T.M. v. W.B. , 2017 Ohio 8622 ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as T.M. v. W.B., 
    2017-Ohio-8622
    .]
    STATE OF OHIO                    )                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    )ss:                NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF LORAIN                 )
    T.M.                                                 C.A. No.       16CA011025
    Appellant
    v.                                           APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
    ENTERED IN THE
    W.B.                                                 COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
    Appellee                                     CASE No.   11DU074617
    DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
    Dated: November 20, 2017
    HENSAL, Presiding Judge.
    {¶1}    T.M. appeals from the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas,
    Domestic Relations Division. We reverse and remand.
    I.
    {¶2}    T.M. (“Mother”) and W.B. (“Father”) divorced in 2013. Mother and Father have
    two biological children, both of whom are minors. The divorce decree included a shared
    parenting plan, which designated both parties as residential parents and legal custodians, but
    designated Father as the residential parent for school purposes. The shared parenting plan
    indicated that Mother would have possession of the children on alternating weekends, and every
    Wednesday after school until the following morning. During the summers, the children were to
    alternate between Mother and Father’s houses on a weekly basis.
    {¶3}    Although this case has a lengthy post-decree procedural history, this Court will
    limit its recitation of the facts to the motion practice and hearing that precipitated this appeal.
    2
    Relevantly, Mother filed a motion to modify the shared parenting plan.          The trial court
    considered that motion, among others, during hearings that occurred between July 2015 and
    April 2016. The parties reached an in-court agreement relative to certain issues in April 2016.
    The parties, however, did not reach an agreement with respect to a school year possession
    schedule for their children. Instead, they agreed that they would defer to the trial court, and
    would accept the schedule it set forth.
    {¶4}    Subsequent to the in-court agreement, Father filed a summary of the agreement
    and Mother moved the trial court to adopt the in-court agreement. Thereafter, Father sent a
    proposed judgment entry to the trial court, the guardian ad litem, and Mother’s counsel. He then
    sent them an amended proposed judgment entry. The trial court adopted the amended proposed
    judgment entry in full. Mother moved for relief from the trial court’s judgment, and – with that
    motion still pending – filed a notice of appeal with this Court. Mother’s merit brief raises two
    assignments of error for our review.
    II.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
    ADOPTING A PROPOSED JUDGMENT ENTRY WHICH DOES NOT
    ACCURATELY REFLECT THE TERMS OF THE PARTIES’ APRIL 1, 2016
    IN-COURT AGREEMENT.
    {¶5}    In her first assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court abused its
    discretion by adopting the proposed judgment entry because it did not accurately reflect the
    parties’ in-court agreement. Mother argues that the judgment entry conflicts with the in-court
    agreement as it relates to a number of issues, including which parent is the residential and
    custodial parent, Father’s relocation, the summer possession schedule, and the school year
    possession schedule.
    3
    {¶6}    Regarding Father’s relocation, Mother asserts that the in-court agreement reflects
    that Father was permitted to relocate once within the Elyria or Midview school districts without
    prior approval from the court. Subsequent relocations, however, would require the court’s
    approval. Mother argues that, contrary to the in-court agreement, the judgment entry authorizes
    Father to move anywhere within Lorain County.
    {¶7}    This Court’s review of the transcript indicates that the parties agreed that Father
    could relocate within either the Elyria or Midview school districts. Indeed, Father testified that
    he was “solely looking at * * * Midview or Elyria school districts,” and the trial court later
    confirmed that Father “may move someplace * * * either in Elyria or Midview school district[.]”
    The trial court further indicated that Father could relocate once without seeking the court’s
    permission, but that subsequent relocations would require the court’s approval. Thus, because
    the judgment entry authorizes Father to relocate anywhere within Lorain County, it conflicts with
    the parties’ in-court agreement on this issue.1
    {¶8}    Regarding the summer possession schedule, Mother argues that the trial court
    amended the schedule despite the parties’ in-court agreement that it would remain the same. At
    the hearing, the trial court specifically stated that “the summer schedule is going to * * * remain
    the same[,]” and the parties confirmed that the schedule had been working for them.
    Notwithstanding, the trial court’s judgment entry modifies the summer possession schedule. The
    judgment entry, therefore, conflicts with the parties’ in-court agreement on this issue.
    1
    We note that the trial court’s judgment entry also conflicts with its prior order – which
    the trial court issued after the hearing but prior to the disputed judgment entry – authorizing
    Father to relocate within the Midview or Elyria school districts.
    4
    {¶9}    Thus, having reviewed the record, it is clear that the trial court’s judgment entry
    conflicts with the parties’ in-court agreement on certain issues. To the extent that Father argues
    that the trial court had the authority to modify the shared parenting plan, his argument is
    misplaced under these facts. At the hearing, the trial court made clear that the only issue left for
    it decide was the school year possession schedule, and that its judgment entry would otherwise
    reflect the parties’ in-court agreement. The trial court’s subsequent judgment entry stated that
    the court accepted the agreement, yet modified some of the agreed-upon terms. As a result, we
    hold that the trial court erred by adopting the proposed judgment entry, which did not accurately
    reflect the parties’ in-court agreement. Mother’s first assignment of error is sustained.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RUBBER STAMPING THE PROPOSED
    JUDGMENT ENTRY SUBMITTED BY COUNSEL FOR [FATHER]
    WITHOUT INSTRUCTION BY THE TRIAL COURT.
    {¶10} In her second assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court erred by
    “rubber stamping” Father’s proposed judgment entry, which was submitted without the trial
    court’s instruction to do so. In light of our disposition of the preceding assignment of error, we
    decline to address the merits of Mother’s second assignment of error on the basis that it is moot.
    App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Mother’s second assignment of error is overruled.
    III.
    {¶11} Mother’s first assignment of error is sustained. Mother’s second assignment of
    error is overruled on the basis that it is moot. The Judgment of the Lorain County Court of
    Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
    proceedings consistent with this decision.
    Judgment reversed,
    and cause remanded.
    5
    There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
    Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
    this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
    Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
    judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
    period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
    instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
    mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
    Costs taxed to Appellee.
    JENNIFER HENSAL
    FOR THE COURT
    CARR, J.
    CALLAHAN, J.
    CONCUR.
    APPEARANCES:
    JOSEPH G. STAFFORD and NICOLE A. CRUZ, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.
    BRENT L. ENGLISH, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16CA011025

Citation Numbers: 2017 Ohio 8622

Judges: Hensal

Filed Date: 11/20/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021