State v. Reeves , 2015 MT 74N ( 2015 )

March 3 2015
DA 14-0252
Case Number: DA 14-0252
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2015 MT 74N
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
DEAN ANTHONY REEVES,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Rosebud, Cause No. DC-2012-09
Honorable George Huss, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Dean Anthony Reeves, self-represented; Lewistown, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Mardell Ployhar, Assistant
Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Brant S. Light, Assistant Attorney General, Special Deputy County
Attorney for Rosebud County; Helena, Montana
C. Kristine White; Rosebud County Attorney; Forsyth, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: February 11, 2015
Decided: March 3, 2015
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating
Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not
serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this
Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana
Reports.
¶2 Dean Anthony Reeves (Reeves) appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea by the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Rosebud County. In 2012, Reeves
pled guilty to Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs and Tampering with Witnesses
and Informants. The District Court sentenced Reeves in accordance with the plea
agreement to a term of 20 years, with all of that time suspended. Thereafter, Reeves
failed to comply with the terms of his suspended sentence and, upon revocation of his
sentence, the District Court resentenced Reeves to a term of 20 years, with 8 years
suspended. Reeves subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his original plea. The
District Court denied Reeves’ motion, concluding Reeves failed to present good cause.
Reeves raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the District Court erred in concluding
Reeves’ plea was voluntary; and (2) whether the District Court erred in denying Reeves’
motion for a new Presentence Investigation Report (PSI).
¶3 Pursuant to § 46-16-105(2), MCA, a court may permit withdrawal of a guilty plea
where good cause is shown. “Good cause exists when a defendant’s plea is made
involuntarily.” Burns v. State, 2012 MT 100, ¶ 6, 365 Mont. 51, 277 P.3d 1238.
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“However, we will not overturn a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea if the defendant was aware of the direct consequences of the plea, and if the plea was
not induced by threats, misrepresentation, or an improper promise such as a bribe.”
Burns, ¶ 6.
¶4 Reeves received an entirely suspended sentence, signed a written waiver, and
confirmed during the plea colloquy he was acting knowingly, voluntarily, and had not
received any threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises. There is no evidence that
Reeves’ plea agreement was not entered voluntarily.
¶5 Reeves next argues the court erred by denying his motion for a new PSI, asserting
it did not accurately state his extensive criminal history. However, we “have recognized
that where a sentencing court is found not to have relied on improper or erroneous
information in sentencing a criminal defendant, there is nothing to correct or rebut and,
therefore, that the defendant is not entitled to resentencing on due process grounds.”
Bauer v. State, 1999 MT 185, ¶ 24, 295 Mont. 306, 983 P.2d 955 (emphasis in original;
internal quotations omitted). Even assuming for sake of argument that the PSI misstated
Reeves’ criminal history, he is not entitled to resentencing. Reeves was sentenced in
accordance with the plea agreement and contrary to the recommendation of the PSI. At
Reeves’ urging, the District Court rejected the 30-year sentence, with 15 years
suspended, recommended in the PSI, and adopted the sentence recommended by the plea
agreement. Accordingly, any alleged error in the PSI does not provide grounds for
reversal because the PSI was not relied upon by the court in sentencing Reeves.
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¶6 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of
our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The
District Court clearly did not err by denying Reeves’ motion to withdraw his plea.
¶7 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ BETH BAKER
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