State v. Jenkins , 332 Mont. 34 ( 2006 )

No. 05-399
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2006 MT 85STATE OF MONTANA, TOWN OF DARBY,
RAVALLI COUNTY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JACK J. JENKINS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DC 02-145,
Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jack J. Jenkins, pro se, Shelby, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General, Jennifer Anders,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
George Corn, Ravalli County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 22, 2006
Decided: April 25, 2006
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Jack Jenkins appeals an Order of the District Court for the Twenty-First Judicial
District, Ravalli County, denying his Petition for Writ of Certiorari or Supervisory Control.
We affirm.
¶2 We address the following issue on appeal: Did the District Court abuse its discretion
when it denied Jenkins’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari or Supervisory Control?
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 The District Court entered the following statement of facts in its May 24, 2005
Opinion and Order denying Jenkins’ petition.
It appears undisputed that pursuant to a number of Darby City Court
judgments in 1997, 1998 and 2002, Mr. Jenkins was assessed fines totaling
$2,875.00 and was ordered to complete the ACT program and pay the cost
thereof in the sum of $200.00. The fines and fees were to be paid in full by
March 11, 2003. Jenkins filed an appeal of his convictions to this Court on
September 11, 2002, but subsequently moved to dismiss his appeal. The
appeal was dismissed by this Court and the case remanded to Darby City Court
on October 23, 2002. On November 18, 2002, Jenkins was arrested for Felony
DUI and other charges. He ultimately pled guilty to that charge and on June 4,
2003 was sentenced to thirteen (13) months in State custody, plus five (5)
years as a persistent felony offender and five (5) years probation.
On July 30, 2003, Jenkins was sentenced to the Montana State Prison.
He has a parole eligibility date of September 11, 2005, and a discharge date of
June 16, 2009.
On September 24, 2003, the Darby City Court issued a “Fail to Comply
Warrant” directing that Jenkins be arrested and brought before the Darby City
Court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for failure
to pay the assessed fines and fees.
Jenkins has applied for a pre-release center placement, but the Montana
Department of Corrections refused consideration of a pre-release placement
due to the outstanding warrant from Darby City Court.
According to the pre-sentence investigation report dated June 3, 2003,
in Cause No. DC-02-170, Jenkins is in good health and has a work history
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including employment as a logger, and various other jobs in Montana,
Washington, Nevada and Idaho.
Jenkins filed a “Motion to Dismiss and Request to Enter into Payment
Agreement” with the Darby City Court, by which he sought to have the Court
recall/dismiss the warrant in exchange for a time pay agreement which would
allow him to qualify for a pre-release placement. The City Attorney opposed
the motion and the Court entered its order denying the motion on January 24,
2005.
¶4 As the State points out in its brief on appeal, many of the facts stated above are not
substantiated in the record now before this Court because they come from other sources such
as Jenkins’ Department of Corrections (DOC) file. However, the State further notes that the
Statement of Facts in Jenkins’ opening brief indicates that he does not disagree with the
District Court’s findings.
DISCUSSION
¶5 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Jenkins’ Petition for Writ of
Certiorari or Supervisory Control?
¶6 A Writ of Certiorari, or a Writ of Review, may be granted by this Court or a district
court or any judge of those courts “when a lower tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial functions has exceeded the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board, or officer and there is
no appeal or, in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.” Section
27-25-102, MCA. Moreover, this Court will not overturn a district court’s denial of a writ
unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Schaefer v. Egeland, 2004 MT 199, ¶ 11, 322 Mont.
274, ¶ 11, 95 P.3d 724, ¶ 11 (citing Shiplet v. Egeland, 2001 MT 21, ¶ 5, 304 Mont. 141, ¶ 5,
18 P.3d 1001, ¶ 5). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court acts arbitrarily
without conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason.” Schaefer, ¶ 11 (citing
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Bailey v. Beartooth Communications Co., 2004 MT 128, ¶ 10, 321 Mont. 305, ¶ 10, 92 P.3d
1, ¶ 10).
¶7 Jenkins claims the Darby City Court exceeded its jurisdiction by denying him due
process and speedy trial rights and unfairly denying his ability to qualify for community
corrections programs while in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The State
argues that the fact that the City Court denied Jenkins’ motion does not mean that the City
Court Judge exceeded her jurisdiction, which is the standard for certiorari.
¶8 We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that while the existence of a warrant
may place Jenkins in an escape-risk classification that impacts his placement within the
DOC, Jenkins has not shown that the Darby City Court is under some legal obligation to
quash an otherwise valid warrant merely to facilitate Jenkins’ placement in a pre-release
center or other community corrections program.
¶9 Moreover, Jenkins has not provided any authority to the effect that the City Court
Judge exceeded her jurisdiction by denying his motion to quash the warrant. Although
Jenkins cites to several decisions of this Court, none of those cases stand for the proposition
that a city court judge exceeds her jurisdiction when she refuses, as a matter of discretion, to
quash an outstanding warrant so as to render the petitioner eligible for alternative placement
within the correctional system.
¶10 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Jenkins’ Petition for Writ of Certiorari or Supervisory Control.
¶11 Affirmed.
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/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
We Concur:
/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
/S/ JIM RICE
/S/ PATRICIA COTTER
Justice John Warner dissents.
¶12 I disagree with the Court’s holding as it is fundamentally unfair and violates Jenkins’
constitutional right to due process. The Darby City Court has refused to execute or quash its
warrant for Jenkins. As a result, the outstanding warrant renders him ineligible for parole or
community correctional programs.
¶13 The Court states in its Opinion that Jenkins has not shown that the Darby City Court is
under any legal obligation to quash an otherwise valid warrant. I disagree.
¶14 I note that Jenkins is acting pro se in this matter and we will give pro se litigants
reasonable latitude and flexibility in presenting their cases. Jenkins clearly asserts in his
District Court brief that the City Court has denied him his due process rights. Indeed, there is
substantial authority for the position that due process requires “reasonable diligence” in the
issuance and execution of a warrant for arrest. See State v. Longhorn, 2002 MT 135, ¶ 28,
310 Mont. 172, ¶ 28, 49 P.3d 48, ¶ 28 (quoting Doggett v. U.S. (1992), 505 U.S. 647, 656,
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112 S. Ct. 2686, 2693, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 531); accord McCowan v. Nelson (9th Cir. 1970),
436 F.2d 758, 760; Shelton v. U.S. Bd. Of Parole (D.C. Cir. 1967); 388 F.2d 567, 574;
Greene v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections (6th Cir. 1963), 315 F.2d 546, 548 (failure of
authorities to proceed with reasonable diligence to execute a warrant for arrest after a parole
violation may result in waiver of violation and loss of jurisdiction if authorities had either
actual or constructive notice of parolee’s whereabouts).
¶15 The City Court has a duty to exercise reasonable diligence in the execution of its
arrest warrant, yet it refuses to do so. Jenkins’ whereabouts is certainly no secret as he is
currently incarcerated at the Crossroads Correctional Center. Due process requires that the
City Court proceed to execute its warrant and order that he be brought before the court to
answer for his contempt of court.1 If the City Court refuses to execute the warrant, then it
must quash it. In any case, the City Court cannot be allowed to sit on the warrant, taking no
further action, for the collateral purpose of keeping Jenkins in prison.
¶16 Even though the Court is correct in concluding that a writ of certiorari is improper
here, the Court ignores Jenkins’ argument that we should exercise supervisory control. This
Court exercises supervisory control in appropriate cases pursuant to the authority granted in
Article VII, § 2(2) of the Montana Constitution, and Rule 17(a), M.R.App.P. The use of this
1
A court has the authority to execute an arrest warrant when the defendant is currently
housed in a state correctional facility. See section 46-6-215, MCA (execution of a search
warrant); section 46-6-210, MCA (arrest by peace officer); section 46-17-401, MCA (except
as provided in Titles 3 and 6, the proceedings and practices in a municipal court shall be the
same as in a district court); section 3-1-515, MCA (arrest and detention by sheriff); section 3-
11-303(2), MCA (application to city court).
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power is appropriate where the district court is proceeding based on a mistake of law which,
if uncorrected, would cause a significant injustice. Inter-Fluve v. Montana Eighteenth
Judicial Dist. Court, 2005 MT 103, ¶ 17, 327 Mont. 14, ¶ 17, 112 P.3d 258, ¶ 17. A due
process violation surely constitutes a significant injustice.
¶17 I would issue the writ, reverse the District Court, and remand to the City Court with
instructions to execute its warrant for Jenkins or to quash it, as is constitutionally required.
/S/ JOHN WARNER
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