Robert Hankins v. John Wetzel , 640 F. App'x 130 ( 2016 )


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  •      ALD-085                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 15-2324
    ___________
    ROBERT HANKINS,
    Appellant
    v.
    JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary of the Penn. Dept. of Corrections; SHIRLEY MOORE-
    SMEAL, Acting Commissioner of the Penn. Dept. of Corrections; MARIROSA LAMAS,
    Superintendent at SCI Rockview; ROBERT MARSH, Deputy Superintendent; JEFFERY
    HORTON, Deputy Superintendent; TIM MILLER, Program Manager; WILLIAM
    WILLIAMS, (Ted) Medical Director; DANIEL FOX; AMY NIXON; BRADLEY
    NEWTON; JEFFREY WITHERITE; MICHAEL BELL, Grievance Officer; DORINA
    VARNER; KURT GRANLUND; BRIAN THOMPSON, Deputy Supt. at SCI Rockview;
    JEFFREY RACKOVAN; GEORGE SNEDEKER; JULIE PENSIERO/KOLTAY;
    JEREMY TIPTON; JOHN GRICE; JOHN GRAHAM; SHARON CLARK; STEWART
    BOONE; FRANCIS M. DOUGHERTY; BEATRICE RIVELLO; BUREAU OF
    HEALTH CARE SERVICES; JOHN KNIGHT; JANE DOES Nurses at SCI Rockview
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-00953)
    District Judge Honorable Richard P. Conaboy
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Jurisdictional Defect,
    Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B),
    or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    December 17, 2015
    Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: January 6, 2016)
    _________
    OPINION*
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Pro se appellant Robert Hankins (“Hankins”) appeals from the judgment of the
    United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in his civil rights
    case. As the appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the
    decision of the District Court.
    I.
    Hankins is a state prisoner currently housed at SCI-Huntingdon and previously
    housed at SCI-Rockview. During his time at SCI-Rockview, Hankins was repeatedly
    placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) and on a restricted list due to his conduct.
    Hankins filed an amended civil rights complaint against members of the Pennsylvania
    Department of Corrections (“D.O.C.”),1 naming various SCI-Rockview administrators
    and staff as defendants. For brevity’s sake, we will refer to these defendants as the
    “D.O.C. Defendants.”
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    1
    Defendants Bureau of Healthcare Services; D.O.C. Secretary John Wetzel; Deputy
    Secretary Shirley Moore Smeal; Regional Staff Assistants Brad Newton and Jeffrey
    Witherite; Grievance Officers Michael Bell and Dorina Varner; and Julie Pensiero/Koltay
    and Jeremy Tipton were dismissed over the course of motions practice. Hankins also
    named a set of Jane Doe nurses, but their identities were never clarified and so were
    dismissed.
    2
    Hankins raised numerous claims, some of which were dismissed by the District
    Court on motion of the D.O.C. Defendants, and others which were dismissed over the
    course of discovery. The District Court allowed several of Hankins’s claims to go
    forward, namely that: regulations unconstitutionally prevented him from buying and/or
    receiving outside publications while housed in the RHU; he was subjected to retaliation
    for pursuing his legal remedies; and his incoming mail was interfered with. The D.O.C.
    defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court granted. Hankins
    appeals from that order.2
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    , and we have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise plenary review over the District
    Court’s order granting summary judgment. 3 See Young v. Martin, 
    801 F.3d 172
    , 177 (3d
    Cir. 2015). A district court may grant summary judgment only when the record “shows
    that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When making this analysis, a
    2
    This case was initially listed for possible dismissal due to a jurisdictional defect. The
    District Court’s order granting summary judgment was entered on March 27, 2015.
    Hankins filed a document on April 17, 2015, called “Objections,” and then filed his
    notice of appeal on May 18, 2015. The District Court construed the “Objections” as a
    motion for reconsideration and denied it on November 2, 2015. Because the document
    was not a clear motion for reconsideration, Hankins’s notice of appeal appeared untimely,
    but was, in fact, timely. Hankins did not appeal from the District Court’s November
    order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii). Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over
    the order granting summary judgment, but not the order denying reconsideration.
    3
    district court must credit the evidence of the non-moving party, and draw all justifiable
    inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986). A mere “scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party]’s
    position will be insufficient” to create a genuine issue of fact. 
    Id. at 252
    . The non-
    moving party “must show where in the record there exists a genuine dispute over a
    material fact.” See Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 
    480 F.3d 252
    , 256 (3d Cir. 2007). The
    non-moving party cannot rest on his complaint, but must point to affidavits, depositions,
    interrogatory answers, and/or any admissions in establishing that there are material,
    disputed facts. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 324 (1986).
    A. First Amendment Claim
    The District Court correctly entered summary judgment on Hankins’s First
    Amendment claim. Where a prison regulation imposes restrictions on an inmate’s
    constitutional rights, that regulation is valid only if “it is reasonably related to legitimate
    penological interests.” See Turner v. Safley, 
    482 U.S. 78
    , 89 (1987). Turner sets forth
    four factors for courts to consider when determining if a prison regulation is in fact
    reasonable: (1) a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate,
    neutral governmental interest; (2) any alternative means of exercising the infringed right;
    (3) the burden that the accommodation imposes on prison resources; and (4) any readily
    available alternatives existing that would fully accommodate the inmate’s rights with
    3
    We may summarily affirm a decision of the District Court if the appeal does not raise a
    substantial issue. 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
    4
    little cost to legitimate penological interests. See Sharp v. Johnson, 
    669 F.3d 144
    , 156
    (3d Cir. 2012). The prison has the burden of demonstrating the first factor, and if it meets
    that burden, we consider the three other factors. 
    Id.
     Ultimately, the inmate bears the
    burden of showing that the regulation is unreasonable. 
    Id.
    Hankins specifically alleged that his First Amendment rights were violated by
    SCI-Rockview’s restrictive publication policies. The first policy stated that books could
    not be purchased on the behalf of RHU prisoners, and the second required newspapers to
    be exchanged on a one-for-one basis. These policies were changed after Hankins filed
    the current lawsuit.
    While the defendants changed the policies, they defended the initial, more
    restrictive policies as legitimate under Turner, and cited Beard v. Banks, 
    548 U.S. 521
    (2006), and Iseley v. Beard, 
    841 A.2d 168
     (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004), to support their
    position. Both cases upheld a more restrictive publication policy than what Hankins
    challenged. Regarding the first Turner factor (and citing Iseley), the D.O.C. defendants
    argued that there were legitimate, neutral governmental interests regarding the
    publication regulations: reducing the risk of flammable materials; limiting an inmate’s
    ability to hide or trade prison contraband; limiting available resources for potential
    weapons; and providing a form of non-violent behavior modification. They submitted
    disciplinary reports documenting Hankins’s many outbursts and threats in support of
    these arguments. They then pointed to alternative means for Hankins and other prisoners
    to exercise their rights under the second Turner factor. They noted that prisoners
    5
    received publications from within the prison; were allowed to keep a copy of a religious
    text; received materials from pre-existing subscriptions; were allowed to renew
    newspaper subscriptions; and were allowed to have one newspaper at a time. Regarding
    the third Turner factor, the defendants argued that the burden that Hankins’s
    accommodation request posed a danger to correctional staff and inmates. They provided
    evidence documenting his history of threatening staff, throwing bodily fluids on staff,
    assaulting staff, and screaming obscenities. The defendants did not squarely discuss the
    fourth Turner factor. However, the District Court stated that the defendants had
    demonstrated that “there was an absence of available ready alternatives.”
    Hankins did not submit evidence that established a genuine dispute over any
    material fact. Hankins argued that Beard supported his position, but he read the case
    incorrectly. In Beard, the Supreme Court upheld a blanket ban of publications - a more
    severe policy than what Hankins challenged here. See Beard, 
    548 U.S. at 525-26
    .
    Hankins also contended, without any support, that because a prior prison and the next
    prison he was housed at gave him legal exemptions, that SCI-Rockview should have
    given him the same privilege. Ultimately, we give state prison officials deference in
    making such decisions. See Turner, 
    482 U.S. at 90
    . As such, the defendants were
    entitled to summary judgment.
    B. Retaliation Claims
    The District Court correctly entered summary judgment on Hankins’s retaliation
    claims because he did not provide evidence to establish a causal link between the exercise
    6
    of his rights and the disciplinary actions taken against him and did not show that his mail
    was tampered with. In order to succeed in a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish
    three elements. First, he must demonstrate that his conduct was constitutionally
    protected. Then, he must show retaliatory action “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary
    firmness from exercising his constitutional rights[.]” Fantone v. Latini, 
    780 F.3d 184
    ,
    191 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 
    241 F.3d 330
    , 333 (3d Cir. 2001)). Finally, he
    must establish a causal link between his constitutionally protected conduct and the
    adverse action taken against him. 
    Id.
     In the prison context, the plaintiff has the “initial
    burden of proving that his constitutionally protected conduct was ‘a substantial or
    motivating factor’ in the decision to discipline him.” Rauser, 
    241 F.3d at 333
    .
    Hankins alleged that he was retaliated against because he exercised his right to
    pursue legal remedies. He stated that: SCI-Rockview medical staff ignored his requests
    to trim his toe-nails, for sensitive toothpaste, and for replacement eyeglasses; he was
    denied permission to purchase or receive religious and non-religious publications; and he
    was prevented from receiving incoming mail and newspapers. Hankins also alleged that
    he was prevented from accessing his legal property and was improperly placed on total
    movement restriction.
    In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants most explicitly pointed to
    record evidence regarding causation. First, regarding Hankins’s medical retaliation
    claims, they noted his medical requests, while delayed, were in fact complied with. The
    delays were due to D.O.C. bureaucratic requirements and restrictions. Next, regarding
    7
    his publications retaliation claim, the defendants noted that the publication policies at
    issue existed before Hankins was transferred to SCI-Rockview, and so that applying the
    policies to him were not retaliatory. Next, the defendants argued that Hankins did not
    adequately define his mail retaliation claim, but all the same, pointed to record evidence
    showing that he received at least six letters from an attorney and letters from his sister,
    and that he has been able to successfully access the courts with his filings. Regarding his
    legal property retaliation claim, the defendants noted that under D.O.C. policy, Hankins
    had access on a monthly basis to his legal property, and that in practice, his requests to
    access that property was granted. Finally, regarding his restricted movement claim, the
    defendants pointed to the fact that Hankins had a history of activities restrictions to
    establish that placing him on total movement restriction was not unwarranted.
    Despite all of the evidence he provided, Hankins did not establish a genuine
    dispute over any material fact. He did not point to any facts actually raising a genuine
    issue of fact regarding retaliatory motives on the part of the defendants. Accordingly, the
    defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
    For the reasons stated above, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
    decision.
    8