Estate of Morehouse v. Yellowstone ( 1997 )


Menu:
  •            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    1997
    ESTATE OF DEBORAH RUTH MOREHOUSE.
    Deceased; JAMES MOREHOUSE as
    Personal Representative,
    Plaintiff and Appellant,
    COUNTY OF YELLOWSTONE, STATE OF
    MONTANA; DEPUTY BAUER, DEPUTY
    KAMMINGA & DEPUTY ELLIS,
    Defendants and Respondents
    APPEAL FROM:     District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District.
    In and for the County of Yellowstone,
    The Honorable Maurice Colberg, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    James Robert Graves, Ingrid Gustafson, Graves, Toennis & Gustafson,
    Billings, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Charles R. Cashmore, Billings, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: April 3, 1997
    Decided: A p r i l 2 4 ,   1997
    Filed:
    clerk
    MEMORANDUM
    Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal
    Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent and shall be published
    by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its
    result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company.
    This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the respondents, Yellowstone County
    and Deputies Bauer, Kamminga and Ellis (hereinafter collectively referred to as Yellowstone
    County or the Deputies), and against the appellant Estate of Deborah Ruth Morehouse, James
    Morchouse as personal representative (heremafter referred to as Morehouse). We reverse
    and remand for new trial.
    The basic facts are that during the early morning hours of October 31, 1992, the
    Deputies, after having breakfast at a local Billings restaurant, found Brent Straw, now
    deceased, parked next to their patrol car in his pickup, intoxicated and passed out. They tried
    to arouse him and were minimally successful in doing so. Without taking any precautions
    or making any arrest, the deputies left Straw asleep in the pickup. A short time later Straw
    drove the wrong way on Interstate 90, between Laurel and Billings, Montana, and collided
    with the vehicle of Deborah Ruth Morehouse, who was on her way to work. Morehouse
    died as a result of the accident. The Estate brought suit against Yellowstone County,
    asserting that the Deputies were negligent in failing to arrest Straw for DUI and that their
    negligence resulted in the death of Morehouse. The jury determined that the Deputies had
    probable cause to arrest Straw for DUI; that they were negligent in not making the arrest; but
    that their negligence was not a legal cause of Morehouse's death. Prior to bringing suit,
    Morehouse settled with the estate of Brent Straw.
    Three issues are raised on appeal:
    I. Were Morehouse's substantive due process rights violated by allowing the jury to
    consider the affirmative defense that Morehouse's damages were caused by or contributed
    to by an unnamed third party, pursuant to 5 27-1-703(6), MCA (1995)?
    2. Was the issue of causation properly submitted to the jury?
    3. Did the District Court err in admitting evidence of drug use and sale by
    Morehouse's son?
    Having considered the arguments of the parties in the context of the record of this
    case, we conclude that the jury verdict and the judgment entered in this case by the District
    Court should be reversed and this case remanded for a new hial on the issue of liability and
    damages.
    Issue I
    In light of our decision in Plumb v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Court (Mont.1996), 927 P.2d
    1011,53 St.Rep. 1187, declaring the nonparty defense unconstitutional, it was error for the
    District Court to submit this defense to the jury. While Yellowstone County argues that
    submission of the nonparty defense to the jury in this case was harmless error because the
    jury found that the Deputies' conduct was not the legal cause of the accident in which
    Morehouse died, we agree with Morehouse that the nonparty defense so permeated the entire
    litigation in this case that Morehouse's substantive due process rights were violated by the
    submission of the nonparty defense to the jury. There is simply no way to gage the effect of
    this defense on the jury's deliberations and verdict and, accordingly, the case must be retried.
    Issue 2
    With regard to issue two, Morehouse argues that where law enforcement officers
    negligently failed to arrest a DUI suspect and the suspect then causes an automobile fatality
    within one hour and twenty minutes after being encountered by the law enforcement officers
    and where, as both parties seem to agree, there was no intervening or superseding negligence
    or any allegation of comparative negligence, then as a matter of law the negligence of the
    officers must be a legal cause in bringing about the decedent's death. On that basis,
    Morehouse argues that we should remand the case for a new trial only on the issue of
    damages. We disagree.
    Causation is normally an issue to be decided by the fact finder and where conflicting
    evidence is presented at trial, such issues must be decided by the jury. Werre v. David
    (1996), 275 Mont. 376,392,913 P.2d 625,635. We obviously do not h o w exactly on what
    basis the jury determined that the negligence of the deputies was not a legal cause of
    Morehouse's death. Given the nature of the conflicting evidence presented to the jury,
    including the substantial causation instruction offered by Morehouse, and given, that the jury
    was allowed to consider the nonparty defense, it would be improper for this Court to
    speculate as to the reasons why the jury made the decision on the issue of causation that it
    did. Again, the only proper way to resolve this case is to remand for retrial on liability as
    well as on damages.
    Issue 3
    Finally, appellant argues that the District Court abused its discretion in admitting
    evidence that Morehouse's son used and sold marijuana following his mother's death.
    Yellowstone County argues that admitting the evidence was within the court's discretion or
    was at most hamless error.    111 the   context in which this evidence was admitted in this case,
    and because we are remanding this case for a new trial, we conclude that it is unnecessary
    that we address this issue.
    Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
    April 25, 1997
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that the following certified order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, t tle
    o
    foliowing named
    James Robert Graves, Esq.; Ingrid Gustafson, Esq.
    Graves, Toennis & Gustafson
    P.O. Box 7227
    Billings, MT 59103-7227
    J
    i
    Charles R. Cashmore
    Attorney at Law
    301 N. 27th St.
    Billings, MT 59101
    ED SMITH
    CLERK OF TEE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF MONTANA
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96-731

Filed Date: 4/24/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014