Com. v. Shields, C. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S58031-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                 :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    CHAUNCY K. SHIELDS                         :
    :
    Appellant                :      No. 1812 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 4, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0002938-2015
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                          FILED OCTOBER 10, 2017
    Appellant, Chauncy K. Shields, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury
    trial convictions for two (2) counts of possession with intent to deliver a
    controlled substance (“PWID”), two (2) counts of possession of drug
    paraphernalia, and two (2) counts of criminal use of a communication
    facility.1 We affirm.
    The trial court’s opinion fully set forth the relevant facts and
    procedural history of this case.         Therefore, we have no reason to restate
    them.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and (a)(32); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a),
    respectively.
    J-S58031-17
    Appellant raises three issues for our review:
    DID THE COURT ERR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT
    APPELLANT’S SENTENCE WAS NOT EXCESSIVE BECAUSE
    IT  WAS    WITHIN  THE  STANDARD   RANGE   FOR
    SENTENCING?
    DID THE COURT ERR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE
    EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY THE COMMONWEALTH WAS
    SUFFICIENT FOR THE JURY TO FIND…APPELLANT GUILTY
    OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM?
    DID THE COURT ERR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE
    JURY VERDICT WAS NOT SO CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
    AS TO SHOCK ONE’S SENSE OF JUSTICE?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 7).2
    After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
    applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Merle L.
    Ebert, Jr., we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief.   The trial court
    opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
    presented.     (See Trial Court Opinion, filed January 11, 2017, at 6-15)
    (finding: (1) Appellant’s sentences were within standard range of sentencing
    guidelines; court had benefit of presentence investigation (“PSI”) report and
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Appellant failed to include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his appellate
    brief, but the Commonwealth did not object. See Commonwealth v.
    Robertson, 
    874 A.2d 1200
    , 1211 (Pa.Super. 2005) (stating when defendant
    fails to include a Rule 2119(f) statement in appellate brief, and
    Commonwealth has not objected, this Court can overlook omission and
    review issue if substantial question is evident from appellate brief). But see
    Commonwealth v. McNear, 
    852 A.2d 401
    , 408 (Pa.Super. 2004)
    (concluding sentencing issue is waived when defendant does not include
    Rule 2119(f) statement in appellate brief, and Commonwealth properly
    objects to omission).
    -2-
    J-S58031-17
    commentary from counsel and Appellant when it sentenced Appellant; PSI
    report indicated Appellant had prior record score of 5 and lengthy and recent
    criminal history, including guilty plea to felonies in 2011 and 2012; Appellant
    committed current offenses while on state parole; court sentenced Appellant
    on each count to standard range sentence based on his prior record score;
    court would have been justified in imposing aggravated range sentence,
    because Appellant committed offenses less than 100 days after he was
    released from prison; when it sentenced Appellant, court considered PSI
    report, Appellant’s background, need to protect public, gravity of offenses,
    and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs; court did not have to state reasons for
    deviating from the absolute bottom of standard range when imposing
    Appellant’s sentence;3 (2) evidence demonstrated that on April 14, 2015,
    and April 15, 2015, Appellant met CI and gave CI crack cocaine in exchange
    for money; CI testified she knew Appellant as drug dealer; CI testified she
    had   used    heroin    and    crack    cocaine   before   she   became   informant;
    undercover officers observed Appellant meet with CI on April 14, 2015, and
    ____________________________________________
    3
    The law does not require the sentencing court to echo the words of the
    Sentencing Code, reciting every factor under Section 9721(b); instead, the
    record as a whole must reflect the court’s consideration of the statutory
    factors in light of the facts of the offenses and the offender’s character.
    Commonwealth v. Ventura, 
    975 A.2d 1128
    , 1135 (Pa.Super. 2009),
    appeal denied, 
    604 Pa. 706
    , 
    987 A.2d 161
     (2009) (reiterating sentencing
    court can satisfy requirement to place on record reasons for imposing
    particular sentence by indicating court has considered PSI and weighed all
    relevant statutory factors).
    -3-
    J-S58031-17
    April 15, 2015; after meetings, CI provided police with baggies containing
    substance, which Appellant stipulated was cocaine; police found no other
    substance when they searched CI and her vehicle before and after
    transactions; CI called same telephone number immediately before each
    transaction to set up deals and both times she spoke with same person
    whom she identified as Appellant; Appellant was identified as individual who
    arrived to carry out drug transactions; jury could reasonably infer that CI
    called Appellant and arranged purchase of crack cocaine from him; evidence
    was sufficient for jury to convict Appellant of charges; (3) jury was able to
    evaluate credibility of all witnesses and to weigh evidence; testimony and
    evidence summarized in discussion of Appellant’s sufficiency claim showed
    CI called Appellant on two separate occasions, arranged to meet with him to
    buy cocaine, and met and bought cocaine from him twice; verdict was not
    against weight of evidence). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial
    court opinion.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/10/2017
    -4-
    Circulated   09/13/2017   04:18 PM
    COMMONWEAL TH                                                     : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
    : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
    : CP - 21 - CR - 2938 - 2015
    v.                                          : CHARGES: (1) UNLAWFUL DELIVERY,
    MANUFACTURE,
    POSSESSION WITH INTENT
    TO DELIVER A SCHEDULE II
    CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE-
    COCAINE (2 COUNTS)
    (2) CRIMINAL USE OF
    COMMUNICATION FACILITY
    (2 COUNTS)
    (4) UNLAWFUL POSSESSION
    OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
    (2 COUNTS)
    CHAUNCY K. SHIELDS
    OTN: T7090996                                                      : AFFIANT: CPL. KEITH R. SEIBERT
    IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925(a)
    Ebert, J., January 11, 2017 -
    In this post-sentence appeal, Appellant challenges the sentence imposed upon
    him and the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. This opinion is written pursuant to
    Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a). Appellant's Concise Statements of the Errors Complained of on
    Appeal, which he provided in narrative form, reads as follows:
    The Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate state
    sentence of 3-8 years on two deliveries of crack cocaine to a
    friend working as a Confidential Informant ("Informant") with
    the Drug Task Force, with weights of .59 grams and .14
    grams, respectively via use of cellular telephones on both
    occasions. The drug paraphernalia counts were costs only.
    While the individual sentences are within the standard
    ranges of the sentencing guidelines they are each at the
    uppermost point of the standard range only three months
    shy of the aggravated range without explanation or reasons
    1
    JAN 11 2017                                                         JAN 11 2017
    ;- __ ::c:t)~t'.): . ·~   ,·'(·\!JI   l_(+C~ < )f:   ·····-------·-~····--
    given and are excessive based on the record. Most of
    Defendant's convictions resulting in his prior record score of
    5 occurred between 2001 and 2003, i.e., 12-15 years ago.
    Further, The evidence at trial was substantially based on the
    suspect testimony of the Informant, an admitted drug user
    with a faulty memory, and lacking in any other proof except
    one surveillance photograph, which showed Defendant
    exiting a Burger King restaurant holding a Burger King bag in
    a Burger King parking lot, which would have contained a
    hamburger if Defendant had been stopped and detained
    right then. Instead, he was arrested at a later date.
    Consequently, the verdicts were against the weight and
    sufficiency of the evidence for the following reasons:
    1. The Defendant was not the target of any police narcotics
    investigation.
    2. The Defendant's name as a drug seller and the nickname
    "DQ" originated from the police civilian witness
    ("Informant"), an arrested and known heroin user that
    police squeezed information from and forced her to tell
    them a name of "who can you get drugs from right now,
    today?".
    3. It is alleged that the Defendant's cell phone was called
    twice to set up drug deals, but neither the cell phone
    carrier nor the owner of the cell number allegedly dialed
    were admitted into evidence.
    4. The police never spoke to the Defendant on the
    telephone, but only claim they overheard the other party
    had a "male voice".
    5. A car was driven to the alleged drug deals with the
    Informant, but no license or ownership information was
    ever introduced at trial and the vehicle owner could have
    been the "DQ" referred to at trial and setting up deals on
    the phone casting doubt upon the Defendant as the
    perpetrator.
    6. In fact, there was another male in the car referred to in
    the Burger King parking lot.
    2
    7. The alleged transactions were not "controlled buys" as no
    marked money was used by police.
    8. The alleged seller was never stopped and detained at the
    scene of the alleged buys to determine if he had the buy
    money or any cocaine or residue in his possession.
    9. There was no fingerprint evidence to identify the
    perpetrator.
    10. The police and Informant both testified the Informant was
    a heroin user at the time of the alleged drug deals, yet
    the two buys were set up over the telephone for
    purchases of crack cocaine; if the Informant and the
    Defendant truly knew each other as testified to, the
    Defendant would have known the Informant was a heroin
    user and clearly would have been suspicious by the
    request for crack cocaine.
    11. There was no corroborating physical evidence of either
    alleged drug deal or the parties involved.
    12. Finally, at best, the riddled-with-holes prosecution might
    support arguendo that Defendant was a "runner", but
    even that scenario is not proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt on the trial record.
    Statement of Facts
    On April 13, 2015, officers of the Cumberland County Drug Task Force made
    arrangements to use the services of a Confidential Informant (hereinafter "Cl"), for the
    purpose of performing controlled purchases of illegal narcotics.1 When asked to identify
    individuals that the Cl knew could provide illegal narcotics to her, the Cl identified
    Appellant, among others.2 The Cl identified Appellant as a drug dealer operating under
    1
    Notes of Testimony, In Re: Trial, September 20, 2016 at 73 (hereinafter, N.T. Trial Day 2 _).
    2
    Notes of Testimony, in Re: Trial, September 19, 2016 at 23 (hereinafter, N.T.Trial Day 1 _).
    3
    the street name of "DQ."3 At the time, Appellant was not under investigation by the Drug
    Task Force,4 and the police did not provide Appellant's name to the Cl as a suggested
    drug dealer or person of interest.5 On April 14, 2015, and April 15, 2015, the Cl called a
    telephone number that she identified as Appellant's, in order to set up drug deals for the
    purchase of crack cocaine.6 Both times, the Cl spoke to an indlvidual she identified as
    Appellant while arranging the drug purchases.'
    On April 14, 2015, Appellant agreed to meet Cl in the parking lot of the local
    Burger King restaurant. Appellant was photographed arriving at the scene and entering
    the Cl's vehicle.8 While inside the vehicle, Appellant provided the Cl with crack cocaine
    in exchange for $100. 00 in official funds. 9 Appellant was not arrested at that time, based
    on a strategic decision made by those members of the Drug Task Force present at the
    scene."
    On April 15, 2015, Appellant again agreed to meet Cl, for the purpose of selling
    her crack cocaine. This meeting, originally scheduled for the parking lot of a local gas
    station, had its location altered at the last moment, and occurred on the side of the
    3
    N.T. Trial Day 1 at 21.
    4
    N.T. Trial Day 2 at 120-121.
    5
    & at 73
    6
    N.T. Trial Day 1 at 22-23.
    7
    lg_ at 29.
    8
    N.T. Tria! Day 2 at 53.
    9
    &at 79.
    10
    & at 133-134 (wherein Corporal Seibert explained that, when investigated drug dealers, for strategic reasons
    the Drug Task Force typically waits to arrange and carry out multiple drug buys before arresting the dealer).
    4
    road.11 The Cl picked up Appellant, drove around the block, and again purchased crack
    cocaine from Appellant in exchange for $50.00 of official funds.12 While not
    photographed on this occasion, Appellant was observed inside the Cl's vehicle and
    exiting the vehicle by Corporal Keith Seibert.13 After both meetings, the Cl immediately
    rendezvoused with members of the Drug Task Force, 14 and provided them substances
    that Appellant stipulated contained cocaine. The Cl was searched prior to and after
    meeting Appellant, and no other illegal substances were found on her person or in her
    possession at any time. 15
    Ultimately, as a result of the investigation Appellant was arrested and charged
    with the instant offenses. After a continuance of arraignment on February 02, 2016, to
    allow Appellant to secure counsel, Appellant was arraigned on March 01, 2016. The
    pretrial conference was continued, at Appellant's request, from March 01, 2016, to May
    04, 2016. The Commonwealth requested an unopposed continuance on May 16, 2016,
    and the matter was rescheduled for trial on July 11, 2016. Due to the unavailability of
    witnesses, the Commonwealth again moved to continue the trial date, over Appellant's
    objection. The trial date was rescheduled to September 19, 2016, and the trial was
    ultimately held on September 19, 2016, and September 20, 2016.
    Appellant was tried on the above-captioned charges, and found guilty on all
    counts by a jury of his peers. On October 04, 2016, Appellant was sentenced. At Count
    11
    N.T. Trial Day 1 at 31.
    12
    N.T. Trial Day 2 at 86.
    13
    &   at 87-88.
    14
    N .T. Trial Day 2 at 78, 103.
    15
    & at 76-78,     82-83, 85, 103.
    5
    1, two counts of Unlawful Delivery of Cocaine, Defendant was sentenced on each count
    to imprisonment in a State Correctional Institute for not less than 18 months nor more
    than 5 years. On the charges at Count 2, two counts of Criminal Use of a
    Communication Facility, the Defendant was sentenced on each count to 18 months to 3
    years to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the sentence at Count 1. On
    Count 4, two counts of Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, the Defendant was
    sentenced to only pay the costs of prosecution on each count. Accordingly, the
    aggregate sentence was three (3) years to eight (8) years. Appellant filed a timely
    motion to reconsider sentence on October 14, 2016, which was denied by Order of
    Court dated October 19, 2016. Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on November 03,
    2016, and his Concise Statement on November 23, 2016. Appellant, even though
    represented by counsel, also filed a prose motion to modify or reconsider sentence,
    dated November 16, 2016, and filed of record on December 12, 2016.
    Discussion
    Out of Appellant's lengthy statement of errors complained of on appeal, this court
    was able to discern three principle areas wherein Appellant alleges error. First,
    Appellant challenges the length of his standard-range sentence. Second, Appellant
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Third, Appellant challenges the weight of the
    evidence. For the following reasons, this court should properly be affirmed on appeal.
    i.     The term of Appellant's sentence
    If an appellant's concise statement raises a substantial question that the
    sentence imposed is inappropriate under the sentencing code, the Superior Court will
    grant permission to appeal and will consider the merits of that appellant's arguments.
    6
    See Com. v. Malovich, 
    903 A.2d 124
     7, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). Generally, a substantial
    question is raised when a plausible claim is raised that the sentencing court's actions
    were inconsistent with a specific provision of the sentencing code or were contrary to
    the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process.               !sh (citing   to Com. v.
    McAfee, 
    849 A.2d 270
    , 274 (Pa. Super. 2004)). A bald assertion of error is not
    accepted: rather, an appellant must support his assertions by articulating the way in
    which the court's actions violated the sentencing code.          kl    (citing to Com. v. Mouzon,
    
    812 A.2d 617
    , 627 (Pa. 2002)). However, the argument that a sentence is manifestly
    excessive can raise a substantial question. Com. v. Boyer, 
    856 A.2d 149
    , 152 (Pa.
    Super. 2004).
    If appellate review is granted, the standard of review is that sentencing is vested
    in the discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of
    that discretion. See Malovich. supra at 1252. An abuse of discretion involves a sentence
    which was manifestly unreasonable, or which resulted from partiality, prejudice, bias or
    ill will. 19..:. at 1253. It is more than just an error in judgment.   kl A sentencing     court must
    . state on the record its reasons for imposing sentence: nevertheless, a lengthy discourse
    on sentencing philosophy is not required.        kl     Where a sentence is within the standard
    range of the guidelines and the sentencing court enjoyed the benefit of a pre-sentence
    investigation, Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the
    Sentencing Code. See Com. v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 171 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    When appellate review of a sentence is granted, the sentence shall be vacated
    and remanded if the appellate court finds:
    7
    1 . The sentencing court purported to sentence within the
    sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines
    erroneously;
    2. The sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing
    guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the
    application of the guidelines would be clearly
    unreasonable; or
    3. The sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing
    guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
    42 Pa. C.S. §9781. In the instant case, Appellant concedes that the sentence he
    received was within the guidelines,16 removing prongs 1 and 3 from consideration.
    With regard to prong 2, this court enjoyed the benefit of a presentence
    investigation.17 Review of that presentence investigation revealed that Appellant has a
    prior record score of 5.18 The presentence investigation also revealed that Appellant has
    a lengthy and recent criminal history, including guilty pleas to felony charges in 201119
    and 2012,20 despite Appellant's attempt to minimize his criminal background and portray
    his prior record as largely an unfortunate byproduct of the distant past.21
    The standard range sentence on each charge of Unlawful Delivery of Cocaine for
    a defendant with a prior record score of 5 was a term of incarceration with a minimum
    duration of 12 to 18 months. Appellant was found guilty on two counts of that offense,
    16
    See Appellant's Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, at 2.
    17
    See Notes ofTestimony, In Re: Sentencing, held October 04, 2016, at 5 (hereinafter N.T. Sentencing_).
    18
    See Appellant's Guideline Sentence Form.
    19
    See Cumberland County Criminal Docket No. 2741-2010 (wherein Appellant pied guilty to a charge of
    Manufacture, Delivery, or Possessionwith Intent to Manufacture or Deliver, an ungraded felony, on April 14,
    2011).
    20
    See Cumberland County Criminal Docket No. 1370-2012 (wherein Appellant pied guilty to a charge of Receiving
    Stolen Property, a felony of the second degree, on September 25, 2012).
    21
    See Appellant's Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, at 2.
    8
    and sentenced to two concurrent terms of 18 to 60 months of incarceration.
    Consecutive to that sentence was the sentence for Appellant's two convictions for
    Criminal Use of a Communication Facility. For a defendant with a prior record score of
    5, the standard range sentence was, again, a minimum term of incarceration of 12 to 18
    months. The sentences for the two counts of Criminal Use of a Communication facility
    were concurrent to each other, but consecutive to the sentence for Unlawful Delivery of
    Cocaine, giving Appellant a total term of incarceration of 3 to 8 years. This term of
    incarceration was exclusively within the standard range and was entered after review of
    Appellant's presentence investigation and consideration of both Appellant's background
    and the crimes Appellant was convicted of committing by the jury.
    Appellant contends that this court erred by not putting on the record reasons or
    an explanation to support the specific standard range sentence imposed on him. In
    effect, Appellant is attempting to create a new requirement for entering a standard
    range sentence. Appellant contends that specific reasons which justify deviation from
    the absolute bottom of the standard range must be placed on the record at the time of
    sentencing. This interpretation is not grounded in any statutory authority or case law
    that this court is aware of. Instead, a sentence in the standard range of the sentencing
    guidelines, supported by a presentence investigation, is presumed proper. See Com. v.
    Moury, supra at 171.
    Other than a bald allegation of excess sentencing Appellant raises no allegation
    that in this case a standard range sentence is manifestly unreasonable, or a product of
    partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. Appellant has a prior record score of 5, and was
    convicted of multiple felony offenses in the instant matter. This court enjoyed the benefit
    9
    of having a presentence investigation available, and reviewed that report in depth. As
    noted in the Presentence Report, the Defendant was sentenced by President Judge
    Edward Guido on September 25, 2012, for Recklessly Endangering Another Person
    (M2) [gun-related], Receiving Stolen Property (F2) [stolen gun] and Possession of
    Ecstasy. The Defendant was sentenced to a period of two to four years in a state
    correctional institute as noted in the Defendant's probation file. The Defendant was
    released from state prison on January 12, 2015.22 Thus the Defendant was only out of
    state prison less than 100 days before committing these new crimes. This in and of
    itself would have justified an aggravated range sentence based on the fact that the
    Defendant committed these offenses while on state parole.
    Appellant's sentence reflects the facts of this case as well as this court's
    consideration of his background, the need to protect the public, the gravity of the
    offenses as they relate to the community, and Appellant's rehabilitative needs. After
    those considerations, this court arrived at the conclusion that standard range sentences
    were appropriate. Therefore, this court should properly be affirmed on appeal.
    ii.     The sufficiencyof the evidence against Appellant
    In the alternative, Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to
    sustain guilty verdicts against him for the charges he was convicted of. As stated by the
    Supreme Court:
    The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether accepting as
    true all of the evidence reviewed in the light most favorable to
    the Commonwealth, together with all reasonable inferences
    therefrom, the trier of fact could have found that each element of
    the offenses charged was supported by evidence and
    22
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole letter to PresidentJudge Edward Guido dated
    January 6, 2015.
    10
    inferences sufficient in law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    Commonwealth v. Lovette. 
    450 A.2d 975
    . 977 (Pa. 1982).
    Here, Appellant utterly disregards the requirement that all of the evidence be
    reviewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, together with all reasonable
    inferences therefrom. Rather, Appellant's contemptuous portrayal of the evidence could
    charitably be described as presented in the light most favorable to Appellant. Appellant
    cherry-picked testimony and evidence, such as pointing out that no fingerprint evidence
    identified the offender,23 in order to make his case that there was insufficient evidence
    presented at trial to support convicting him of the above-captioned charges. This
    purported deficiency in the evidence, as an example, ignores the unrebutted testimony
    of Corporal Seibert, who stated that in his experience usable fingerprints generally
    cannot (and in this case, were not) be recovered from drug baggies.24 Again, as an
    example of the points raised by Appellant, the jury was free to consider the credibility of
    Corporal Seibert as well as the lack of fingerprint evidence when determining whether
    the Commonwealth met its burden of proving Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    Instead of Appellant's position, the evidence presented taken in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth demonstrated that on April 14, 2015, and April 15,
    2015, Appellant met the Cl, and gave the Cl crack cocaine in exchange for a total of
    $150. 00 over the course of two transactions. The Cl testified that she knew Appellant
    principally as a drug dealer operating under the alias "DQ." The Cl testified that she
    23
    See Appellant's ConciseStatement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, at ,J9.
    24
    N.T. Trial Day 2 at 138-139.
    11
    used both heroin and crack cocaine prior to becoming an informant,25 which is again
    relevant because Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient because the Cl did
    not use cocaine26 and therefore Appellant, if he were a drug dealer, would have known
    something was amiss if Cl asked him for cocaine. Appellant's argument on that point
    was simply not borne out by the record.
    Undercover police officers observed Appellant meeting the Cl on both April 14
    and April 15, 2015, and after both meetings the Cl provided police with baggies
    containing a substance that Appellant later stipulated contained cocaine. The Cl and her
    vehicle were searched before and after the transactions, and no other contraband was
    located. The Cl called the same telephone number immediately prior to each
    transaction to set up the deals, and spoke with an individual she identified as Appellant
    both times. Appellant was identified as the individual who arrived to carry out the drug
    transactions.27 Thus, it would be reasonable for a jury to infer that the Cl was able to call
    Appellant and arrange to purchase crack cocaine from him, have Appellant meet her in
    her vehicle after that call was made, and receive from Appellant a substance that
    Appellant stipulated at trial was tested and contained cocaine.28                   The Defendant
    attempted on cross examination to disparage the confidential informant as a known
    heroin and cocaine user. Unfortunately for the Defendant, this Court and the jury
    observed the confidential informant in person. She testified that she had been "clean"
    25
    N .T. Trial Day 1 at 26, 40-41.
    26
    See Appellant's Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, filed November 23, 2016, at ,i 10.
    27While Appellant contends that another male individual drove him to the April 14, 2015 transaction and that the
    unknown male individual could in fact be "DQ," Appellant does not allege that any other individual accompanied
    him to the April 15, 2015 transaction, where the Cl also purchased crack cocaine from him.
    28
    N.T. Trial Day 2 at 140-141.
    12
    since February 29, 2016.29 She appeared well dressed, clean cut, and very articulate.
    Again, in examining the record, the Defendant presented no evidence to counter this
    clear eye witness description of these drug deliveries.
    Therefore, there was clearly sufficient evidence for the jury to find
    Appellant guilty of the charges against him, and this court should properly be affirmed
    on appeal.
    iii.        The weight of the evidence against Appellant
    Finally, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence against him. To begin,
    as stated by the Superior Court in Com. v. Galindes, 
    2001 PA Super 315
    , 
    786 A.2d 1004
    , 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001), when reviewing the weight of the evidence:
    [A] true weight of the evidence challenge 'concedes that
    sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict' but questions
    which evidence is to be believed.
    Com. v. Galindes, 
    supra,
     citing to Armbruster v. Horowitz, 
    1999 PA Super 333
    , 
    744 A.2d 285
    , 286 (Pa. Super. 1999). The Galindes Court further stated:
    An appellate court may review the trial court's decision to
    determine whether there was an abuse of discretion, but it
    may not substitute its judgment for that of the lower court.
    Indeed, an appellate court should not entertain challenges to
    the weight of the evidence since our examination is confined
    to the "cold record." Com. v. Murray, 
    408 Pa. Super. 435
    ,
    
    597 A.2d 111
    , 113 (Pa. Super. 1991 ). Our Court may not
    reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence as
    to shock one's sense of justice. 
    Id.
     "Finally, the trier of fact
    while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or
    none of the evidence." Com. v. Valette, 
    531 Pa. 384
    , 
    613 A.2d 548
    , 549 (Pa. 1992). Our review, therefore, is confined
    to whether the trial court abused its discretion.
    Com. v. Galindes, 
    supra
     (emphasis original).
    29
    N.T. Trial Day 1 at 20.
    13
    "It is the province of the jury to assess the credibility of witnesses, and a trial
    judge will not grant a new trial merely because of a conflict in the testimony or because
    he would have reached a different conclusion on the same facts, if he had been the trier
    of fact." Com v. VanDiviner, 
    599 Pa. 617
    , 630, 
    962 A.2d 1170
     (Pa. 2009) (internal
    citations omitted). Here, the jury had the ability to evaluate the credibility of all of the
    witnesses, and to weigh the evidence both in favor of and against Appellant. That
    testimony and evidence is summarized in greater detail above, but if believed by the
    jury it would have shown that the Cl was able to call Appellant on two separate
    occasions, arrange to meet with him to purchase crack cocaine, did meet with him twice
    and did purchase crack cocaine twice. Ultimately, the jury performed its duty and
    weighed the evidence, finding Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
    charges against him. In light of the testimony and evidence presented at trial, that
    verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice.
    Therefore, this court should properly be affirmed on appeal.
    Conclusion
    After review of the record, it is clear that Appellant's claimed errors are baseless,
    and that the jury's verdict and the sentence entered by this court were both proper.
    Appellant attempted to read in a new standard range sentencing requirement that a
    court place on the record specific reasons for not entering a sentence at the bottom of
    the standard range. In effect, Appellant would have trial courts eliminate the "range"
    portion of a standard range sentence, leaving only a minimal "standard" sentence, and
    expand the aggravated sentencing range to incorporate sentences previously within the
    standard range. Appellant provided no statutory authority or case law citations to
    support that proposition, which directly contradicts the very concept of having a
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    "standard     range" of sentences. In the alternative, Appellant challenged both the
    sufficiency   and the weight of the evidence against him. A jury of Appellant's   peers had
    the opportunity    to weigh the evidence available, determine the credibility of the
    witnesses,    and determine whether the Commonwealth        met its burden to prove
    Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable      doubt. The jury found that the Commonwealth       did
    so, and the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock this court's sense of
    justice. Therefore, this court should properly be affirmed on appeal.
    By the Court,
    J.
    District Attorney's Office
    Public Defender's Office
    15