In the Matter of C.T. ( 2014 )


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  •                   In the Missouri Court of Appeals
    Eastern District
    DIVISION ONE
    IN THE MATTER OF C.T.,                      )       No. ED100988
    )
    Respondent/Appellant,                )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
    )       of the City of St. Louis
    )
    )       Hon. Philip C. Heagney
    )
    )       FILED: May 27, 2014
    C.T. appeals from the Probate Division’s judgment denying his motion to dismiss
    and granting the State’s petition to commit involuntarily C.T. to the care of St. Alexius
    Hospital (“St. Alexius”) for a period not to exceed twenty-one days. We dismiss the
    appeal as moot.
    On December 16, 2013, C.T. was taken to St. Alexius by the police following
    behavior by C.T. outside of a pharmacy where he was exhibiting aggressive, threatening
    behavior and had to be restrained by people in the area until the police arrived. C.T. was
    assessed by staff in the emergency room (“ER”) and by psychiatric intake department as
    well. C.T. initially consented verbally to treatment at St. Alexius, which was duly noted
    in the appropriate forms, and then signed an “Application for Voluntary Hospitalization
    to Psychiatric Services at St. Alexius Hospital.” C.T. was transferred from the ER to the
    men’s psychiatric unit on the third floor, a locked unit. C.T. was examined by Dr.
    Harmeeta Singh on December 17, 2013, Dr. Singh noted that he was “hyper-talkative”
    Dr. Singh consulted with another facility where C.T. had stayed, which served to confirm
    her diagnosis of chronic paranoid schizophrenia. On December 26, 1013, St. Alexius
    admitted C.T. for evaluation on a four-day, 96-hour involuntary commitment after four
    incidents involving C.T. On January 2, 2014, before the 96-hour period expired 1 , a
    health professional at St. Alexius filed a petition in probate court to commit C.T.
    involuntarily for up to twenty-one days for treatment pursuant to sections 632.330 and
    632.335 RSMo 2000. 2
    The Probate Division appointed counsel for C.T. and scheduled a hearing on the
    petition for January 6, 2014. On January 3, 2014, C.T.’s counsel filed a motion to
    dismiss the petition, asserting that the petition was not filed in a timely manner pursuant
    to the requirements of section 632.330. C.T. alleged that he had been an involuntary
    patient at St. Alexius since December 16, 2013. C.T.’s motion was taken with the
    petition. The hearing was delayed due to weather conditions until January 8, 2014. The
    hearing took place at St. Alexius, and was conducted by a commissioner of the Probate
    Division.    Dr. Singh testified, as did C.T.            Dr. Singh testified that based on her
    observation of C.T., he was a chronic paranoid schizophrenic with impulse control and
    generalized and social anxiety issues. She said that based on her observation of C.T. on
    December 17, 2013, she believed that C.T. had the mental capacity to admit himself
    voluntarily to St. Alexius, even though he had problems. Dr. Singh stated based on her
    experience, even though somebody might not be ready for outpatient treatment, he could
    still be competent to make decisions about his welfare and still be competent to
    voluntarily admit themselves to a psychiatric unit.
    1
    Under section 632.005(14) RSMo 2000, 96 hours “shall be construed and computed to exclude Saturdays,
    Sundays and legal holidays which are observed either by the court or by the mental health facility where
    the respondent is detained.”
    2
    Unless noted otherwise, all further statutory citations are to RSMo 2000.
    2
    C.T. testified that he did not think that he had a mental illness or that his mental
    health required hospitalization, and wanted to leave St. Alexius immediately. He stated
    that he thought he was at the St. Alexius ER for treatment of physical injuries and that no
    one explained to him on December 16, 2013, that he was consenting to admit himself for
    psychiatric treatment.
    The Probate Division granted the State’s petition to commit C.T. to the care and
    treatment of St. Alexius for a period not to exceed twenty-one days. It implicitly denied
    C.T.’s motion to dismiss. C.T. neither filed a motion to stay the Probate Division’s order,
    nor a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but rather filed a notice of appeal on January
    21, 2014. 3 He was discharged by St. Alexius on January 28, 2014. C.T. now appeals
    from the trial court’s judgment.
    C.T. contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and in
    granting the petition for involuntary detention for inpatient mental health treatment for a
    period not to exceed twenty-one days because said petition was not filed within ninety-
    six hours of his admission to a mental health facility as required by section 632.330.1
    RSMo 2000, and that he did not consent voluntarily to admission.
    Our review of a judgment entered by the probate division of the circuit court is
    governed by Murphy v Carron, 
    536 S.W.2d 30
    , 32 (Mo. banc 1976). In re Estate of
    Collins, 
    405 S.W.3d 602
    , 604 (Mo. App. 2013). Accordingly, this Court will affirm the
    judgment unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of
    the evidence, or it erroneously states or applies the law. 
    Id. This Court
    defers to the trial
    3
    Pursuant to section 632.430, any person under a court order of involuntary detention for mental health
    treatment under Chapter 632 can file a motion to stay “any order restricting an individual’s liberty” in
    “either the court or the appropriate appellate court.” Under section 632.435, “[a]ny person detained under
    this chapter shall be entitled to file for a writ of habeas corpus.”
    3
    court’s findings of fact because of its superior position to assess the credibility of
    witnesses, but we review questions of law de novo. 
    Id. at 604-05.
    A threshold question in any appellate review of a controversy is the mootness of
    the controversy. TCF, LLC v. City of St. Louis, 
    402 S.W.3d 176
    , 181 (Mo. App. 2013). 4
    Regarding justiciability, a case is moot if a judgment rendered has no practical effect on
    an existent controversy. 
    Id. “The existence
    of an actual and vital controversy susceptible
    of some relief is essential to appellate jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Wilson v. Murray, 
    955 S.W.2d 811
    , 812-13 (Mo. App. 1997). When something occurs that makes a decision on
    appeal unnecessary or makes it impossible for the appellate court to grant effective relief,
    the appeal is moot and generally should be dismissed. 
    TCF, 402 S.W.3d at 181
    .
    C.T. was discharged by St. Alexius on January 28, 2014, after having requested
    appellate review of the trial court’s judgment. A decision by this Court is no longer
    necessary, and there is no effectual relief that can be granted, and accordingly the
    controversy is moot. 5 There are two narrow exceptions to the mootness doctrine that
    Missouri courts recognize. First, if a case becomes moot after submission and argument,
    then dismissal is discretionary. Herman v. Heskett, 
    403 S.W.3d 136
    , 142 (Mo. App.
    2013); second, we may consider the appeal if it raises a recurring issue of general public
    interest and importance that would otherwise evade appellate review. 
    Id. This second
    exception is construed very narrowly. 
    TCF, 402 S.W.3d at 181
    . “‘[I]f an issue of public
    importance in a moot case is likely to be present in a future live controversy practically
    4
    The State of Missouri filed a motion to dismiss C.T.’s appeal as moot, which this Court has taken with the
    case.
    5
    C.T.’s counsel conceded at oral argument that C.T. did not and would not suffer any collateral
    consequences as a result of his involuntary detention for mental health treatment.
    4
    capable of appellate review, then the ‘public-interest’ exception does not apply.’” 
    Id. (quoting City
    of Manchester v. Ryan, 
    180 S.W.3d 19
    , 22 (Mo. App. 2005)).
    The first exception is not applicable in this case as the matter is already moot.
    The very narrow “public-interest” exception is also inapplicable to this matter. There are
    remedies for expedited review. Section 632.430.2 authorizes a motion to stay the trial
    court’s order and judgment in either the trial court or the appellate court.6 Section
    632.435 authorizes a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In addition, section 632.430.1
    provides for an expedited appeal. See Matter of Todd, 
    767 S.W.2d 589
    (Mo. App. 1988).
    If a similar matter were to arise again it would be “practically capable” of appellate
    review, and accordingly the “public-interest” exception to the mootness doctrine is
    inapplicable.
    We grant the State’s motion to dismiss C.T.’s appeal as moot.
    ______________________________
    CLIFFORD H. AHRENS, Judge
    Roy L. Richter, P.J., concurs.
    Glenn A. Norton, J., concurs.
    6
    The relief of filing a motion to stay under section 632.430.2 is not absolute in that a stay order shall not be
    granted where the trial court has found that the person is “so mentally ill” that there exists “an imminent
    likelihood of serious physical harm to himself or others if he is not detained or treated pending appeal.”
    The Probate Division in this case did not find “an imminent likelihood of serious physical harm” but rather
    that C.T. presented “a likelihood of serious harm[.]”
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: ED100988

Judges: Clifford H. Ahrens, J.

Filed Date: 5/27/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014