Matter of C.C. C.J. C.M.C. , 2009 MT 153 ( 2009 )

May 5 2009
DA 08-0468
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2009 MT 153
IN THE MATTER OF:
C.M.C., C.C., and C.J.,
Youths in Need of Care
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Gallatin,
Cause Nos. DN 07-17B; DN 07-18B and DN 07-19B
Honorable Mike Salvagni, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Jim Wheelis, Chief Appellate Defender; Kelli S. Sather,
Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana
(Attorney for Appellant and mother, S.P.)
For Appellee:
Hon. Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General; Mark W. Mattioli
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Marty Lambert, Gallatin County Attorney; Deborah Pratt, Deputy County
Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 4, 2009
Decided: May 5, 2009
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 This is an appeal by S.P. (the mother) from the August 19, 2008 order of the District
Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, the Hon. Mike Salvagni,
terminating her parental rights to her minor children C.M.C., C.C., and C.J. We affirm.
¶2 The mother presents issues for review that we restate as follows:
¶3 Issue One: Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the State met the
statutory criteria for terminating the mother’s parental rights.
¶4 Issue Two: Whether the mother was denied effective assistance of counsel.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶5 The mother’s children are C.M.C., a boy born in 2003; C.C., a girl born in 2004 with
cerebral palsy; and C.J., a boy born in 2006. In March, 2007, the Department of Health and
Human Services (DPHHS) petitioned the District Court to authorize emergency protective
services and temporary legal custody of the children. The mother had left the children with
her parents, saying that she was homeless and could not safely care for them. She asked that
they be placed in the care of the State. The mother’s parents have had physical custody of
two of the children and the other has been in foster care throughout most of the time since
then. In April, 2007, the mother stipulated that the District Court could adjudicate the
children to be “youths in need of care” under Montana law. After a May, 2007, dispositional
hearing, the District Court granted temporary legal custody of the children to DPHHS for six
months, and ordered the mother to complete a structured treatment plan. In October, 2007
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the State petitioned for a six month extension of temporary legal custody to allow the mother
more time to work on the treatment plan, and she agreed.
¶6 On April 29, 2008 the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of the mother
based upon the contention that she had failed to comply with the treatment plan. The District
Court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition on August 5 and 6, 2008, at which the
mother testified. The mother was represented by counsel throughout these various
proceedings. The District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
on August 19, 2008, terminating the mother’s parental rights.
¶7 The District Court’s findings of fact were comprehensive and detailed. They
described the evidence regarding the mother’s inconsistent and half-hearted efforts and her
substantive failure to comply with the major requirements of the treatment plan. At the same
time, the children had thrived in their alternative placements following the award of
temporary legal custody.
¶8 The treatment plan required the mother to complete a chemical dependency evaluation
and to comply with any recommendations that resulted. The mother completed that
evaluation with Karen Furu, whose report identified concerns that included the mother’s
involvement in abusive relationships with men including the fathers of her children, her use
of alcohol and drugs starting at age 16, and the fact that C.C. is a special needs child. The
evaluation showed that the mother was in denial about substance abuse and her relationships
with men, and had a high probability of having a substance dependency disorder. The
mother tested positive for alcohol residue. Furu recommended that the mother abstain from
alcohol and drugs; that she complete a psychological examination; that she participate in
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family and relationship counseling and in drug and alcohol counseling; and that she
participate in individual counseling with a mental health professional and with a licensed
addiction counselor. The mother did not follow through with all of the recommendations.
She began individual counseling with Sally Hand several months later but made no
appointments for months after that.
¶9 The mother underwent a psychological evaluation in August, 2007, with Dr. Ned
Tranel. His report concluded that the mother has a narcissistic personality disorder, a naïve
and detached approach to parenting responsibilities, a tendency to become involved with
dysfunctional men, and a strong possibility of substance abuse. Tranel determined that the
mother’s relationships with dysfunctional men were self destructive and sabotaged her
relationships with her children. At the same time, he found that she exaggerates the true
facts by insisting that everything is fine.
¶10 The evidence clearly illustrated how the mother’s relationships with men given to
physical and verbal abuse and substance use jeopardized the safety of her children. The
mother had an ongoing relationship with one man whose own children were taken from him
based upon his neglect and substance abuse. She maintained that relationship until six weeks
before the termination hearing. She had a relationship with C.J.’s father, which ended only
after he pointed a gun at a babysitter and the three children in a dispute over a car.
¶11 Tranel recommended that the mother complete parenting classes, vocational
assistance, individual counseling, participation in a self-help group to deal with her
personality disorder and that she participate in a 12-step type program to deal with the effects
of drugs in her life. The mother completed only the parenting class and some counseling.
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¶12 The mother did not maintain consistent employment or utilization of public
assistance, and did not seek vocational training, as required by the plan. She did not
participate in any self-help groups. She failed to maintain contact with her social worker
Carol Julien, and failed to maintain a permanent residence or to provide notice of her address
so that her living conditions could be assessed. She failed to have the men she lived with
provide information for background checks as required by the plan. Julien testified that the
mother was not able to meet the needs of the children and had not changed. Julien’s opinion
was that the children needed to “get on with their lives” with a permanent home.
¶13 Marilyn Riley was a counselor for the children C.M.C. and C.C. She reported that
they suffered severe anxiety from trauma while with the mother and that they continued to
suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. C.M.C. reported that one of the mother’s men had
hit him, and that he had seen the mother and boyfriend fighting. Riley found that at age 4
C.M.C. was acting as a caretaker for his younger sister who has cerebral palsy. Riley found
that both children had responded remarkably well to living with the mother’s parents in an
atmosphere of predictability, love and protection that should be continued.
¶14 George Marleau is the mother’s step-father and had cared for C.C. and C.M.C. for
almost a year, along with the maternal grandmother. He testified to the chaotic conditions
with the mother and children when they periodically lived with the parents. He observed that
she gave the children little structure and consistency as to things like daily schedules, meals
and bed times. He observed that she took the children with her when she went out at night
and would live with the parents for days and then disappear for days. He testified that after
the children were left in his custody the mother would sometimes call on the phone, loud and
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drunk, wanting to talk to the children. He testified that when the children first arrived at
their house they were unruly but that they now have manners and are healthy. He believed
that it was in the best interests of the children to stay in stable foster placement and to be
adopted.
¶15 The mother’s brother Joshua testified about the year he was in Montana between
deployments with the Marine Corps. He lived with the parents while they had custody of the
children. He worked at the Hub Bar and testified that he saw his sister there two or three
times a month and that he saw her drinking. He also saw her “out” on the town during times
she said she was working.
¶16 Kira Poulson was the guardian ad litem for the children. She expressed concern about
the mother’s lack of commitment and her failure to take all necessary steps to have the
children returned to her. She recommended that the mother’s parental rights be terminated.
¶17 The District Court concluded that the mother had failed to complete her treatment
plan after having a year to do so, and that the plan had not been successful. She had not
maintained steady employment or place of residence. She did not refrain from alcohol or
bars. She did not get the individual counseling that had been indicated by Tranel and Furu.
Judge Salvagni found that the mother’s explanation for discontinuing individual counseling
was not credible and was not successful because she chose to continue living with the man
whose own children were removed from him. Accordingly, he ordered termination of her
parental rights and this appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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¶18 A court may order the termination of parental rights upon a finding supported by clear
and convincing evidence that the child is a youth in need of care. Section 41-3-609(1),
MCA. The court must find that the parent’s conduct is unlikely to change in a reasonable
time, considering a list of factors the primary one of which is the “physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs of the child.” Section 41-3-609(3), MCA; In the Matter of
C.J.K., 2005 MT 67, ¶ 14, 326 Mont. 289, 109 P.3d 232.
¶19 This Court reviews a district court’s order on termination of parental rights for an
abuse of discretion. In the Matter of J.V., 2003 MT 68, ¶ 7, 314 Mont. 487, 67 P.3d 242. A
court acts arbitrarily when it acts without employment of conscientious judgment or in
excess of the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. Matter of C.J.K., ¶ 13.
Findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, and conclusions of law
are reviewed to determine whether they are correct. Matter of C.J.K., ¶ 13.
¶20 This Court exercises plenary review of whether a parent was denied effective
assistance of counsel in termination proceedings. In the Matter of A.S., 2004 MT 62, ¶ 9,
320 Mont. 268, 87 P.3d 408.
DISCUSSION
¶21 Whether the District Court erred in concluding that the State met the statutory criteria
for terminating the mother’s parental rights.
¶22 The mother contends that the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that the statutory criteria for termination of parental rights were met, and that the District
Court failed to make adequate findings.
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¶23 A natural parent’s right to the care and custody of his or her child is a fundamental
liberty interest which must be protected by fundamentally fair proceedings. Matter of A.S., ¶
12. The court may terminate the parent-child legal relationship upon clear and convincing
evidence that:
(f) the child is an adjudicated youth in need of care and both of the
following exist:
(i) an appropriate treatment plan that has been approved by the court
has not been complied with by the parents or has not been successful; and
(ii) the conduct or condition of the parents rendering them unfit is
unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
Section 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA. Clear and convincing evidence is
simply a requirement that a preponderance of the evidence be definite, clear,
and convincing, or that a particular issue must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence or by a clear preponderance of proof. This
requirement does not call for unanswerable or conclusive evidence. The
quality of proof, to be clear and convincing, is somewhere between the rule in
ordinary civil cases and the requirement of criminal procedure—that is, it must
be more than a mere preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Matter of E.K., 2001 MT 279, ¶ 32, 307 Mont. 328, 37 P.3d 690. The district court
must give “primary consideration to the physical, mental and emotional conditions and needs
of the child.” Section 41-3-609(3), MCA. The child’s health and safety are of paramount
concern. Section 41-3-101(4), MCA. The best interests of the child and the need for
permanent placement in a loving and stable home take priority over parental rights. In the
Matter of A.T., 2006 MT 35, ¶ 20, 331 Mont. 155, 130 P.3d 1249.
¶24 The children here were adjudicated to be youths in need of care, and the mother
stipulated to that determination. There is sufficient clear and convincing evidence that the
mother did not complete the treatment plan, and that it was not successful. The State’s
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witnesses who had worked directly with the mother testified that while she completed some
of the required steps of the treatment plan, she never followed through with most of them.
The testimony showed that the mother’s compliance with the plan was tardy, half-hearted
and sporadic. She did not comply with some of the most crucial steps of the plan such as
individual counseling, steady employment, a permanent residence, and disclosure of her
male companions. She continued to use alcohol and to go to bars.
¶25 The District Court’s conclusion that the mother’s conduct was not likely to change
was likewise demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. That determination requires a
predictive assessment based upon past and present conduct of the parent. In the Matter of
M.T., 2002 MT 174, ¶ 34, 310 Mont. 506, 51 P.3d 1141. In the present case the District
Court had conducted several proceedings involving the mother in the year prior to the
August, 2008 hearing on termination of parental rights. For example, at the May 3, 2007
dispositional hearing the mother agreed to the treatment plan and it was then adopted by the
court. Judge Salvagni emphasized to the mother the need for her to follow every
requirement of the plan and especially to maintain required contact with her social worker.
He explained that termination of her parental rights could occur unless she followed the plan
and all its requirements. He told her that she would have to be able to show that she was
“changing the way that you’ve been handling things so that these children are kept safe and
kept healthy.” He cautioned her “to put your children at the top of your priority list.”
¶26 Several months later, on August 3, 2007, the mother was again before the court about
the treatment plan. The State reported that she had made only “minimal progress” and had
not been truthful about her employment status. The court emphasized to the mother again
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the importance of compliance and the dire consequences that could follow if she failed to do
so. Another hearing occurred on November 2, 2007, on the State’s application to extend
temporary legal custody of the children and to extend the mother’s time for compliance with
the treatment plan for another six months. The mother appeared and agreed that she needed
more time to work on the requirements of the plan. At the next hearing on February 22,
2008, the mother still had questions about what she was required to do under the plan, and
the court answered them. She had not done anything with regard to counseling or self-help
group participation to address the critical issues of co-dependency and her practice of
selecting dysfunctional partners. Judge Salvagni warned her that “you don’t have very much
time left.”
¶27 Despite these repeated warnings in open court and repeated attempts by her social
worker and other professionals who tried to work with her, the mother had still not
completed the requirements of the treatment plan after passage of a year. More
fundamentally, she had not changed her destructive—as to the children—habits of living
with violent, substance-abusing men, failing to maintain employment, and failing to take
personal responsibility for the serious situation that she was in regarding her children. The
long-standing efforts by the District Court and others to get the mother to put the “children at
the top of [her] priority list” had not been successful. She never demonstrated that she was
committed to making reunion with her children the most important goal of her life, and this
was evident in her lack of compliance with the plan.
¶28 The likelihood that she was not going to change in a reasonable time was also
demonstrated by her testimony at the termination hearing. She continued to blame others,
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such as her parents, for her problems. She testified that her own brother was lying when he
testified that he had seen her out in a bar on a number of occasions. She attempted to
minimize the testimony of her social worker and others about her lack of serious progress
with the treatment plan. She gave the same type of excuses for non-compliance that she had
given for the prior year.
¶29 The District Court’s thorough Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter
demonstrate, contrary to the mother’s contention on appeal, that Judge Salvagni was fully
cognizant of the detailed requirements of Montana law that applied to the many proceedings
he conducted concerning these children and their mother. There is no substantial showing
that he misapprehended his role or the requirements of the law at any point. We find no
error.
¶30 Whether the mother was denied effective assistance of counsel. Montana law,
recognizing the important and fundamental interests involved, provides that a parent in a
termination of rights proceeding is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. Matter of
A.S., ¶¶ 12, 20. This Court has adopted “benchmark, although nonexclusive, criteria” for
evaluating effectiveness of counsel in termination proceedings. The first factor requires
consideration of counsel’s experience and training representing parents in termination
proceedings, and the second is the quality of advocacy demonstrated at the hearing. Matter
of A.S., ¶ 26. Even if counsel’s performance is found to be ineffective under these criteria,
the parent must have suffered prejudice as a result. Matter of A.S., ¶ 31.
¶31 The mother contends that her first attorney, who represented her in proceedings prior
to the termination hearing, and her second attorney who represented her at the termination
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hearing, both provided her with ineffective assistance. The mother has provided no
argument of any kind as to the attorneys’ experience and training. We cannot evaluate this
factor without even an argument as to how it may apply in the case, and decline to speculate.
¶32 We will nonetheless address those arguments that the mother has made. She contends
that her first attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the District Court’s application
of the wrong evidentiary standard in finding that the children were abused and neglected.
The District Court stated, in a hearing, that there was “probable cause” that the children were
abused and neglected, not that they were shown to be abused and neglected by a
preponderance of the evidence. There was no evidentiary hearing on whether the children
were abused and neglected because the mother stipulated that they were abused and
neglected. Therefore, even assuming that counsel should have objected to the District
Court’s reference to an improper standard, there is no showing that the mother was
prejudiced or that she would have changed her stipulation if the District Court had cited a
different standard. We do not find that this event demonstrates any material prejudice to the
mother and does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶33 The mother next contends that her attorney did not object to the “appropriateness of
the treatment plan.” The argument is that there were no statements in the treatment plan
explaining why the State “believed” that various parts of the plan were applicable to her and
that those statements were required by § 41-3-443, MCA. The mother specifically agreed to
the treatment plan. She and her attorney attended the hearing held to consider adoption of
the plan and heard explanations and warnings from the District Court about its provisions
and requirements. The mother asked questions about specific provisions of the plan and the
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District Court answered her questions. There is no requirement in § 41-3-443, MCA, that the
State explain on the face of the treatment plan why it “believes” that each portion of the plan
applies and should be implemented. Section 41-3-443(2)(a), MCA, requires a treatment plan
to identify the “problems or conditions that resulted in the abuse or neglect.” The plan here
plainly did so, setting out the mother’s problem areas and what she had to do to address
them. The mother made no claim below that she did not understand the plan or what it
required of her. When she had questions about the plan, she asked those questions at the
several hearings that were conducted over the year prior to the termination hearing. There is
no showing that any failure to explain the State’s beliefs in the treatment plan impaired in
any substantial way the mother’s lack of compliance and lack of success. It was her failure
to comply that led to termination. We find that this event does not demonstrate any material
prejudice to the mother and does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶34 The mother contends that her attorney in the termination hearing was ineffective for
failing to recognize that the District Court had the authority to deny the State’s termination
petition and to continue the temporary legal custody situation of the children. The transcript
of the two-day termination hearing shows that the mother’s attorney actively pursued her
interests, making appropriate objections, vigorously cross-examining witnesses, and making
extended closing argument.
¶35 Even if we assume that counsel should have clarified the District Court’s authority on
the record, the transcripts of the several hearings in the year prior to the termination hearing,
the termination hearing itself, and the written decision more than adequately demonstrate
that Judge Salvagni was well aware of the factual and legal situation. He clearly appreciated,
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because he remarked on it a number of times, that if the State petitioned for termination of
parental rights, he had to make a decision to grant or to deny that petition. If he denied the
petition, then he would have had to decide what to do next, keeping in mind the paramount
factor of the best interests of the children. The mother has not made any showing that this
event materially prejudiced her and it does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.
¶36 Last, the mother argues that her attorney at the termination hearing was ineffective for
failing to call the mother’s counselor, Sally Hand, as a witness. Hand was initially listed as a
witness for the mother but was not called by either side at the termination hearing. Hand saw
the mother for individual counseling for several sessions in the year prior to the termination
hearing. The mother discontinued her visits to Hand for reasons the District Court found to
be not credible, and then scheduled a last-minute session just prior to the termination
hearing. The mother contends that Hand could have countered the testimony of the State’s
witnesses. Hand’s testimony as shown in the affidavit appended to the mother’s brief, at
most would have provided only limited assistance to the District Court in making the
decision.
¶37 Hand’s affidavit, attached to the mother’s brief on appeal, is an out-of-record
document essentially stating Hand’s disagreement with the District Court’s decision to
terminate parental rights. The averments and opinions in the affidavit are not part of the
District Court record. They have not been subject to cross-examination or to evidentiary
objections. Moreover, the Hand affidavit does not address the issues of counsel’s training
and experience or the quality of advocacy as required by Matter of A.S., nor does it
demonstrate that the mother incurred prejudice because Hand did not testify. Parties on
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appeal are bound by the record and may not present additional matters in briefs or
appendices. State v. MacKinnon, 1998 MT 78, ¶ 15, 288 Mont. 329, 957 P.2d 23.
¶38 The face of the hearing record demonstrates that the mother’s trial attorney provided
her with vigorous and competent representation. Here there is no showing or argument
concerning trial counsel’s training and experience, and there was facially competent
representation appearing on the trial record. There has therefore been no threshold showing
that the mother was denied effective assistance of counsel.
¶39 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court.
/S/ MIKE McGRATH
We concur:
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
/S/ JOHN WARNER
/S/ BRIAN MORRIS
Justice Jim Rice, concurring.
¶40 I concur with the results reached by the Court, but offer some additional thoughts
regarding Issue 2, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. I believe appellate counsel has
offered one of the more skillful IAC arguments we have seen in a parental rights case since
this Court held that parents were entitled to make such claims in In the Matter of A.S.
Appellate counsel has closely reviewed the performance of trial counsel and identified
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several potential errors. The Court concludes that no prejudice could have arisen from
counsel’s action, essentially deciding the case under the “second prong” of the IAC standard,
In the Matter of A.S., ¶ 21. This is an appropriate disposition. However, the Appellant
makes points about her trial counsel’s performance and the proper remedy which I find to be
noteworthy.
¶41 Appellant explains that her trial counsel filed a “Notice of Expert Witness” indicating
that Appellant’s former counselor, Sally Jo Hand (Hand), would be called to testify, but then
failed to call her as a witness. To illustrate the potential impact of trial counsel’s alleged
error in failing to call Hand, Appellant has submitted with her appellate briefing an affidavit
from Hand which she describes as an “offer of proof” about Hand’s testimony. Based on
Hand’s affidavit, Appellant argues that Hand would have testified that Appellant was
diligently working on and making significant progress in her personal development,
parenting skills and relationships, that Appellant was consistent in keeping her appointments,
that she was highly engaged, accepting recommendations and implementing them, and that
in breaking off her relationship with her boyfriend, she had shown progress in her decision
making. Hand would have further testified that termination of Appellant’s parental rights
was likely to detrimentally affect the children.
¶42 The State criticizes Appellant’s submission of the affidavit and offer of proof, arguing
that it should not be “a means by which appellate counsel can interject extra-record evidence
on appeal, including, as here, hearsay. An appeal is necessarily confined to the record
below.” (Citation omitted.) This underscores a practical dilemma faced by an appellant’s
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counsel: How can trial counsel’s failure to introduce evidence supportive of the client’s
position be demonstrated on appeal?
¶43 As Appellant explains in her reply brief, she is not, as the State contends, attempting
to add additional evidence to the record. Rather, she has made the “offer of proof” to
establish a basis for the remedy she seeks here: a remand for a limited evidentiary hearing
regarding her counsel’s performance. As authority, she has cited both our holding in In re
K.G.F., 2001 MT 140, ¶ 93, 306 Mont. 1, 29 P.3d 485 (“[T]he record before this Court,
particularly any evidence of the critical pre-hearing investigation, is insufficient.
Accordingly, this matter is reversed and remanded for a fact finding hearing . . . .”), and
People in Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo. App. 2007), which concluded that the
mother’s appellate offer of proof had made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of
counsel and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. The Colorado Court noted the
problem we face here, that “[t]he chief problem is that the record may not contain sufficient
information to enable the appellate court to resolve the parent’s contentions.” People in
Interest of C.H., 166 P.3d at 291.
¶44 I believe Appellant has made a viable “first prong” claim and offered a viable remedy,
a remand for a limited evidentiary hearing. However, given my agreement with the Court’s
conclusion that the lack of prejudice in this case cannot be overcome by additional analysis
of trial counsel’s performance, I concur in affirming the District Court.
/S/ JIM RICE
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Justice James C. Nelson joining in the concurring Opinion of Justice Jim Rice.
/S/ JAMES C. NELSON
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