USCA11 Case: 22-13103 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 02/01/2023 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13103
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT WELLS,
a.k.a. Jared Anthony Chaliz,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cr-00010-WWB-DCI-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13103
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Wells appeals his 12-month sentence imposed upon
revocation of his supervised release. He argues that the district
court erred by considering rehabilitation when imposing the prison
sentence, in violation of Tapia v. United States,
564 U.S. 319 (2011).
He also contends that the district court erroneously believed it
could shorten his prison term at a later time. We agree that plain
Tapia error occurred, so we vacate and remand for resentencing.
I.
In 2018, Wells was convicted of unlawfully possessing a fire-
arm after a felony conviction, see
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and sen-
tence to eighteen months in prison followed by three years of su-
pervised release. He began his term of supervision in February
2021. In November 2021, the district court modified his conditions
of supervision to include participation in mental health and sub-
stance abuse treatment.
In July 2022, a probation officer filed a superseding petition
to revoke Wells’s supervised release, alleging three violations:
(1) using marijuana; (2) failing to submit to urinalysis; and (3) being
convicted of driving with a canceled or suspended license. Accord-
ing to the probation officer’s supporting memorandum, during a
urinalysis appointment in May 2022, Wells admitted using
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22-13103 Opinion of the Court 3
marijuana to cope with marital, financial, and other stressors.
Later at that same appointment, he admitted to adding water to
dilute his urine sample. Wells gave a urine sample the following
day under supervision, which was negative for illegal substances.
A couple weeks later, Wells was pulled over for speeding and hav-
ing an expired temporary tag. He told the officer he had no license,
and a record check showed he had two prior convictions for driving
with a suspended license. He was convicted and sentenced to 31
days in jail, with credit for time served.
Wells admitted the violations, and the district court adjudi-
cated him guilty and revoked his supervised release. The court
then calculated a guideline imprisonment range of 12 to 18 months,
with a statutory maximum of two years.
Wells’s counsel explained that it was the parties’ joint rec-
ommendation for the district court to “vary from the guidelines”
and “put Mr. Wells into a six-month Salvation Army program” for
inpatient substance-abuse treatment while on the two-year maxi-
mum term of supervised release. Defense counsel urged the court
to allow Wells “to get treatment,” because he suffered from alco-
hol abuse and mental-health disorders, including anxiety, depres-
sion, and bipolar, and he was self-medicating with alcohol and ma-
rijuana to cope with the stressors of providing for eight children.
The government stated that it had agreed to the treatment
proposal because it “get[s] at the heart of the issue, underlying
both” his prior criminal conduct and the violations, which was
“substance abuse.” While the program was “not the same” as
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13103
incarceration, the government explained, it was restrictive enough
that Wells was “not going to be out and about doing whatever or
making bad choices for at least six months.”
The district court disagreed with the joint recommendation,
however, concluding that there “should be a punitive aspect to the
violation as well to promote respect for the law.” The court noted
that Wells disrespected the court and the law by attempting to
cheat a urine test and committing a new criminal offense, which
was conduct “altogether different than . . . simply smoking some
pot or drinking alcohol.” So while the court exhorted Wells to fol-
low through on making positive changes in his life, it determined
that a prison term of 12 months was appropriate to account for his
refusal to conform his behavior to the law despite being “given
multiple opportunities.”
Still, the district court emphasized its desire for Wells to re-
ceive treatment. It stated that it would recommend him for the
Bureau of Prisons’ residential drug-treatment program. It also
wanted him to join the Salvation Army program upon his release
“if there’s bed space available” and it was still recommended at that
time, and to participate in “mental health treatment, either outpa-
tient or inpatient.”
The district court then proposed, “if it’s allowed,” permit-
ting Wells to move to the Salvation Army program after serving
six months in BOP custody if there was a bed available and he was
“not getting any treatment in the BOP.” The court made clear it
would, if it could, “sign that motion” permitting the transfer at six
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22-13103 Opinion of the Court 5
months. But after defense counsel suggested there was no legal
way for the sentence “to terminate early,” the court seemingly
abandoned the idea, stating, “All right. I find the sentence is suffi-
cient but not greater than necessary to comply with the statutory
purposes of sentencing.” Wells made a sweeping objection that the
sentence was “procedurally and substantively unreasonable.” He
now appeals.
II.
Wells argues that the district court procedurally erred by
considering his need for rehabilitation as a sentencing factor, in vi-
olation of Tapia. Because Wells did not make an objection along
these lines below, we review for plain error only. See United States
v. Vandergrift,
754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014) (reviewing a
Tapia argument for plain error); United States v. Carpenter,
803
F.3d 1224, 1238 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A sweeping, general objection is
insufficient to preserve specific sentencing issues for review.”).
Under the plain-error standard, we may not reverse a sen-
tence unless the district court committed an error that was plain or
obvious and affected both the defendant’s substantial rights and the
integrity and standing of the judiciary. United States v. Alberts,
859
F.3d 979, 985 (11th Cir. 2017). An error does not affect a defend-
ant’s substantial rights unless there is a “reasonable probability” of
a different sentence absent the error. United States v. Rodriguez,
398 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13103
In Tapia, the Supreme Court held the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 prohibits federal courts from “imposing or lengthening
a prison term in order to promote a criminal defendant’s rehabili-
tation.”
564 U.S. at 321; see
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (stating that “im-
prisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction
and rehabilitation”). We have interpreted Tapia to mean that a
district court errs whenever it “considers rehabilitation when craft-
ing a sentence of imprisonment,” including a revocation sentence.
Vandergrift,
754 F.3d at 1310. But the court is not wholly pre-
vented from considering rehabilitation at sentencing. It may dis-
cuss “opportunities for rehabilitation” in prison or recommend a
defendant for a particular facility or drug-treatment program, so
long as it does not rely on rehabilitative needs when crafting the
prison sentence. Tapia,
564 U.S. at 334. It may also “consider a
defendant’s rehabilitative needs when imposing sentences of pro-
bation or supervised release.” Alberts,
859 F.3d at 986 n.3.
Here, the district court’s comments were, for the most part,
entirely consistent with Tapia. The court was permitted to recog-
nize Wells’s need for treatment, to discuss treatment opportunities
in prison and recommend him for a BOP program, and to consider
his rehabilitative needs on supervised release by requiring him to
complete a drug-treatment program if indicated at that time. See
Tapia,
564 U.S. at 334; Alberts,
859 F.3d at 986 n.3. “So the sen-
tencing court here did nothing wrong—and probably something
very right—in trying to get [Wells] into an effective drug treatment
program.” Tapia,
564 U.S. at 334.
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22-13103 Opinion of the Court 7
Nor did the district court rely on Wells’s rehabilitative needs
when explaining its reasons for imposing the 12-month sentence.
Despite believing that Wells “need[ed] some treatment,” the court
rejected the parties’ treatment-only proposal because it concluded
that there “should be a punitive aspect to the violation as well to
promote respect for the law.” 1 It explained that a prison term was
appropriate because of Wells’s refusal to conform his behavior to
the law despite “multiple opportunities.” Wells’s rehabilitative
needs were nothing more than an “ancillary concern” in the court’s
explanation of its sentence, so they ordinarily would not be enough
to establish plain error. See Alberts,
859 F.3d at 986 (“A defendant
cannot show that his substantial rights were impacted if his reha-
bilitative needs clearly constituted only a minor fragment of the
court’s reasoning.” (quotation marks omitted)).
But when we view the district court’s explanation in light of
its ensuing comments, we are left with grave doubt whether the
explanation applies to the whole prison term or just part of it. After
imposing the 12-month sentence, the court opined that it would, if
it could, allow Wells to transfer from BOP custody to the Salvation
Army for drug treatment if he had “served at least six months of
1 Ina passing footnote, Wells asserts that the district court made an “arguable
error” when it considered the need for a “punitive aspect” to the sentence un-
der
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Wells did not adequately raise this issue on ap-
peal, and he does not establish plain error, in any case. See Vandergrift,
754
F.3d at 1308–09 (holding that it was not plainly erroneous to consider
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release because circuits were split
and neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has resolved the issue).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13103
[his] sentence,” a bed was available, and he was “not getting any
treatment in the BOP.” 2 The proposal, in other words, appears to
have tied the last six months of his prison term to whether he was
receiving treatment in prison. And under it, he would serve more
time in prison if his rehabilitative needs were being met.
The district court’s proposal, though ultimately abandoned,
casts substantial doubt on its justification for the last six months of
the sentence. After all, the court indicated its willingness to termi-
nate or transfer custody at six months so that Wells could receive
effective drug treatment outside the BOP, effectively making the
12-month term half-prison and half-treatment. But if the purposes
of sentencing apart from rehabilitation did not justify confining
him after six months in that instance, it’s hard to see what purposes
the court thought did justify confining him at all after six months,
apart from his rehabilitative needs. That leaves the substantial pos-
sibility that the court instead based the remainder of the sentence
on Wells’s rehabilitative needs. 3
2 The district court phrased its alternative proposal as Wells “serving six
months of his [12-month] term in Salvation Army.” But the court did not
identify a mechanism for Wells to serve a prison term outside of BOP custody.
Rather, it appears, as the government suggested at sentencing, that the parties
and the probation office contemplated the Salvation Army program as a con-
dition of a new term of supervised release imposed on revocation.
3 Notably, the probation officer indicated that the
BOP’s residential drug treat-
ment program (“RDAP”) was “at least a yearlong program.”
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22-13103 Opinion of the Court 9
Because the record indicates that the district court based the
length of Wells’s sentence in part on his rehabilitative needs, which
Tapia and Vandergrift plainly forbid, Wells has established the first
two prongs of plain error. The third prong is also satisfied because
there is a reasonable probability of a different result absent the er-
ror. See Rodriguez,
398 F.3d at 1299. Far from a “minor fragment”
of the court’s reasoning, the record shows that Wells’s rehabilita-
tive needs may have been the dominant factor justifying the last six
months of his prison sentence, given the court’s willingness to ter-
minate or transfer custody of Wells to receive effective drug treat-
ment after six months. Cf. Alberts,
859 F.3d at 986. And unlike
Alberts, in which the district court’s Tapia error did not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights because the court, before announc-
ing the sentence, reemphasized—and without mentioning rehabil-
itation—that its “primary concerns” were the seriousness of the of-
fense, the need for punishment and deterrence, and the need to
protect society, the district court in this case did not reemphasize
the “punitive aspect” of Wells’s sentence. Finally, we elect to use
our discretion to correct the error because it may well undermine
judicial proceedings by causing “an unnecessary deprivation of lib-
erty.” See United States v. Moore,
22 F.4th 1258, 1265 (11th Cir.
2022) (quotation marks omitted).
For these reasons, we vacate Wells’s 12-month revocation
sentence and remand for resentencing.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
