University of Montana Foundation v. Human Rights Commission , 223 Mont. 389 ( 1986 )

No. 86-06
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1986
UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA FOUNDATION,
a Montana nonprofit corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, and its
Administrator, ANNE MacINTYRE,
Defendants and Appe1.lants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis & Clark,
The Honorable Thomas Honzel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Janice Frankino Dogqett, Human Rights Commission,
Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman; Thomas E.
Hattersley, Helena, Montana
Frederick F. Sherwood, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 31, 1986
Decided: October 9, 1986
is; t : : ;986
Filed:
Clerk
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The Montana Human Rights Commission appeals the order of
the First Judicial District which restrained the Commission
from any further proceedings regarding a discrimination
complaint filed by Gayle Walton against the University of
Montana Foundation. The order also required the Commission
Administrator to immediately issue a right to sue letter to
Gayle Walton. We affirm.
The issues are:
1. Did the District Court err in its interpretation of
5 49-2-509, MCA, when it restrained the Commission from
further proceedings and required the Commission to issue a
right to sue letter?
2. Did the District Court err when it refused to admit
evidence regarding the cause of the delay in the Commission's
investigation?
On January 20, 1984 Gayle Walton filed three discrimina-
tion complaints with the Montana Human Rights Commission
(Commission) against the University of Montana Foundation
(Foundation). About sixteen months later, the Foundation
requested that the Commission issue a right to sue letter
regarding FJalton's complaints pursuant to 5 49-2-509, MCA.
Anne MacIntyre, administrator for the Commission, refused the
request and stated she was unable to determine whether Com-
mission efforts to settle the case had been unsuccessful, and
that a right to sue letter would not be issued until such a
determination had been made.
On September 27, 1985 the Foundation applied to the
District Court for writ of review and writ of prohibition.
The Foundation claimed the Commission lost jurisdiction of
Walton's complaints by failing to meet the time limits set
forth in S 49-2-509, MCA, and should be barred from further
proceedings in the matter. The Commission responded with a
motion to quash the Foundation's writ of prohibition. Addi-
tionally, Walton was permitted to intervene. Following
briefing and oral argument, the District Court issued an
order restraining the Commission from any further proceedings
in the matter and requiring Anne MacIntyre, as Division
Adiminstrator, to issue a right to sue letter. Commission
appealed.
Did the District Court err in its interpretation of
S 49-2-509, MCA when it restrained the Commission from fur-
ther proceedings and required the Commission to issue a right
to sue letter?
Section 49-2-509(1), MCA, provides:
(1) The commission staff shall, at the request of
either party, issue a letter entitling the
complainant to file a discrimination action in
district court if:
(a) the commission has not yet held a con-
tested case hearing pursuant to 49-2-505 and has
determined that it will be unable to hold a con-
tested case hearing within 12 months of the date
the complaint was filed under 49-2-501; and
(b) 180 days have elapsed since the complaint
was filed and the efforts of the commission staff
to settle the complaint after informal investiga-
tion pursuant to 49-2-504 have been unsuccessful.
In determining legislative intent, the Court must first
look to the plain meaning of the language used in the stat-
ute. State ex rel. Palmer v. Hart (~ont. 1982), 655 ~ . 2 d
965, 39 St.Rep. 2277; Dorn v. Board of Trustees of Billings
School District No. 2 (Mont. 1983), 661 P.2d 426, 40 St.Rep.
The Commission believes the statute does not permit
removal of a case to district court until an attempt to
settle the case has been made, even though the time require-
ments of the statute have been exceeded. In a letter from
Anne MacIntyre to the Foundation's attorney, this position
was clearly enunciated. In part, the letter stated:
I am unable to determine that the "efforts of the
commission staff to settle the case after informal
investigation pursuant to 49-2-504 have been unsuc-
cessful. " S 49-2-509(1) (b), MCA and A.R.M.
24.9.262 (2)(c) (emphasis added) . I am unable to
make such a determination because the informal
investigation has not been concluded, and will not
be concluded until the commission staff issues its
findings. The reasonable cause or lack of reason-
able cause finding in a case under investigation is
the staff's determination whether the allegations
of the complaint are supported by substantial
evidence. Section 49-2-504, MCA, requires the
staff to make such a determination and then attempt
to settle the case and eliminate the discriminatory
practice through conference, conciliation, and
persuasion. Section 49-2-509 (1) (b), MCA, does not
permit removal to district court until these steps
have been completed, even though the time require-
ments have been met. (Second emphasis added for
this opinion.)
The position of the Commission as stated above is not a
correct interpretation of the statute.
We conclude that 5 49-2-509 (I), MCA, provides that on
the request of either party, a right to sue letter should
issue where 180 days have elapsed since the filing of the
complaint without the completion of an informal settlement,
and in addition, where 12 months have elapsed from the filing
date so that a contested case hearing cannot be held within
such 12 month period. Gayle Walton filed her complaints on
January 20, 1984. As a result, an informal settlement must
have been completed by the Commission by July 19, 1984 - 180
days from filing. As an alternative, the Commission must
have held a contested case hearing by January 19, 1985 - 12
months from January 20, 1984. Neither of these statutory
deadlines were met. This statute then provides that upon the
request of either party, a right to sue letter should issue.
As the District Court's well-phrased order stated:
The language of the statute is clear on its face.
The Commission staff must issue a right to sue
letter at the request of either party if two condi-
tions are met: (1) a contested case has not and
cannot be held within 12 months of the filing of
the complaint; and (2) efforts to informally settle
the matter pursuant to S 49-2-504, MCA, have been
unsuccessful and 180 days have elapsed. Here, no
contested case has been held and more than 12
months have passed since the filing of the com-
plaint. In addition, more than 180 days have
elapsed since the filing of the complaint, and
there has not been a successful settlement. Since
the Foundation has requested the Commission staff
to issue a right to sue letter, it must do so. ..
Section 49-2-509, MCA, does not say that the Admin-
istrator has the authority or the discretion to
determine whether efforts at informal settlement
have been unsuccessful. To hold that the Adminis-
trator has such discretion would be to insert
something which was omitted by the Legislature.
This the Court cannot do. Furthermore, to hold
that the 180 days begins to run only after the
Administrator has made a determination that efforts
to settle have been unsuccessful, would permit the
Commission staff to informally do what it could not
formally do, that is, the staff could continue with
the matter well beyond the 12 month time limit for
holding a contested case. The plain language of
the statute clearly shows that such was not the
intent of the Legislature.
Rule 1 of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure in part
provides that the rules shall be construed to secure "the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
The same guidelines properly may be applied to the adminis-
trative proceeding requirements of 5 49-2-509, MCA. The aim
of the administrative process is to secure a just and inex-
pensive determination which is just as speedy as the court
process. The legislature has placed a reasonable time limit
on the administrative process by granting a total of 12
months within which to complete that process. Nothing has
been presented which demonstrates that the 12 month period is
an unreasonable period. We hold that the District Court did
not err when it restrained the Commission from further pro-
ceedings and required the Commission to issue the right to
sue letter.
I1
Did the District Court err when it refused to admit
evidence regarding the cause of the delay in the Commission's
investigation?
In the present case, the District Court refused to
consider evidence that settlement had not been reached due to
delay caused by the Foundation. If the time periods set
forth in the statute have passed, then upon request a right
to sue letter must be issued. The statute does not address
delays, nor provide for additional time if one side or the
other caused a delay. We hold the District Court did not err
when it refused to admit evidence regarding the cause of the
delay in the Commission's investigation.
We affirm the District Court.
We Concur:
- '
4
Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Frank E . Morrison, Jr. dissents as follows:
I dissent.
The wording in $ 49-2-509(1) (b), MCA, is ambiguous.
Subsection (b) may be read as having one or two conditions.
To determine legislative intent we should look to the
legislative history of § 49-2-509, MCA.
Section 49-2-509, MCA, was introduced as House Bill 660
in the 1983 legislative session. Comments submitted by
Commission Administrator MacIntyre indicate the bill was
intended to provide an alternative forum for a complainant
whose case was not being expeditiously investigated and
settled by the Commission.
There are several reasons the Commission has
requested the introduction of this legislation.
First, many complainants who are represented by
counsel from the outset would prefer to pursue
their complaints in court rather than at an
administrative hearing. Secondly, because of the
inadequate funding of the Commission, the number of
cases awaiting hearing is large and growing. While
the number is not large compared to the number of
cases which are resolved by the Commission staff
through investigation and conciliation prior to
hearing, it does contribute to the Commission
backlog. Furthermore, in many cases, damages
continue to accrue while cases are awaiting hearing
and this seems particularly inequitable to
Respondents.
Because of the fact that the Commission staff is
able to resolve more than 90% of the cases filed
with it through conciliation and investigation, the
Commission believes that all complaints should be
filed with the Commission initially. If the
Commission staff cannot resolve the complaint
within 180 days through conciliation and
investigation, the complainant can then exercise
the election provided for in this bill.
Senate Judiciary Committee minutes, March 9, 1983.
The bill was amended to provide both complainant and
respondent with the right to request a right to sue letter.
Sections 49-2-509, MCA, establish the administrative
remedy for resolving discrimination complaints. The federal
district court for the District of Montana found that the
legislature intended to create a procedure whereby the
Commission would informally eliminate discriminatory
practices by conference, conciliation, and persuasion, and
that the statutory remedy is exclusive. Walker v. The
Anaconda Co. (D.C.Mont. 1981) 520 F. Supp. 1143, 38 St.Rep.
1557. I agree with this analysis.
In the present case, the District Court refused to
consider evidence that settlement had not been reached due to
delay caused by the Foundation. This was error. If a party
is permitted to stall its way into district court, the
statutory remedy can be rendered meaningless. Pursuant to
549-2-504, MCA, the Commission staff shall informally
investigate a filed complaint promptly and impartially. This
task becomes exceedingly difficult where the respondent
refuses to comply with discovery requests.
I would interpret S 49-2-509 (1)(b), MCA, to require a
look into the progress of settlement efforts after 180 days
have elapsed. The legislative history reveals S 49-2-509,
MCA, was implemented to provide an alternative remedy where
administrative delay is preventing resolution of a complaint.
In the present case, the district judge should have
determined whether the Foundation or the Commission was
responsible for the delay.
The Commission's interpretation of S 49-2-509 (1), MCA,
is found at ARM 24.9.262;
(2) The division administrator shall issue
the right to sue letter on behalf of the Commission
upon receipt of a written request from either party
if the administrator determines:
(a) No contested case hearing has been held
in the case;
(b) 180 days have elapsed since the complaint
was filed;
(c) the efforts of the division to settle the
case after informal investigation have been
unsuccessful; and
(d) the Commission will be unable to hold a
contested case hearing in the matter within 12
months of the date the complaint was filed.
The District Court found this rule to be an incorrect
interpretation of the statute as it contains four enumerated
conditions rather than two, and it allows the division
administrator to determine whether settlement efforts have
been unsuccessful.
The rule is, in my opinion, proper under the statute.
Subsection (c) of the rule does not give the administrator
unbridled discretion to extend a case beyond the 12 month
time limit for holding a contested case hearing. The
Commission has a duty to promptly investigate complaints and
immediately try to eliminate discriminatory practices.
Neither party should be permitted to circumvent the
administrative remedy by using dilatory tactics. The
legislative history and time limits contained within the
statute support this result.
The District Court should be reversed and the case