Rhoads v. Miller , 352 F. App'x 289 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 5, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
SAMUEL EUGENE RHOADS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-8093
(D.C. No. 1:07-CV-00306-WFD)
MATTHEW MILLER, individually, (D. Wyo.)
Defendant-Appellant,
and
BEN MAYLAND, individually and
in his official capacity; DAVID
MATTIS, in his official capacity;
BIG HORN COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE; KENNETH BLACKBURN,
in his official capacity,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Matthew Miller appeals from the district court’s order denying him
qualified immunity against Samuel Rhoads’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that
Deputy Miller subjected him to excessive force while booking him into the Big
Horn County Jail. We affirm.
Background
On December 1, 2005, Deputy Ben Mayland responded to a complaint that
a drunken man in a wheelchair – Mr. Rhoads – was threatening bar patrons.
Deputy Mayland arrested Mr. Rhoads and delivered him to the jail for booking.
Mr. Rhoads, then sixty-six years old, admits to being an alcoholic. At
deposition, he testified that he was drinking that day and his memory of events is
not very good. According to his recollection, he was arrested by two officers at
the bar and taken to the jail. Upon arrival, he was wheeled into the garage, and
then he was beaten by one of the arresting officers, whose identity he was not
sure of. The officer grabbed his arm, pulled him out of his wheelchair, and tipped
him over, then kicked him in the ribs and stomped on his hands. He claims he
never got as far as the booking area, but instead was taken to the hospital after the
beating.
Deputy Miller tells a different version of the facts. His deposition
testimony was that Mr. Rhoads was drunk and verbally abusive. After trying to
fill out the booking forms, eventually the deputy moved Mr. Rhoads into a room
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adjacent to the booking area so that Mr. Rhoads could change into a jail uniform.
Mr. Rhoads did not quickly remove his street clothes, and he continued to use
foul language. After removing his street pants, he began swinging the jail pants
in the air. He brushed Deputy Miller with the pants and threw them on the
ground. He then began swinging his arms, lightly brushing the deputy’s chest.
Deputy Miller used an arm-bar takedown on Mr. Rhoads, removing him from his
wheelchair to the ground. As a result, Mr. Rhoads suffered a bleeding cut above
his eye and a dislocated left elbow which ultimately required surgery to repair.
Mr. Rhoads sued Deputy Miller and others under § 1983, alleging that he
was subjected to an excessive use of force. Skeptical of Mr. Rhoads’ testimony
about being beaten, the district court relied on the deputy’s testimony.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that, even under Deputy Miller’s version of the
facts, Mr. Rhoads identified a constitutional right that was clearly established at
the time of the incident. Accordingly, the court denied the deputy’s motion for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Deputy Miller appeals.
Jurisdiction
We first must satisfy ourselves that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
See Johnson v. Martin, 195 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Rhoads
suggests that we lack jurisdiction because there are genuine issues of material fact
precluding summary judgment. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995)
(holding unappealable a summary judgment order that “determines only a
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question of evidence sufficiency” (quotation omitted)). But the district court’s
ruling was not based on the parties’ factual dispute; instead, it addressed legal
issues. And this court has recognized that in the qualified immunity context,
“even though a district court concludes that there are controverted factual issues,
a summary judgment ruling may still be immediately appealable in certain
circumstances,” such as where “a qualified immunity appeal raises the kind of
abstract legal issues that are separate from the factual issues that may arise at
trial.” Johnson v. Martin, 195 F.3d at 1214.
It is undisputed that Mr. Rhoads was injured at the jail on December 1,
whether through the arm-bar maneuver as Deputy Miller claims or through a
beating as Mr. Rhoads claims. While the existence of disputed facts is relevant to
our decision, as discussed below, we conclude that this appeal primarily involves
legal issues and we have jurisdiction to proceed.
Analysis
We review the denial of qualified immunity de novo. See York v. City of
Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2008). “The doctrine of qualified
immunity protects public officials performing discretionary functions unless their
conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Johnson v. Martin, 195 F.3d at 1216(quotations omitted). In reviewing a claim of qualified immunity, then, the court
considers (1) whether the facts establish a violation of a constitutional right and
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(2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the incident. See
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815-16 (2009). But courts are “permitted to
exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Id. at 818. Deputy Miller
challenges the district court’s decision regarding both of these elements.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity,
we take the facts “in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury.”
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007). “[T]his usually means adopting . . .
the plaintiff’s version of the facts,” id. at 378, unless that version “is so utterly
discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him,” id. at
380. In Scott, the plaintiff’s testimony was discredited by a videotape that
completely contradicted his version of the events. 550 U.S. at 379. Here, there is
no videotape or similar evidence in the record to blatantly contradict Mr. Rhoads’
testimony. 1 There is only other witnesses’ testimony to oppose his version of the
facts, and our judicial system leaves credibility determinations to the jury. See
Allen v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 241 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The
weighing of evidence, the reconciliation of inconsistent testimony, and the
assessment of a witness’ credibility is solely within the province of the jury.”);
1
Counsel informed the district court that the main booking area was under
video surveillance. But the jail’s practice is to reuse tapes, and the tape from the
date of this incident was recorded over when the jail failed to take any measures
to preserve it.
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Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1159 (10th Cir. 1992) (“It is the jury’s
exclusive province to assess the credibility of witnesses and determine the weight
to be given to their testimony.”). And given the undisputed fact of injury,
Mr. Rhoads’ alcoholism and memory problems go to the weight of his testimony,
not its admissibility. 2 See Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2002)
(stating, in light of evidence that plaintiff was injured by officers, “[s]imply
because [plaintiff] has no clear recollection of the act which he contends caused
his severe injury does not mean that his claim must fail as a matter of law”).
Mr. Rhoads alleges that his injuries resulted from a beating rendered
without resistence or provocation. If believed by the jury, the events he describes
are sufficient to support a claim of violation of clearly established law under
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989), and this court’s precedent. See,
e.g., Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1055 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
plaintiff’s testimony that officers beat him with flashlights, kneed him in the
groin, and shoved him face-first into a wall supported excessive force claim and
showed a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment on
qualified immunity); Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024, 1026 (10th Cir. 1992)
2
We recognize that Mr. Rhoads also testified that Deputy Miller was not one
of the persons who had beaten him, but Deputy Miller admits to performing the
arm-bar maneuver on Mr. Rhoads (which maneuver is generally in accord with
Mr. Rhoads’ description of an officer grabbing his arm and pulling him out of his
wheelchair). In light of Deputy Miller’s admission and Mr. Rhoads’ admitted
memory problems, a reasonable jury could believe that Mr. Rhoads was subjected
to a beating, as he testified, while discounting his description of his assailant(s).
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(per curiam) (holding that assaultive behavior against an arrestee by an officer
could not be determined to be objectively reasonable as a matter of law); Austin v.
Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that, under arrestees’
version of the facts alleging repeated assaults without provocation, among other
abuses, no reasonable officer could have believed such treatment to be
constitutionally permissible); Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding that it was not objectively reasonable for an officer to choke and
beat a detainee where the detainee was not threatening the officer); see also York,
523 F.3d at 1209, 1211 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that jury could easily find
constitutional violations where detainee’s arm was broken when officers forced
him to the ground with an arm-bar takedown, placed a knee in his back, and
threatened to employ Taser). The jurors may decide not to credit Mr. Rhoads’
testimony, but that is their prerogative, not ours. Therefore, the district court did
not err in denying Deputy Miller’s motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity.
Conclusion
The district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Deputy Miller is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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