Simmons v. Reichardt ( 2010 )

Filed 12/23/10 NO. 4-10-0143
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
DAWN SIMMONS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Livingston County
NANCY REICHARDT and GREG REICHARDT, ) No. 05L14
Defendants-Appellees. )
) Honorable
) Jennifer H. Bauknecht,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In May 2005, plaintiff, Dawn Simmons, sued defendants,
Nancy and Greg Reichardt, for injuries she sustained in June 2003
while on a trampoline. In October 2007, Nancy and Greg filed a
motion for summary judgment under section 2-1005 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2008)), arguing that (1)
they did not owe Dawn a duty to warn her that jumping on a
trampoline may cause injury, (2) Dawn did not present evidence
that the trampoline was defective, and (3) Greg did not own the
trampoline or the property on which the trampoline was located.
Following a March 2009 hearing, the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Nancy and Greg.
Dawn appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (1)
granting summary judgment in Greg's favor and (2) denying her
subsequent motion to reconsider. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts were gleaned from the parties'
pleadings, depositions, affidavits, admissions, and other sup-
porting documents filed with the trial court.
In 2003, Greg and his eight-year-old daughter, Haley,
lived in a home owned by Greg's mother, Nancy. Nancy also rented
a room to Matt Ryan, a mutual friend of Greg and Dawn. In June
2003, Dawn drove to Nancy's home to visit Greg, whom she had
known for several years. Shortly after arriving, Dawn, Haley,
and Matt began playing a game called "popcorn" on the trampoline
located in Nancy's backyard. Dawn described that the game--which
she had played several times on that trampoline--required a
person to sit in the center of the trampoline's bouncing surface,
while others bounced along the outer edges in an attempt to "pop"
the sitting person into the air.
Dawn explained that because she had been experiencing
lower back spasms, which she had been treated for since 2001, she
did not want to jump on the trampoline. Instead, Dawn sat in the
middle of the trampoline's circular surface while Matt and Haley
attempted to propel her into the air. At some point, Dawn was
lifted into the air, came back down onto the trampoline surface,
and "bottomed out," which caused her to hit her buttock on the
ground. As a result, Dawn experienced pain and immediately
stopped playing on the trampoline. Thereafter, Dawn, Matt, and
Haley began playing catch with a football.
After playing catch, Dawn returned to Nancy's home,
where Greg and Nancy had been during Dawn's time outside with
Matt and Haley. Dawn told Greg that (1) she had hit her buttock
on the ground while on the trampoline and (2) her buttock and
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tailbone were aching. Dawn stated that Greg responded by laugh-
ing and stating, "[N]ow you know why I don't go on that thing."
Later that evening, Dawn experienced an aching tailbone but
"could still walk and move around." Dawn spent the night at
Nancy's home, and the following morning, experienced pain in her
lower back and tailbone area that intensified as the day pro-
gressed. Eventually, Dawn drove to a drugstore to fill a pre-
scription that her doctor had prescribed for muscle spasms months
earlier.
Two weeks later, Dawn sought medical attention for her
lower back, and her doctor prescribed an oral steroid. During a
second doctor visit, the physician ordered a magnetic resonance
imaging test. Shortly thereafter, Dawn called Greg and asked him
to file a claim with his insurance company because she did not
have health insurance. Greg initially responded that he would do
so, but a few days later when Dawn called Greg about her request,
he refused to take her call. In September 2003, Dawn had surgery
on a disk in her lower back that had been putting pressure on her
spinal cord. Dawn claimed that as a direct result of the trampo-
line incident, she was unemployed from August 2003 through
January 2004.
After Dawn decided to sue Nancy and Greg, she made a
written record of the events related to the trampoline incident,
which spanned from June through September 2003. In an entry
dated "Week of Sunday[,] June 15, 2003[,]" Dawn wrote, in perti-
nent part, the following:
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"During the conversation, I mentioned
how much pain my back was in from the trampo-
line bottoming-out. Greg's response was,
'Hey, now you know why I don't go on that
thing anymore! (laughs)...We just moved it to
the other side of the yard, so some of the
springs were probably loose."
In May 2005, Dawn filed a two-count complaint, alleging
that Nancy and Greg, respectively, (1) knew the trampoline's
springs were loose and (2) failed to warn her (a) about the loose
springs and (b) that the weight of two adults on the trampoline
would be sufficient for the trampoline's bouncing surface to make
contact with the ground.
In October 2007, Nancy and Greg filed a motion for
summary judgment under section 2-1005 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-
1005 (West 2008)), arguing that (1) they did not owe Dawn a duty
to warn her that jumping on a trampoline may cause injury, (2)
Dawn did not present evidence that the trampoline was defective,
and (3) Greg did not own the trampoline or the property on which
the trampoline was located. In support of the motion for summary
judgment, Greg attached an affidavit, in which he stated, in
pertinent part, the following:
"2. That the property where [Dawn's]
alleged injuries occurred was owned solely by
[Nancy].
3. That the trampoline upon which
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[Dawn] allegedly sustained her injuries was
purchased and owned solely by [Nancy]."
Following a March 2009 hearing on the motion for
summary judgment, the trial court, in May 2009, entered a written
order granting summary judgment in favor of Greg and Nancy. With
regard to the grant of summary judgment in Greg's favor, the
court's order stated, in pertinent part, the following:
"[I]t is undisputed that Greg *** was
not home at the time of the incident, did not
own the trampoline[,] and had not given
[Dawn] permission to use the trampoline.
[Dawn's] theory against [Greg] is *** based
upon the statement he made after the inci-
dent. However, the statement itself is vague
and does not show prior knowledge on the part
of [Greg]. Assuming arguendo that [Greg]
made this statement, he could not very well
have warned [Dawn] about it since he was not
home at the time of the incident. Moreover,
he was not the owner of either the home or
the trampoline and therefore[,] would owe no
duty to [Dawn] to warn her of any defects."
(Emphases added.)
In June 2009, Dawn timely filed a motion to reconsider,
requesting that the trial court reverse its grant of summary
judgment in Greg's favor. In support of her motion, Dawn ap-
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pended only the affidavit of Kimberly Gordon, Greg's former
spouse, who asserted that (1) she was with Greg when he purchased
the trampoline in 2000, (2) the trampoline became Greg's property
after their divorce, and (3) Nancy neither purchased nor financed
the purchase of the trampoline.
In September 2009, Greg filed an answer to Dawn's
motion to reconsider in which he (1) argued that the trial court
should not consider Kimberly's affidavit because Dawn did not
provide a reasonable explanation as to why the affidavit was not
provided to the court at the March 2009 hearing on the motion for
summary judgment and (2) acknowledged that he was at Nancy's home
during the trampoline incident, but that he neither knew that
Dawn was using the trampoline nor gave her permission to do so.
(The record shows that prior to the hearing on Dawn's
motion to reconsider, Nancy died. Thus, Dawn's motion to recon-
sider was solely directed to the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in Greg's favor.)
Following a January 2010 hearing on Dawn's motion to
reconsider, the trial court entered the following docket entry:
"[The court] notes that Greg was home at
[the] time of [the] incident (contrary to
[statement] in order granting summary judg-
ment ***), but [he was] not aware [that]
anyone [was] outside using [the] trampoline.
Affidavits [submitted with motion] to recon-
sider not properly before [the court]. Re-
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gardless, [the court] finds [nothing] which
would cause [the court] to reconsider its
ruling. [Motion] to reconsider denied."
(Emphasis in original.)
This appeal followed.
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Dawn's Claim That the Trial Court Erred by Granting
Summary Judgment in Greg's Favor
1. Summary Judgment and the Standard of Review
"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affida-
vits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.' " Irwin Industrial Tool Co. v. Illinois
Department of Revenue, 238 Ill. 2d 332, 339-40, ___ N.E.2d ___,
___ (2010), quoting 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2008). A triable
issue of fact precluding summary judgment exists where the
material facts are disputed or where the material facts are
undisputed, but reasonable persons might draw different infer-
ences from those undisputed facts. Williams v. Manchester, 228
Ill. 2d 404, 417, 888 N.E.2d 1, 9 (2008).
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial
burden of proof. Atanus v. American Airlines Inc., 403 Ill. App.
3d 549, 553, 932 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (2010); Evans v. Brown, 399
Ill. App. 3d 238, 243, 925 N.E.2d 1265, 1271 (2010). "When
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court must determine
whether, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
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party, the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on
file reveal any genuine issues of material fact and, if not,
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." Brugger v. Joseph Academy, Inc., 202 Ill. 2d 435, 446, 781
N.E.2d 269, 275 (2002). "We review de novo the trial court's
grant of summary judgment." Brown, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 244, 925
N.E.2d at 1271.
2. Dawn's Contention That a Genuine Issue of Material
Fact Precluded Summary Judgment
Dawn argues that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment in Greg's favor. Specifically, Dawn contends
that contrary to the court's findings, a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact existed as to whether Greg owned the trampoline. In
support of her contention, Dawn relies on Greg's August 2007
deposition, in which Greg provided the following pertinent
testimony:
"[DAWN'S ATTORNEY]: Do you know what
size the trampoline was that was in your
yard?
[GREG]: *** It might have been 15-foot
[in] diameter maybe. ***
[DAWN'S ATTORNEY]: And you were the one
who purchased the trampoline ***?
[GREG]: Yes.
[DAWN'S ATTORNEY]: And do you remember
when that was?
[GREG]: That would be [sic] before
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[Haley and I] moved to [Nancy's home], so I
would think it would probably be [20]02.
[DAWN'S ATTORNEY]: And what did you
purchase it for, if anything?
[GREG]: For Haley."
Upon appellate review of a trial court's summary-
judgment determination, the appellant may (1) refer to the record
only as it existed at the time the trial court ruled, (2) outline
the arguments made at that time, and (3) explain why the trial
court erred by granting summary judgment. Lawrence & Allen, Inc.
v. Cambridge Human Resource Group, Inc., 292 Ill. App. 3d 131,
136, 685 N.E.2d 434, 439 (1997).
The problem with Dawn's contention is that prior to the
March 2009 hearing on Greg's motion for summary judgment, she
never submitted Greg's deposition to the trial court as it
addressed that motion. Thus, when the court entered a written
order in May 2009 granting summary judgment in Greg's favor, the
court was correct to observe--based upon the materials the
parties had submitted--that it was "undisputed" that Greg was not
the owner of either the home or the trampoline. Indeed, although
Dawn later filed a motion to reconsider that contained additional
evidentiary material--namely, the affidavit of Kimberly Gordon--
she never presented the court with Greg's deposition, as Dawn's
counsel conceded at oral argument before this court. Accord-
ingly, because the content of Greg's deposition was not properly
before the court at the March 2009 summary-judgment hearing, we
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refuse to consider it on appeal. See Brown, 399 Ill. App. 3d at
252, 925 N.E.2d at 1278 ("'The scope of appellate review of a
summary[-]judgment motion is limited to the record as it existed
at the time the trial court ruled'"), quoting McCullough v.
Gallaher & Speck, 254 Ill. App. 3d 941, 947, 627 N.E.2d 202, 207
(1993). To hold otherwise would mean reversing the trial court
based upon evidence it never heard, an action this court is
extraordinarily disinclined to ever take.
Having concluded that the August 2007 deposition was
not properly before the trial court, we turn to the merits of
Dawn's argument, considering only the evidence that was properly
before the court.
Here, the competent evidence--which we note was
undisputed--at the March 2009 summary-judgment hearing shows that
Nancy owned (1) the trampoline in question and (2) the property
on which the trampoline was located. Thus, Greg had no duty to
warn Dawn of trampoline defects--if any--irrespective of his
knowledge of such defects. Accordingly, we conclude that the
trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in Greg's
favor. See Turner v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 401 Ill. App. 3d
698, 705, 930 N.E.2d 418, 425 (2010) (summary judgment is appro-
priate when a plaintiff fails to provide facts from which a court
can infer the existence of a duty).
3. A Suggested Checklist for Summary-Judgment Practice
All too often, deficiencies in a nonmoving party's
response to a movant's motion for summary judgment results--as in
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this case--in a trial court's grant of summary-judgment and the
resulting affirmation on appeal. Thus, a better practice might
be for counsel to adopt a checklist--similar to the rules that
attorneys must follow in summary-judgment proceedings held in
federal court--to minimize, if not eliminate, such deficiencies.
For example, local rule 7.1(D)(2) of the United States
District Court, Central District of Illinois, requires that
responses in opposition to a motion for summary judgment contain
the following: (1) an introduction, summarizing the legal and
factual basis for the opposition, which includes an explicit
statement of the relief sought; (2) separate sections outlining
(a) undisputed material facts, (b) disputed material facts, (c)
disputed immaterial facts, (d) undisputed immaterial facts, and
(e) additional material facts; and (3) an argument section that
responds directly to the movant's argument for summary judgment
by identifying each disagreement with a proposed point of law and
why the movant's summary-judgment motion should not be granted.
C.D. Ill. Ct. R. 7.1(D)(2) (eff. January 20, 2010).
Employment of such a checklist, although not mandatory,
would undoubtedly assist attorneys filing and opposing summary-
judgment motions by forcing them to efficiently and effectively
focus their respective arguments on the central concern underly-
ing such motions, which is whether a genuine issue of material
fact is present on the record before the trial court. Moreover,
such a tightly focused presentation to the court would also
result in (1) the efficient use of scarce judicial resources and
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(2) a better and clearer record on appeal, assuming summary
judgment is granted.
B. Dawn's Claim That the Trial Court Erred
by Denying Her Motion To Reconsider
Dawn next argues that the trial court erred by denying
her motion to reconsider. We disagree.
"The purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to
the trial court's attention (1) newly discovered evidence not
available at the time of the hearing, (2) changes in the law, or
(3) errors in the court's previous application of existing law."
Stringer v. Packaging Corp. of America, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1135,
1140, 815 N.E.2d 476, 481 (2004). When a movant seeks reconsid-
eration based on newly discovered evidence, "a party must show
that the newly discovered evidence existed before the initial
hearing but had not yet been discovered or was otherwise unob-
tainable." Stringer, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 1141, 815 N.E.2d at
481. A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
reconsider lies within its sound discretion, and this court will
not disturb such a ruling absent an abuse of discretion.
Stringer, 351 Ill. App. 3d at 1140, 815 N.E.2d at 481.
In this case, Dawn contends that Kimberly's affidavit
was not presented to the trial court at the March 2009 summary-
judgment hearing because although Kimberly "was known to the
parties, no one knew she had any knowledge of the owner of the
trampoline until she raised it in a discussion with [Dawn] after
the [court's] ruling on the [summary-judgment] motion." However,
Dawn's assertion fails to reasonably explain why her conversation
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with Kimberly could not have taken place during the 46 months
that elapsed from the time she filed her May 2005 complaint until
the March 2009 hearing on the motion for summary judgment, yet
she acquired Kimberly's signed affidavit 10 days after the court
granted summary judgment.
In this regard, we reaffirm the following rationale
underlying the requirement that a movant provide a reasonable
explanation, justifying why evidence presented at a hearing on a
motion to reconsider was not available at the time of the origi-
nal hearing:
"'Trial courts should not permit litigants to
stand mute, lose a motion, and then franti-
cally gather evidentiary material to show
that the court erred in its ruling. Civil
proceedings already suffer from far too many
delays, and the interests of finality and
efficiency require that the trial courts not
consider such late-tendered evidentiary mate-
rial, no matter what the contents thereof may
be.'" (Emphasis in original.) Stringer, 351
Ill. App. 3d at 1141, 815 N.E.2d at 481,
quoting Gardner v. Navistar International
Transportation Corp., 213 Ill. App. 3d 242,
248-49, 571 N.E.2d 1107, 1111 (1991).
Accordingly, because Dawn failed to reasonably justify
why Kimberly's affidavit was not available or unobtainable at the
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time of the March 2009 summary-judgment hearing, we conclude that
the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Dawn's motion
to reconsider.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
grant of summary judgment in Greg's favor.
Affirmed.
KNECHT, P.J., and POPE, J., concur.
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