Matter of L.A. , 2013 MT 327 ( 2013 )

November 5 2013
DA 12-0689
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2013 MT 327IN THE MATTER OF:
L.A.,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DI 11-05
Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Wade Zolynski, Chief Appellate Defender; Eileen A. Larkin, Assistant
Appellate Defender; Helena, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General; Micheal S. Wellenstein,
Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana
William E. Fulbright, Ravalli County Attorney; Hamilton, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 16, 2013
Decided: November 5, 2013
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 L.A. appeals the order of the Twenty-First Judicial Court, Ravalli County,
ordering her involuntary commitment and involuntary medication. After a two-day trial,
the jury concluded by special verdict that L.A. was suffering from a mental disorder, was
unable to provide for her basic needs, was an imminent threat of injury to herself or
others, and, if left untreated, her condition would deteriorate. At the dispositional hearing
immediately following the verdict, the District Court adopted an Order of Commitment
and Transport Order submitted by the State. In 2011, we reversed a previous order of
commitment for L.A. due to the entry of an order by the District Court that employed
conclusory statements of statutory criteria rather than a detailed statement of facts. In re
L.L.A., 2011 MT 285, ¶¶ 11, 23, 362 Mont. 464, 267 P.3d 1. L.A. challenges the present
commitment order on the same grounds. We affirm and review the following issues on
appeal:
¶2 1. Did the District Court err by failing to make a detailed statement of facts in its
post-trial disposition order as required by § 53-21-127(8)(a), MCA?
¶3 2. Did the District Court err by failing to meet the statutory prerequisites of § 53-
21-127(8)(h), MCA, to authorize involuntary medication?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶4 L.A. has previously been diagnosed as suffering from Schizophrenia. Following
her release from her previous commitment in April 2011, L.A. was on medication and her
condition was stable. She returned to live with her parents and was seen at a health clinic
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to assist her with a treatment program. L.A. moved into her own apartment, but later
moved back in with her parents. L.A. stopped taking her medication in early 2012, and
her unusual behavior started to return. L.A.’s parents were concerned for L.A.’s safety
and well-being, and began documenting L.A.’s behavior. Based on a report by Fred
Huskey, a licensed clinical professional counselor and certified mental health
professional, the State filed a petition for involuntary commitment of L.A. L.A.
requested a jury trial pursuant to § 53-21-125, MCA.
¶5 At trial, L.A.’s father testified that L.A. stopped taking her medications because
she believed “medications are poison and that they will kill her.” He also testified
regarding his concern for her health due to her refusal to seek medical treatment for
health problems and her increasingly poor hygiene. L.A. would get agitated and become
physically aggressive with her parents if they asked her to take her medication or
otherwise suggested she had a mental disorder. He also testified that L.A. was engaging
in increasingly odd behavior such as staring at the wall and laughing while alone, placing
toxic substances near her private area to prevent evil from getting her, plugging the toilet
with items to stop evil rays, and placing coins around her bed to protect her from evil or
“bioterror.” The jury viewed a videotape recorded by L.A.’s parents depicting strange
behaviors by L.A. during a week long period shortly before trial. L.A.’s father also
testified that L.A. was afraid to live alone due to her worsening paranoia, and was unable
to pay her bills or manage her own finances.
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¶6 Darby Deputy Marshall Jon Moles testified that, a few days before the trial, L.A.
approached him and asked him if he could hear screaming. She then told him that
someone was being murdered at Como Lake, and that people in black clothing were in
town to artificially inseminate people. Irene Walters, a nurse practitioner at Riverfront
Mental Health Center, testified that L.A.’s condition began to deteriorate when she quit
taking her medications in early 2012. Walters testified she was afraid that L.A.’s fears
were so strong that she could ultimately hurt herself or her family. Huskey testified that
Schizophrenia is treatable, but if left untreated each psychotic episode results in greater
damage. Huskey believed that L.A. was not able to provide for her own basic needs or
safety, and could be at risk of harming herself or others. Huskey did not recommend a
less restrictive plan for L.A. because of her refusal to take medication and follow up with
her treatment plan.
¶7 L.A. testified on her own behalf and adamantly denied having a mental disorder.
She claimed that attempts to confine and forcibly medicate her were a threat to national
security, and likely the result of sexual harassment. She also claimed that if she was
forced to take medication she would likely die.
¶8 The jury completed a special verdict form, concluding that by a reasonable
medical certainty L.A. suffered from a mental disorder. The jury also found by clear and
convincing evidence that because of her mental disorder L.A. was “substantially unable
to provide for her basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety;” that “there
exists an imminent threat of injury to [L.A.] or to others because of [her] acts or
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omissions;” and that L.A.’s mental disorder, “as demonstrated by [L.A.’s] recent acts or
omissions, will, if untreated, predictably result in deterioration” to the point she “will
become a danger to self or to others, or will be unable to provide for [her] own basic
needs.” Finally, the jury found that the physical facts and evidence necessary to support
their answers were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶9 Immediately after dismissing the jury, the District Court held a dispositional
hearing. The court asked the State for a proposed order, which the State already had
prepared. The Order of Commitment recited the findings stated on the special verdict
form, which essentially tracks the language of § 53-21-126(1), MCA. The order
contained five additional findings of fact, including that L.A. suffers from Schizophrenia,
undifferentiated type, as diagnosed by Huskey; that, based upon the testimony, L.A.
required commitment to Montana State Hospital; and that this commitment was the
least-restrictive environment possible “based upon [L.A.’s] behavior and non-compliance
with medications.” The order committed L.A. to the Montana State Hospital for up to 90
days, and approved involuntary medication if it was deemed necessary to facilitate her
treatment. The court orally stated that the commitment and involuntary medication
authorization were based on findings of the jury and the report by Huskey.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 We exercise de novo review to determine whether a district court correctly
interpreted and applied the relevant statutes. In re Mental Health of E.P.B., 2007 MT
224, ¶ 5, 339 Mont. 107, 168 P.3d 662. Whether a district court’s findings of fact satisfy
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the statutory requirements is a question of law which we review for correctness. In re
L.L.A., ¶ 7.
¶11 It is the jury’s function to weigh and resolve conflicts in the evidence, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and “make the factual determinations necessary to render a
verdict.” Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, ¶ 94, 336 Mont. 225, 154 P.3d 561. The court
must defer “to the jury’s constitutionally sanctioned decisional role,” Mont. Const. art. II,
§ 26, and it is not the court’s role to repeat the jury’s tasks and retry a case or reweigh
evidence. Seltzer, ¶ 94. We review a jury verdict to determine whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, it is supported by substantial
credible evidence. Seltzer, ¶ 94.
DISCUSSION
¶12 1. Did the District Court err by failing to make a detailed statement of facts in its
post-trial disposition order as required by § 53-21-127(8)(a), MCA?
¶13 The key difference between this case and L.A.’s 2011 appeal is that the findings
here were made by a jury instead of a judge. In In re L.L.A., the trial judge was the trier
of fact. Here, L.A. received a trial by jury and the jury found that the evidence proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that L.A. suffered from a mental disorder, was unable to care
for herself, posed a threat of harm to herself or others, and, if left untreated, would
continue to deteriorate.
¶14 Only once in a published opinion have we addressed a case where a jury, rather
than a judge, made the involuntary commitment determination. See In re D.M.S., 2009
MT 41, 349 Mont. 257, 203 P.3d 776. In re D.M.S. involved a challenge to the
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sufficiency of the evidence. In re D.M.S., ¶¶ 3, 20. Here, L.A. does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict, but argues only that the District
Court erred “by ordering her involuntary commitment . . . without providing a detailed
statement of facts” as required by § 53-21-127(8), MCA.
¶15 Juries generally do not enter detailed findings of fact from the evidence they hear.
Though the involuntary commitment statutes must be strictly followed, including the
entry of “detailed findings of fact,” § 53-21-127(8)(a), MCA, it is not possible for a
judge, who is not privy to a jury’s deliberations, to know in detail what evidence the jury
accepted or rejected in reaching its verdict. To ask the judge to enter detailed findings
after a jury has reached a commitment verdict would require speculation and usurp the
jury process, allowing the judge’s determination of the evidence to supersede the jury’s.
“Statutory construction should not lead to absurd results if a reasonable interpretation can
avoid it.” Bitterroot River Protective Ass’n. v. Bitterroot Conserv. Dist., 2008 MT 377,
¶ 72, 346 Mont. 507, 198 P.3d 219 (citation omitted).
¶16 Here, the jury utilized a special verdict form upon which they indicated that the
evidence proved that L.A. suffered from a mental disorder, was unable to care for herself,
posed a threat of harm to herself or others, and, if left untreated, would continue to
deteriorate predictably to the point of danger to herself or others. The special verdict
form, along with the additional findings entered by the District Court in its order, were
sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements in a case tried to a jury.
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¶17 2. Did the District Court err by failing to meet the statutory prerequisites of § 53-
21-127(8)(h), MCA, to authorize involuntary medication?
¶18 L.A. argues the District Court erred by “authorizing her involuntary medication
without providing a detailed statement of facts,” citing § 53-21-127(8)(h), MCA.
However, this provision does not require entry of a detailed statement of facts for
purposes of authorizing the administration of medication involuntarily. That requirement
is applicable only to the determination that a respondent is suffering from a mental
disorder and requires commitment. See § 53-21-127(8)(a), MCA. The court’s reasoning
regarding why “involuntary medication was chosen from among other alternatives” must
only be supported by the usual “findings of fact.” Section 53-21-127(8)(h), MCA.
¶19 The jury determined that the evidence presented at trial proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that L.A. suffered from a mental disorder and that her condition
satisfied the requirements for commitment. The District Court orally noted that the order
was adopted based upon the findings of the jury and the recommendations of Huskey, the
designated Professional Person. Its written findings stated that the commitment and
involuntary medication authorization were ordered based upon Huskey’s
recommendation and L.A.’s “behavior and non-compliance with medications,” and that
less restrictive alternatives were not appropriate for the same reason. Though these
findings do not detail the particular evidence upon which the court’s findings and
conclusions were based, the record was replete with evidence of L.A.’s behavior and
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non-compliance with medications, and the statute only required findings supporting the
reasoning for the authorization. Therefore, we conclude the order was sufficient.1
¶20 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
1
We are mindful that in In re R.W.K, 2013 MT 54, ¶ 32, 369 Mont. 193, 297 P.3d 318, decided
after the case sub judice was tried, we “urge[d] the district courts to plainly and clearly state in
orders of commitment whether the circumstances justify authorizing the chief medical officer or
designated physician to administer medication involuntarily, and if so, the reason involuntary
medication was chosen from among other alternatives.” Although this task belonged to the
District Court, the court’s ability to identify determining circumstances was likewise inhibited by
not being privy to the jury’s acceptance or rejection of evidence during deliberations.
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