Com. v. Shafer, S. ( 2015 )


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  • J-S15019-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    SHAWN W. SHAFER
    Appellant                  No. 1237 MDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of June 11, 2013
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-40-CR-0003182-2012
    BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., WECHT, J., and JENKINS, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.:                               FILED MARCH 19, 2015
    Shawn W. Shafer appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
    following his entry of guilty pleas to robbery, escape, resisting arrest, and
    possessing instruments of crime (“PIC”).1 Counsel for Shafer has petitioned
    for leave to withdraw as counsel on the ground that Shafer’s issue on direct
    appeal is wholly frivolous.       We grant the petition for leave to withdraw as
    counsel, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.
    The trial court set forth the underlying procedural history of this case
    as follows:2
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(iv), 5121(a), 5104, and 907, respectively.
    2
    The facts underlying Shafer’s guilty plea are immaterial to our
    disposition. Therefore, we need not recite them here.
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    The [c]ourt accepted [Shafer’s] guilty pleas at a hearing on
    March 15, 2013.     A Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) was
    ordered to be completed by the Luzerne County Adult Probation
    and Parole Department, and a sentencing hearing was
    scheduled.
    On June 11, 2013, [Shafer] appeared before the [c]ourt for
    sentencing. Upon a review of the PSI and upon consideration of
    the submissions made by [Shafer] and counsel at the sentencing
    hearing, [the court] determined that sentences within the
    standard range of the applicable sentencing guidelines were
    appropriate.     Accordingly, [Shafer] was sentenced to an
    aggregate term of seventy[-]five (75) months to one hundred
    fifty (150) months in a state correctional institution.
    Additionally, although [the court] ordered Count 4 to be served
    concurrently with the sentence on Count 2, Counts 7 and 8 were
    ordered to be served consecutive [sic] to each other,
    consecutive to Count 2, and consecutive to any other sentence
    [Shafer] was then serving. [Shafer] was subsequently advised
    of his post-sentence rights before the hearing concluded.
    [After a series of attempts to appeal pro se and orders issued by
    this Court, o]n June 4, 2014, [Shafer] filed a [counseled] Motion
    to Modify Sentence which [the trial court] denied by Order of the
    same date. A Nunc Pro Tunc Notice of Appeal was filed on June
    19, 2014, and on June 2[3], 2014, [the court] ordered [Shafer]
    to filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and requested the Commonwealth
    to respond thereto.
    On July 2, 2014, [Shafer] filed his Concise Statement . . . . The
    Commonwealth’s response was filed on July 10, 2014.
    Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 9/25/2014, at 1-2.
    On September 25, 2014, the trial court entered its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
    opinion, in which it reviewed Shafer’s sentence and concluded that Shafer
    had failed to raise a substantial question that his sentence was contrary to
    the fundamental norms or a violation of a provision of the Sentencing Code.
    Id. at 3-5.
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    J-S15019-15
    On November 14, 2014, counsel for Shafer filed an Anders brief in
    which she presented issues that might arguably support an appeal.3 Counsel
    filed her petition for leave to withdraw as counsel on the same day, stating
    that, after a conscientious examination of the record, she determined that
    the appeal would be wholly frivolous. See Petition for Leave to Withdraw as
    Counsel, 11/14/2014, at unnumbered page 1 ¶ 2. Attached to the petition is
    a copy of her letter to Shafer advising him of her intent to seek withdrawal
    as his counsel and of Shafer’s right to retain new counsel or to proceed with
    his appeal pro se, and providing him with a copy of the Anders brief filed
    with this Court.      See id. at Attachment.     Shafer has not responded to
    counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw.
    [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies . . . counsel’s petition to
    withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the
    procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2)
    refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
    supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the
    appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for
    concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate
    the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes
    on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is
    frivolous.
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 361 (Pa. 2009).
    Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders petition
    and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the right to
    ____________________________________________
    3
    See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967); Commonwealth v.
    McClendon, 
    434 A.2d 1185
     (Pa. 1981), abrogated in part by
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa. 2009).
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    J-S15019-15
    retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points
    worthy of this Court’s attention.
    If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical requirements of
    Anders, this Court will deny the petition to withdraw and
    remand the case with appropriate instructions (e.g., directing
    counsel either to comply with Anders or file an advocate’s brief
    on Appellant’s behalf). By contrast, if counsel’s petition and
    brief satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our own review of
    the appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous. If the appeal is
    frivolous, we will grant the withdrawal petition and affirm the
    judgment of sentence.        However, if there are non-frivolous
    issues, we will deny the petition and remand for the filing of an
    advocate’s brief.
    Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 
    957 A.2d 1265
    , 1266 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (citations omitted).
    In the instant case, counsel has complied with the Anders and
    Santiago requirements.     She has submitted a brief that summarizes the
    case and cites to the record, see Anders Brief at 1-4; refers to anything
    that might arguably support the appeal, id. at 5-6; and sets forth her
    reasoning and conclusion that the appeal is frivolous, id. at 6-7.          See
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. She has filed a petition for leave to withdraw as
    counsel, sent Shafer a letter advising him that she found no non-frivolous
    issues, provided Shafer with a copy of the Anders brief, and notified Shafer
    of his right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se.         Shafer has not
    responded.
    “Once counsel has satisfied the [Anders] requirements, it is then this
    Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the trial court’s proceedings and
    render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly
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    frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Lilley, 
    978 A.2d 995
    , 998 (Pa. Super. 2009)
    (citation omitted).
    The Anders brief raises one question for our review: “Whether the
    consecutive   sentences   imposed    by    the   [trial   court]   are   harsh   and
    excessive?” Anders Brief at 1.
    In her Anders brief, counsel asserts that Shafer’s “aggregate
    sentence, imposed with certain counts running consecutively to each other
    and the entire sentence running consecutively to any other sentence
    currently being served, is harsh and excessive.” Id. at 5. We agree with
    counsel that the issue is without merit.
    An argument premised upon the court’s order running a defendant’s
    sentences consecutively is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
    sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Glass, 
    50 A.3d 720
    , 726 (Pa. Super.
    2012).
    [A]ccordingly, pursuant to the dictates of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781,
    [an appellant] must petition for allowance of appeal by including
    in his brief a separate, concise statement of the reasons relied
    upon for allowance of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). The Rule
    2119(f) Statement must “raise a substantial question as to the
    appropriateness of the sentence” by demonstrating that the
    “actions of the sentencing court [were either] inconsistent with
    the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms
    underlying the sentencing process.”
    Commonwealth v. Fowler, 
    893 A.2d 758
    , 766 (Pa. Super. 2006) (case
    citations omitted).
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    J-S15019-15
    In the instant case, counsel’s Anders brief includes a statement of
    reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).
    See Anders Brief at 5.      Shafer contends that his sentence is excessive
    because the court imposed some sentences consecutive to each other, and
    consecutive to any other sentences being served, despite Shafer’s “regret for
    his criminal actions that were motivated by a drug addiction.”        
    Id.
     at 2
    (citing Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”) Sentencing, 6/11/2013, at 10).
    “[A]n allegation that the sentencing court did not consider certain
    mitigating factors does not raise a substantial question.” Commonwealth
    v. McNabb, 
    819 A.2d 54
    , 57 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted).           “[An
    a]ppellant’s claim that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences . . . to
    run consecutively, instead of concurrently, to a previously imposed sentence
    does not raise a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Pass, 
    914 A.2d 442
    , 446 (Pa. Super. 2006).          Furthermore, in general, “a claim of
    excessiveness of sentence does not raise a substantial question where the
    sentence is within the statutory limits.”   Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    741 A.2d 726
    , 735 (Pa. Super. 1999).
    Shafer’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence for the
    court’s alleged failure to consider mitigating factors while running his
    sentences consecutively fails to raise a substantial question. Accordingly, his
    petition for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of his sentence
    is frivolous. Furthermore, upon independent review, we find no other non-
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    frivolous basis for appeal.   Therefore, we conclude that Shafer’s appeal is
    wholly frivolous. O’Malley, 
    957 A.2d at 1266
    .
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.       Petition for leave to withdraw as
    counsel granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/19/2015
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