Matter of the Estate of Gregory Eng , 2017 MT 100 ( 2017 )

05/02/2017
DA 16-0603
Case Number: DA 16-0603
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2017 MT 100IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
GREGORY ENGELLANT,
A Protected Person.
___________________________________
DAREN ENGELLANT and KEVIN ENGELLANT,
Petitioners and Appellants,
v.
KENNETH ENGELLANT, individually and
as Guardian and Conservator for
GREGORY ENGELLANT, a protected person,
Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Chouteau, Cause No. DP-85-008
Honorable Daniel A. Boucher, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Paul A. Sandry, Johnson, Berg, & Saxby, PLLP, Kalispell, Montana
For Appellee:
Stephen R. Brown, Jr., Bradley E. Dugdale, Bosch, Kuhr, Dugdale,
Martin & Kaze, PLLP, Havre, Montana
For Gregory Engellant:
Daniel N. McLean, Jerrod D. Bevan, Crowley Fleck, PLLP,
Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 29, 2017
Decided: May 2, 2017
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
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Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Daren Engellant and Kevin Engellant filed a petition to remove Kenneth Engellant
as conservator for Gregory Engellant. They appeal from the District Court’s September
19, 2016 order granting Kenneth’s motion for summary judgment and concluding that they
lacked standing to maintain the petition. We reverse and remand.
¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows: Did the District Court err in granting
summary judgment to Kenneth and dismissing the petition for lack of standing?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 The parties to this case are all related. Petitioners Daren and Kevin Engellant are
the sons of Respondent Kenneth Engellant, and they are the nephews of Gregory Engellant.
Gregory was permanently disabled in an accident in 1982. His brother Kenneth has served
as his appointed conservator since 1985. Gregory executed a will in 1978 prior to his
accident, and in 2012 he executed a second will. Daren and Kevin are devisees under both
wills.
¶4 Daren and Kevin object to the way their father Kenneth has handled their Uncle
Gregory’s affairs as conservator. They complained to Montana Adult Protective Services
(APS) that Kenneth was improperly administering the conservatorship estate. APS filed
an action seeking to remove Kenneth as conservator, but the action was subsequently
dismissed by stipulation. Daren and Kevin filed the present action in November 2014 in
the conservatorship proceeding, seeking to remove their father Kenneth as conservator for
their Uncle Gregory.
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¶5 In September 2015 Kenneth filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that
Daren and Kevin lacked standing to maintain a proceeding to remove him as conservator.
In September 2016 the District Court granted Kenneth’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that Daren and Kevin lacked standing.
¶6 Daren and Kevin appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7 This Court reviews a district court’s decision on summary judgment de novo to
determine whether it is correct, using the same criteria as the district court under
M. R. Civ. P. 56. Pilgeram v. GreenPoint Mortgage, 2013 MT 354, ¶ 9, 373 Mont. 1, 313
P.3d 839.
DISCUSSION
¶8 Issue: Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Kenneth and
dismissing the petition for lack of standing?
¶9 The District Court determined that Daren and Kevin’s petition was governed by
§ 72-5-413, MCA, which allows a “person interested in the welfare” of a conserved person
to petition for an order removing the conservator. The District Court determined that the
definition of “person interested in the welfare of a protected person” in § 72-5-413(4),
MCA, governed whether Daren and Kevin had standing to pursue the petition. That section
provides that “[f]or purposes of this section” a “person interested in the welfare of a
protected person” is “any person, institution, or agency that is furnishing or supplying any
money for support or care of a person for whom a conservator has been appointed.” The
District Court determined that the brothers did not qualify under this definition, and that
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they could not rely upon the definition of “interested person” in § 72-1-103(25), MCA,
because they were only devisees under Uncle Gregory’s will and therefore had only an
expectancy interest that was insufficient to grant them standing.
¶10 Sections 72-1-103(25) and 72-5-413, MCA, appear in the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC), § 72-1-101, MCA, et seq., which uses some variant of the term “interested person”
in a number of contexts.1 Section 72-1-103, MCA, provides “general definitions” for the
UPC, while providing that there can be “additional definitions contained in the subsequent
chapters” of the Code (Emphasis added). The definition in § 72-1-103(25), MCA,
provides:
“Interested person” includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors,
beneficiaries, and any others having a property right in or claim against a
trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person. The term
also includes persons having priority for appointment as personal
representative and other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The
meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and
must be determined according to the particular purposes of and matter
involved in any proceeding.
Subsection (12) of that same statute defines “Devisee” as “a person designated in a will to
receive a devise.”
¶11 When interpreting a statute, this Court will “seek to implement the objectives the
legislature sought to achieve, and if the legislative intent can be determined from the plain
language of the statute, the plain language controls.” In re Conservatorship of Kloss, 2005
MT 39, ¶ 10, 326 Mont. 117, 109 P.3d 205. A statute must be construed according to its
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See, e.g., § 72-3-105, MCA (an interested person may apply to the clerk for a determination in
an informal proceeding); § 72-3-402, MCA (an interested person may petition for supervised
administration); § 72-3-634, MCA (an interested person may move for a settlement of fees).
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plain meaning and if the language is clear and unambiguous then no further interpretation
is required. In addition, the Court must construe a statute as a whole in order to avoid
absurd results and to give effect to the purpose of the statute. Infinity Ins. Co. v. Dodson,
2000 MT 287, ¶ 46, 302 Mont. 209, 14 P.3d 487.
¶12 Applying these principles here, it is clear that the term interested person defined in
§ 72-1-103(25), MCA, includes Daren and Kevin. They are “interested persons” under
UPC proceedings because they are devisees under Uncle Gregory’s will. We disagree with
the District Court’s determination that the phrase “any others having a property right” in
§ 72-1-103(25), MCA, excludes them from the class of “interested persons.” They are
devisees, and whether devisees have a present or future right, they are specifically included
as “interested persons” under § 72-1-103(25), MCA.
¶13 We disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that § 72-5-413(4), MCA, defines
the exclusive class of persons entitled to bring a petition for an order subsequent to
appointment. First, the plain language does not say that only those described in subsection
(4) may bring a petition. Rather, the plain intent of the subsection is to expand the class of
petitioners beyond those included in § 72-1-103(25), MCA, to include persons or entities
(including agencies) that furnish support for a person under a conservatorship. Second, the
general definition in § 72-1-103, MCA, recognizes that additional definitions of terms may
appear elsewhere in the UPC. The definition in § 72-5-413(4), MCA, is such an “additional
definition” and nothing indicates that it is exclusive or that it supplants the definition in
§ 72-1-103(25), MCA. Finally, § 72-1-103(25), MCA, specifically provides that the
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meaning of interested person “may vary from time to time and must be determined
according to the particular purposes of and matter involved in any proceeding.”
¶14 In summary, the language in the two statutes at issue, §§ 72-1-103 and 72-5-413,
MCA, evidences an intent, as applicable to the facts of this case, to provide a more
expansive rather than a more restrictive definition of who may bring a petition under
§ 72-5-413, MCA. In re the Conservatorship of Kloss, ¶ 10. The language of the two
statutes does not conflict so that one is the specific and one the general. Clearly the two
statutes may be construed and applied harmoniously. In re Estate of Easterbrook, 2003
MT 317, ¶ 7, 318 Mont. 275, 80 P.3d 419 (applying the two statutes together to determine
who is an “interested person”).
¶15 To the extent that In re the Estate of Miles v. Miles, 2000 MT 41, 298 Mont. 312,
994 P.2d 1139 (involving the interest of statutory heirs in an annuity contract that
terminated on the annuitant’s death) and In re the Guardianship and Conservatorship of
Anderson, 2009 MT 344, 353 Mont.139, 218 P.3d 1220 (involving a payment-on-death
beneficiary of an investment account) hold that each class of persons listed in
§ 72-1-103(25), MCA, must possess a present property right in the estate to be an
“interested person,” those cases are factually distinguished. Neither of those cases
involved devisees. “Devisees” are “interested persons” under § 72-1-103(12) and (25),
MCA, and § 72-5-413, MCA, without possessing any other right or claim.
CONCLUSION
¶16 This case presents a question of law based upon Montana statutes. While the briefs
contain extensive argument about intra-family disagreements regarding the
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conservatorship, the District Court did not make any findings of fact on those issues, and
the parties do not contend that there are disputed issues of material fact that preclude
summary judgment. This Opinion is limited to the issue of standing.
¶17 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We Concur:
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JIM RICE
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