Arrowhead Lake Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Ajay Aggarwal and Megha Garg ( 2020 )

MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
WESTERN DISTRICT
ARROWHEAD LAKE ESTATES )
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, ) WD83019 Consolidated with
INC., ) WD83049
)
Appellant-Respondent, ) OPINION FILED:
v. )
) September 1, 2020
AJAY AGGARWAL AND MEGHA )
GARG, )
)
Respondent-Appellants. )
)
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri
Honorable Kimberly Jane Shaw, Judge
Before Division One:
Thomas H. Newton, P.J., Mark D. Pfeiffer and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., JJ.
Arrowhead Lake Estates Homeowners Association, Inc. (HOA) appeals a
Boone County Circuit Court judgment that did not award the HOA attorney ’s
fees as mandated by the Arrowhead Lake Estates Declaration of Covenants,
Easements and Restrictions (Declaration) in a dispute over the construction of
an unapproved pool-equipment building (building) on property owned by Drs.
Ajay Aggarwal and Megha Garg (Lot Owners). We reverse and remand.
The Lot Owners submitted plans to the HOA in April 2017, seeking its
approval to add a pool, hot tub, fire pit, decking, and a fence to their lakeside
property in Boone County, Missouri. The next day, the HOA’s architectural
control committee approved the plans, and the Lot Owners responded by
agreeing that any potential changes in the project would be communicated to the
HOA. The HOA was not informed that changes would be made to the approved
plan, but it became aware in August 2017 that the Lot Owners were constructing
near the pool a building that was not part of the submitted plan. The HOA sent
a cease-and-desist letter to the Lot Owners demanding that they cease
construction of the building and remove it from the property.
The Lot Owners refused to do so, and the HOA filed a two-count petition
for injunctive relief (1) to have the building removed and (2) for attorney’s fees
and costs associated with the litigation to be awarded, with the judgment
constituting a lien on the Lot Owners’ property. The Lot Owners filed a counter-
claim, seeking a declaration as to the meaning of terms used in the HOA
Declaration, under which the HOA could not prevail on a demand to remove the
building. Following extensive discovery, a summary judgment motion filed by
the Lot Owners, and an eight-day bench trial, the trial court ruled in the HOA’s
favor on both counts, ordering the removal of the unapproved building and court
costs to be taxed to the Lot Owners, but refusing to award attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party, the HOA. The HOA appealed and the Lot Owners filed a cross-
appeal, which has been consolidated with the HOA appeal. The Lot Owners have
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abandoned the cross-appeal. 1 The HOA has also filed a motion for attorney’s
fees, costs and expenses associated with proceedings before this Court; we have
taken it with the case.
Legal Analysis
The HOA argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding
it prevailing-party attorney’s fees and litigation expenses because the
Declaration that binds the parties requires such an award to be made.
An action seeking injunctive relief is an action in equity. In a court-
tried equity case, the trial court’s judgment will be upheld unless no
substantial evidence supports it, it is against the weight of the
evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. To the extent
that the trial court’s grant of injunctive relief involves weighing the
evidence, determining the credibility of witnesses, and formulating
an injunction of the appropriate scope, the appellate court reviews
for abuse of discretion. However, questions of law are reviewed de
novo.
Lake at Twelve Oaks Home Ass'n v. Hausman, 488 S.W.3d 190, 195 (Mo. App.
W.D. 2016). As the only remaining issue on appeal is the interpretation of the
Declaration, our review is de novo. See Kelly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
218 S.W.3d 517, 522 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007) (interpretation of a contract is a
question of law that we review de novo on appeal).
According to the Missouri Supreme Court, a declaration “is simply a
contract” and “[i]n an unambiguous contract, the intent of the parties is to be
1
The notice of appeal indicated that the Lot Owners intended to challenge the injunctive relief granted
by the trial court.
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discerned from the contract alone.” DeBaliviere Place Ass'n v. Veal, 337 S.W.3d
670, 676 (Mo. banc 2011).
The Declaration allows the recovery of attorney’s fees when the HOA
brings an action at law or in equity to enforce the covenants and conditions.
Specifically, subparagraph 18d(2) of the Declaration, which the HOA cited in the
petition, states,
Each Party shall bear all of its own costs (including the fees of its
attorney or other representative) incurred after the Termination of
Mediation under subparagraph (c), (3), and shall share equally in the
costs of conducting any voluntary arbitration proceeding
(collectively “Post Mediation Costs”), except as otherwise provided
in this Declaration; provided, however, if the Claim is litigated in
whole or in part, the prevailing party shall be entitled to receive
an aware [sic] of attorney’s fees and court costs as deemed
appropriate by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(emphasis added). 2
“Missouri follows the ‘American Rule,’ meaning that each party generally
pays for its own attorney fees. However, [a]ttorney fees are recoverable in two
situations: when a statute specifically authorizes recovery and when
the contract provides for attorney fees.” Scheck Indus. Corp. v. Tarlton Corp.,
435 S.W.3d 705, 732 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (citations omitted). The request for
attorney’s fees must include the basis for the award under the relevant statute or
2
The HOA also references paragraph 20 of the Declaration as another provision authorizing the
recovery of attorney’s fees. That provision is not relevant to this proceeding, however, as that
provision relates to the recovery of attorney’s fees by a party in its capacity as a lot owner. Here, the
allegations of the petition and every step the HOA took in the trial proceeding were always in the
capacity as the HOA (enforcing the Declaration’s provisions) and not as a lot owner. Hence, the only
attorney’s fees provision applicable to the current proceeding is paragraph 18d(2) of the Declaration.
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contract. Ruby v. Troupe, 580 S.W.3d 112, 115 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (noting
that pleading must allege facts that would support fee award under applicable
statute or contract). Here, the HOA argues that because the Declaration states
that a prevailing party “shall” be entitled to attorney’s fees and because it
prevailed, reasonable attorney’s fees must be awarded. In this regard, the HOA
cites Desu v. Lewis, 427 S.W.3d 843, 844-45 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014), to support
its claim that a trial court commits error when not awarding attorney’s fees where
a contract provides for their payment. Id. at 845 (“The Agreement contains
language that states: ‘In the event of litigation between the parties, the prevailing
party shall recover, in addition to damages or equitable relief, the cost of
litigation including reasonable attorney’s fees’.”); see also Brown v. Brown-Thill,
437 S.W.3d 344, 346 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (finding award mandatory where
agreement between the parties stated, “If either party pursues any claim, dispute,
or controversy against the other in a proceeding other than the arbitration
provided herein, the responding party shall be entitled to dismissal or injunctive
relief regarding such action and recovery of all costs, losses, and attorneys ’ fees
relating to such action.”); Midland Prop. Partners, LLC v. Watkins, 416 S.W.3d
805, 819 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (holding that contract must provide expressly
for attorney’s fees to justify departure from the American Rule, and, with
agreement allowing the recovery of “costs” only, lower court erred in awarding
attorney’s fees). As set forth above, the relevant contractual provision of the
Declaration, paragraph 18d(2), expressly states that the prevailing party “shall
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be entitled to an awar[d] of attorney’s fees and court costs as deemed appropriate
by a court of competent jurisdiction.”
Adhering to the Declaration language and giving paragraph 18d(2) its plain
and unambiguous meaning, we conclude that the Declaration includes both a
mandatory requirement and a discretionary component to that requirement. The
mandatory and non-discretionary phrase is that “the prevailing party shall be
entitled to receive an awar[d] of attorney’s fees and court costs.” (emphasis
added). Thus, the trial court had no discretion and was required to make an award
of attorney’s fees and court costs to the prevailing party; here, the HOA. As to
the amount of that mandatory award, however, paragraph 18d(2) obligates the
trial court to award only such sum of attorney’s fees as it deems “appropriate.”
Accordingly, as the trial court has no discretion but to make an attorney’s fees
award under the Declaration’s terms, the judgment must be reversed and
remanded. This point is granted and, upon remand, the trial court is directed to
make an award of attorney’s fees to the HOA “as deemed appropriate” by the
trial court. 3
3
The HOA submitted an affidavit to the trial court requesting $83,677.60 for attorney’s fees, costs,
and litigation expenses incurred during the trial stage of this proceeding and has submitted an
additional request for attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. In our remand order, we make no state ment
as to what amount of attorney’s fees at trial or on appeal is “appropriate” as considered by the trial
court, only that the trial court is obligated to make an award of attorney’s fees to the HOA as the
prevailing party.
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Conclusion
Finding that the trial court did not adhere to the plain and unambiguous
contractual terms of the Declaration, we reverse and remand for the trial court to
make an award of attorney’s fees to the HOA. In so doing, the trial court is
required to award only such sum of attorney’s fees “as deemed appropriate.” We
also grant the HOA’s motion for attorney’s fees and court costs incurred on
appeal, but remand for the trial court to determine under the Declaration the
amount of fees on appeal it deems appropriate.
/s/ Thomas H. Newton
Thomas H. Newton, Presiding Judge
Mark D. Pfeiffer and Edward R. Ardini, JJ. concur.
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