Procaccini v. Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc. , 175 Conn. App. 692 ( 2017 )


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  •        JAMES M. PROCACCINI, ADMINISTRATOR
    (ESTATE OF JILL A. PROCACCINI)
    v. LAWRENCE AND MEMORIAL
    HOSPITAL, INC., ET AL.
    (AC 38380)
    Prescott, Mullins and Beach, Js.
    Syllabus
    The plaintiff administrator of the estate of the decedent sought to recover
    damages from the defendant E Co. for medical malpractice in connection
    with the death of the decedent by a methadone overdose. On November,
    29, 2008, the decedent was found unresponsive and was brought to a
    hospital emergency department, where she was treated for a suspected
    drug overdose by M, the attending emergency department physician.
    After the decedent’s vital signs improved and stabilized, she was dis-
    charged and returned to the home of a friend, where she was found
    unresponsive the next morning and pronounced deceased. The plaintiff
    alleged that E Co. was vicariously liable for the medical malpractice of
    M in treating the decedent for a suspected drug overdose. The plaintiff
    claimed that M’s discharge of the decedent after only four and one-half
    hours of observation was premature in that M should have kept the
    decedent under medical monitoring for twenty-four hours, which is the
    period of time during which the fatal side effects of methadone toxicity
    may occur, and that if the decedent had remained under medical monitor-
    ing for the full twenty-four hours, the fatal overdose side effects she
    experienced after her discharge would have been treated and her even-
    tual death from methadone toxicity would have been averted. The jury
    returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the trial court rendered judgment
    in accordance with the verdict, from which E Co. appealed to this court.
    E Co. claimed, inter alia, that there was no direct evidence as to when the
    decedent consumed the fatal dose of methadone, and that the undisputed
    scientific evidence established that if she had actually overdosed on
    methadone on November 29, 2008, she would have had a recurrence
    of overdose symptoms before she was discharged from the hospital’s
    emergency department. Held:
    1. There was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that E Co.’s
    negligence caused the decedent’s death:
    a. The jury had before it sufficient evidence from which it could have
    inferred, without resorting to speculation, that the decedent had con-
    sumed the fatal dose of methadone before she was brought to the
    emergency department on November 29, 2008: although the jury was
    presented with conflicting expert testimony as to how soon a methadone
    overdose patient would experience recurring overdose symptoms after
    receiving a certain medication that is used as an antidote for opiate and
    opioid overdoses, the jury was free to believe the opinion of the plaintiff’s
    expert witness, S, on the standard of care, that delayed, recurring respira-
    tory depression can occur in methadone overdoses, even if such a
    phenomenon defied certain undisputed and settled toxicology princi-
    ples, and to disbelieve those portions of the testimony of E Co.’s expert
    witness, P, on causation, that attempted to refute that phenomenon,
    and E Co.’s claim that it was improper for the jury to consider S’s
    testimony concerning the concept of delayed, recurring respiratory
    depression as it related to causation was unavailing because even if S’s
    testimony was offered strictly for standard of care purposes, E Co.
    failed to pursue any preemptive or remedial measures that would have
    precluded or limited S’s testimony on the issue of delayed, recurring
    respiratory depression, and the court never instructed the jury that it
    should disregard S’s testimony thereon or that it should consider such
    testimony only for standard of care purposes, and, therefore, the evi-
    dence regarding delayed, recurring respiratory depression was before
    the jury to use for any purpose, including causation; moreover, the fact
    that the decedent did not immediately experience recurring overdose
    symptoms one hour after the overdose medication was administered
    did not require the jury to conclude that the decedent’s overdose on
    November 29, 2008, was caused by a narcotic other than methadone,
    as the jury could have concluded, instead, that the delayed, recurring
    respiratory depression that the decedent eventually experienced was
    consistent with her ingestion of a toxic dose of methadone before her
    visit to the emergency department on November 29, 2008.
    b. E Co. could not prevail on its claim that because the plaintiff failed
    to present evidence demonstrating that the decedent would have been
    admitted to the hospital had M not discharged her from the emergency
    department, the jury could not reasonably have found that E Co. caused
    the decedent’s death: although the plaintiff’s expert, S, initially testified
    that the standard of care applicable to possible methadone overdoses
    required M to admit the decedent to the hospital for continuous monitor-
    ing, S subsequently clarified that the applicable standard of care required
    only that M monitor the decedent for twenty-four hours for signs of
    recurrent opiate overdose, and the jury reasonably could have accepted
    that portion of S’s testimony indicating that monitoring was required
    and rejected that portion of his testimony suggesting that admittance
    was required; accordingly, to prove causation, the plaintiff needed to
    show only that the decedent could have been monitored sufficiently for
    twenty-four hours, and the jury reasonably could have inferred that
    from the evidence presented.
    2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying E Co.’s motion to
    set aside the jury’s award of $150,000 in damages for the destruction
    of the decedent’s capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s activities; the jury
    reasonably could have forecast the decedent’s life expectancy from its
    own knowledge and from the substantial evidence presented by the
    plaintiff of the decedent’s age, health, physical condition and habits, all
    of which were relevant to determine life expectancy, and, therefore, the
    jury’s award of damages for the destruction of the decedent’s capacity to
    carry on and enjoy life’s activities was not unreasonable or speculative.
    Argued March 21—officially released August 22, 2017
    Procedural History
    Action to recover damages for medical malpractice,
    and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
    the judicial district of New London, where the action
    was withdrawn as against the named defendant et al.;
    thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint as
    against the defendant Emergency Medicine Physicians
    of New London County, LLC; subsequently, the matter
    was tried to the jury before Hon. Joseph Q. Koletsky,
    judge trial referee; verdict for the plaintiff; thereafter,
    the court denied the motions to set aside the verdict and
    for a directed verdict filed by the defendant Emergency
    Medicine Physicians of New London County, LLC, and
    rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from
    which the defendant Emergency Medicine Physicians
    of New London County, LLC, appealed to this court.
    Affirmed.
    Daniel J. Krisch, with whom were Frederick J.
    Trotta, Sr., and, on the brief, Logan A. Forsey and
    Jennifer S. Mullen, for the appellant (defendant Emer-
    gency Medicine Physicians of New London County,
    LLC).
    Matthew E. Auger, with whom, on the brief, was Eric
    W. Callahan, for the appellee (plaintiff).
    Opinion
    MULLINS, J. In this medical malpractice action, the
    defendant1 Emergency Medicine Physicians of New
    London County, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the
    trial court, after a jury trial, rendered in favor of the
    plaintiff, James M. Procaccini, administrator of the
    estate of Jill A. Procaccini (decedent). On appeal, the
    defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence
    supporting the jury’s verdict and award of noneconomic
    damages. Specifically, it claims that the plaintiff failed
    to present sufficient evidence for the jury (1) to find
    that the defendant’s negligence caused the death of the
    decedent, and (2) to award $150,000 in damages for the
    destruction of the decedent’s capacity to carry on and
    enjoy life’s activities. We affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    The following facts, as reasonably could have been
    found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant
    to this appeal. On November 30, 2008, the decedent,
    who was thirty-two years old, died from a methadone
    overdose. In the years leading up to her death, the
    decedent had struggled with polysubstance abuse.
    After achieving a period of sobriety early in 2008, the
    decedent relapsed on November 16, 2008. On that date,
    the decedent admitted herself to Saint Francis Hospital
    and Medical Center in Hartford (Saint Francis), seeking
    treatment for a heroin overdose. On the next day,
    November 17, 2008, the decedent was transferred to
    Cedarcrest Hospital, Blue Hills Substance Abuse Ser-
    vices (Blue Hills), in Newington.
    The decedent remained at Blue Hills from November
    17, 2008, until her discharge on November 28, 2008.
    During her stay at Blue Hills, the decedent was adminis-
    tered varying doses of methadone for treatment of her
    opiate withdrawal symptoms. Methadone, an opioid,2
    frequently is used by clinicians to alleviate the with-
    drawal symptoms that patients experience while under-
    going opiate detoxification. Although methadone
    commonly is used in the clinical setting and, thus,
    administered under a clinician’s supervision or pursu-
    ant to a prescription, it also can ‘‘be purchased [illegally]
    on the streets as street methadone.’’ The decedent’s last
    dose of methadone, five milligrams, was administered
    at Blue Hills at 7:45 a.m. on November 21, 2008. The
    decedent was discharged from Blue Hills on November
    28, 2008.
    After leaving Blue Hills on November 28, 2008, the
    decedent made at least two phone calls. One of those
    calls was to a person from whom the decedent had
    purchased drugs in the past. Another call was to Charles
    Hope, a substance abuse counselor and a recovering
    drug addict with whom the decedent was friendly. Hope
    agreed to let the decedent stay at his house in New
    London on the condition that she not use drugs. Hope
    picked up the decedent from West Hartford on the
    evening of November 28, 2008, and brought her to his
    home in New London. Upon their arrival at Hope’s
    home, Hope and the decedent talked briefly and then
    retired for the night. Hope heard the decedent use the
    microwave in his kitchen at some point during the night.
    On the morning of November 29, 2008, Hope woke
    up the decedent and noticed that she was ‘‘feeling a
    little sick.’’ Hope left his home sometime in the late
    morning or early afternoon of November 29. Hope later
    called the decedent sometime that afternoon and had
    a conversation with her. When Hope returned to his
    home at approximately 6:45 p.m., however, he found
    the decedent lying unconscious on his living room
    couch. Hope began performing cardiopulmonary resus-
    citation, which restored the decedent’s breathing. At
    approximately 6:47 p.m., Hope called 911.
    Emergency medical technicians (EMTs) from the
    New London Fire Department arrived at Hope’s house
    on November 29, 2008, at approximately 6:51 p.m. The
    EMTs found the decedent unresponsive, lying in a
    supine position in Hope’s living room with pinpoint
    pupils and agonal respirations. Hope told the EMTs
    that the decedent ‘‘had been on methadone,’’ that the
    decedent ‘‘had a history of addiction,’’ and that he was
    unsure if she used drugs that day. Because she was
    unconscious, however, the EMTs were unable to obtain
    any medical history from the decedent. The EMTs
    administered oxygen to the decedent via an oral airway
    and bag valve mask. Hope and the EMTs briefly
    searched Hope’s house for drugs, drug paraphernalia,
    and other evidence of drug use. They did not find any
    such evidence.
    Shortly thereafter, at approximately 6:55 p.m., para-
    medics from Lawrence & Memorial Hospital (Law-
    rence & Memorial) arrived on the scene. The
    paramedics placed the decedent in their ambulance.
    At some point between 6:55 p.m. and 7:03 p.m., the
    paramedics intravenously administered the decedent
    1.4 milligrams of Narcan.
    Narcan is used as an ‘‘antidote’’ for opiate and opioid
    overdoses. Narcan, like opiates and opioids, attaches
    to the opioid receptors located in the body’s central
    nervous system. Narcan, however, does not cause any
    of the effects that opiates and opioids produce, such as
    pain relief, a ‘‘high’’ feeling, and respiratory depression.
    Instead, because opioid receptors have a ‘‘stronger
    affinity for the Narcan molecule than [they do] for [opi-
    ates and opioids],’’ Narcan ‘‘just knocks [opiates and
    opioids] out and takes residency in the receptor[s]
    . . . .’’ ‘‘[Once] [t]he Narcan displaces the opiate [or
    opioid] from the receptor[s] . . . the person’s opiate
    effects evaporate . . . the person wakes up and [he or
    she is] breathing and . . . alert . . . .’’ In other words,
    ‘‘intravenous administration of Narcan . . . pro-
    duce[s] a near-instantaneous reversal of the narcotic
    effect . . . within a minute or two at the most . . . .’’
    By the time the ambulance arrived at Lawrence &
    Memorial at 7:03 p.m., the dose of Narcan had revived
    the decedent. The decedent was conscious and answer-
    ing questions asked by the paramedics. The paramedics
    were able to determine that the decedent was taking
    several medications, including methadone, Topamax,
    Seroquel, insulin, and Ambien. In their written report,
    the paramedics indicated that the ‘‘chief complaint’’
    was an ‘‘[overdose] on Heroin’’ and that the decedent
    was ‘‘found in respiratory arrest due to [overdose].’’
    Upon arriving at Lawrence & Memorial, the decedent
    was taken to the emergency room, where her condition
    was triaged. In examining the decedent, the triage
    nurse, Sarah Zambarano, created an electronic report
    detailing the decedent’s condition at 7:13 p.m. Zambar-
    ano indicated in the electronic report that the paramed-
    ics informed her that Hope told them that the decedent
    ‘‘took methadone, ? of heroin.’’
    At approximately 7:15 p.m., the decedent was
    assessed by another emergency room nurse, Pamela
    Mays. At 7:36 p.m., Mays recorded the following in her
    treatment notes: ‘‘[the decedent] admits to using heroin
    toni[ght] . . . states off methadone for several months
    after detox . . . now using again.’’ Mays also indicated
    that the decedent ‘‘appear[ed] comfortable’’ and was
    ‘‘cooperative,’’ ‘‘alert’’ and ‘‘oriented . . . .’’ Contrary
    to May’s notes, Hope, who had arrived at the emergency
    room between 7:30 p.m. and 8 p.m., recalled that the
    decedent was ‘‘very adamant that she did not take any
    heroin . . . .’’ According to Hope, the decedent told
    Mays that ‘‘I did not take any heroin, I took methadone.’’
    At approximately 7:45 p.m., the attending emergency
    room physician, Thomas E. Marchiondo, examined the
    decedent. At the time he began treating the decedent,
    Marchiondo had access to the paramedics’ report,
    which indicated that the decedent had a suspected over-
    dose on heroin, that the decedent also was taking meth-
    adone, and that the decedent had been found in
    respiratory arrest. Marchiondo detailed his examination
    of the decedent in his own written report. In his report,
    Marchiondo noted that the decedent’s ‘‘chief complaint’’
    was an ‘‘unintentional heroin overdose.’’ Although the
    decedent apparently denied any ‘‘other co-ingestion,’’
    Marchiondo’s report indicated that the decedent’s ‘‘cur-
    rent medications’’ included methadone.
    Marchiondo’s report also indicated that a urine toxi-
    cology screen had been ordered. The results of the
    screen, of which Marchiondo was aware when treating
    the decedent, revealed that the decedent’s urine tested
    positive for the presence of methadone, an unidentified
    opiate, and unidentified benzodiazepines. Because that
    screen merely was qualitative, it could not identify the
    specific type of opiate ingested by the decedent or the
    exact concentration of that substance or methadone in
    the decedent’s system.
    As a result of his review of the drug screen results,
    as well as his examination of the decedent and review
    of the treatment notes prepared by the nurses and emer-
    gency responders, Marchiondo concluded that the dece-
    dent had ingested both methadone and heroin.
    Regarding the methadone, although he could not deter-
    mine specifically when or in what manner the decedent
    ingested it, Marchiondo concluded that the decedent
    ingested some quantity of methadone ‘‘within the past
    couple of weeks.’’ In so concluding, Marchiondo relied
    on the fact that methadone was listed as a medication
    in her medical history, which caused him to believe
    that the decedent was taking the methadone ‘‘under a
    doctor’s prescription . . . .’’ Marchiondo consequently
    ‘‘would have expected [methadone] to come out posi-
    tive in her urine.’’ Accordingly, he concluded that the
    overdose symptoms that the decedent was experiencing
    ‘‘were due to a heroin overdose’’ and agreed with a
    statement by the plaintiff’s counsel that the decedent’s
    symptoms ‘‘[were] in no way related to the methadone
    that was in her system.’’3
    The decedent remained in the Lawrence & Memorial
    emergency room from 7:13 p.m. to approximately 11:53
    p.m. on November 29, 2008. ‘‘All throughout her stay
    . . . [the decedent] remained awake, alert, and aware,
    nontoxic. And through time . . . her vital signs had
    improved.’’ Hope, who had stayed with the decedent
    at her bedside, also observed that, although initially the
    decedent seemed, as characterized by the defendant’s
    counsel, ‘‘sluggish,’’ her condition continued to improve
    and she was ‘‘laughing and making jokes.’’ During her
    hospitalization at Lawrence & Memorial, the decedent
    was not administered any Narcan. Marchiondo had
    determined that it was not necessary to treat the dece-
    dent with Narcan because her vital signs had improved
    while she was at Lawrence & Memorial.
    Throughout her stay, the decedent was monitored by
    Mays, who noted in her report that the decedent’s vital
    signs improved and stabilized. At approximately 8 p.m.,
    the decedent was ‘‘awake and alert and asking to leave
    . . . [but was] told that she was here for the night.’’ At
    this point, the decedent’s respiration rate had improved
    to sixteen breaths per minute, and her oxygen satura-
    tion level had risen to 99 percent. These levels were
    ‘‘basically normal.’’ The decedent also had been taken
    off supplemental oxygen.
    At 9 p.m., the decedent was ‘‘resting soundly’’ and
    her ‘‘[respiration was] easy/even.’’ Her respiration rate
    and oxygen saturation level had not changed since 8
    p.m. At 10 p.m. and 11:30 p.m., the decedent’s respira-
    tion rate still was sixteen breaths per minute, and her
    oxygen saturation level still was 99 percent. At some
    point between 11:35 p.m. and 11:53 p.m., the decedent
    was discharged and was provided instructions for a
    ‘‘narcotic overdose,’’ which advised the decedent to
    ‘‘[r]eturn to the ER if [her condition] worse[ned].’’
    Upon being discharged from Lawrence & Memorial,
    the decedent left with Hope. Hope and the decedent
    stopped for food and coffee before returning to Hope’s
    home. At Hope’s home, Hope and the decedent con-
    versed until approximately 1:30 a.m. on November 30,
    2008, at which point, Hope went to bed. When Hope left
    the decedent to go to bed, the decedent was kneeling on
    the corner of the bed in Hope’s guest bedroom, watch-
    ing television and looking at photographs. Hope did not
    hear any activity during the night.
    After waking up at approximately 9:45 a.m. later that
    morning, Hope found the decedent unresponsive. The
    decedent’s body was ‘‘frozen stiff’’ and kneeling in the
    same position in which she had been on Hope’s guest
    bed when Hope last saw her at 1:30 a.m. earlier that
    morning. Hope called 911 at approximately 10:39 a.m.
    New London police, accompanied by New London
    Fire Department EMTs, arrived at Hope’s home on
    November 30 at approximately 11 a.m. The decedent
    was pronounced deceased by the EMTs at approxi-
    mately 11:05 a.m. Thereafter, Hope assisted the police
    in searching his entire house for drug paraphernalia
    and other evidence of drug use. Neither Hope nor the
    five law enforcement officers searching the scene found
    anything relating to drug activity.
    At approximately 1:34 p.m., Penny Geyer, an investi-
    gator with the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner,
    arrived at Hope’s home. At the scene, Geyer performed
    an external examination of the decedent’s clothed body.
    She did not find any illicit drugs or drug paraphernalia
    on or around the decedent’s body, and she did not
    observe any signs of drug ingestion on the decedent’s
    body, such as needle marks or residue in the decedent’s
    nose or mouth.
    Deputy Chief Medical Examiner Edward T. McDo-
    nough III performed the decedent’s autopsy on Decem-
    ber 1, 2008. A toxicology screen ordered by McDonough
    detected the presence of methadone in the decedent’s
    blood. Specifically, the report indicated that the concen-
    tration of methadone in the decedent’s blood was 0.39
    milligrams per liter. The postmortem toxicology screen
    did not detect any opioids or opiates other than
    methadone.
    As a result of his review of the toxicology report and
    his examination of the decedent, McDonough con-
    cluded that the final cause of the decedent’s death was
    ‘‘methadone toxicity.’’ In so concluding, McDonough
    determined that the postmortem concentration of meth-
    adone in the decedent’s blood, 0.39 milligrams per liter,
    was ‘‘within the fatal range.’’ McDonough also deter-
    mined that the decedent died sometime between 5 a.m.
    and 7 a.m. on November 30, 2008, although this was
    merely a ‘‘crude’’ approximation because the time of
    death could have been ‘‘much earlier.’’
    In November, 2010, the plaintiff, acting as the admin-
    istrator of the decedent’s estate, brought this medical
    malpractice action seeking damages for the decedent’s
    death. The plaintiff’s initial complaint asserted one
    count against Marchiondo, one count against Law-
    rence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., and Lawrence &
    Memorial Hospital Corporation, and one count against
    the defendant. Following the plaintiff’s withdrawal of
    the separate counts against Marchiondo and Law-
    rence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., and Lawrence &
    Memorial Hospital Corporation; see footnote 1 of this
    opinion; the plaintiff amended his complaint to seek
    recovery from only the defendant.
    The plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges that the
    defendant is vicariously liable for the medical malprac-
    tice that its employee,4 Marchiondo, committed in treat-
    ing the decedent for a suspected drug overdose on
    November 29, 2008. The gravamen of the plaintiff’s com-
    plaint is that Marchiondo’s discharge of the decedent
    after only four and one-half hours of observation at
    Lawrence & Memorial was premature. According to
    the plaintiff, because the decedent presented with a
    possible methadone overdose, Marchiondo should have
    kept her under medical monitoring for twenty-four
    hours, which is the period of time during which the
    fatal side effects of methadone toxicity may occur.
    Accordingly, the plaintiff alleges, if the decedent had
    remained under medical monitoring for the full twenty-
    four hours, the fatal overdose side effects she experi-
    enced after her discharge would have been treated and
    her eventual death from methadone toxicity would have
    been averted.
    In his complaint, the plaintiff sought both economic
    and noneconomic damages resulting from the dece-
    dent’s death. The claim for economic damages included
    medical expenses and funeral costs, and the claim for
    noneconomic damages sought compensation for the
    decedent’s permanent loss of her ability to carry on
    and enjoy life’s activities.
    After the plaintiff rested, the defendant moved for a
    directed verdict. Specifically, the defendant argued that
    ‘‘the plaintiff [had] not submitted sufficient evidence to
    establish a prima facie case with respect to causation.’’
    (Emphasis added.) The defendant did not challenge the
    sufficiency of the evidence regarding the appropriate
    standard of care and the defendant’s breach thereof.
    The court reserved decision on the defendant’s motion
    for a direct verdict.
    The jury returned a plaintiff’s verdict and awarded
    $12,095 in economic damages and $500,000 in noneco-
    nomic damages. The award consisted of $350,000 for
    the decedent’s death and $150,000 for the destruction
    of the decedent’s capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s
    activities.
    After the jury returned its verdict, the defendant
    renewed its motion for a directed verdict.5 As in its
    initial motion, the defendant challenged the sufficiency
    of the evidence only with respect to causation: ‘‘[T]he
    evidence presented by the plaintiff during his case-in-
    chief [was] insufficient to support a conclusion that any
    alleged negligence on the part of the defendant was the
    cause in fact of the death of [the decedent].’’ Specifi-
    cally, the defendant argued that there were ‘‘two miss-
    ing links in the plaintiff’s chain of causation: (1) that
    [the decedent] overdosed on methadone on [November
    29, 2008]; and (2) that [the decedent] met the criteria
    for admission to [Lawrence & Memorial].’’
    Regarding the first ‘‘missing link,’’ the defendant con-
    tended that ‘‘the jury had no basis—other than conjec-
    ture—to find that [the decedent] overdosed on
    methadone on November 29, [2008]. To the contrary,
    science and the chronology of events point only to the
    ‘reasonable hypothesis’ that [the decedent] took the
    lethal dose of methadone after Dr. Marchiondo dis-
    charged her.’’ (Emphasis in original.)
    Regarding the second ‘‘missing link,’’ the defendant
    contended that ‘‘the jury could only guess about another
    critical piece of the puzzle: admission to [Lawrence &
    Memorial]. . . . [T]here was no evidence about [Law-
    rence & Memorial’s] criteria for admission, or whether
    [the decedent] met those criteria.’’ According to the
    defendant, the applicable standard of care required
    Marchiondo to admit the decedent to Lawrence &
    Memorial. Thus, the defendant posited, the plaintiff
    could not prove that Marchiondo’s breach of that stan-
    dard of care caused the decedent’s death without evi-
    dence that the decedent likely would have been
    admitted to Lawrence & Memorial.
    After holding a hearing on the defendant’s renewed
    motion for a directed verdict, the court denied the
    motion. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be
    set forth as necessary.
    I
    SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE ON CAUSATION
    The defendant’s first claim on appeal is that the plain-
    tiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which the
    jury reasonably could have found that the defendant
    caused the decedent’s death. Specifically, the defendant
    argues that ‘‘there are two gaping holes in the evidence:
    (1) proof that the decedent consumed the fatal dose of
    methadone before her discharge from the emergency
    room on November 29, [2008], and (2) proof that she met
    the criteria for admission to [Lawrence & Memorial].’’
    two causation challenges seriatim.
    A
    In its first challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
    on causation, the defendant contends that there ‘‘was
    no direct evidence [regarding] when the decedent con-
    sumed the fatal dose of methadone. . . . [O]nly cre-
    ative guesswork supports the jury’s inference that the
    decedent did so before, and not after, her discharge
    from the emergency room.’’ (Emphasis added; internal
    quotation marks omitted.) In particular, the defendant
    argues that the jury’s finding regarding causation is
    inconsistent with ‘‘time and science, i.e., the mechanical
    details disclosed by the evidence . . . .’’ (Internal quo-
    tation marks omitted.) According to the defendant, the
    ‘‘undisputed’’ scientific evidence presented at trial dem-
    onstrated that ‘‘[i]f the decedent had actually overdosed
    on methadone on November 29, [2008], she would have
    had a recurrence of overdose symptoms long before
    she was discharged [from Lawrence & Memorial].’’
    (Emphasis added.) Thus, because the decedent did not
    experience recurring overdose symptoms ‘‘long before’’
    her discharge, she had not consumed a toxic amount
    of methadone on November 29. We disagree.
    The following additional facts and procedural history
    guide our resolution of this claim. A substantial part of
    the evidence presented by both parties at trial came in
    the form of expert testimony. Both parties presented
    expert testimony on the issue of causation. McDonough,
    who was disclosed as the plaintiff’s causation expert,
    also was the medical examiner who performed the dece-
    dent’s autopsy. He testified that the postmortem level
    of methadone in the decedent’s blood, 0.39 milligrams
    per liter, was a toxic concentration and caused her
    death. He further testified that the specific ‘‘mechanism
    of death’’ probably was respiratory depression, in which
    the methadone intoxication would have ‘‘[shut] down
    [the decedent’s] breathing.’’ McDonough’s determina-
    tion of the cause of death called into doubt Marchi-
    ondo’s diagnosis of the decedent, which was that she
    had overdosed on heroin, not methadone.
    Dr. Steven Pike, the defendant’s expert on causation,
    initially testified that he could not determine within a
    reasonable degree of medical probability whether the
    decedent’s cause of death was methadone toxicity. He
    later testified, however, that ‘‘it’s probably more likely
    than not’’ that methadone toxicity was the cause of the
    decedent’s death.
    The defendant’s strategy in contesting causation
    essentially was to demonstrate that the decedent
    ingested the fatal dose of methadone after she was
    discharged from Lawrence & Memorial. According to
    the defendant, if the plaintiff could not establish that
    the decedent ingested the fatal dose before her dis-
    charge, there would be no causal connection between
    the allegedly negligent treatment she received at Law-
    rence & Memorial and the methadone toxicity to which
    she eventually succumbed. Critically, during the defen-
    dant’s cross-examination of McDonough, McDonough
    conceded that he could not rule out the possibility that
    the fatal dose of methadone was ingested after the
    decedent’s discharge.
    Without direct evidence of when the decedent con-
    sumed the fatal dose, the parties largely relied on indi-
    rect evidence from which the jury could infer the timing
    of the decedent’s ingestion of methadone. In turn, such
    indirect evidence required the application of the toxico-
    logical concepts and biochemical processes that govern
    how the human body absorbs, metabolizes, and
    excretes Narcan and various opiates and opioids. The
    following evidence relating to those scientific principles
    was presented through the parties’ expert testimony.
    For the most part, the parties’ experts were in
    agreement on several fundamental toxicological con-
    cepts and biochemical processes. The first important
    concept about which the experts provided testimony
    was half-life. A half-life is the time it takes for the con-
    centration of a drug in a person’s system to be reduced
    by one-half. It takes approximately the lapse of five
    half-lives for a drug to be eliminated completely from
    a person’s system. Because the body does not start to
    eliminate a drug until it is absorbed, the first half-life
    of a drug will not begin to run until after the drug
    is absorbed.
    The second concept about which the parties’ experts
    testified was duration of effect. Although related to the
    concept of half-life, duration of effect ‘‘is not equivalent
    to the half-life of the drug. In some cases, it may be
    less than the half-life of the drug. In some cases, it may
    be longer than the half-life of the drug.’’ While half-life
    refers to the rate at which an absorbed drug is elimi-
    nated from the body, duration of effect refers to how
    long a drug produces physiologic effects.6 To illustrate
    this distinction, it is possible that a small concentration
    of a drug still is in the body after several half-lives,
    yet that small concentration has ceased producing any
    effects. The converse also applies in the case of some
    drugs: ‘‘[A drug] may go through a couple half-lives,
    [but] still be producing some effect . . . .’’
    The parties’ experts also generally agreed regarding
    the half-lives and durations of effect of Narcan, long-
    acting narcotics, and short-acting narcotics. The half-
    life of Narcan, approximately thirty to eighty minutes,
    is much shorter than the half-lives of both long-acting
    narcotics and short-acting narcotics. Additionally, the
    half-lives of short-acting narcotics are shorter than the
    half-lives of long-acting narcotics. For instance, the
    plaintiff’s expert testified that the half-life of metha-
    done, a long-acting narcotic, ranges from fifteen to fifty-
    five hours, and the defendant’s expert testified that it
    could range from eighteen to sixty hours. In contrast,
    according to the plaintiff’s expert, the half-life of heroin,
    a short-acting narcotic, is two to five hours, and the
    defendant’s expert stated that it is three to four hours.
    The durations of effect of Narcan, short-acting nar-
    cotics, and long-acting narcotics largely were undis-
    puted as well. The duration of Narcan’s antidotal effect
    begins almost instantaneously upon administration and
    lasts for thirty to ninety minutes.7 Generally, Narcan
    ‘‘wears off much sooner than . . . [opiates and opioids
    such as] heroin . . . or methadone.’’ Heroin ‘‘has an
    effect of four to six hours,’’ while methadone produces
    ‘‘a[n] . . . effect of twelve to twenty-four hours.’’
    The parties’ experts also noted, however, that there
    are some ‘‘interindividual’’ variations in those durations
    of effect and half-lives because ‘‘each individual metab-
    olizes materials differently.’’ Furthermore, the method
    of administration, the dosage size, and the individual’s
    tolerance for the drug all affect how quickly after inges-
    tion the drug will begin to produce effects. In particular,
    because intravenous administration delivers the drug
    directly into the bloodstream, it causes an individual
    to absorb the drug faster than oral administration and,
    therefore, produces effects sooner than oral administra-
    tion. For instance, because oral administration of meth-
    adone is ‘‘not an instantaneous absorption,’’ ‘‘it takes
    time for the methadone to be absorbed . . . .’’ Thus,
    it could take as long as two and one-half hours after
    ingestion for orally administered methadone to be
    absorbed fully and to reach a peak concentration in
    the blood.
    Having agreed that the effects produced by long-act-
    ing and short-acting narcotics generally outlast Nar-
    can’s antidotal effects, the parties’ experts also agreed
    that overdose symptoms, including respiratory depres-
    sion, may return after Narcan wears off. In other words,
    if the concentration of a narcotic still is at a toxic level
    after Narcan wears off, there will be ‘‘a recurrence of
    the symptoms that prompted . . . [the initial dose of]
    Narcan.’’ The overdose symptoms reappear because
    Narcan only temporarily displaces the narcotic from
    the body’s opioid receptors. Once the Narcan has worn
    off, the remaining concentration of the narcotic reatta-
    ches to the opioid receptors.
    Despite their agreement on the foregoing principles,
    the parties’ experts disagreed on a critical point. Specifi-
    cally, their testimony differed with respect to the issue
    of how soon recurring overdose symptoms return after
    the administration of Narcan. When asked by the defen-
    dant’s counsel what happens to ‘‘patients if they still
    have a toxic or rising dose of opiate or opioid after the
    Narcan wears off,’’ Pike answered: ‘‘[A]n hour after
    Narcan, they’re going to have a recurrence of the symp-
    toms that prompted the paramedics or . . . physician
    to give the Narcan.’’ (Emphasis added.) Regarding meth-
    adone overdoses in particular, Pike further testified that
    ‘‘patients who do overdose on methadone . . . have to
    be admitted because you’re going to be standing there
    administering Narcan every hour, hour and a half . . . .
    [T]hey need a continuous infusion of Narcan . . . until
    they get below that concentration that was causing the
    overdose effects, and that could take as long as a
    day . . . .’’
    In applying those principles to the decedent’s case,
    Pike made the following three observations. First, if a
    methadone overdose had caused the initial respiratory
    depression the decedent was experiencing when Hope
    found her on November 29 at 6:45 p.m., then the respira-
    tory depression should have returned ‘‘at about 8
    o’clock,’’ i.e., approximately one hour after the para-
    medics administered Narcan. This conclusion was pred-
    icated on the assumption, acknowledged by both
    parties’ experts, that methadone is a long-acting nar-
    cotic that has a long half-life and duration of effect.
    Thus, according to Pike, if the concentration of metha-
    done was sufficiently toxic to cause respiratory depres-
    sion at 6:45 p.m., then it probably still would have been
    sufficiently toxic when the Narcan wore off at 8 p.m.
    Second, according to Pike, the record revealed that
    the respiratory depression in fact did not return when
    the Narcan should have been wearing off. To be sure,
    the respiratory depression did not return at any point
    during the decedent’s hospitalization at Lawrence &
    Memorial. On the contrary, the decedent’s vital signs,
    including her respiration rate and oxygen saturation
    levels, stabilized at normal levels hours before her dis-
    charge. Furthermore, the decedent’s condition did not
    warrant another administration of Narcan at Law-
    rence & Memorial.
    Third, Pike inferred from those first two observations
    that the decedent’s initial respiratory depression was
    caused by a short-acting narcotic, not a long-acting
    narcotic. According to Pike, a short-acting narcotic, by
    virtue of having a relatively short half-live and duration
    of effect, would not have caused a recurrence of over-
    dose symptoms after Narcan wore off. That is, there
    would have been a ‘‘rapid decay’’ of the short-acting
    narcotic’s concentration during Narcan’s period of
    effectiveness, leaving a nontoxic concentration after
    Narcan wore off. Therefore, the absence of any recur-
    ring overdose symptoms after Narcan’s period of effec-
    tiveness is consistent with an overdose on a short-acting
    narcotic, not a long-acting narcotic like methadone.
    On the basis of those three observations, Pike opined
    that the decedent had not ingested a fatal concentration
    of methadone before she was hospitalized at Law-
    rence & Memorial. Pike attributed the positive metha-
    done finding in the Lawrence & Memorial drug screen
    to the methadone that the decedent was administered
    at Blue Hills. He had ‘‘[n]o doubt whatsoever’’ that the
    Blue Hills methadone caused the positive methadone
    finding on November 29, 2008, notwithstanding the fact
    that the last Blue Hills dose was administered to the
    decedent on November 21, 2008. Pike reasoned that the
    Blue Hills methadone would have been detected on
    November 29 because five half-lives had not passed
    since the November 21 dose. In so reasoning, Pike
    apparently assumed that the Blue Hills methadone’s
    half-life was substantially longer than twenty-four
    hours, even though he previously had used twenty-four
    hours as ‘‘a reasonable estimate’’ of methadone’s
    half-life.
    Testimony provided by one of the plaintiff’s experts,
    Eric Schwam, controverted Pike’s opinion that recur-
    ring respiratory depression always presents approxi-
    mately one hour after the administration of Narcan. An
    emergency medicine physician who opined mainly on
    the standard of care,8 Schwam testified that the ‘‘experi-
    ence of decades of . . . [caring for] patients [overdos-
    ing on] long-acting opiates’’ has shown that ‘‘delayed
    respiratory depression can occur . . . .’’ (Emphasis
    added.) According to Schwam, ‘‘you don’t know when
    [the] return of respiratory depression is going to occur.
    One might think that it would occur when the Narcan
    wears off, and that’s a widely held misconception
    . . . . [T]hat’s a very easy thing to assume if you know
    a little bit about opiate toxicology, but decades of expe-
    rience have shown that if that’s the way you think and
    you discharge a patient, a lot of them will be dead the
    next day.’’ (Emphasis added.)
    Schwam also described two specific cases of delayed
    recurring respiratory depression that he had encoun-
    tered in his medical practice. In the first case, ‘‘[a]
    patient took an overdose of methadone, was seen in
    the emergency department, was monitored for six
    hours, was discharged by the physician, thinking that
    everything was okay, and the person had recurrence
    of respiratory depression. Fortunately, they survived.’’
    In the second case, which was ‘‘very similar to [the
    decedent’s case],’’ a ‘‘patient was discharged home and
    was found dead the next day.’’ According to Schwam,
    ‘‘these cases . . . have been going on for years, and
    apparently, they continue to happen.’’ For these rea-
    sons, Schwam testified, the appropriate standard of
    care for a suspected methadone overdose is ‘‘monitor[-
    ing] . . . for twenty-four hours for signs of recurrent
    opiate overdose.’’ (Emphasis added.)
    Although Schwam was not a causation expert,9 the
    defendant never objected to counsel’s questions per-
    taining to delayed recurring respiratory depression on
    the ground that they were outside the scope of the
    subject matter of Schwam’s testimony.10 Moreover, the
    defendant never moved, on that specific ground, to
    strike Schwam’s answers regarding delayed recurring
    respiratory depression.11
    The plaintiff’s other expert, McDonough, also dis-
    agreed with Pike’s assertion that the Blue Hills metha-
    done caused the positive methadone finding in the
    decedent’s drug screen at Lawrence & Memorial. He
    opined that the Blue Hills methadone was not the same
    methadone that was detected in the drug screen on
    November, 29, 2008. McDonough reasoned that the
    amount of methadone the decedent received at Blue
    Hills on November 21, 2008, ‘‘is basically the smallest
    dosage you can have’’ and that the drug screen was
    conducted ‘‘eight and one-half days from the last inges-
    tion of that five milligram tablet . . . .’’ In so reasoning,
    McDonough apparently refused to assume, like Pike,
    that the Blue Hills methadone’s half-life was substan-
    tially longer than twenty-four hours.
    In analyzing the defendant’s first challenge to the
    sufficiency of causation evidence, we begin by setting
    forth our standard of review. ‘‘A party challenging the
    validity of the jury’s verdict on grounds that there was
    insufficient evidence to support such a result carries a
    difficult burden. In reviewing the soundness of a jury’s
    verdict, we construe the evidence in the light most
    favorable to sustaining the verdict. . . . Furthermore,
    it is not the function of this court to sit as the seventh
    juror when we review the sufficiency of the evidence
    . . . rather, we must determine . . . whether the total-
    ity of the evidence, including reasonable inferences
    therefrom, supports the jury’s verdict . . . . [I]f the
    jury could reasonably have reached its conclusion, the
    verdict must stand, even if this court disagrees with
    it. . . .
    ‘‘Two further fundamental points bear emphasis.
    First, the plaintiff in a civil matter is not required to
    prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt; a mere pre-
    ponderance of the evidence is sufficient. Second, the
    well established standards compelling great deference
    to the historical function of the jury find their roots in
    the constitutional right to a trial by jury.’’ (Citations
    omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. Hart-
    ford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 
    317 Conn. 357
    ,
    370–71, 
    119 A.3d 462
     (2015).
    ‘‘[I]t is [the] function of the jury to draw whatever
    inferences from the evidence or facts established by
    the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . .
    Because [t]he only kind of an inference recognized by
    the law is a reasonable one . . . any such inference
    cannot be based on possibilities, surmise or conjecture.
    . . . It is axiomatic, therefore, that [a]ny [inference]
    drawn must be rational and founded upon the evidence.
    . . . However, [t]he line between permissible inference
    and impermissible speculation is not always easy to
    discern. When we infer, we derive a conclusion from
    proven facts because such considerations as experi-
    ence, or history, or science have demonstrated that
    there is a likely correlation between those facts and the
    conclusion. If that correlation is sufficiently compelling,
    the inference is reasonable. But if the correlation
    between the facts and the conclusion is slight, or if a
    different conclusion is more closely correlated with the
    facts than the chosen conclusion, the inference is less
    reasonable. At some point, the link between the facts
    and the conclusion becomes so tenuous that we call it
    speculation. When that point is reached is, frankly, a
    matter of judgment. . . .
    ‘‘[P]roof of a material fact by inference from circum-
    stantial evidence need not be so conclusive as to exclude
    every other hypothesis. It is sufficient if the evidence
    produces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief in
    the probability of the existence of the material fact. . . .
    Thus, in determining whether the evidence supports a
    particular inference, we ask whether that inference is
    so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. . . . In other
    words, an inference need not be compelled by the evi-
    dence; rather, the evidence need only be reasonably
    susceptible of such an inference. Equally well estab-
    lished is our holding that a jury may draw factual infer-
    ences on the basis of already inferred facts. . . .
    Finally, it is well established that a plaintiff has the
    same right to submit a weak case as he has to submit
    a strong one. (Citations omitted; emphasis added; inter-
    nal quotation marks omitted.) Curran v. Kroll, 
    303 Conn. 845
    , 856–57, 
    37 A.3d 700
     (2012).
    We next set forth the legal principles governing medi-
    cal malpractice actions. ‘‘[T]o prevail in a medical mal-
    practice action, the plaintiff must prove (1) the requisite
    standard of care for treatment, (2) a deviation from that
    standard of care, and (3) a causal connection between
    the deviation and the claimed injury.’’ (Internal quota-
    tion marks omitted.) Gold v. Greenwich Hospital Assn.,
    
    262 Conn. 248
    , 254–55, 
    811 A.2d 1266
     (2002). ‘‘Generally,
    expert testimony is required to establish both the stan-
    dard of care to which the defendant is held and the
    breach of that standard.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Id., 255. Likewise, ‘‘[e]xpert medical opinion
    evidence is usually required to show the cause of an
    injury or disease because the medical effect on the
    human system of the infliction of injuries is generally
    not within the sphere of the common knowledge of
    the lay person.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Milliun v. New Milford Hospital, 
    310 Conn. 711
    , 725,
    
    80 A.3d 887
     (2013).
    The defendant does not argue that there is insufficient
    evidence supporting the jury’s findings regarding the
    appropriate standard of care and Marchiondo’s devia-
    tion from that standard of care. Thus, we focus on the
    principles pertaining to causation. ‘‘All medical mal-
    practice claims, whether involving acts or inactions of
    a defendant physician, require that a defendant physi-
    cian’s conduct proximately cause the plaintiff’s injuries.
    The question is whether the conduct of the defendant
    was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury.
    . . . This causal connection must rest upon more than
    surmise or conjecture. . . . A trier is not concerned
    with possibilities but with reasonable probabilities.
    . . . The causal relation between an injury and its later
    physical effects may be established by the direct opin-
    ion of a physician, by his deduction by the process of
    eliminating causes other than the traumatic agency, or
    by his opinion based upon a hypothetical question.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sargis v. Donahue,
    
    142 Conn. App. 505
    , 513, 
    65 A.3d 20
    , cert. denied, 
    309 Conn. 914
    , 
    70 A.3d 38
     (2013).
    ‘‘[I]t is the plaintiff who bears the burden to prove
    an unbroken sequence of events that tied his injuries
    to the [defendants’ conduct]. . . . This causal connec-
    tion must be based upon more than conjecture and
    surmise.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Paige v. St. Andrew’s Roman Catholic Church
    Corp., 
    250 Conn. 14
    , 25–26, 
    734 A.2d 85
     (1999). A plain-
    tiff, however, ‘‘is not required to disprove all other possi-
    ble explanations for the accident but, rather, must
    demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the
    defendant’s negligence was the cause of the accident.’’
    (Emphasis added.) Rawls v. Progressive Northern Ins.
    Co., 
    310 Conn. 768
    , 782, 
    83 A.3d 576
     (2014). ‘‘[T]he issue
    of causation in a negligence action is a question of fact
    for the trier . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Burton v. Stamford, 
    115 Conn. App. 47
    , 87, 
    971 A.2d 739
    , cert. denied, 
    293 Conn. 912
    , 
    978 A.2d 1108
     (2009).
    With the relevant legal framework in mind, we turn
    to the present case. As an initial matter, we highlight
    that the parties’ dispute regarding causation revolves
    around the issue of when the decedent ingested the
    fatal dose of methadone. That issue, in turn, depends
    principally on the application of the toxicological princi-
    ples governing the relative half-lives and durations of
    effect of Narcan and long-acting and short-acting nar-
    cotics. Thus, we begin by reviewing the expert evidence
    relating to those toxicological principles.
    The thrust of the defendant’s argument is that the
    undisputed ‘‘physical facts of human biology’’ and ‘‘set-
    tled scientific principles’’ ‘‘permit[ted] only one conclu-
    sion: If the plaintiff had consumed the fatal dose of
    methadone before her discharge from the emergency
    room, there would have been some sign of the drug’s
    resurgent effect before 1:30 a.m.’’ The fundamental flaw
    in this argument is that the relevant ‘‘physical facts’’
    and ‘‘scientific principles’’ were disputed at trial. Our
    review of the record reveals that, although the parties’
    experts concurred on much of the relevant science,
    their testimony diverged on a crucial point. As pre-
    viously explained in considerable detail, the parties’
    experts disagreed as to how soon after receiving Narcan
    a methadone overdose patient experiences recurring
    overdose symptoms.
    The defendant’s causation expert, Pike, testified that
    recurring methadone overdose symptoms should pre-
    sent, if at all, one hour after the administration of Nar-
    can. This testimony, however, was contradicted directly
    by the testimony of Schwam, the plaintiff’s standard of
    care expert. In particular, Schwam testified that
    ‘‘delayed respiratory depression can occur’’ in cases of
    overdoses on long-acting narcotics and that ‘‘you don’t
    know when [the] return of respiratory depression is
    going to occur.’’ (Emphasis added.) According to
    Schwam, ‘‘[o]ne might think that [the return] would
    occur when the Narcan wears off, [but] that’s a widely
    held misconception . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
    Schwam recalled from his experience two cases in
    which delayed recurring respiratory depression
    occurred. Although the defendant correctly points out
    that these two cases may not be exactly analogous to
    the decedent’s case, they still, nonetheless, are illustra-
    tive of the broader point that delayed recurring can
    occur in cases of methadone overdose.
    Despite some testimony suggesting that delayed
    recurring respiratory depression violates certain scien-
    tific principles, Schwam testified that it is a medical
    phenomenon that actually has been observed in prac-
    tice. Indeed, Schwam opined not only that the phenome-
    non can occur, but that it occurs despite what the
    defendant characterizes as ‘‘undisputed’’ and ‘‘settled’’
    scientific principles. Specifically, Schwam testified that
    ‘‘a little bit [of knowledge pertaining to] opiate toxicol-
    ogy’’ has given rise to the ‘‘widely held misconception’’
    that recurring overdose symptoms return ‘‘when the
    Narcan wears off . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) In other
    words, the evidence did not establish, as the defendant
    suggests, that delayed onset of recurring respiratory
    depression was scientifically impossible. On the con-
    trary, the jury heard expert testimony that delayed
    recurring respiratory depression can occur in metha-
    done overdoses, even if such a phenomenon seems
    to defy the ‘‘undisputed’’ and ‘‘settled’’ toxicological
    principles of half-life and duration of effect.
    ‘‘Conflicting expert testimony does not necessarily
    equate to insufficient evidence.’’ (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) Dallaire v. Hsu, 
    130 Conn. App. 599
    ,
    603, 
    23 A.3d 792
     (2011). Rather, ‘‘[w]here expert testi-
    mony conflicts, it becomes the function of the trier of
    fact to determine credibility and, in doing so, it could
    believe all, some or none of the testimony of either
    expert.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DelBuono
    v. Brown Boat Works, Inc., 
    45 Conn. App. 524
    , 541, 
    696 A.2d 1271
    , cert. denied, 
    243 Conn. 906
    , 
    701 A.2d 328
    (1997). It is axiomatic that in cases involving ‘‘conflict-
    ing expert testimony, the jury is free to accept or reject
    each expert’s opinion in whole or in part.’’ (Internal
    quotation marks omitted.) Shelnitz v. Greenberg, 
    200 Conn. 58
    , 68, 
    509 A.2d 1023
     (1986).
    In the present case, the jury certainly was free to
    believe and accept the opinion of the plaintiff’s expert
    that the phenomenon of delayed recurring respiratory
    depression can occur in methadone overdoses. Like-
    wise, it was free to disbelieve and reject the parts of
    the testimony of the defendant’s expert that attempted
    to refute that phenomenon. Therefore, contrary to the
    defendant’s assertion, the fact that the decedent did not
    immediately experience recurring overdose symptoms
    one hour after Narcan was administered did not require
    the jury to conclude that the decedent’s overdose on
    November 29, 2008, was caused by a short-acting nar-
    cotic rather than methadone. The jury could have con-
    cluded, instead, that the delayed recurring respiratory
    depression the decedent eventually experienced was
    consistent with her ingestion of a toxic dose of metha-
    done before her visit to Lawrence & Memorial on
    November 29, 2008.
    Notwithstanding our conclusion that the parties pre-
    sented conflicting expert testimony on the concept of
    delayed recurring respiratory depression, the defendant
    argues that it is improper to consider Schwam’s testi-
    mony in reviewing the evidence on that concept. Specif-
    ically, the defendant argues that ‘‘Schwam testified as
    an expert on the standard of care, not causation. [Thus]
    [the jury] had no basis to transplant that standard of
    care testimony to the foreign soil of causation—and no
    guidance from an expert on how to make it grow there
    if [it] did.’’ According to the defendant, ‘‘[t]he plaintiff
    put on Dr. Schwam for one purpose; his testimony can-
    not be used for another and totally different purpose.’’
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We find this argu-
    ment unpersuasive.
    As an initial matter, we note that it is unclear from
    the record whether Schwam’s testimony was offered
    solely for standard of care purposes. The plaintiff’s dis-
    closure of Schwam’s testimony indicated that Schwam
    would testify on a wide range of subject matter, includ-
    ing how delayed recurring respiratory depression
    caused the decedent’s death.12 Additionally, the record
    is silent as to how the plaintiff actually offered the
    testimony and if at that time he in fact limited his offer
    to standard of care purposes.
    Notwithstanding the ambiguity surrounding the plain-
    tiff’s proffer of Schwam’s testimony, the parties appar-
    ently agree that Schwam’s testimony was offered only
    for standard of care purposes.13 Schwam, nonetheless,
    was an emergency medicine physician who had experi-
    ence treating overdose patients and reviewing overdose
    cases in his capacity as a hospital’s director of quality
    assurance. Thus, his testimony regarding delayed respi-
    ratory depression was an ‘‘expert’’ opinion in the sense
    that it was based on his expertise and experience in
    practicing emergency medicine, a field apparently
    requiring knowledge of the toxicological and pharmaco-
    logical properties of narcotics. The fact that the parties’
    dispute over the standard of care and causation both
    centered primarily on those properties reveals that the
    issues of standard of care and causation clearly were
    intertwined in the present case.
    Even if Schwam’s testimony was offered strictly for
    standard of care purposes, the defendant failed to pur-
    sue any preemptive or remedial measures that would
    have precluded or limited Schwam’s testimony on the
    issue of delayed recurring respiratory depression. The
    defendant did not file a motion in limine on that issue;
    it did not object to questions on that issue asked of
    Schwam by the plaintiff’s counsel;14 it did not move to
    strike Schwam’s testimony regarding that issue;15 and
    it did not request a limiting instruction directing the
    jury to consider Schwam’s testimony on that issue only
    for standard of care purposes. See State v. Dews, 
    87 Conn. App. 63
    , 69, 
    864 A.2d 59
     (rejecting claim that trial
    court, sua sponte, should have ‘‘stricken . . . testi-
    mony and offered a limiting instruction as to its use’’
    because ‘‘defendant did not object to . . . testimony,
    he failed to seek to have the testimony stricken . . .
    he did not request a limiting instruction . . . [and] he
    [did not] take exception to the court’s failure to give a
    limiting instruction’’), cert. denied, 
    274 Conn. 901
    , 
    876 A.2d 13
     (2005).
    Accordingly, the court never instructed the jury that
    it should disregard Schwam’s testimony on delayed
    recurring respiratory depression or that it should con-
    sider such testimony only for standard of care purposes.
    In the absence of any such instruction from the court,
    the evidence regarding delayed recurring respiratory
    depression was before the jury for it to use for any
    purpose, including causation. See Curran v. Kroll,
    
    supra,
     
    303 Conn. 863
    –64 (‘‘We also are not persuaded by
    the . . . argument that the Appellate Court improperly
    concluded that evidence of the decedent’s telephone
    call to [the defendant physician] would support an infer-
    ence that the decedent would have called [the defen-
    dant] about her leg pain if she had been warned about
    it because the evidence was not presented for that pur-
    pose . . . . This evidence was admitted in full, without
    limitation. In the absence of any limiting instruction,
    the jury was entitled to draw any inferences from the
    evidence that it reasonably would support.’’ [Emphasis
    added.]); see also State v. Carey, 
    228 Conn. 487
    , 496, 
    636 A.2d 840
     (1994) (‘‘If [inadmissible] evidence is received
    without objection, it becomes part of the evidence in
    the case, and is usable as proof to the extent of the
    rational persuasive power it may have. The fact that it
    was inadmissible does not prevent its use as proof so far
    as it has probative value. . . . This principle is almost
    universally accepted. . . . The principle applies to any
    ground of incompetency under the exclusionary rules.’’
    [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).
    The defendant also argues that, even if the jury could
    consider Schwam’s testimony for causation purposes,
    the combined expert testimony of Schwam and McDo-
    nough still was insufficient to establish causation. Spe-
    cifically, the defendant argues that ‘‘[e]ven if the
    plaintiff could dress up standard of care testimony in
    causation clothes, Dr. Schwam did not opine that
    delayed respiratory depression caused the decedent’s
    death. No [expert] witness did.’’ (Emphasis altered.)
    The defendant also contends that McDonough’s opinion
    as to the decedent’s cause of death was inadequate
    because McDonough could not determine if the dece-
    dent consumed the fatal dose of methadone before her
    discharge from Lawrence & Memorial. Thus, the grava-
    men of the defendant’s challenge to the expert evidence
    on causation is that the opinions of McDonough and
    Schwam were deficiently unspecific. We are unper-
    suaded.
    The defendant correctly states that a plaintiff in a
    medical malpractice action generally must prove causa-
    tion with expert testimony. See Milliun v. New Milford
    Hospital, supra, 
    310 Conn. 725
    . We disagree with the
    defendant, however, that the cumulative effect of the
    expert evidence and other evidence presented in this
    case did not establish a causal connection between the
    defendant’s negligence and the decedent’s death.
    First, although McDonough did not testify specifically
    that the respiratory depression responsible for the dece-
    dent’s death was ‘‘delayed,’’ he did opine that the cause
    of death was respiratory depression resulting from
    methadone toxicity. McDonough also provided subse-
    quent testimony indicating that the ‘‘presumed time to
    onset’’ of respiratory depression in methadone over-
    doses ‘‘could be quite long’’ because ‘‘the respiratory
    depression comes on much later than the pain relief.’’
    (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, expert testimony pro-
    vided by Schwam, which we presume the jury credited,
    described in considerable detail the phenomenon of
    delayed recurring respiratory depression in methadone
    overdoses. The occurrence of fatal respiratory depres-
    sion hours after the decedent’s consumption of metha-
    done was consistent with the expert testimony provided
    by McDonough and Schwam. Thus, when all of the
    expert testimony is considered together, the jury rea-
    sonably could have inferred that the decedent suc-
    cumbed to delayed respiratory depression.
    Second, the fact that McDonough could not deter-
    mine the specific time at which the decedent consumed
    the fatal dosage of methadone does not render his opin-
    ion inadequate. Rather, the specific timing of the dece-
    dent’s ingestion of methadone was a fact that the
    plaintiff could have proven with circumstantial evi-
    dence. See Shelnitz v. Greenberg, supra, 
    200 Conn. 66
    (‘‘[in a medical malpractice action] [c]ausation may be
    proved by circumstantial evidence and expert testi-
    mony’’ [emphasis added; internal quotation marks omit-
    ted]). On direct examination, the plaintiff asked
    McDonough whether it was his opinion that, if the dece-
    dent had consumed methadone before her discharge
    but not afterward, the methadone consumed before her
    discharge on November 29, 2008, caused the decedent’s
    death. McDonough answered that question in the affir-
    mative. In answering that question, McDonough clearly
    had to assume that the decedent ingested methadone
    only before, and not after, her discharge. In other words,
    McDonough offered a conditional opinion that the
    methadone consumed before the decedent’s discharge
    caused her death, the condition being that the plaintiff
    prove that the methadone in fact was consumed before,
    and not after, her discharge. McDonough’s testimony
    was not the exclusive means of proving that fact.
    Having determined that the jury reasonably could
    have credited expert testimony supportive of the phe-
    nomenon of delayed recurring respiratory depression,
    we now examine the other evidence relating to when
    the decedent consumed the fatal dose of methadone.
    Our review of the record leads us to conclude that there
    was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer,
    without resorting to speculation, that the decedent con-
    sumed the fatal dose of methadone before her dis-
    charge.16
    In particular, the jury was presented with the follow-
    ing relevant evidence. At approximately 6:45 p.m. on
    November 29, 2008, the decedent was found to be suffer-
    ing from symptoms that are consistent with an opiate
    or opioid induced overdose. The decedent’s improve-
    ment in response to a dose of Narcan confirmed that
    she had been experiencing an overdose on an opioid
    or opiate. The paramedics who treated the decedent
    were able to determine that the decedent’s ‘‘current
    medications’’ included methadone. Hope searched his
    home upon finding the decedent overdosing on Novem-
    ber 29, and he did not find any drugs, drug parapherna-
    lia, or evidence of drug use.
    There were conflicting accounts as to whether the
    decedent admitted to taking methadone, but the jury
    certainly was free to credit the account wherein the
    decedent told the emergency room nurses that she took
    methadone and not heroin. Critically, a toxicology
    screen performed in the emergency room on November
    29, 2008, detected the presence of methadone in the
    decedent’s urine. The jury heard expert testimony that
    the positive finding for methadone in that screen could
    not have been caused by the therapeutic doses of metha-
    done the decedent received eight days earlier.
    From the time she was discharged, 11:53 p.m. on
    November 29, 2008, until 1:30 a.m. on November 30,
    2008, the evidence showed that the decedent was in
    the company of Hope, who did not observe her ingest
    any more drugs. At some point between 1:30 a.m. and
    9:45 a.m., the decedent experienced another episode of
    respiratory depression, which the jury could have found
    to be the type of delayed recurring respiratory depres-
    sion that Schwam opined is consistent with methadone
    overdoses. Hope testified that he did not hear any move-
    ment from the decedent between 1:30 a.m. and 9:45
    a.m. on November 30, unlike the night of November 29,
    when he had heard the decedent use the microwave in
    his kitchen. Hope found the decedent’s body in the
    same position in which it had been when he last saw
    the decedent at 1:30 a.m.
    The medical examiner determined that the concentra-
    tion of methadone present in the decedent’s blood at
    the time of death was at a toxic level. The decedent’s
    death occurred approximately seven to fifteen hours
    after she initially overdosed on November 29, 2008.
    Hope and law enforcement officials searched Hope’s
    home on November 30, 2008, and did not find any evi-
    dence relating to drug activity. In addition, Geyer, an
    investigator with the medical examiner’s office, did not
    find any drugs, drug paraphernalia, or signs of drug use
    on or near the decedent’s body.
    Construing all of the evidence in the light most favor-
    able to sustaining the verdict, as we must; Saint Ber-
    nard School of Montville, Inc. v. Bank of America, 
    312 Conn. 811
    , 834, 
    95 A.3d 1063
     (2014); we conclude that
    it is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the
    decedent consumed a fatal dose of methadone before
    she was brought to the emergency room at Lawrence &
    Memorial on November 29, 2008.
    B
    In its second challenge to the sufficiency of causation
    evidence, the defendant contends that ‘‘there is a
    [another] missing link in the plaintiff’s causal chain.
    . . . [T]he jury could only guess whether the decedent
    would have been admitted to [Lawrence & Memorial]
    if Dr. Marchiondo had not discharged her.’’ According
    to the defendant, in order to prove that Marchiondo’s
    negligence caused the decedent’s death, the plaintiff
    was required to present evidence regarding ‘‘[Law-
    rence & Memorial’s] admission standards . . . and
    whether the decedent met them.’’ Because the plaintiff
    failed to present such evidence, the defendant contends,
    the jury reasonably could not have found that the defen-
    dant caused the decedent’s death. We disagree.
    The defendant’s second sufficiency challenge suffers
    from the basic flaw of misunderstanding Schwam’s tes-
    timony regarding the applicable standard of care. As
    the defendant argues, Schwam did testify initially that
    the standard of care applicable to possible methadone
    overdoses required Marchiondo to ‘‘admit [the dece-
    dent] to the hospital for continuous monitoring . . .
    for a minimum of twenty-four hours.’’ (Emphasis
    added.) Schwam subsequently clarified, however, that
    the applicable standard of care only required Marchi-
    ondo ‘‘to monitor her. He needed to ideally admit her
    to an intensive care unit, but certainly to monitor her
    for twenty-four hours for signs of recurrent opiate over-
    dose.’’ (Emphasis added.) The jury, of course, could
    have accepted the part of Schwam’s testimony indicat-
    ing that monitoring was required and rejected the part
    suggesting admittance was required.
    Consequently, in order to prove causation, the plain-
    tiff needed to show only that the decedent could have
    been monitored sufficiently for twenty-four hours, not
    admitted for that period of time. Zambarano, an emer-
    gency room nurse at Lawrence & Memorial, testified
    that the decedent was monitored in a room called the
    ‘‘observation room’’ during her hospitalization. Nurses
    assigned to the observation room monitor the vital signs
    of patients in that room both in person and through
    remote telemetric monitoring displays at a nearby
    nurses’ station. Thus, nurses can respond immediately
    to a crash in the vital signs of an observation room
    patient. According to Zambarano, patients can stay
    overnight in the observation room. Alternatively, Zamb-
    arano testified, patients can be monitored in less acute
    areas, such as hallway beds. With that testimony, along
    with the evidence that the decedent was ‘‘told that she
    was here for the night,’’ the jury reasonably could have
    inferred that it was more likely than not that the dece-
    dent could have been monitored medically for twenty-
    four hours at Lawrence & Memorial.
    Accordingly, in construing all of the evidence in the
    light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, as we
    must; Saint Bernard School of Montville, Inc. v. Bank
    of America, supra, 
    312 Conn. 834
    ; we conclude that
    there was sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s find-
    ing that the defendant’s negligence caused the dece-
    dent’s death.
    II
    SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
    JURY’S AWARD OF DAMAGES
    The defendant’s second claim is that the plaintiff failed
    to present sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s
    award of $150,000 in damages for the destruction of
    the decedent’s capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s
    activities. Specifically, the defendant contends that a
    plaintiff seeking damages for the destruction of a dece-
    dent’s capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s activities
    must present evidence of the decedent’s life expec-
    tancy. According to the defendant, the plaintiff failed
    to present evidence of the decedent’s life expectancy
    in the present case, and, therefore, the jury’s award of
    damages for the destruction of the decedent’s capacity
    to carry on and enjoy life’s activities was ‘‘speculative
    and unreasonable.’’ We disagree.
    The following additional facts and procedural history
    are necessary to our resolution of the defendant’s sec-
    ond claim. At trial, the plaintiff presented evidence of
    the decedent’s (1) age, (2) health, (3) physical condition,
    and (4) habits and activities. Regarding the decedent’s
    age, a photograph of the decedent’s driver’s license,
    which contained the decedent’s date of birth, was
    admitted into evidence.
    Regarding the decedent’s health, the plaintiff offered
    some of the decedent’s medical records. Those records
    indicated that, in addition to polysubstance abuse, the
    decedent suffered from diabetes, hypothyroidism, high
    cholesterol, high blood sugar, anxiety, and depression.
    The records also indicated that, since 2000, the dece-
    dent had completed several inpatient and outpatient
    substance abuse treatment programs and had been hos-
    pitalized several times for diabetes related compli-
    cations.
    Regarding the decedent’s physical condition, McDo-
    nough’s autopsy report, wherein he detailed the obser-
    vations of his external and internal examinations of
    the decedent, was admitted into evidence. McDonough
    testified that he observed ‘‘no evidence of acute trauma’’
    as a result of his external examination of the decedent’s
    body. Furthermore, McDonough’s internal examination
    revealed no evidence of disease afflicting the decedent’s
    cardiovascular, hepatobiliary, lymphoreticular, gastro-
    intestinal, genitourinary, and central nervous systems,
    nor was there evidence of disease afflicting the dece-
    dent’s head, neck, internal genital organs, or abdominal
    and chest cavities. McDonough’s examination did
    reveal, however, that the decedent’s thyroid exhibited
    signs of chronic inflammation and that her lungs were
    congested with fluid.
    Regarding the defendant’s habits and activities, as
    previously set forth, there was considerable evidence
    presented of the decedent’s lengthy struggle with polys-
    ubstance abuse and her alternating periods of sobriety
    and relapse. In addition to her drug problems, however,
    there was evidence presented regarding the decedent’s
    other habits and activities. The decedent’s father, James
    Procaccini, testified that in the summer of 2008 the
    decedent was a ‘‘very happy person’’ who was ‘‘able to
    function in life very well.’’ According to her father,
    the decedent helped him and his wife with household
    chores, submitted ‘‘an awful lot’’ of job applications, and
    attended Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. The ‘‘bright
    spot in [the decedent’s] life’’ at that time, however, was
    helping her father and mother care for her two year
    old twin niece and nephew. Prior to the summer of
    2008, the decedent had graduated from the University
    of Vermont with a bachelor of science degree and had
    taken a cross-country trip to Mount Rainier in Wash-
    ington.
    Following the jury’s return of a plaintiff’s verdict, the
    defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict on
    the ground that the jury’s award of damages for the
    destruction of the decedent’s capacity to carry on and
    enjoy life’s activities was ‘‘speculative.’’ Specifically, the
    defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to present
    evidence of ‘‘[h]ow long the plaintiff likely would have
    lived,’’ and, therefore, ‘‘[w]ithout a life expectancy table,
    or some other evidence on this topic,’’ the jury’s award
    ‘‘[could not] stand.’’ The court denied the defendant’s
    motion to set aside the verdict.
    We begin our analysis by outlining our standard of
    review. ‘‘The standard of review governing our review
    of a trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside the
    verdict is well settled. The trial court possesses inherent
    power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court’s
    opinion, is against the law or the evidence. . . . [The
    trial court] should not set aside a verdict where it is
    apparent that there was some evidence upon which the
    jury might reasonably reach [its] conclusion, and should
    not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice
    of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to
    denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the
    application of legal principles . . . . Ultimately, [t]he
    decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a
    broad legal discretion . . . that, in the absence of clear
    abuse, we shall not disturb.’’ (Internal quotation marks
    omitted.) Kumah v. Brown, 
    160 Conn. App. 798
    , 803,
    
    126 A.3d 598
    , cert. denied, 
    320 Conn. 908
    , 
    128 A.3d 953
     (2015).
    We now turn to the legal principles governing dam-
    ages awards in wrongful death actions. ‘‘In actions for
    injuries resulting in death, a plaintiff is entitled to ‘just
    damages’ together with the cost of reasonably neces-
    sary, medical, hospital and nursing services, and includ-
    ing funeral expenses.’ General Statutes § 52-555. ‘Just
    damages’ include (1) the value of the decedent’s lost
    earning capacity less deductions for her necessary liv-
    ing expenses and taking into consideration that a pre-
    sent cash payment will be made, (2) compensation for
    the destruction of her capacity to carry on and enjoy
    life’s activities in a way she would have done had she
    lived, and (3) compensation for conscious pain and
    suffering.’’ (Emphasis added.) Katsetos v. Nolan, 
    170 Conn. 637
    , 657, 
    368 A.2d 172
     (1976).
    Regarding compensation for the destruction of a
    decedent’s capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s activi-
    ties, our Supreme Court has stated the following: ‘‘[T]he
    parties in a death action are entitled to attempt to pre-
    sent an over-all picture of the decedent’s activities to
    enable the jury to make an informed valuation of the
    total destruction of his capacity to carry on life’s activi-
    ties. . . . So, for example, evidence bearing on how
    pleasurable the decedent’s future might have been is
    admissible . . . as is evidence as to the decedent’s hob-
    bies and recreations.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
    added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Waldron v.
    Raccio, 
    166 Conn. 608
    , 616–17, 
    353 A.2d 770
     (1974); id.,
    617 (evidence of ‘‘decedent’s attachment to his family’’
    relevant to claim for destruction of capacity to carry
    on and enjoy life’s activities); see also Katsetos v. Nolan,
    
    supra,
     
    170 Conn. 658
     (evidence that decedent ‘‘was hap-
    pily married,’’ ‘‘had four children,’’ ‘‘was a very happy
    person and in good health,’’ ‘‘was a dedicated mother
    and homemaker,’’ ‘‘[was] active in many outside activi-
    ties,’’ ‘‘was a state-licensed hairdresser,’’ and had
    worked in pizza restaurant and office relevant to her
    capacity to enjoy life’s activities); cf. Bruneau v. Quick,
    
    187 Conn. 617
    , 635–36, 
    447 A.2d 742
     (1982) (in personal
    injury action for surgeon’s malpractice, evidence that
    plaintiff no longer could undertake ice skating, sailing,
    ballroom and jazz dancing, and gardening as she had
    before botched surgery was relevant to her ‘‘ability to
    carry on and enjoy certain activities’’).
    A claim for the destruction of a decedent’s capacity
    to carry on and enjoy life’s activities requires proof of
    the decedent’s life expectancy. See Sims v. Smith, 
    115 Conn. 279
    , 286, 
    161 A. 239
     (1932) (‘‘damages based upon
    the loss to the estate of a decedent by his death neces-
    sarily involves a consideration of the probable duration
    of his life’’); cf. Acampora v. Ledewitz, 
    159 Conn. 377
    ,
    384–85, 
    269 A.2d 288
     (1970) (in personal injury action,
    trial court erred in allowing jury to consider damages
    for permanent pain and suffering because ‘‘no evidence
    was introduced as to [plaintiff’s] life expectancy’’).
    With respect to the type of evidence that can be used
    to prove one’s life expectancy, our Supreme Court has
    stated the following: ‘‘A mortality table17 is not the exclu-
    sive evidence admissible to establish the expectancy
    of life, since age, health, habits and physical condition
    may afford evidence thereof.’’ (Emphasis added; foot-
    note added.) Johnson v. Fiske, 
    125 Conn. 445
    , 449, 
    6 A.2d 354
     (1939). ‘‘[Mortality] tables only give the average
    of a large number of lives, and in the individual case
    the expectancy may be higher or lower than the average.
    While generally held admissible, they are not conclu-
    sive, nor are they the exclusive evidence admissible in
    proof of that fact, which the jury may determine from
    other evidence . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Donoghue v.
    Smith, 
    114 Conn. 64
    , 66, 
    157 A. 415
     (1931); see also
    Tampa v. Johnson, 
    114 So. 2d 807
    , 810 (Fla. App. 1959)
    (‘‘[a] jury is not bound by mortality tables, but these
    constitute only one of many factors that may be consid-
    ered in estimating life expectancy’’ [emphasis added]);
    Glover v. Berger, 
    72 Wyo. 221
    , 250, 
    263 P.2d 498
     (1953)
    (‘‘[d]irect evidence as to plaintiff’s expectancy of life,
    however, is not essential, but the jury may determine
    such fact from their own knowledge and from the proof
    of the age, health, and habits of the person and other
    facts before them’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]).
    Use of a mortality table is not the exclusive means of
    proving life expectancy because ‘‘our rule for assessing
    damages in death cases gives no precise mathematical
    formulas for the jury to apply. . . . [T]he assessment
    of damages in wrongful death actions must of necessity
    represent a crude monetary forecast of how the dece-
    dent’s life would have evolved.’’ (Citations omitted;
    emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Katsetos v. Nolan, 
    supra,
     
    170 Conn. 657
    . Indeed, ‘‘[t]he
    life expectancy of the deceased, for the purpose of
    assessing damages in a wrongful death action, is a ques-
    tion of fact for the jury to decide . . . .’’ (Emphasis
    added.) 22A Am. Jur. 2d 353, Death § 221 (2013).
    Consequently, ‘‘jurors may determine such fact from
    their own knowledge and from the proof of the age,
    health, and habits of the person and other facts before
    them.’’ (Emphasis added.) 29A C.J.S. 493, Damages
    § 141 (2012); see also 22A Am. Jur. 2d, supra, § 349, pp.
    469–70 (‘‘if age, sex, health, and mental capacity are
    proven, the jury is entitled to determine from these
    facts and circumstances . . . in its sound judgment
    . . . the decedent’s life expectancy, without resort to
    mortality tables’’). ‘‘The law does not require the pro-
    duction of . . . life expectancy tables whenever there
    is an issue of life expectancy, and does not regard them
    as essential to the establishment of that issue or to the
    recovery of damages based on life expectancy.’’ 29A
    Am. Jur. 2d 723, Evidence § 1383 (2013).
    Thus, insofar as the defendant argues that the plain-
    tiff’s proof of the decedent’s destroyed capacity to enjoy
    life’s activities is insufficient because he did not present
    ‘‘government mortality tables,’’ we disagree. As pre-
    viously addressed in considerable detail, the plaintiff
    presented substantial evidence of the decedent’s age,
    health, physical condition, and habits, all of which are
    relevant to determining life expectancy. The decedent’s
    age was established by her driver’s license; the dece-
    dent’s sundry illnesses were established by her medical
    records; the decedent’s physical condition at the time
    of her death was expounded in McDonough’s autopsy
    report and trial testimony; and the jury was familiar
    with the decedent’s enduring drug habits. Moreover,
    the jury heard testimony from the decedent’s father
    regarding the activities in which the decedent enjoyed
    partaking, including her strong attachment to her niece
    and nephew. Waldron v. Raccio, 
    supra,
     
    166 Conn. 616
    –17 (decedent’s ‘‘attachment to his family’’ relevant
    to his capacity to enjoy life’s activities). Thus, the jury
    reasonably could have made a ‘‘ ‘crude . . . forecast’ ’’;
    Katsetos v. Nolan, 
    supra,
     
    170 Conn. 657
    ; of the dece-
    dent’s life expectancy from its own knowledge and from
    proof of the decedent’s age, health, physical condition,
    and habits.
    In light of the foregoing evidence that the plaintiff
    presented with respect to the decedent’s life expectancy
    and activities that she enjoyed, we conclude that the
    jury’s award of damages for the destruction of the dece-
    dent’s capacity to carry on and enjoy life’s activities
    was not unreasonable or speculative. Accordingly we
    conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in
    refusing to set aside the jury’s award of damages for
    the destruction of the decedent’s capacity to carry on
    and enjoy life’s activities.
    The judgment is affirmed.
    In this opinion the other judges concurred.
    1
    Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., Lawrence & Memorial Corporation,
    and Thomas E. Marchiondo, a physician, were initially named as defendants
    in this action. Prior to trial, the plaintiff withdrew the action as against
    Lawrence & Memorial Hospital, Inc., and Lawrence & Memorial Corporation,
    and filed an amended complaint naming Emergency Medicine Physicians
    of New London County, LLC, as a defendant. After filing this appeal, but
    before oral argument was heard, the plaintiff withdrew the claims as against
    Marchiondo, who died before trial began. Accordingly, because those three
    other defendants are not involved in this appeal, we refer to Emergency
    Medicine Physicians of New London County, LLC, as the defendant through-
    out this opinion.
    2
    The jury heard expert testimony explaining the differences between
    opiates and opioids. An opiate is a ‘‘naturally occurring’’ narcotic that is
    derived from poppy plants. There are four opiates: opium, heroin, codeine,
    and morphine. An opioid is a ‘‘synthetic or semisynthetic narcotic . . . .’’
    Examples of well-known opioids include oxycodone, hydrocodone, fentanyl,
    and methadone.
    3
    Marchiondo also diagnosed the decedent with pneumonia.
    4
    The parties stipulated at trial that Marchiondo was ‘‘an employee, agent,
    representative, or servant of [the defendant] and acting within and pursuant
    to the scope of his employment, agency, representation, and authority with
    [the defendant].’’ Accordingly, the court instructed the jury: ‘‘If you find that
    . . . Marchiondo’s treatment of [the decedent] was negligent, that is, devi-
    ated from the applicable standard of care, and that negligence was a substan-
    tial factor in bringing about her death, then [the defendant] is responsible
    for . . . Marchiondo’s conduct and, in that event, you should find against
    [the defendant].’’
    5
    The court reserved decision on the defendant’s renewed motion for a
    directed verdict when it granted the defendant’s motion for an extension
    of time to file other postverdict motions. Subsequent to the court’s granting
    of the motion for an extension of time, the defendant filed a motion to set
    aside the jury’s verdict, wherein the defendant again renewed its motion
    for a directed verdict. The trial court denied both the motion to set aside
    and the motion for a directed verdict, the latter of which was denied nunc
    pro tunc.
    6
    Throughout trial, it appears that the parties, and even their expert wit-
    nesses, occasionally blurred the distinction between half-life and duration
    of effect. Indeed, although he warned against ‘‘confus[ing] duration of effect
    with half-life,’’ Pike himself provided a definition of ‘‘half-life’’ that seemingly
    incorporated the concept of the duration of effect: ‘‘half-life . . . has . . .
    to do with how long th[e] physiologic response that the drug is producing
    will be effective . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) As another example, when asked
    by the defendant’s counsel to provide the ‘‘durational effect’’ of Narcan,
    McDonough replied: ‘‘It would be similar to the half-life of thirty to eighty
    minutes.’’ (Emphasis added.)
    Nevertheless, it is of little importance whether the technical scientific
    distinction between half-life and duration of effect was preserved consis-
    tently at trial. As explained previously in greater detail, the crucial issue at
    trial pertained to Narcan’s relative effectiveness as compared to both long-
    acting and short-acting narcotics. The parties’ experts agreed that ‘‘[Nar-
    can’s] effectiveness is much shorter than the effect of the longer-acting
    [and] even short-acting narcotic[s] . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Moreover, as
    also explained previously in greater detail, it was undisputed that the half-
    lives and durations of effect of short-acting narcotics are shorter than those
    of long-acting narcotics.
    7
    The defendant, but not the plaintiff, asserts that the ‘‘parties stipulated
    that the maximum effective duration of the Narcan given to the decedent
    was ninety minutes.’’ (Emphasis added.) Although the record reveals that
    the plaintiff offered to stipulate that the effective duration of Narcan is
    ‘‘twenty to ninety minutes,’’ neither the defendant nor the court accepted
    this proposed stipulation. Furthermore, the court never submitted any such
    stipulation to the jury.
    8
    Although the defendant does not challenge the jury’s finding with respect
    to the standard of care, we note that Schwam opined that Marchiondo’s
    treatment of the decedent deviated from the appropriate standard of care
    for a possible methadone overdose. Schwam testified that Marchiondo
    improperly ruled out methadone as a potential cause of the decedent’s
    overdose because there was ‘‘sufficient evidence to at least raise the possibil-
    ity that the overdose was . . . partly methadone.’’ Consequently, having
    wrongly excluded methadone, Marchiondo also failed to provide the dece-
    dent with the appropriate care for a methadone overdose, which is ‘‘monitor[-
    ing] . . . for twenty-four hours for signs of recurrent opiate overdose.’’
    9
    The plaintiff conceded at oral argument before this court that Schwam’s
    testimony was offered only for standard of care purposes.
    10
    The defendant did file two motions in limine regarding the scope of
    Schwam’s testimony. The second, which sought to preclude Schwam from
    testifying on the ‘‘effective duration of Narcan,’’ effectively was granted
    when the court stated that it would sustain any ‘‘objection that fairly impli-
    cates . . . [the] effective duration of Narcan.’’ The first motion sought to
    preclude Schwam from testifying regarding the standard of care with respect
    to Marchiondo’s diagnosis of pneumonia. The plaintiff agreed to not elicit
    any testimony from Schwam regarding the pneumonia diagnosis. Neither
    of those two motions, however, sought to preclude or limit in any respect
    Schwam’s testimony regarding delayed recurring respiratory depression.
    11
    The defendant did move to strike the following testimony from Schwam’s
    direct examination: ‘‘Well, [the belief that respiratory depression would
    return when Narcan wears off is] a very easy thing to assume if you know
    a little bit about opiate toxicology, but decades of experience have shown
    that if that’s the way you think and you discharge a patient, a lot of them
    will be dead the next day.’’ The court, however, denied the motion to strike.
    Critically, the defendant’s stated ground for the motion to strike was that
    Schwam’s answer was not responsive to the question asked by the plaintiff’s
    counsel. At no point did the defendant move to strike Schwam’s testimony
    on the ground that it was outside the scope of the plaintiff’s offer of Schwam’s
    testimony for standard of care purposes.
    12
    Specifically, the plaintiff stated in the disclosure that Schwam would
    testify as to (1) ‘‘all subject matter arising from his expertise in the field
    of emergency medicine, including the treatment of patients suspected of
    suffering from drug overdose’’; (2) ‘‘all subject matter arising from his educa-
    tion, training, and experience’’; (3) ‘‘the care and treatment [the decedent]
    received from the defendant during her emergency department admission
    on November 29, 2008’’; (4) ‘‘the decedent’s medical history, her presenting
    symptoms, the course of treatment she received by the defendant, the diagno-
    sis provided, the laboratory results, and the medical course that could and
    should have occurred, but did not’’; and (5) ‘‘certain aspects of the testimony
    provided by the defendant’s experts.’’
    In outlining the subject matter of Schwam’s testimony, the disclosure also
    stated: ‘‘Please see the attached five page opinion letter . . . that capture[s]
    the expected subject matter of his expected testimony.’’ In the attached
    opinion letter, Schwam opined, among other things, that (1) ‘‘when Narcan
    is administered to counteract methadone, the Narcan usually wears off long
    before the methadone, and patients may seem well for several hours, only
    to relapse and become unconscious much later’’; (2) ‘‘when the effects of
    Narcan [administered to the decedent] wore off, the effects of methadone
    returned and she suffered unresponsiveness and fatal respiratory depression;
    and (3) ‘‘to a reasonable medical certainty, it can be determined that the
    delayed toxic effects of the methadone caused [the decedent’s] death.’’
    13
    See footnote 9 of this opinion.
    14
    See footnote 10 of this opinion.
    15
    See footnote 11 of this opinion.
    16
    The defendant’s reliance on Paige v. St. Andrew’s Roman Catholic
    Church Corp., supra, 
    250 Conn. 14
    , is unavailing. The defendant cites Paige
    as support for its position that the jury in the present case resorted to
    improper speculation in finding that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s
    death. We are unpersuaded by the defendant’s reliance on Paige because
    it is distinguishable from the present case.
    In Paige, our Supreme Court held that there was insufficient evidence
    supporting the jury’s finding that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
    Id., 17. The plaintiff in Paige was cleaning a boiler located in the defendant’s
    church when someone activated the boiler, causing the plaintiff to sustain
    serious burn injuries. Id., 16–17. There was no direct evidence presented at
    trial that affirmatively established that the person who activated the boiler
    was an employee, servant, or agent of the defendant. Id., 34. Thus, the
    plaintiff’s case relied principally on two alternative theories of negligence:
    (1) the defendant failed to supervise and instruct its employees, servants,
    and agents with respect to the boiler’s operation; and (2) the defendant
    failed to restrict public access to the boiler’s controls. Id., 27.
    In returning a plaintiff’s verdict, the jury answered several interrogatories
    regarding the plaintiff’s theories of negligence. Id., 26–27 n.13. Its responses
    to the interrogatories indicated that it had found that the defendant was
    not negligent in failing to restrict public access to the boiler’s controls. Id.,
    27–28. It did find, however, that the defendant was negligent in failing to
    supervise and instruct its employees, agents, and servants with respect to
    the boiler’s operation. Id., 27. Notwithstanding its finding that the defendant
    negligently supervised and instructed its employees, agents, and servants,
    the jury indicated in another interrogatory that the defendant’s custodian
    was not the person who activated the boiler. Id., 27 n.13.
    The jury’s responses to the interrogatories were central to our Supreme
    Court’s analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence on causation. Id., 28–31.
    Specifically, the court reasoned that those responses indicated that the jury’s
    finding of negligence ‘‘was limited to the manner in which [the defendant]
    dealt with its own employees, servants and agents.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.,
    28. Therefore, ‘‘[i]n order for there to have been a causal connection between
    the defendant’s negligent conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries . . . it would
    have had to have been an employee, agent or servant of the defendant who
    activated the [boiler]. . . . [T]he converse [was] equally true . . . . [T]he
    defendant’s conduct [could not have been] causally linked to the plaintiff’s
    injuries if the [boiler] was activated by a person who was not an employee,
    agent or servant of the defendant.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 28–29.
    In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on causation, the court in
    Paige examined only the evidence relating to whether the person who
    activated the boiler was an employee, servant, or agent of the defendant.
    The plaintiff’s evidence unquestionably suggested that there was only one
    employee, agent, or servant of the defendant who was near the boiler con-
    trols at the time of the accident and who knew how to use those controls—
    the defendant’s custodian. Id., 24, 34. As previously explained, however, the
    jury’s response to an interrogatory indicated that it specifically found that
    the defendant’s custodian was not the person who activated the boiler. Id.,
    27 n.13. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the ‘‘jury could not have con-
    cluded that it was an employee of the defendant who had activated [the]
    boiler . . . .’’ Id., 34.
    The defendant argues that Paige guides our resolution of its sufficiency
    claim. Specifically, it contends that ‘‘[l]ike the possibility that a member of
    the public may have turned on the church boiler [in Paige], nothing . . .
    in this case [eliminated] the possibility that the decedent took the fatal dose
    [of methadone] after she left the emergency room.’’ We are not persuaded
    by the defendant’s analogy.
    We conclude that Paige presented a distinct situation involving a logical
    inconsistency in the jury’s verdict. In responding to a set of highly detailed
    and specific interrogatories, the jury revealed that its finding of negligence
    was based solely on the defendant’s conduct with respect to its employees,
    agents, and servants. Yet, its responses to those interrogatories also revealed
    that it exonerated the only employee of the defendant who, according to
    the plaintiff’s evidence, could have activated the boiler. There are no jury
    interrogatories in the present case that reveal a similar inconsistency in the
    jury’s verdict, nor is any such inconsistency otherwise apparent. Further-
    more, the plaintiff in Paige failed to present any evidence from which the
    jury reasonably could infer that the person who activated the boiler was
    an employee, agent, or servant of the defendant. In the present case, however,
    there is ample evidence from which the jury could infer that the decedent
    consumed the lethal dose of methadone before her discharge. In particular,
    there was evidence that the decedent exhibited opioid overdose symptoms
    prior to her discharge, that her urine tested positive for methadone at the
    time of her hospitalization, and that the delayed respiratory depression she
    experienced after her discharge was consistent with the consumption of a
    toxic dose of methadone prior to her discharge.
    17
    A mortality table, also termed an ‘‘actuarial table,’’ is ‘‘[a]n organized
    chart of statistical data indicating life expectancies for people in various
    categories . . . .’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (10th Ed. 2014).