STATE OF MISSOURI, Plaintiff-Respondent v. SPENSER A. FARR ( 2020 )

STATE OF MISSOURI, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
v. ) No. SD36175
)
SPENSER A. FARR, ) Filed: September 29, 2020
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PHELPS COUNTY
Honorable John D. Beger
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART
Spenser A. Farr (“Defendant”) appeals his convictions after a jury trial of three
counts of first-degree statutory sodomy perpetrated against two different children (counts 3,
4, and 5). 1 In finding Defendant guilty of those crimes, the jury declined to convict
Defendant of the lesser crime of child molestation in the first degree. Defendant challenges
his convictions on the ground that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to
also instruct the jury on the nested, lesser-included offense of child molestation in the
second degree.
Because second-degree child molestation is a nested, lesser-included offense of first-
degree child molestation, the trial court erred in refusing to give the requested instructions.
As to counts 3 and 4, the State correctly argues that the presumed prejudice resulting from
1
The jury found Defendant “not guilty” as to counts 1 and 2.
1
that error was rebutted because the element of the victim’s age was adequately tested by the
instructions given to the jury. Because no such testing of the second victim’s age occurred
in connection with Count 5, the presumption of prejudice was not rebutted, and we must
reverse that conviction and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Background
Defendant was charged by Amended Information with five counts of statutory
sodomy in the first degree. Counts 1 through 4 pertained to J.S. (“Victim 1”). The alleged
victim in Count 5 was J.G. (“Victim 2”). 2 While both victims testified at trial that they were
born just seven days apart in August 2000, the crimes against Victim 2 were alleged to have
potentially occurred after Victim 2’s twelfth birthday, so the State did not charge Defendant
with enhanced statutory sodomy with respect to Victim 2. 3 Thus, the counts at issue were
charged as follows:
Count [3] [Enhanced] Statutory Sodomy 1st Degree – Deviate Sexual Intercourse With
Person Less Than 12 Years of Age
....
[D]efendant in violation of Section 566.062, RSMo, committed the felony of
statutory sodomy in the first degree . . . in that on or between May 1, 2012
and June 30, 2012 . . . [D]efendant for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
the sexual desire of [] Defendant, had deviate sexual intercourse with [Victim
1], who was then less than twelve years old, by using his hand to stimulate
[Victim 1]’s penis.
Count [4] [Enhanced] Statutory Sodomy 1st Degree – Deviate Sexual Intercourse With
Person Less Than 12 Years of Age
2
We may refer to Victim 1 and Victim 2 collectively as “Victims” throughout this opinion.
3
As will be discussed herein, “regular” first-degree statutory sodomy requires deviate sexual intercourse with a
child less than 14, while enhanced first-degree statutory sodomy involves a child less than 12. Sections
566.062.1 and .2. Unless otherwise noted, all statutory citations are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2006. The
applicable version of section 566.068 is RSMo 2000.
2
....
[D]efendant in violation of Section 566.062, RSMo, committed the felony of
statutory sodomy in the first degree . . . in that on or between May 1, 2012
and June 30, 2012 . . . [D]efendant for the purpose of arousing or gratifying
the sexual desire of [] Defendant, had deviate sexual intercourse with [Victim
1], who was then less than twelve years old, by inserting his finger into
[Victim 1]’s anus.
Count [5] [“Regular”] Statutory Sodomy 1st Degree – Deviate Sexual Intercourse With A
Person Less Than 14 Years old
....
[D]efendant in violation of Section 566.062, RSMo, committed the felony of
statutory sodomy in the first degree . . . in that on or between February 1,
2012 and September 1, 2012 . . . [D]efendant for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying the sexual desire of [] Defendant, had deviate sexual intercourse
with [Victim 2], who was then less than fourteen years old, by using his hand
to stimulate [Victim 2]’s penis.
(Emphasis added.)
During the instructions conference, the trial court indicated that it would
tender an instruction on the lesser offense of first-degree child molestation on all
counts. Each submitted instruction for first-degree child molestation stated that, if
the jury found Defendant was not guilty of first-degree statutory sodomy, then it
must consider whether he was guilty of first-degree child molestation against “a
child less than fourteen years old[.]” Defendant also requested that the court instruct
the jury on second-degree child molestation, which would have required the jury to
find that the victims were less than seventeen years old. 4 In response to that request,
the State argued:
Judge, as to the lesser-included of child molestation in the second
degree, I don’t believe the Court is obligated to give that pursuant to 556.046,
specifically [s]ubsection 2 that says, the Court shall not be obligated to
4
Defendant’s request that that the trial court also tender instructions on first-degree sexual misconduct, third-
degree sexual misconduct, and third-degree assault was refused, but Defendant does not appeal that ruling.
3
charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there’s a basis for a
verdict acquitting the person of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense.
In this case statutory -- or child molestation in the first degree would
be the -- would be, I guess, the included offense charged, if you want to call it
that. And child molestation would be the included offense. And when
comparing the two jury instructions, the only difference is in paragraph third
relating to the age of the child.
The uncontroverted evidence in this case is that the dates of birth of
the boys were in 2000, and I don’t believe there’s any basis in the evidence
that’s been elicited that a jury would find that the victim was more than 14
years old, but less than 17. So I don’t think you’re obligated to provide that.
The trial court agreed with the State and refused Defendant’s request to instruct the jury on
second-degree child molestation.
Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s refusal to give a proffered instruction de novo.
State v. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Mo. banc 2014).
Analysis
Despite the different age alleged in Count 5, each of Defendant’s points claims:
The trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on child
molestation in the second degree, a nested lesser-included offense of statutory
sodomy in the first degree and a dominated lesser-included offense of child
molestation in the second degree, for [counts 3, 4, and 5] . . . in that there was
a basis in the evidence for an acquittal of the higher offense and a conviction
of the lesser offense, and [Defendant] was thereby prejudiced.
Section 556.046 governs the submission of lesser-included offenses and has
been interpreted as follows.
Missouri law requires instruction on a lesser included offense when (1) “a
party timely requests the instruction;” (2) “there is a basis in the evidence for
acquitting the defendant of the charged offense;” and (3) “there is a basis in
the evidence for convicting the defendant of the lesser included offense for
which the instruction is requested.” State v. Smith, 522 S.W.3d 221, 225
(Mo. banc 2017) (quoting [Jackson], 433 S.W.3d [at 396]). “Doubts
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concerning whether to instruct on a lesser included offense should be
resolved in favor of including the instruction, leaving it to the jury to decide.”
Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 399 (internal quotation omitted).
State v. Welch, 600 S.W.3d 796, 806-07 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020).
Section 556.046.1(1) defines a lesser-included offense as one “established by
proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the
offense charged[.]” We agree with the parties that second-degree child molestation
is a lesser-included offense of first-degree child molestation within the meaning of
section 556.046.1(1) as the only difference between the two crimes is the age of the
victim. Compare section 566.067.1 (first-degree child molestation requires sexual
contact with a child less than 14) with section 566.068.1 (second degree child
molestation requires sexual contact with a child less than 17). See also State v.
Hines, 377 S.W.3d 648, 657-58 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012) (discussing what constitutes a
lesser-included offense).
There is no dispute that Defendant timely requested the instruction, and the
State concedes in its brief that there was a basis in the evidence for convicting
Defendant of the lesser-included offense of second-degree child molestation as the
State presented evidence that Victims were less than 17 years’ old. Thus, the parties’
only disagreement is whether there was a basis in the evidence for acquitting
Defendant of first-degree child molestation, the immediately-higher included
offense. 5
5
Because the issue here is the refusal to “submit[] an instruction that is more than one step down from
the charged offense, there must be a basis in the evidence for acquitting the defendant of the
immediately higher-included offense.” State v. Meine, 469 S.W.3d 491, 495 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015).
The immediately higher offense submitted in this case was first-degree child molestation.
5
First-degree child molestation occurs when one has sexual contact with a
child who is less than 14. Section 566.067.1. In contrast, second-degree child
molestation has a higher age limit -- sexual contact with a child who is less than 17.
Section 566.068.1.
“For there to be a basis in the evidence to acquit [Defendant] of first-degree
[child molestation] and yet convict him of second-degree [child molestation], there
must be a basis in the evidence for concluding that the [S]tate failed to prove the one
element that separates the two crimes.” See Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 396. Here, that
differential element is the age of the alleged victim. To prevail, Defendant must
show that there was a basis in the evidence for the jury to conclude that Victims were
at least 14, but were less than 17 years old. See id. at 397.
Victim 1 – the alleged victim in counts 3 and 4 – testified at trial that he was
born in August 2000. If true, that would have made him eleven years old at the time
of the charged events. 6 The State also introduced a picture of Victim 1 taken in
February 2012, a few months before the earliest range of the charged conduct.
Victim 2 – the alleged victim in Count 5 – testified at trial that he was also
born in August 2000. If believed by the jury, that would have made Victim 2 eleven
or twelve years old at the time of the charged conduct. 7 The State also introduced a
May 2012 photograph of Victim 2, a date within the charged range.
Defendant argues that, because the jury can disbelieve all, some, or none of
the evidence, it could have disbelieved Victims’ testimony about their ages and
6
With respect to Victim 1, the State alleged that the charged events occurred between May 1, 2012,
and June 30, 2012.
7
With respect to Victim 2, the State alleged that charged events occurred between February 1, 2012 and
September 1, 2012.
6
believed them to be older than 13 but not yet 17, thereby making it possible to
convict Defendant of second-degree child molestation instead of first-degree
statutory sodomy or first-degree child molestation.
The State’s position is that, while there was a basis in the evidence to convict
Defendant of second-degree child molestation (because the evidence supported a
finding that Victims were less than 17 years of age), there was no basis in the
evidence to acquit Defendant of child molestation in the first-degree – the
immediately higher offense – because there was no basis in the evidence to conclude
that Victims were 14, 15, or 16 years old at the time of the charged offenses. We
disagree.
The State’s argument is inconsistent with Jackson, which reminds us that
the jury’s right to disbelieve all or any part of the evidence, and its right to
refuse to draw any needed inference, is a sufficient basis in the evidence to
justify giving any lesser included offense instruction when the offenses are
separated only by one differential element for which the state bears the
burden of proof.
433 S.W.3d at 401.
As earlier noted, the differential element separating first-degree and second-degree
child molestation is the age of the victim, an element that the State bore the burden of
proving. State v. Balbirnie, 541 S.W.3d 702, 713 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). Thus, although
the jury was free to believe Victims’ testimony about their respective dates of birth, the jury
also had the opportunity to view them in person at trial – as well as view photographs of
them allegedly taken around the time of the charged conduct – and the jury was equally free
to disbelieve Victims’ testimony and conclude that they were older.
7
While the State argues that merely disbelieving the State’s evidence did not provide
a basis for concluding that Victims were 14, 15, or 16 at the time of the offenses, Defendant
was not obligated to introduce affirmative evidence of their age or present other evidence
that might cast doubt upon the State’s evidence to be entitled to an instruction on the nested,
lesser-included offense. Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 401-02. Rather, there is almost always a
basis in the evidence to acquit a defendant of the immediately higher-included offense
because of the jury’s right to disbelieve all, some, or none of the evidence presented in a
particular case. Meine, 469 S.W.3d at 495; Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 399.
In other words:
No matter how strong, airtight, inescapable, or even absolutely certain the
evidence and inferences in support of the differential element may seem to
judges and lawyers, no evidence ever proves an element of a criminal case
until all 12 jurors believe it, and no inference ever is drawn in a criminal case
until all 12 jurors draw it.
Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 399-400.
Thus, the evidence supported an instruction on second-degree child
molestation, and the trial court erred in refusing to give it. However, the fact that the
trial court erred does not end our inquiry; Defendant must also demonstrate that he
was prejudiced by that error.
Defendant is aided in doing so by a presumption that prejudice resulted if the
trial court refused to give a properly-requested instruction on a nested, lesser-
included offense. State v. Brown, 524 S.W.3d 44, 49 (Mo. banc 2017). That said,
the presumption of prejudice can be rebutted. 8 Id. When, as here, instructions are
8
While our high court stated in Jackson, 433 S.W.3d at 395, that the failure to submit a lesser-
included nested instruction is always reversible error when the requirements are met, in Jackson, the
trial court instructed the jury only on the charged offense. Id. at 394. Here, the trial court also
8
given for a greater offense and one lesser-included offense, and the defendant is
found guilty of the greater offense, and that finding of guilt necessarily rejected the
possibility that the victims were older than the charged age at the time of the offense,
prejudice does not exist. See id.
No Prejudice as to Counts 3 and 4
In counts 3 and 4, Defendant was charged with and convicted of enhanced
statutory sodomy in the first degree. That charge required the jury to find that
Defendant had deviate sexual intercourse with a child less than 12. Section
566.067.2(2). The jury was also instructed on the lesser offense of first-degree child
molestation, which would have required the jury to find that Victim 1 was less than
14. 9 Because the jury found Defendant guilty of enhanced first-degree statutory
sodomy and declined to find him guilty of first-degree child molestation, it
specifically rejected the possibility that that Victim 1 was more than eleven years old
at the time of the offense.
In Becker v. State, 260 S.W.3d 905, 912 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008), the eastern
district of our court noted that “the age element of enhanced first-degree statutory
sodomy (a victim under age twelve) necessarily encompasses the age element of
first-degree child molestation (a victim under age fourteen) because every person
under age twelve is also under age fourteen.” See also Brown, 524 S.W.3d at 49-50
(trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to instruct on third-degree
instructed the jury on the lesser offense of first-degree child molestation, thereby allowing us to
determine whether Defendant was prejudiced by the error. See Brown, 524 S.W.3d at 49.
9
It is important to note that, while first-degree child molestation, like first-degree statutory sodomy, has an
enhanced punishment when the crime is perpetrated against a child less than twelve, the first-degree child
molestation instructions submitted to the jury on counts 3, 4, and 5 all posited “regular” first-degree child
molestation, which requires proof that the victim was a child “less than fourteen” years of age. See sections
566.067.1 and .2(2).
9
assault because that instruction would have directly tested the proposition that the
defendant acted purposefully by requiring the jury to consider whether he acted
recklessly, unlike the second-degree assault instruction that was given).
By finding Defendant guilty of the greater offense of enhanced first-degree
statutory sodomy, the age element was adequately tested because the jury necessarily
found that Victim 1 was “less than 12.” See Meine, 469 S.W.3d at 496-97; State v.
Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 515 (Mo. banc 2004) (rejecting the defendant’s argument
that the jury should have been instructed on involuntary manslaughter as the jury was
instructed on first- and second-degree murder and found defendant guilty of first-
degree, thereby rejecting the opportunity to find that the defendant did not
deliberate).
Here, the jury, given the opportunity to reject the element that Victim 1 was
less than 12, did not do so. As a result, the trial court’s error in refusing to instruct
on child molestation in the second degree did not prejudice Defendant in regard to
counts 3 and 4.
Lack of Prejudice Not Shown as to Count 5
The State, however, makes no similar, or other, no-prejudice argument
regarding Count 5, on which the jury found Defendant guilty of unenhanced, or
“regular,” first-degree statutory sodomy by having deviate sexual intercourse with
Victim 2, a victim who was alleged to be “less than fourteen[.]” On that count, both
instructions given to the jury (covering “regular” first-degree statutory sodomy and
the lesser offense of first-degree child molestation) alleged the same age element –
less than fourteen.
10
Second-degree child molestation requires a finding that the victim was less
than 17. Section 566.068.1. This would therefore have been the only instruction
that introduced a different age element for the jury to consider. Smith, 522 S.W.3d
at 227-28. Here, as in Smith, if the trial court had submitted an “instruction for
[second-degree child molestation, it] would have tested the jury’s belief [about
Victim’s age].” Id. at 228. Because that instruction was not submitted, the age
element was not adequately tested, and the presumption of resulting prejudice
suffered by Defendant has not been rebutted. See id. at 227-28; Brown, 524 S.W.3d
at 49.
Decision
Defendant’s convictions on counts 3 and 4 are affirmed. His conviction on
Count 5 is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
DON E. BURRELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR
JEFFREY W. BATES, P.J. – CONCURS
GARY W. LYNCH, J. – CONCURS
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