Barbara Stennes-Cox v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC , 700 F. App'x 731 ( 2017 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        NOV 1 2017
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BARBARA STENNES-COX,                            No. 16-35251
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01682-TSZ
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC; et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Washington
    Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted October 23, 2017**
    Before:      LEAVY, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
    Barbara Stennes-Cox appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing
    her action alleging a Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim for rescission. We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Serra v. Lappin, 
    600 F.3d 1191
    , 1195 (9th Cir.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    2010). We affirm.
    The district court properly dismissed Stennes-Cox’s action as time-barred
    because Stennes-Cox did not send a notice of rescission to defendants within three
    years of consummation of the loan. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of
    rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender
    fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home
    Loans, Inc., 
    135 S. Ct. 790
    , 792 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of
    rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years
    after the transaction is consummated); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 
    309 F.3d 1161
    , 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the
    courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the
    three-year limitation period.”). We reject as without merit Stennes-Cox’s
    contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.
    We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
    appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    2                                   16-35251
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-35251

Citation Numbers: 700 F. App'x 731

Filed Date: 11/1/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023