Singh v. Sessions ( 2018 )


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  •    16-1277
    Singh v. Sessions
    BIA
    Hom, IJ
    A201 109 582
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
    AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
    COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
    FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
    OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@).     A
    PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
    NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
    States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
    on the 9th day of May, two thousand eighteen.
    PRESENT:
    JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
    DENNIS JACOBS,
    Circuit Judges,
    MICHAEL P. SHEA,*
    District Judge.
    _____________________________________
    GURDEV SINGH,
    Petitioner,
    -v.-                                    16-1277
    JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III,
    UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    *   Judge Michael P. Shea, United States District
    Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by
    designation.
    ____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:           AMY NUSSBAUM GELL, New York, NY.
    FOR RESPONDENT:           EVAN P. SCHULTZ, Trial Attorney,
    Office of Immigration Litigation,
    United States Department of
    Justice, (with Chad A. Readler,
    Principal Deputy Assistant
    Attorney General, Stephen J.
    Flynn, Assistant Director, and
    Imran R. Zaidi, Trial Attorney, on
    the brief), Washington, DC.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, IT IS HEREBY
    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    is DENIED.
    Petitioner Gurdev Singh, a Sikh who is a native and
    citizen of India, seeks review of an April 11, 2016,
    decision of the BIA affirming a November 5, 2014, decision
    of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application
    for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Gurdev
    Singh, No. A201 109 582 (B.I.A. Apr. 11, 2016), aff’g No.
    A201 109 582 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 5, 2014). We
    assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
    the procedural history, and the issues presented.
    Under the circumstances of this case, “we review both
    the BIA's and the IJ's opinions.” Chen v. Bd. of
    Immigration Appeals, 
    435 F.3d 141
    , 144 (2d Cir. 2006). The
    applicable standards of review are well established. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 510
    , 513
    (2d Cir. 2009). We find no error in the decisions below
    and deny Singh’s petition.
    To qualify for asylum, Singh had to demonstrate either
    that he (1) suffered past persecution or (2) has a well-
    founded fear of future persecution. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(B); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a)-(b)(1), (2). The
    agency did not err in concluding that Singh satisfied
    neither burden.
    1. Singh’s application for asylum was supported almost
    exclusively by his own testimony. “The testimony of [an]
    applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s
    burden without corroboration, [so long as] the applicant
    satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony
    is credible.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(b)(ii). However, the
    agency supportably concluded that Singh was not a credible
    witness. See Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir.
    2008) (per curiam) (“We defer [to an adverse credibility
    ruling] unless . . . no reasonable fact-finder could [have]
    ma[d]e such a[] . . . ruling.”).
    Although Singh offered corroboration, the agency acted
    within its discretion in excluding the purportedly
    corroborating evidence as untimely. The agency has broad
    discretion to “set . . . time limits for the filing of
    applications and related documents” and to exclude filings
    that are untimely. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.31
    (c); see also Dedji
    v. Mukasey, 
    525 F.3d 187
    , 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Singh had
    nearly two years to submit evidence in compliance with the
    filing deadline imposed by the agency; nevertheless, he
    submitted the evidence at issue almost a month after the
    deadline had passed. That evidence was available prior to
    the deadline, and Singh failed to “demonstrate[] good
    cause” for the delay. Dedji, 
    525 F.3d at 192
    .
    Accordingly, the agency was justified in ordering
    exclusion.
    2. Singh claimed in his 2012 asylum application that he
    feared future persecution at the hands of the National
    Congress Party, which was then the ruling party in India.
    But at his 2014 merits hearing, Singh claimed for the first
    time that he feared future persecution at the hands of the
    Shiromani Akali Dal-BJP (“BJP”), the party that had assumed
    power in India while Singh was living in the United States.
    Specifically, Singh claimed that the BJP “take[s] land and
    property from . . . Sikhs.” CAR 58.
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    Singh attempted to justify the omission of the BJP-
    based claim from his initial application on the ground that
    the BJP was not yet in power in 2012. However, Singh
    conceded on cross-examination that he was aware of the
    BJP’s activities vis-à-vis Sikh landowners before 2012.
    And he did not amend his asylum application to reflect his
    purported fear of the BJP upon the party’s ascension to
    power in early 2014. Moreover, Singh offered no evidence
    that he is a landowner. These facts support the agency’s
    view that Singh was willing to say whatever he thought
    would buttress his asylum claim, regardless of truth. The
    agency’s conclusion that Singh failed to offer sufficient
    credible evidence of a well-founded fear of future
    persecution is therefore supported by the record.
    3. The agency had sufficient ground to conclude that
    Singh offered insufficient credible evidence of past
    persecution. Singh testified that, on two occasions in
    2010, he was attacked by four members of the National
    Congress Party. However, Singh’s testimony regarding the
    alleged attacks was “generalized,” lacking “specifics and
    details,” including the exact nature of any injuries he
    suffered. CAR 62; see also Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of
    Justice, 
    433 F.3d 332
    , 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that an
    asylum applicant must demonstrate that the harm he suffered
    rose above “mere harassment”). This lack of detail,
    combined with the agency’s supportable finding that Singh
    was not a “credible witness,” entitled the agency to afford
    Singh’s testimony “very little evidentiary weight” and to
    ultimately reject his claim of past persecution. CAR 61;
    see also Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
    471 F.3d 315
    , 342
    (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that the weight to afford evidence
    is largely within the agency’s discretion).
    There is no evidence in the record--including the
    evidence deemed untimely--to compel a conclusion different
    from the one reached by the agency. The medical letter
    that Singh submitted after the filing deadline, which the
    agency actually did consider "for [the sake of]
    completeness,” was vague, unsworn, and not a
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    contemporaneous record of medical treatment. CAR 62. The
    affidavits from Singh’s family members were similarly short
    on detail, prepared four years after the alleged attacks,
    and unsupported by personal knowledge. And the letter from
    a member of Singh’s political party, which stated simply
    that Singh had been attacked on two unspecified dates, was
    unsworn and lacked any indication of personal knowledge.
    4. Given that the agency reasonably found that Singh
    “failed to [present sufficient] credible evidence of either
    past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
    persecution,” CAR 62, it did not err in denying asylum.
    Nor did the agency err in denying Singh withholding of
    removal and relief under the CAT, both of which require
    even greater showings. Lecaj v. Holder, 
    616 F.3d 111
    , 119-
    20 (2d Cir. 2010).
    We have considered Singh’s remaining arguments and
    conclude that they are without merit. The petition for
    review is DENIED. Any stay of removal previously granted
    in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a
    stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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