
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the deceptive practices provisions
    contained in article 6 of the CCPA, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 to -106, do not apply to
    and regulate the fees a landlord may charge a tenant pursuant to a lease of residential real
    property.
    C. Certified Question Answered
    Finally, we return to the certified question: “Does the West Virginia
    Consumer Credit and Protection Act (including W.Va. Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a and
    §§ 46A-6-101 to -106) apply to the relationship between a landlord and tenant under a
    lease for residential rental property?” Based on all of the foregoing, we answer this
    question in the negative and conclude that the CCPA does not apply to the relationship
    between a landlord and tenant under a lease for residential real property. We therefore
    22
    hold that the debt collection provisions, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-2-122 to -129a, and
    deceptive practices provisions, W.Va. Code §§ 46A-6-101 to -106, both contained in the
    West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, do not apply to and regulate the fees
    a landlord may charge to a tenant pursuant to a lease of residential real property.14
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We answer the certified question in the negative.
    Certified Question Answered.
    14
    Our answer to the certified question includes the following caveat—the CCPA
    does not generally apply to the relationship between a landlord and tenant under a lease
    for residential real property. However, according to the explicit language contained in
    W.Va. Code § 46A-6-109(a), written lease agreements “for the rental of space to be
    occupied for residential purposes,” are required to be written according to the plain
    language requirements of that statute.
    23