Kruckenberg v. City of Kalispell , 322 Mont. 177 ( 2004 )

No. 04-046
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2004 MT 185ANGIE KRUCKENBERG, Trustee, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
CITY OF KALISPELL,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DV 2002-601(C),
Honorable Ted O. Lympus, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Richard DeJana, Richard DeJana & Associates, Kalispell, Montana
For Respondent:
Charles A. Harball, City Attorney, Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 4, 2004
Decided: July 13, 2004
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Angie Kruckenberg, et al. (collectively Kruckenberg), appeals the District Court’s
ruling in favor of the City of Kalispell (Kalispell). We reverse and remand.
¶2 We restate the issues on appeal into one issue. The issue on appeal is whether the
District Court lost jurisdiction when the notice of entry of judgment was filed.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶3 Each of the appellants in this matter are private landowners within or near Kalispell
with property boundaries contiguous to an approximately ten-acre parcel which was annexed
into Kalispell and rezoned. After annexation, the property zoning was changed from R-1,
Suburban Residential, to R-4, Two-Family Residential. Kruckenberg filed a complaint
which alleged generally that the annexation of the property was illegal and void and, because
of the illegal annexation, Kalispell lacked authority to zone or approve a subdivision of the
property. The specific counts contained in the original complaint were entitled as follows:
Count I: General allegations; Count II: Declaration of illegal annexation; Count III:
Declaration of illegal zoning; Count IV: Declaration of improper approval of subdivision;
Count V: Declaration that ordinance 1438 is illegal and void; and Count VI: This action has
been brought because the city of Kalispell has failed to enforce interests significant to its
citizens.
¶4 Kalispell filed a motion to dismiss (pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P.) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Kruckenberg then filed a motion for
summary judgment “determining that the annexation of the property at issue was illegal and
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void and determining that because of the illegal annexation the City of Kalispell lacked the
authority to zone or approve a subdivision of the property.” After Kalispell answered,
Kruckenberg filed a motion that was both a supplement to her motion for summary judgment
and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Kalispell filed its response. Both sides briefed
the issues. Kruckenberg filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings requesting that
the court grant partial summary judgment determining that zoning of the property at issue
was void for failure to follow Kalispell’s regulations. Kalispell filed its response.
¶5 The District Court entered an “Order and Rationale on Motions for Summary
Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings” which denied Kruckenberg’s motion for summary
judgment and the first and second motions for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted
summary judgment in favor of Kalispell regarding Kruckenberg’s standing to challenge the
annexation. The court determined that Kruckenberg did not have standing because
Kruckenberg did not own property in the area annexed. Kruckenberg also claimed that
Kalispell violated the Kalispell Municipal Code because it did not comply with the zoning
notice requirements in Kalispell Municipal Code § 27-30-030. The court concluded that this
code section applies only to property already in the city which is proposed for rezoning.
Because the property at issue was newly-annexed property, the Kalispell Code section did
not apply, only the Montana Code applied. The court determined that Kalispell fully
complied with the applicable § 76-2-303, MCA, hearing and notice requirements.
¶6 Kalispell proceeded to file a notice of entry of judgment. Approximately two weeks
after the notice of entry of judgment was filed, Kruckenberg filed a motion to amend the
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original complaint. The District Court granted this motion and Kruckenberg filed an
amended complaint. The amended complaint added the owner of the annexed property as
a defendant and also added two new counts to the previous six counts. These new counts
were entitled: Count VII: The development of the property should be set aside; and Count
VIII: Because of the actions of the City and Owl Corporation specific defendants are more
particularly damaged.
¶7 Approximately three weeks after the amended complaint was filed, the court entered
an order nunc pro tunc in which it stated that the court had previously entered an order
“which fully and finally disposed of [the] case in favor of [Kalispell].” Although
Kruckenberg’s motion to amend the complaint was unopposed, the court stated that, when
it granted the motion, it was unaware that Kalispell had filed a notice of entry of judgment.
The court cited Hankinson v. Picotte (1988), 235 Mont. 143, 766 P.2d 242, and concluded
that it no longer had discretionary authority to grant leave to amend because the court lost
subject matter jurisdiction when Kalispell filed the notice of entry of judgment. The court
determined that the order allowing Kruckenberg to file the amended complaint was void and
should be stricken. Kruckenberg appeals the nunc pro tunc order. Although the dissent
states that the appeal is also from the summary judgment order, this order is appealed from
in the alternative if the nunc pro tunc order is determined to be a Rule 54 certification.
Because we determine that the jurisdictional issue addressed in the nunc pro tunc order is
determinative, the alternative basis is not ripe for appeal. We reverse and remand.
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Discussion
¶8 Did the District Court lose jurisdiction when the notice of entry of judgment was
filed?
¶9 In its order nunc pro tunc, the court stated that “[o]nce a notice of entry of judgment
is filed, the Court no longer has discretionary authority to grant leave to amend, the Court
loses subject matter jurisdiction and the time for appeal begins to run.” We do not need to
address the question of whether the initial summary judgment order was final and appealable
unless the District Court was correct in its nunc pro tunc order that it lost jurisdiction to
allow the amended complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the District
Court’s nunc pro tunc order is appealable and that the District Court erred in concluding that
it did not have jurisdiction to allow the amended complaint. That determination is
dispositive of this appeal.
¶10 We review a district court’s conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction to determine whether
the court is correct. Alpine Buffalo, Elk & Llama Rch. v. Andersen, 2001 MT 307, ¶ 22, 307
Mont. 509, ¶ 22, 38 P.3d 815, ¶ 22. The filing of the notice of entry of judgment begins the
running of the time limitations for filing a notice of appeal. Hankinson, 235 Mont. at 146,
766 P.2d at 243-44. “[T]he filing of an appeal to this Court stays all proceedings in the
district court, thereby removing jurisdiction from that court to proceed further in the matter.”
McCormick v. McCormick (1975), 168 Mont. 136, 138, 541 P.2d 765, 766. It is the “appeal
to this court [that] divests the district court of jurisdiction over the order or judgment from
which the appeal is taken. Thereafter the lower court is without jurisdiction to proceed upon
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any matter embraced therein.” McCormick, 168 Mont. at 138, 541 P.2d at 766 (citation
omitted).
¶11 Kruckenberg argues that since the court did not certify the summary judgment order
as final under Rule 54, M.R.Civ.P., the order was not a final appealable order. Because the
court’s summary judgment order only addressed two of the many issues raised in the
complaint, Kruckenberg claims the court did not issue a final judgment and the nunc pro tunc
order was thus issued in error. Nonetheless, since the nunc pro tunc order characterizes the
summary judgment order as final, Kruckenberg appeals from that order.
¶12 Reviewing the court’s determination that it lost jurisdiction once the notice of entry
of judgment was entered, we determine that the court’s conclusion was incorrect. Alpine
Buffalo, Elk & Llama Rch., ¶ 22. At the time the motion to file an amended complaint was
granted, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the case. Although the filing of a notice of
entry of judgment starts the clock running for the time to appeal, it does not divest the
District Court of jurisdiction. Hankinson, 235 Mont. at 146, 766 P.2d at 243-44. The court
is not divested of jurisdiction until a notice of appeal is filed. McCormick, 168 Mont. at 138,
541 P.2d at 766. The subsequent nunc pro tunc order stating that the order to allow the
amended complaint was void was based on a mistaken interpretation of law. McCormick,
168 Mont. at 138, 541 P.2d at 766. The court continued to have jurisdiction to allow for an
amended complaint. We reverse the court’s determination that it did not have jurisdiction
to entertain a motion for an amended complaint. Alpine Buffalo, Elk & Llama Rch., ¶ 22.
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¶13 Despite the District Court’s declaration in the order nunc pro tunc that the previously
entered summary judgment order fully and finally disposed of the case in favor of Kalispell,
all issues raised in the original complaint were not resolved (e.g., the subdivision issues have
standing requirements, pursuant to § 76-3-625, MCA, which are separate and distinct from
the standing requirements regarding annexation).
¶14 The only issue that is ripe for appellate review is whether the court lost jurisdiction
upon the filing of the notice of entry of judgment. We determine that it did not. We reverse
the court’s conclusion that it lost jurisdiction, reinstate the order allowing the amendment to
the complaint, and remand for further proceedings on the amended complaint and all
remaining issues.
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
We concur:
/S/ KARLA M. GRAY
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ JIM RICE
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Justice Patricia O. Cotter, dissenting.
¶15 I respectfully dissent. I would reach the merits of the District Court’s Order of
Summary Judgment in favor of the City of Kalispell, and affirm.
¶16 I concur in the Court’s conclusion that the District Court erred in its determination
that it lost jurisdiction over the case once the Notice of Entry of Judgment was filed of
record. However, I would nonetheless reach the merits of the District Court’s Order of
Summary Judgment. The propriety of the Order of Summary Judgment is properly before
us, as the plaintiffs explicitly appealed both from the Order Nunc Pro Tunc and from the
Order of Summary Judgment in their Notice of Appeal. Reaching the merits, I would
conclude that the end result of the District Court’s Order Nunc Pro Tunc, which was the
striking of the prior order allowing the amendment to the complaint, and the indication that
the case was previously fully adjudicated on the merits, was correct.
¶17 The Court maintains that the Order of Summary Judgment was not final because all
issues raised in the original complaint were not resolved. ¶ 13. I disagree. Although
plaintiffs now contend there were issues left unresolved by the summary judgment Order,
this is not the position they took in the District Court. It was the plaintiffs who contended
that there were no genuine issues of material fact. It was the plaintiffs who sought summary
judgment on the basis that, because the annexation was illegal and void, the City of Kalispell
lacked jurisdiction to either zone or subdivide property over which it had no authority. In
other words, plaintiffs’ zoning and subdivision arguments hinged entirely upon their
contention that the City lacked jurisdiction to undertake the annexation. If the District Court
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was correct that plaintiffs had no standing to contest the annexation, it follows that they had
no standing to contest the City’s jurisdiction. This would mean that their lack of jurisdiction
arguments would fail, and so, in turn, would their ensuing claims. The only other issue
raised by the plaintiffs before the court entered its summary judgment ruling was with
respect to whether notice was properly given before the public hearing on the initial zoning
of the property. The District Court ruled on this issue as well.
¶18 When the District Court granted summary judgment to the City of Kalispell, it
correctly determined that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the annexation
because Kruckenburg and the other plaintiffs did not own property in the area annexed.
Collateral attacks on annexations are not allowed by those who do not have standing to
directly challenge them. O’Donnell Fire Serv. & Equipment v. Billings (1985), 219 Mont.
317, 711 P.2d 822. Moreover, the court also correctly determined that the City of Kalispell
fully complied with State law regarding notice of the public hearing for initial zoning of the
property. For the reasons set forth above, between these two rulings the District Court
resolved all issues raised by the plaintiffs and argued in their Motion for Summary Judgment
and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Because the plaintiffs affirmatively alleged there
were no genuine issues of material fact for the District Court to resolve, the District Court
did not err in proceeding to enter a final judgment in favor of the City of Kalispell.
¶19 The plaintiffs’ lack of standing to challenge the annexation will not change, regardless
of the character of the amendments they seek to add to their Complaint against the City of
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Kalispell. For this reason, I see no reason to reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I would therefore affirm.
/S/ PATRICIA O. COTTER
Justice James C. Nelson joins in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Patricia O. Cotter.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
Justice Jim Regnier joins in the concurrence and dissent of Justice Patricia O. Cotter.
/S/ JIM REGNIER
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